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Egypt’s 2011 revolution led to debates about Salafis’ entry into politics for the first 
time. The socio-political vision and character of Salafi groups were relatively 
understudied. As such, the primary question of this thesis is what is the Salafis’ vision 
for social and political change in post-revolution Egypt? The vision is traced through 
Salafis’ discourse concerning change. The texts analyzed were collected from Al-
Da’awa Al-Salafyya (DS), and its political arm the Al-Nor party: the latter is the only 
surviving Islamist party, following the toppling of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in 
2013. The texts were gathered through field research, and analyzed using Critical 
Discourse Analysis. This analysis enabled what is the first mapping of DS’ vision for 
change. Based on this, the thesis argues that following its entry into politics, DS 
reproduced its long-held discourse of social and political change. It achieved this by 
introducing changes to the form of its discourse, while preserving its core content. The 
thesis demonstrates that “continuity and consistency” of DS’ key discourse for change 
(Manhaj), was central to its framing processes towards mobilizing political 
participation. More broadly, the thesis concludes that the wider movement and the 
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In the aftermath of January 2011 Revolution1 in Egypt, debates emerged about Egyptian 
Salafis’ official entry to politics for the first time in their history. Such debates do not 
only stem from the ambiguous nature of such groups that were understudied before the 
January Revolution, but also from the fact that Salafism had been always a problematic 
concept. Thus, questions arose as concerns Salafi thought and its impact on society. In 
this regard, various social and political groups in Egypt, such as Christians, women, and 
seculars, felt much concern over the Salafis entering politics. In addition, there were 
assumptions that Salafi discourse was transformed or should be transformed to cope 
with the new developments and to serve their political goals, even if this involved 
compromising the main tenets of Salafism. Thus, in the midst of such concerns and 
debates about the emergence of that new ambiguous political actor, it became important 
to scrutinize the Salafis’ vision for change after the Revolution.  
Since the main interest in Egyptian Salafis came after they became political actors, this 
study attempts to deal with the question of what is the Salafis’ vision for social and 
political change in Post-revolution Egypt? The study focuses on the Salafi movement 
that uses political means to attain its goals, and which is the only Islamist party that 
survived and entered 2015 parliament, that is Al-Da’awa Al-Salafyya (DS), and its 
political arm, Al-Nor party (NP). Accordingly, this study is neither interested in militant 
nor in apolitical Salafis.  
                                                             
1 The term revolution is used in this thesis to describe the uprisings that took place in January 2011 and June 2013, in 
line with the current Egyptian constitution. This is to stay atop of the ongoing debate on the political, popular and 
academic levels on the term to use to describe such transformative events and whether they are revolutions, coups or 
uprising, since such debate does not speak directly to the topic of discussion in this thesis.  
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This thesis assumes that the Egyptian Salafis’ discourse is the product of interaction 
with the Egyptian social structure, as well as the various regional and global influences 
(e.g.: Egyptian Sufism, leftist discourse, interaction with the rest of Egyptian Islamists, 
and liberals, and the Egyptian culture and tradition, Wahhabism, and global Salafism). 
Moreover, as regards DS, the texts collected reflect its clear stance against both Takfir 
(claiming society or persons as infidel) and the use of violence, in addition to the 
movement’s adoption of a bottom-up approach to social change. Thus, it works from 
within the Egyptian society and could not be considered isolated, which demarcates a 
clear difference between Egyptian Salafis and other groups within global Salafism. In 
addition, a closer look at DS’ approach proves it distinct from other Islamists, as well as 
other Salafis in Egypt. In this regard, other Salafi groups that adopt an isolationist top-
down approach for change and embrace Takfir and violence could not survive on the 
political scene, nor integrate in the society. In addition, due to the lack of a clear 
independent political vision, other Egyptian politicized Salafi groups dissolved in the 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and adopted its policy choices. Therefore, all the Salafi 
political parties that were established post January 2011 Revolution, disappeared from 
the Egyptian political scene post June 2013 Revolution, except for NP, which explains 
why the study focuses on DS and NP. 
However, despite the peculiarity of DS’ vision for change among Salafis, its striking 
contradiction with the mainstream discourse for change in Egypt, the Egyptian legal 
framework, and Egyptians’ perception of religion and identity and culture was manifest 
during the January 2011 Revolution and in the post-revolution period, when they turned 
such vision into action. Yet, despite the challenges that DS and NP faced in view of 
their problematic discourse and policy choices, within a transitional Egyptian context 
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they managed to be the only surviving Islamist political party after toppling the MB 
regime in June 2013. Such survival raised questions, again about DS’ and NP’s vision 
for change, their intentions, and what kind of compromises or transformations they 
undertook to stay in the political scene.  
Since DS and NP, the case study of this dissertation, are newcomers to politics, such 
vision would be traced through critically analyzing their discourse about change. 
The reason why the researcher focuses on the discourse is not only because the in-depth 
study of the ideological and discursive aspects of DS, particularly as concerns the 
concept of social change, are absent in the literature, but also for the fact that this 
project started just a few months after the establishment of NP. This means that NP is a 
new political actor that did not have a history of policy choices or tactics. Therefore, an 
in-depth understanding of their discourse on social change, that developed over forty 
years, and starting with the movement rather than the party, is a more practical and 
accessible approach to studying this political actor. In addition, the fact that ideology is 
central to CDA was another reason why this framework was convenient in studying this 
case (Herzog, 2016). Also, given that CDA is a “problem oriented commitment” to deal 
with daily social problems such as subordination, exclusion, and discrimination 
(Sjölander, 2011), which are traits attributed to Islamist movements, it is appropriate to 
the study in light of the fears and suspicions about Salafis’ official entry to Egyptian 
politics, as will be discussed in the following chapters. Such fears were, for instance, 
connected to their commitment to democracy, and the possible exclusion and 
discriminaton against Christians and women. Thus, operationalizing CDA on DS’ 
discourse is one way of deconstructing such discourse to uncover aspects of exclusion 
and discrimination, if any, and to assess the level of such aspects and to what extent 
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they could be reflected in NP’s policies. The literature on DS/NP generally describes 
them as pragmatists, lacking political experience, and not in possession of a clear 
political model. It also questions their intentions in view of the fears discussed above 
and projects MB experience onto them, as will be shown in the section on the existing 
literature. Such conclusions were derived from what DS/NP’s members say, and from 
analysing their actions.  
However, this dissertation’s in-depth analysis of how DS’ discourse was constructed 
within its operating context and over an extended period made it possible to explore 
whether and how they reproduced or transformed such discourse once they entered 
politics, and how it was reflected in their few policy choices. Thus, this project deals 
with a religious social movement that presents a discourse which primarily draws upon 
holy texts and claims to own the pure version of Islam and of the interpretations of 
Quran and Sunna as delivered by the pious predecessors (see chapter 2 for charcteristics 
of the salafi discourse). On one hand, this implies that they claim that what they say are 
facts rather than one version of the interpretation of Islam. On the other hand, the self-
reinforcing literature on Islamists and Salafis, as will be discussed later, provides a 
narrative and an understanding of Salafi movements and of Islamist movements in 
general that is taken for granted. Therefore, operationalizing CDA is one way of 
deconstructing DS’ ideology or discourse on social change, and of what they want to do 
through their involvement in social and political actions. Meanwhile, it helps in taking a 
critical position on the dominant understanding of Islamists in the literature. Such an in-
depth analysis of these groups contributes to studies of extremism and de-radicalization 
through scrutinizing the movement itself rather than expressing what it ought to be or 
5 
 
projecting other Islamist models on it, thus adopting an analytical rather than a 
judgemental position.  
In this regard, the dialectical nature of discourse as “socially constitutive” (Egan 
Sjölander, 2011: 23) implies that, on the one hand, it influences how power, identities 
and relationships within DS and in interaction with the other are formed, and on the 
other hand, is influenced by its context. This also made an “ethnographically driven 
CDA” (Richardson et al., 2014) the frame that can help in deconstructing and 
contextualizing DS/NP’s discourse. Such a discourse, when contextualized within the 
Egyptian social and political contexts and in relation to other Islamist discourses, led to 
highlighting several aspects that were realtively absent in the literature. Moreover, 
locating the discourse of such a religious social movement within the movement’s 
dynamics and characteristics, through a focus on its discursive aspect, namely framing, 
provided a different perspective.  
As this project developed it argued that DS reproduced its discourse and that, given the 
movement’s history (emergence, resource mobilization, organization, and framing 
processes), the reproduction of Manhaj and the reassurance of the continuity and 
consistency of the discourse was the main tool of framing aiming at mobilizing the 
members of the movement to politically participate. This can be attributed to the fact 
that the members of both DS and NP at the different levels and age and gender 
categories expressed clearly in the field that they give priority to religious propagation 
over political participation and that they see religious influences to have wider and more 
sustainable effects when it comes to changing society as opposed to political 
participation. Such an approach applies to other cases in the literature of Islamist 
movements who had indirect political effect but were giving priority to a wider religious 
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and societal influence (Mahmood, 2001). Nevertheless, the fact that DS elected to enter 
politics with such an understanding is one of the puzzles that this study attempts to 
solve, while trying to avoid the projection of other Islamists’ experience onto DS. 
Therefore, through providing an overview of DS as a social movement which presents  
both the cultural and the materialistic aspects of the movement, and through 
operationalizing CDA to the movement’s texts on social change and comparing them to 
the results of CDA of the interviews carried out in the field, this thesis argues that the 
weight of the intellectual and the cultural resources of the movement override its 
materialistic aspects and direct them. If the strength of MB is in its organization and 
centralized structure, the point of strength of DS lies in its Manhaj, which is the core of 
the framing processes and the cement of the movement, and which was resorted to in 
order to make up for the lack of discipline and the decentralized, loose nature and 
intellectual independence of the members of DS, and later NP. In this respect, framing 
of actions is necessarily used to market choices and to mobilize members. Therefore, 
exploring such a process (the discursive aspect of the movement) and how it is 
performed within DS is one of the main contributions of this thesis. This makes 
focusing on the ideational aspect of DS and its discourse crucial, so as to provide a solid 
starting point and a reference, in future studies, to understanding its policies and choices 
after it became a political actor. 
The texts analyzed in this study were collected from both DS and NP, through archival 
and ethnographic research held in four Egyptian governorates over six months (July 3rd 
2013 - January 7th 2014). Such texts include articles, books, papers, statements, lectures, 
and semi-structured and conversational interviews. These texts will be analyzed through 
operationalizing Norman Fairclough’s three-dimensional CDA. Such a framework 
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allows for understanding the mutual influences between the social structure, discursive 
practices (social practice), and texts (events or moments of social practice) (Fairclough, 
1992, 2010). On one hand, this framework is useful in highlighting the contradictions 
within discourse in a changing social structure, and in explaining whether such change 
leads to discourse transformation or reproduction. On the other, the CDA of Fairclough 
matches ethnographic research, since it is not confined to textual analysis but rather 
includes intonation, facial expressions, and body language. The combination of 
Ethnography and CDA allows for a comprehensive analysis of understudied social 
groups and movements (Fairclough, 1992, 2010).   
The methodology employed is ethnographic research, rather than just depending only 
on interviews. This methodology provided a triangulated data collection based on 
observation, archival research, and semi-structured and conversational interviews. Such 
a methodology was useful on different grounds. It allowed for long term interaction 
with a large number of members of NP and DS, sometimes in informal contexts. This 
helped the researcher to derive useful observations and notes on DS and NP, and to gain 
members’ confidence. Moreover, this methodology allowed for accessing a large 
number of DS’ and NP’s followers: not only on the leaders’ level, but also middle level 
and rank and file members, with different age and gender categories and in different 
governorates, and various political positions.  
On the one hand holding conversations with members who are not leaders or spokesmen 
or used to talking to media allowed for more spontaneous reactions, with uncalculated 
and sometimes emotional responses. This minimized the likelihood of packaged, ready-
made answers and messages, while also facilitating re-checking and testing of the 
content of the interviews in different situations, and on different levels. Such cross-
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checking was especially important given that some of the contacts were unplanned. In 
addition, the moment when the field work was held was an emergency and a transitional 
stage when the party was still new on the political scene and was encountering 
sweeping changes in Egypt. As such, the members were not prepared with packaged 
answers and preset positions as compared to periods of stability and normal conditions, 
and as the party gets more experience. The moment of the field work also lent itself to 
close scrutiny of internal divisions and differences.  
The content of the interviews was corroborated using thorough archival research to trace 
the roots of the movement’s discourse on social change over its history (late1970s-
2015). This enabled understanding and testing what DS/NP’s members were saying in 
the field, and allowed the researcher the opportunity to provide her own historical 
narrative of DS’ discourse on social change that was developed over almost forty years. 
The thesis also traces how such discourse influenced DS’ members approach and 
contribution to the debate on social change during the political mobilization in Egypt 
leading to 2011 revolution, their position on the revolution, and their approach to social 
change upon their entry into politics. The results of the analysis of the archival material 
were compared to the results of the analysis of the interviews carried out in the field. 
This was to test whether the discourse of DS was transformed or reproduced during this 
transitional stage, both in Egypt and over the movement’s history. The comparison was 
also used to test the influence of DS’ foundational texts and how it was reflected in the 
content of what leaders, middle level and rank and file members say, and in some of the 
few choices they were able to make in this relatively short period of political 
involvement. Such a historical narrative of the discourse on social change is one of the 
main contributions this dissertation offers. 
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The main hypothesis of this thesis was that DS’ vision for social and political change is 
in the stage of transformation due to their official involvement in politics. However, as 
mentioned above, the developments of this project proved this hypothesis to be 
inaccurate. For according to the main findings of the fieldwork and data analysis, this 
study argues that DS’ vision for change was not transformed, but rather underwent an 
apparent change in the discourse. Thus, DS’ representation of reality, doctrine of 
change, and view of the various social groups and political powers remained unchanged. 
In other words, DS managed to reproduce its discourse with the same content, yet in a 
different form in order to adapt to the change in the social structure caused by the 
January 2011 revolution. 
Accordingly, the main argument of this study is that DS managed to reproduce its 
discourse for change, and that the reassurance of preserving the “consistency and 
continuity” of the movement’s discourse on social change, constituted the core of the 
movement’s framing process, for the sake of mobilizing its followers to participate in 
politics. In contrast with the initial hypothesis, reproduction of the discourse represents 
a point of strength for NP after entering into political interactions. The apparent changes 
to the discourse were introduced, rather, to facilitate the party’s communication with the 
rest of political and social groups as a political actor.  
This argument has a number of implications, among them is the fact that DS has a clear 
guiding line for its political actions, and that NP’s policy choices conform to its original 
vision. In addition, this study highlights that NP, thus far, represents a model of an 
Islamist political party that conforms to Shura rather than to the traditional competitive 
power-seeking model, a position that NP is expected to uphold as long as it remains 
intellectually and structurally connected to DS. Thus, the social movement and its 
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political embodiment, despite their controversial output and lack of political experience, 
proved to be self-conscious of their choices that are rooted in their thought, as well as of 
the political model they want to establish. Under these conditions, they maneuver for 
the sake of keeping a foothold in the Egyptian political scene, in view of the political 
and the societal challenges to both their model and discourse. Such a model is distinct in 
the Egyptian context, and among other Islamists.  
The main findings of the CDA proves that on the textual level, DS and its political arm 
NP, preserved the same argumentation, and word meaning, with slight changes in the 
wording used, where some words either disappeared or were replaced by mild words 
that still fall in line with the same original definitions of the movement. On the 
discursive level, they increasingly drew upon the political and legal discourses, yet, still 
secondary to the religious discourse that remained dominant. That is, DS continued to 
give priority to Shari’a and their policy choices are based on religious cost-benefit 
calculations, in reaction to the various political developments and challenges. In 
addition, they started to use new genres such as appearing in various talk shows, even 
with unveiled female TV anchors, and they tried to adopt an informal daily conversation 
style to be closer to the public. The combination of a strict religious discourse especially 
on the level of leaders, and appearing on mainstream talk shows reflected contradiction 
in their combination of discursive orders. Also, the fact that they drew upon the 
religious discourse of the movement, and express commitment to the legal framework 
and social conventions of Egypt, represented another contradiction. This is because, on 
the one hand, the religious discourse of DS defies the Egyptian legal framework and 
social conventions in various aspects, particularly as concerns women’s rights, 
Christians’ citizenship, art, culture and identity. On the other hand, preserving religious 
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calculations resulted in what seems to be costly political choices at some stages, which 
was hard to reason, especially coming from the party. These contradictions in the 
combination of orders of discourse (genre, style, and discourses) and between discourse 
and action can be claimed to be misleading to outsiders, who would criticize DS and NP 
as sacrificing their religious tenets for the sake of political gains, while they are actually 
sustaining their doctrine through apparent changes and compromises. In addition, these 
contradictions give an impression that DS and NP have a hidden agenda and that if they 
have the choice they would not follow the law, and would rather turn against all the 
foundations of the Egyptian state and society. So, the public and other social and 
political groups suspected both DS and NP, as after two revolutions, they were acting 
within a transforming social structure. Such transitional stage constituted a challenge to 
the movement and its political front. Owing to the fact that they attempted to hold the 
equation of handling sweeping political changes while preserving their religious tenets, 
both DS and NP have undertaken controversial policy choices. 
 
Existing Literature on Salafism and Politics 
The literature on Salafism reflects both a consensus on the problematic nature of its very 
concept and on the fact that Salafi groups are understudied in general. However, before 
January 2011 revolution, there were a number of useful conceptual and theoretical 
contributions that helped lay the foundation for this study, as regards definitions, 
concepts, history, classification and mapping the divisions among Salafis, as well as 
tracing their intellectual references and the employment of such references in various 
contexts (Haykel, 2009, Lacroix, 2009, Lauzi`ere, 2010, Wiktorowicz, 2006). However, 
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most of these contributions did not focus on Egyptian Salafis, and particularly DS, as 
much as the development of Salafism in Saudi Arabia, gulf countries, and Jordan, 
except for Lauzi’ere’s (2010) conceptual history approach that gave insights on 
publishing as a catalyst for the development of the concept of Salafism and how this 
development took place within the Egyptian case. Also, there is a contribution on 
Egyptian Salafism in (Meijer, 2009) where the study of Egyptian Salafism, and 
Islamism in general, focused primarily on radicals and militants especially in the wake 
of September 11th 2001, and on MB as the example for moderate Egyptian Islamists. In 
line with this comes (Heffelfinger, 2007) study on the trends in Egyptian Salafi 
Activism, which geared towards studying Jihadi Salafism while briefly pointing to the 
activism of University Islamists’ in the 1970s, and the centrality of social change to 
their activism and thought. 
Egyptian Salafis can be studied in light of the contributions on Nassir El Din Al-Albani, 
one of their main contemporary intellectual references (Lacroix, 2009), classifying them 
as quietists (Haykel, 2009, Lacroix, 2009). 2  Such contributions constitute a useful 
source for the conceptual and historical background in this thesis. Yet, this thesis shows 
how DS, while presenting one version of Salafism influenced by Al-Albani, is not 
fitting fully in the suggested categories by these contributions. This is because the 
nature of DS as a Salafi movement diverged from that of the other movements and 
groups founded on Al-Albani’s thought within the Saudi, or non-Egyptian contexts in 
general. This, in fact, underlines another theme in the literature on the study of Islamist 
movements that emphasizes the importance of contextualizing such movements. While 
not directly engaging Salafist movements, a number of studies were useful as regards 
                                                             
2 In the same category also falls the more recent article by (OLIDORT, J. 2015b. The Politics of “Quietist” Salafism. 
The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World [Online], 18. 
13 
 
clarifying the context in which the Salafi movement and discourse developed in Egypt, 
and to how essentialist approaches and generalizations derived from western ideologies 
might not be helpful in studying these movements (Mahmood, 2001, Ismail, 2003). One 
study actually analyzed Islamist movements as social movements (Ismail, 2004), that 
discussed the activities of the organized religious charity groups in Cairo, and among 
them Ansar Al-Sunna Al-Mohammadyya (AS) and Al-Gami’yya Al-Sahari’yya, the 
traditional Salafi organizations in Egypt, however, without addressing them as Salafis.  
After January revolution 2011, one major study (Gauvain, 2013) focused on Egyptian 
Salafis in Cairo from an anthropological perspective, going back before the revolution, 
with insights on the relationship between Salafism and the Egyptian tradition and 
culture, Al-Azhar position on Salafis, Salafi enclave discourse, and how the concept of 
purity influenced their relationship with non-Muslims particularly Christians, and the 
consequences of such notions after January 2011, and when Salafis entered politics. 
Despite the minimal reference to DS and NP, the aforementioned issues are of interest 
to this study which focuses on the development of DS’ discourse as an Egyptian Salafi 
movement, and how it relates to the country’s culture, mainstream discourse, social 
groups and the other Islamists.  
Another post-revolution contribution came to speak more directly about political 
Salafism in Egypt (Hamming, 2013), which applied Bourdieu’s framework to explore 
the Egyptian Salafis’ shift from a religious movement to a politically-involved one, and 
how such shift affected its role in both the religious and the political fields. The study 
argued that Salafis’ discourse turned populist, as they started to draw upon political 
discourses that even overshadowed the religious, thus constituting a risk to Salafis’ 
credibility and their capability of sustaining their position in the two separate fields, the 
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religious and the political. Hamming suggests that homogenising the political and the 
religious would be the way out, yet this became difficult in view of the public’s 
dissatisfaction with the experience of MB rule. He also expected that the internal 
challenge for Salafis would come in the form of inter-generational conflicts, drawing 
parallels to other non-Egyptian Salafi groups, which is an issue to be further 
investigated in this thesis. The conclusion that Salafis’ discourse is changing due to 
political interactions, despite matching the initial hypothesis of this thesis, goes in the 
opposite direction of what this study concludes about DS discourse upon entering 
politics.  
Finally, a number of policy and analysis papers, and opinion articles came out trying to 
offer quick answers about Egyptian Salafis, who became political actors and to answer 
who they are and what are the prospects and the implications of their entry into politics, 
and the future of such actors (Lacroix, 2012, El-Sherif, 2012b, Davis-Packard, 2014, 
Awad, 2014, Brown, 2013, Linn, 2015, El-Sherif, 2015, Olidort, 2015a). Some of these 
contributions came early in 2012 when the Egyptian Salafi political engagement was 
still at its very beginning and before the sweeping developments that took place 
afterwards. Almost all these articles and papers had consensus on the fact that Salafis 
are highly diversified, yet studied them as one trend or one movement. Therefore, 
making general conclusions drawing upon inputs from different, and sometimes 
contradicting, Salafi groups, led to quite blurred understanding of Salafi political actors 
in Egypt. In addition, trying to study all Salafis at once might lead to unrepresentative 
samples or interviews, where some conclusions about NP for instance were derived 
from interviews with those who split from the party, or through focusing on its leaders 
rather than rank and file, and without understanding the affiliations and the relationship 
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of the Salafi interviewed with the party he or she represents, or separated from. Adding 
to this, there was a minimal representation of female Salafis in the literature reviewed. 
Furthermore, sometimes for policy purposes there were pre-set lists of concepts 
projected on Egyptian Salafi movements, seeking answers to questions that might be 
interesting or of concern for the West. However, through interviews, particularly if held 
by foreigners, Salafis’ answers seemed to be more of directed messages rather than a 
true expression of their thought (Davis-Packard, 2014).  
One problem with this last category of works on Egyptian Salafis is that they presented 
one line of analysis that became self-reinforcing, possibly leading to a cycle of 
misunderstanding, especially with the dearth of academic literature highlighted earlier. 
More generally, the various contributions reviewed raise questions such as what is the 
appropriate methodology and approach to the study of such groups; so that, for 
example, the views and terminology of the Salafis can be better captured? And how 
could the selection of the interviewees be made as objective and representative of the 
phenomenon under investigation? There remains also a concern with the accurate 
translation of the Arabic texts produced by Salafis and the understanding of Islamic 
legal rulings and concepts.  
While this thesis was in progress, different narratives about the history of Salafis and of 
DS in particular started to emerge, a different situation from where finding secondary 
historical references was a challenge at the beginning of the project. Back then, there 
were no references but the primary sources of the narratives of DS’ members 
themselves. One of the comprehensive contributions that became available is that of 
(Awad, 2014), which despite being closer to a detailed biography of DS, tried to 
operationalize social movement literature concepts, particularly structure, organization, 
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finances, and decision making, which lie mostly within the resource mobilization theory 
approach, without much focus on the Manhaj and historical evolution of the discourse 
of the movement. Accordingly, despite the usefulness of these contributions as regards 
historical narrative, and mapping of Egyptian Salafis, they did not provide in-depth 
undertakings on the discourse and Manhaj, and without necessarily using history to 
inform present actions and policy choices. This made it seem as if the movement’s 
political participation marked a historical break or rupture with the religious movement, 
and shifted the movement into the political Islamists or activists’ category. This opened 
the door for drawing parallels between DS and the MB. Moreover, due to the 
domination of the study of MB and radicals in the studies of Islamists in Egypt, there 
was a projection of the structure, strategies and raison d'être of the MB and other 
Islamist groups and factions, on Egyptian Salafis, and particularly DS and NP. As a 
result, to cite one example, DS in its evolution was thought to “be mimicking the MB” 
structure (El-Sherif, 2015), and organization, but failed to reproduce the MB model, and 
while trying to do this, DS was distracted from its scholarly production. Similarly, DS 
as a political actor, in the footsteps of MB, faces a gap between its Islamist propaganda 
and its political actions that come to contradict it (El-Sherif, 2015).  
Another aspect of the influence of studying MB and radicals is manifested in focusing 
on the actions and the strategies of the Salafi parties, particularly of NP. Entering 
politics DS and NP are characterized as traditional power-seeking Islamist, “politicos” 
or activists, who would or should react to political challenges pragmatically and with no 
regard to their intellectual reference, where their references will or should be revised 
and adapted to fit in the political field and to deal with the different economic, social 
and political problems (El-Sherif, 2015, Brown, 2013, Lacroix, 2012). There is also a 
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tendency to project some types of divisions on DS and NP, ranging from inter-
generational conflict (Hamming, 2013), religious versus politicians divisions (Lacroix, 
2012), or divisions as concerns the management, organization and the structure within 
the party (El-Sherif, 2012b), through analysing the party’s actions, media statements, 
and NP members’ interviews. Some of the studies also pointed out that Salafis did not 
develop a political vision and model and that they need to work on this, and to be 
responsive to their constituency (El-Sherif, 2015); lacking political experience, they 
also give the impression that they are “benign” (Hamming, 2013), or do not know what 
they want to do, or that they are projected to fail in politics (Linn, 2015, Brown, 2013). 
This study questions many of these conclusions.  
As a project that started in early 2012, and witnessed all the following developments on 
the political scene in Egypt, and of the Salafis’ political experience until the 2015 
parliamentary elections, this thesis focuses on one Egyptian Salafi movement, that is 
DS, and its political arm, NP, and on one concept or intellectual issue, that is “social 
change”. This makes the starting point for analysis, not the political party, but rather the 
social movement, and particularly how its discourse on social change developed within 
the Egyptian context, and how this influenced, if at all, its policy choices when it 
entered politics. The following section will provide an overview of how this project will 
be presented and how the thesis developed. 
What makes this dissertation different from the rest of the literature is that it focuses on 
the ideational aspect of DS as a social movement and how its ideology might have 
influenced the policy choices of its political party. Thus, the starting point is the 
ideology and the ideational aspects of the movement, rather than the strategies and the 
policies of the party, and this is the main contribution of this dissertation. Focusing on 
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the tactics without grounding them in the ideology or trying at least to trace the nature 
and the direction of the relationship between such tactics and policies and the original 
ideology, and between the party and the overarching movement, can prove misleading. 
This dissertation argues that understanding the ideational part is crucial for explaining 
many of the controversial policy choices. 
 
Thesis Outline  
Chapter 1: Analytical Framework and Methodology 
This chapter will present the analytical framework adopted in this thesis, which is 
divided into two parts: social movement concepts, particularly as concerns framing; and 
discourse analysis as an approach to understanding the movement’s ideology, or 
Manhaj, and framing processes. On discourse analysis, there will be an explanation of 
why this study adopts CDA, and why it operationalizes Fairclough’s framework in 
particular. Then, there will be a discussion of the methodology and data collection, 
which is ethnographic research, as regards its utility in studying the case of DS and NP 
on the one hand, and how it could be combined with CDA on the other. Finally, this 
chapter will present an account of how the methodology was carried out in the field, and 
how Fairclough’s framework was adapted to the case study.  
Chapter 2: DS on the Map of Global and Egyptian Salafism  
This chapter presents the main concepts and mapping of Salafi groups, and provides a 
historical overview of Salafism in Egypt, for the sake of situating DS among other 
Islamists and Salafis.  
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Chapter Three: DS’ Development as a Social Movement 
This chapter studies the history of the movement that goes back to late 1970s through 
combining the concepts of both resource mobilization theory and the cultural approach 
to social movements, particularly as concerns framing and meaning making, with the 
aim of highlighting the internal mechanisms, the survival strategies, the pattern of the 
state-movement relationship, the accessibility to discourse and the discursive conflicts, 
the intellectual references, the opportunity structures, socio-economic and political 
context, and the interactions that all contributed to the emergence and the survival of the 
movement. In this regard, a historical account of DS is not presented for its own sake, 
but rather for the purpose of tracing the roots of the movement’s discourse within the 
Egyptian context. It will serve as an introduction to an in-depth analysis of the features 
and the components of DS’ discourse on social change. Discourse, in this thesis, is not 
what DS says, but rather what is DS’ representation of reality as a result of continuous 
interaction with its Egyptian context. Thus, this chapter sheds light on the nature of the 
movement in relation to the Egyptian state and society, and sets the stage for discussing 
the movement’s discourse on social change and its Manhaj and methodology in view of 
this history.  
Chapter 4: DS’ Framing and the Construction of Manhaj for Social Change 
In this chapter, the CDA of DS’ foundational texts on social change is an attempt to 
understand the movement’s Manhaj (methodology), or ideology, and to situate it within 
the Egyptian Islamist discourse. In addition, there will be a close look at the elements of 
their framing processes and self-identification (discursive practices) carried out within a 
changing social structure, thus leading to the reproduction or the transformation of the 
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movement’s discourse for social change. Establishing a point of reference through a 
close look at the foundational texts for social change is done for the sake of comparing 
the movement’s discourse, before and after they entered politics, since this study deals 
with DS’ discourse in view of the change that took place in Egypt after January 2011, 
and the question of whether this led to change in DS’ discourse for social change.  
Chapter 5: DS’ Manhaj of Gradual Reform within a Revolutionary Context  
In view of the general features of DS’ discourse, this chapter discusses the movement’s 
position on revolution as a means of change, and the implication of such a position on 
DS’ contribution in the debate on social change that took place in Egypt, particularly 
from 2004 and until 2011 revolution. This is accomplished through a survey and 
analysis of DS’ texts in this period. Finally, this chapter will examine how DS put its 
vision for social change into action during and in the aftermath of January 2011 
Revolution. In particular, the chapter will examine whether the movement’s position 
constituted a ‘vision,’ or was simply a number of instantaneous reactions, in view of the 
movement’s discourse on revolutions and protest, as well as the movement’s 
participation in protest after January 2011.  
This chapter also applies CDA to DS’ texts on social change, and surveys its members’ 
media contributions after January 2011, when DS established NP and started political 
interaction. This is an attempt to trace the possible transformation in DS’ discourse for 
social change and its relationship with the various social and political groups in Egypt. 
The CDA results will help in understanding the framing processes that the movement 
carried out during the January 2011 revolution, and then to mobilize its members to 
participate in politics in the post-revolution period. In addition, these CDA results shed 
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light on processes of self-identification that became essential after entering politics and 
interacting with various actors. Finally, this chapter will compare the features of DS’ 
discourse on social change post-January 2011 revolution to those of the movement’s 
foundational discourse on change, in order to see to what extent this discourse was 
transformed or reproduced. In other words, whether DS’ framing processes departed 
from, or acted as an extension to its ideology.   
Chapter 6: DS’ Vision for Change as a Political Actor 
This chapter applies CDA to the texts collected in the field from the party (NP), and 
presents the ethnographic research notes, in order to compare the discourse of the party 
to that of the movement. Then, there is a discussion of the structural relationship 
between the party and the movement. Accordingly, in view of the discursive and 
structural relationship between the movement and the party, the nature and the policy 
choices and strategies of the party will be discussed, to examine how DS’ Manhaj or 
vision was put into action when it became a political actor, and how this influences the 
relationship of the party with the rest of the political and social groups in Egypt. Thus, 
the party’s actions and strategies in themselves are not the main interest, but rather how 
they departed from or conformed to the original discourse of the movement, or its 
Manhaj.  
This chapter also offers examples of the aspects in which DS’ and NP’s discourse 
diverted from the mainstream discourse and legal framework in Egypt, specifically with 
regards to women’s status and role, Christians’ citizenship, and Egyptian culture. This 
will be done through CDA of texts collected in the field as well as the presentation of 




The thesis will conclude by summarizing how DS’ and NP’s discourse developed 
within the turbulent Egyptian social and political context, and how they represent a 
distinct Islamist model that does not fall into the traditional categories of Islamists or 
Salafis. The conclusion also considers the future prospects for NP within the Egyptian 
political scene, particularly in view of the party’s contested discourse and controversial 
policy choices.  
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CHAPTER 1: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
In view of the literature reviewed, the features of Salafism, and of Salafi groups, 
presented a number of challenges to this study. Among such challenges and features is 
the fact that Salafis are generally understudied, particularly Egyptian Salafis. Moreover, 
the study is taking place in a transitional stage in Egyptian history and in the history of 
Egyptian Salafis in particular. Under such major political transformations, focusing on 
immediate political reactions and tactics might not be useful, since such policies and 
decisions might reflect temporary or exceptional actions that do not accurately explain 
the groups’ true nature and orientations. In addition, Salafi groups as described by the 
literature are highly diversified (Gauvain, 2013), which means that studying the whole 
Salafi trend in Egypt might give only snapshots on each group without much in-depth 
understanding, something that in turn makes generalizations about the whole trend 
misguiding. In addition, there is the fact that Salafis give priority to the text over the 
human agent. However, the Salafi trend gives space for applying individual reason 
within the limits of the holy texts, thus, individuals can self-educate themselves, without 
necessarily being dependent on scholars (Lacroix, 2009, Abu El-Fadl, 2005, Haykel, 
2009). Such intellectual independence gives the individual and group levels of analysis 
relatively equal weight. Furthermore, Egyptian Salafis at the time when this project 
started were newcomers to politics,3 and this made the understanding of their ideologies 
or Manhaj (methodology) and their discourse, the only possible source for studying 
their political thought and orientations. Finally, the religious nature of Salafis makes 
their ideational and cultural component central in studying them. As a result of such 
                                                             




general aspects of Salafism, the question in this chapter is what is the most appropriate 
analytical framework, and methodology, for the study of Salafis?  
In order to deal with the abovementioned challenges, this project selected one group 
from among Egyptian Salafis to be the focus of the study, which is DS4. In line with the 
previous literature studying Islamists using social movement theories (Wiktorowicz, 
2004, Bayat, 2007, 2005, Clark, 2004, Ismail, 2004), the approach to studying DS will 
be also through employing social movement concepts. Therefore, the starting point in 
this thesis is neither the political party nor the NGO which DS members established 
after January 2011, but rather DS as a religious movement that entered politics and 
governmental institutions.  
Therefore, the focus here is on how the movement emerged within the Egyptian context, 
and how its discourse developed in relationship to other discourses, resulting in a 
Manhaj (methodology and world view) and in shaping DS’ relationship to other social 
and political groups. In this regard, the study will discuss the framing processes and 
dynamics this movement carried out in order to survive under an authoritarian regime, a 
revolution, and after entering politics. 
Approaching DS through studying its discourse on social change over its history, its 
framing processes, and internal dynamics within the Egyptian context, is an attempt to 
understand DS’ vision for change, which is the main question of this study. This is also 
to examine the hypothesis through exploring to what extent the framing processes (as a 
discursive practice) led to the reproduction or departure from the movements’ original 
Manhaj (ideology), in view of political interactions, and the implications of this on the 
movement and, if at all, on the party.  
                                                             
4 The case study selection will be discussed in the methodology and fieldwork sections. 
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To answer these questions this study will employ concepts from social movement 
theory, particularly in discussing DS’ history, then there will be a focus on DS’ framing 
processes through the critical discourse analysis of the movement’s texts on social 
change, which were collected through ethnographic research. Such an analytical 
framework and methodology will be discussed in the following sections. Then, there 
will be a presentation of how the methodology was carried out in the field and how the 
analytical framework was applied to the texts collected.  
 
Section One: Social Movement Theory and the Study of Religious Actors 
One of the significant contributions to the study of religious movements, was that of 
Kniss (2007). In this study, there are three levels of analysis; the cultural ideological 
level and how religious values and ideas may shape collective action, the organizational 
level and internal rules of the religious movement, and the national and global political 
economies, and the institutionalized relations between state and religion. It stated that it 
is not helpful to separate religion from movement studies, and that this was a general 
feature of some of the literature on religious movements. For instance, Oberschall’s 
early study of the New Christian Right (NCR) in the USA (Oberschall, 1993a), focused 
on the means of organization of the NCR, rather than on the process of meaning making 
itself. Therefore, Kniss suggested a historical case-based hybrid of religion and social 
movement studies, in view of their history and without reducing one of them to the 
other in order to avoid questions like; does political involvement leads to religious 
decline. Yet, the question of how religion affects the emergence of social movements or 
how social movements appear within religious fields is not sufficiently studied and this 
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requires more comprehensive studies across different religious traditions places and 
times (Kniss, 2007).  
Another contribution in studying religious movements was that of Snow and Byrd 
(Snow, 2010) where they applied framing processes on Islamic terrorist groups. The 
authors highlighted the fact that the west tends to generalize, and consider these terrorist 
groups as homogenous, which gives a distorted image of such groups. They studied 
some terrorist Islamic groups in the Middle East and Central Asia through examining 
their ideological dimension by focusing on their framing process as the key discursive 
mechanism. Such framing processes link ideas, values, ideology, and events in order to 
guarantee the support of adherents and bystanders, and to facilitate mobilization. This 
not only includes a call for Jihad, but also a call for violence, and to spread this 
message. Due to the fact that ideology is not homogenous, tight, or directly linked to 
behavior, there is high diversity among Islamic movements whether within global 
movements or inside each particular movement (Snow, 2010). 
What is common in these studies is that they combined material and cultural approaches 
in explaining religious social movements. In this respect, dealing with DS in the way 
specified above would constitute a contribution to the field of religious social 
movements through providing an empirical study. In view of the main question and 
hypothesis, the study will relatively develop along these levels of analysis, and will 
employ framing as a key concept. In the following part of this section there will be a 





Resource Mobilization Theory  and the Culturalist Institutionalist Approach 
Social movement theories mainly investigated movements’ emergence, dynamics, and 
outcomes (Jenkins, 1983). Such theories were dominated by two main influences: the 
materialistic rationalist approach represented in the Resource Mobilization Theory 
(RMT), and the culturalist institutionalist approach that was associated with the 
development of the political process approach, and the concepts of framing and 
opportunity (McAdam, 1996). Whereas traditional social movement analysis was 
focused on the ‘breakdown theory’ or the ‘strains theory’ that attributes the formation 
of social movements, religious sects, and extremist groups to the occurrence of social 
changes that lead to dissatisfaction and grievances. However, systematic research 
proved that grievances are not sufficient to understand the formation of sustainable 
social movements (Oberschall, 1993b). Yet, this concept remains relevant to the case of 
DS and particularly as concerns its emergence. 
Regarding the sustainability of a movement the two main issues that prevailed in the 
discussion of the various RMT theorists were the resources controlled by the group 
before the beginning of the mobilization efforts, and the mobilization and organizational 
processes by which the movements direct such resources towards social change, and 
how outsiders may contribute to the increase of these resources (Jenkins, 1983). Despite 
the fact that in the case of DS the ideational part has more weight than these 
materialistic components, they will be studied in order to understand the dynamics and 
the survival strategies of the movement at different stages, and how this was later 
reflected on the party. However, these materialistic factors will be connected to the 
ideational ones, e.g. the resources of the movement and whether they come from 
voluntary local sources or foreign ones, and how they influence the intellectual 
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background and agenda of the movement. In addition, among the resources in religious 
movements there are social relations, that are for instance faith sisterhood/brotherhood 
connections in the case of DS, as a source of keeping organization and mobilization 
within a large group (Oberschall, 1973). Moreover, RMT also gives a perspective on the 
conditions favorable to the initiation of mobilization, which include, for instance the 
loosening of social control due to a division among the ruling class, or long or 
unsuccessful wars, as these factors will exhaust the regime resources; hence, it will be 
difficult to control and suppress opponents, which are conditions that might have 
contributed to the Islamic resurgence movement, and could explain the emergence of 
DS in Egypt as part of this wider movement (Oberschall, 1973). While the main 
obstacles to mobilization are for instance the problem of counter-movements and 
organized opposition that will resist the goals of the movement, such as the MB, other 
Islamist movements, and leftists in the case of DS. Another obstacle is the participation 
cost and negative sanctions under an authoritarian regime and how this factor influenced 
DS-state relationship and whether it influenced DS’ position on protest and revolution. 
Finally, whether the limited resources were an obstacle to the movement’s mobilization 
(Oberschall, 1993b).  
In this respect, mobilization is defined as the potential of a movement depending on its 
pre-existing group organization (Jenkins, 1983). According to Oberschall “organization 
provides a mechanism for resources commitment to some central group or agency that 
then allocates these resources to the pursuit of collective goals and organization 
maintenance” (Oberschall, 1993b). Such organization can be easily attained if a group 
already has a strong identity so that its members can be easily mobilized (Jenkins, 1983, 
McCarthy, 1988). Nevertheless, there has been a debate among RMT theorists on the 
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means and structures of organization as regards to their efficiency in promoting 
mobilization. For instance, there were discussions on whether a centralized tight 
structure or de-centralized loose structure can help in reducing conflicts within the 
movement, and whether a central leadership and maximization of division of labor can 
promote integration, or that this should be substituted by informal networks and an 
over-arching ideology (McCarthy, 1988, Jenkins, 1983). Such debate on organization 
will be examined in the case of DS, in order to highlight the dynamics of the movement 
and how this affected its mobilization when the movement entered politics.  
In this study, discussing DS’ resources, mobilization and organization will be combined 
with studying the relationship between the movement and its political context, political 
opportunity structures, and the processes of interpretation and framing. In this regard, 
Tarrow (1998) warned that contention is not all about struggles over meaning, and 
excess focus on this side of contention diverts attention from social networks, and 
connective structures and away from the links of imagined and lived experiences. For 
him, culture is in fact embedded in structural changes and in how political opportunity 
triggers discursive responses on what people choose to do when they act collectively. 
Thus, there should be a middle space between the ungrounded formulations of rational 
choice theory, and the all too grounded interpretations of culturalism, hence there 
should be focus on opportunities and constraints, repertoires and framing, mobilizing 
structures, as well as cycles and institutional response (Tarrow, 1998). 
Political Opportunity and Political Opportunity Structure 
As one of the prominent theorists in the political process approach put it, the interaction 
of organization with opportunities produces a repertoire, that in turn limits the actions of 
30 
 
contending parties (Tilly, 1988). In this regard, political opportunities are defined as the 
consistent, albeit neither fixed nor permanent, dimensions of the political environment. 
Such dimensions stimulate collective action by influencing people’s prospects of 
success or failure (Tarrow, 1998). Adopting a partially rationalist approach, Tarrow 
emphasized that people’s choice to take action or to remain inactive, might depend to a 
great extent on the changes in the available opportunities. However, political 
opportunities cannot make up for the long-term weaknesses in cultural, ideological, and 
organizational resources (Tarrow, 1998). In the light of such definitions the concept of 
opportunity is essential in understanding DS’ decisions to abstain from political 
participation under Mubarak, to establish a political party in 2011, and to be the only 
surviving Islamist party after 2013 revolution.  
The main dimensions of opportunity are; first, increasing access, for instance due to the 
adoption of some reform policies, second, shifting alignments, third, divided elites, 
fourth, influential allies, and finally, repression and facilitation. Opportunities also 
depend on state strength and strategies (McAdam, 1996, Tarrow, 1998). In this regard, 
Kriesi (2007) introduced a framework that links political opportunity to the whole 
political context. He suggested that the political context is formed of a number of 
components that are interlinked. First, structures, which encompass the international 
context, political institutions, cultural models, and cleavages structures, second, the 
configuration of political actors which determines the forms of alliances and conflict 
structures, and third, the interaction context that links both structure and configuration. 
This third level of analysis includes the strategies of public authorities and policy 
makers, and the opportunities that influence the choice of the strategies of collective 
political actors. These collective actors’ strategies, in turn, influence strategies of public 
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authorities and political actors (Kriesi, 2007). However, Kriesi admits that this 
framework is west-centric, and is mainly applicable to democracies, and he 
recommended that it should be subject to modifications in order to be useful in studying 
cases in non-democracies, as well as on cases of inter-, supra-, and transnational levels, 
and that the role of media should be also integrated in this approach (Kriesi, 2007). 
Despite the fact that the political context framework in its relation to political 
opportunity is more relevant to democratic systems, it remains useful in understanding 
how DS reacted to the political opportunities available in the system, in view of DS-
state relationship, its ideology (Manhaj), alliances and conflicts. Yet, to act upon an 
opportunity, the movement should frame it using its own terms.   
Framing 
An attractive message and a just cause are not sufficient for mobilization, unless they 
are efficiently framed and communicated to the movement’s constituency, and to the 
public on a wider scope, in the field of symbols and issues (Oberschall, 1993b). In this 
regard, Zald (1996) attributed political and mobilization opportunities to the reframing 
of grievances and injustices in a way that leads to action, and that such process usually 
reflects cultural contradiction.  
Contrary to RMT, framing concepts imply that social movements are not defending 
preconfigured ideas but are developing and producing meanings, organizing experience, 
and guiding action, through simplifying the events and realities with the intention of 
mobilization for their ‘protagonists,’ ‘antagonists,’ and ‘bystanders.’ And that this 
meaning production process is dynamic, where framing is a continuing process in which 
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frames are constantly articulated and elaborated, to generate meanings that are not only 
different from the existing frames but are challenging them (Snow, 2000, Snow, 2007).  
Framing processes involve discursive processes that include talk and conversations, 
speech acts and written communications of movement members that are developed 
through two processes. First, frame articulation which means linking events and 
experiences, leading to a new vision or interpretation. The second process is frame 
amplification which involves highlighting some issues, events, or beliefs as being more 
important than others (Snow, 2000). In fact, frames understanding depend on these two 
processes rather than the topics or issues that such frames deal with, and this requires 
field work overtime and access to discourse (Snow, 2000). Discursive processes are also 
linked to ideology; however, are rarely determined by them. They are rather considered 
elaborate articulations of the existing ideologies or ideas and beliefs, hence they act as 
extensions to ideologies (Snow, 2007). There is also the Strategic Processes that is the 
goal directed framing meant to attain certain purposes, for instance, to obtain resources 
or mobilize members and this involves bridging, extension, amplification, and 
transformation. Framing also involves contested processes where frames are contested 
from within the movement itself and from counter-movements and media (Snow, 2000). 
However, such framing processes do not exist in vacuum but are embedded in political 
opportunity structures, affect and are affected by cultural opportunities and constraints, 
and are influenced by the type of their targeted audience. Accordingly, framing cannot 
be sufficiently understood unless it is contextualized in its discursive field or discursive 
opportunity structures, which suggest that the shape and history of discursive framing 
processes and the fields that they are embedded in are not only a result of the stream of 
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events, cultural resources, and interactants, but also of the political context in which 
they exist (Snow, 2000, Snow, 2007). 
In line with this, the political opportunity structure, by itself, is incapable of explaining 
why there are variations in the degree of facilitation and constraints of social 
movements. This is due to the absence of the study of the ideational aspects of 
movements. Also, the framing approach that focuses on the cultural and discursive sides 
of social movements, cannot explain why some frames succeeded and others failed  
(Koopmans, 1999). Therefore, in order to make up for that they linked up both the 
political opportunity structure, and the framing model. As a result, in their analysis, they 
adopted the concept of discursive opportunity structures that determines which ideas are 
sensible, constructions of reality are realistic, and claims of the legitimate5 could be 
accepted in a certain polity and at a specific time. In this regard, they developed a model 
that assesses the different reactions of the elite to the actions of the challengers in view 
of the opened-closed discursive and institutional opportunities (Koopmans, 1999). This 
model states that if the discursive and institutional opportunities are closed, the 
movement will collapse or at least be marginalized. In case the two opportunities are 
opened, then the movement will get access to and concessions from the elite. However, 
if the discursive opportunity is available while the institutional opportunity is closed, the 
movement will be able to influence the public but not as an official political actor. This 
was partially the case of some Salafis before the revolution, where Salafis had access to 
media, mosques, and schools, but were not officially involved in politics. Also, in this 
case the elite will accommodate some of the movement’s ideas that do not contradict the 
                                                             
5 On cultural environment and boundaries of the legitimate see also (WILLIAMS, R. H. 2007. The Cultural Contexts 
of Collective Action: Constraints, Opportunities, and the Symbolic Life of Social Movements. In: DAVID A SNOW, 
S. A. S., HANSPETER KRIESI (ed.) The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements. UK Blackwell Publishing.  
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dominant interests and cultural codes. Meanwhile, the movement’s collective action 
will be subject to repression (pre-emption). Finally, if the discursive opportunities are 
closed but the institutional opportunities are opened, then the elite will allow some 
elements of the movement to become official political actors, and to enter institutions. 
Nevertheless, these institutional opportunities are dependent on the movement’s 
adherence to the dominant rules (co-optation) (Koopmans, 1999). While this 
classification is relatively rigid, it helps in understanding DS-state relationship pattern, 
as well as its prospects after it entered politics.   
In view of the relationship between the political context and its facilitation to processes 
of framing, Snow (2007) mentions that framing and ideological work can still proceed 
even within a repressive political structure in private hidden contexts and this means 
that whether the structure helps or not, these processes will take place but in different 
ways and degrees. This can be useful in studying DS’ activities under the successive 
authoritarian regimes, and to investigate to what extent their framing activities were 
hidden, or took place in public. Also, whether DS had ambitions to enter politics 
officially, or that their framing processes in this regard started only after the revolution, 
given that the available opportunities do not influence the movement until the leaders 
define them as opportunities (Snow, 2000).  
Another aspect of framing is that it is responsible for identity construction, yet is not the 
only mechanism to explain the relationship between personal and collective identity 
(Snow, 2000). In this respect, Miethe adopts the concept of keying processes as a level 
of analysis to study social movements, which is the analysis of the reasons of frames 
formation and their function for the actors (Miethe, 2009 ). This concept relates the 
‘biographical disposition’ of single actors in a movement to the understanding of the 
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fluctuations of participants in the social movements, where the reframing processes that 
take place in association with the changes of the social movement can be related to the 
individual actor. So, this actor might be acting according to her own primary frame and 
her choices might not correspond to those of other participants within the group. In this 
keying process, there are processes of up-keying, and down-keying, that may be adding 
or removing layers of the frame, hence, in some cases, leading to a fit between the 
individual and the collective frame, rather than the withdrawal of the individual from 
the group (Miethe, 2009 ). This concept is interesting as concerns DS case particularly 
with the individual reason and intellectual independence of Salafis in general. Thus, the 
keying concept will be adapted to the study of DS in the light of the importance of the 
individual level in this type of movements. This would help in understanding to what 
extent there were divisions within DS at the different stages of its political engagement, 
and how individuals within the movement reacted to its framing processes. 
Given that framing is central in this study, the primary focus will be on DS’ discourse, 
therefore, the abovementioned questions and concepts will be discussed through the 
application of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to texts collected from DS and NP. 
The following section will discuss why this study is adopting CDA, particularly 
Fairclough’s framework. 
 
Section Two: Critical Discourse Analysis 
This study uses CDA which is not an analysis of discourse in itself, but rather of the 
dialectical relations between discourse and other objects, elements, or moments, as well 
as an analysis of the internal relations of discourse (Fairclough, 2010: 4). Such 
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definition goes in line with aspects of the above mentioned definition of framing. In this 
regard, CDA, from among other approaches to discourse analysis, is more appropriate 
to the study of framing processes of a social movement within a certain context. This is 
because this critical realist approach recognizes the social world as constructed, yet 
distinguishes between construals (interpretations) and construction, and in order for 
construals to have a socially constructive effect, certain conditions should exist, such as 
power relations. This means that CDA is a moderate form of social constructivism 
(Fairclough, 2010: 4). Thus, CDA is not just an analysis of discourse (texts) but “a 
systematic transdisciplinary analysis of relations between discourse and other elements 
of social process” (Fairclough, 2010: 10). In this regard, CDA shows the origins of 
discourse and how it is formed through articulating together existing discourses in an 
attempt to answer “why and how certain strategies and discourses emerge in particular 
social circumstances?” (Fairclough, 2010: 19). In addition, CDA helps to explore the 
relations of dialogue, contestation, and dominance between discourses such as the 
debate between different strategies through rhetorically oriented analysis, why certain 
strategies succeed and others fail and what strategies might be better. Moreover, CDA 
looks at recontextualization of discourses which means how particular discourses 
become dominant and hegemonic across structural boundaries (social fields; such as 
education and politics) or scalar boundaries (local, national, and regional) (Fairclough, 
2010: 20). This understanding of discourse speaks to the combination of political 
context, opportunities and framing processes discussed earlier, and helps in 
understanding the relationship between the religious and the political in DS’ discourse, 
before and after extending its activities from the religious field to politics. In addition, it 
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gives an insight into how DS’ discourse relates to the Egyptian local discourses, and to 
Global Salafism by far and large.  
CDA also is mainly interested in questions of why and how particular strategies and 
discourses appeared at specific social circumstances? It also tries providing an answer to 
what extent these discourses changed, and how they were legitimized? How the past 
was narrated and how the future is imagined? (Fairclough, 2010: 19). This makes CDA 
closer to the main research question of this study, helping to answer the question of 
whether DS’ discourse has changed after the structural changes brought about by 
January 2011 revolution, and how did DS narrate the past in order to justify the change? 
and how do DS’ followers imagine the future?  
Upon surveying the various trends in CDA, this study will apply Fairclough’s three 
dimensional framework, which investigates language in relation to power and ideology, 
and is unveiling the discursive nature of the contemporary social and cultural changes 
(Wodak, 2009: 6-7). This framework states that there are three levels of social life: 
social structure, social practices, and social events. The social structure influences and is 
influenced by practices. Such practices take place through institutions, organizations, 
and networks of practices, and are constituted of certain elements: actions, 
representations, and identification. Such elements have semiotic aspects, which are the 
orders of the discourse. In this regard, ‘genre’’ is the discursive aspect of action, 
‘discourses’ are the semiotic aspect of representation, and ‘style’ is the semiotic part of 
identification. These social practices (actions, representations, and identifications) and 
their respective discursive aspects (genres, discourses, and styles) lead to the occurrence 
of events, where texts are the discursive aspect of the events (Fairclough, 2010). Texts 
here are not confined to written texts, but also conversations and interviews, as well as 
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multimodal texts, such as visual images. All this means that social and discursive 
practices are the link between the structure (the social and political context in this study) 
and the events (texts) (Fairclough, 2010: 232-233, 163). 
The researcher operationalized Norman Fairclough’s CDA framework as a means of 
keeping a distance between herself and the texts collected through applying a three-level 
framework. This firstly investigates textual features (wording, word meaning, 
metaphors, theme…), and secondly discursive practices (genre, style, discourses) which 
are seen as semiotic aspects of social practices (actions, identification, and 
representation). Thirdly, the societal level or contextualization of DS’ discourse within 
the Egyptian context (international influences, political institutions, alliances and 
conflicts, cultural models, and interactions) was examined drawing on the literature and 
on the field observations (Kriesi, 2007; Richardson, 2014; Sjölander, 2011).  
CDA also offers a robust safeguard against the risks of a researcher taking the content 
of interviews at face value. According to the above explanation of CDA, such an 
approach is useful in highlighting contradictions within the texts, in the discursive 
combinations, and between the texts and the Egyptian context. It also allows for 
understanding the relationship between the religious and the political in DS’ discourse, 
and how they identify themselves within the texts, thus in understanding the nature of 
DS/NP’s role and identity as a religious actor within a political context, in departure 
from the rest of the literature. It also allows for answering the question of whether the 
contradictions that took place in times of transition led to the transformation or the 
reproduction of DS’ discourse. This is while taking into consideration that discourse 
here is not just what DS/NP’s members say as such, but rather how they represent 
reality. Thus, what is presented in this dissertation is the results of the CDA of the 
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interviews and of the archival material in the light of the observations, but not the 
content of the interviews. The researcher examined how DS/NP’s ideology (Manhaj of 
social change) was constructed through looking at textual features, interdiscursivity and 
intertextuality, and how it was sustained through a dynamic process of framing that 
proved to be an extension of their ideology, within the different political contexts 
throughout their history. Using this framework, the study will analyze the texts that are 
produced by DS and NP concerning social and political change pre- and post-revolution 
Egypt. This analysis is not primarily concerned with what a particular sheikh or DS 
member says, but rather with the “social sources” and the “social effects” of the texts’ 
production (Herzog, 2016: 69). 
In this concern, following Fairclough’s framework, the textual analysis is of dual 
character: interdiscursive analysis and multimodal analysis. Interdiscursive analysis is 
an analysis of which discourses, genres, and styles are drawn upon in a text, and how 
they are articulated together, where texts can draw upon and articulate together multiple 
discourses, genres, and styles. Thus, the interdiscursive level links the micro level of the 
texts to social analysis of practices, organizations, and institutions. This is while the 
multimodal analysis deals with the different semiotic modes (language, visual images, 
body language, music and sound effects), and their articulation (Fairclough, 2010: 7). In 
view of the proposed analytical framework for this study and the definition of texts that 
are the unit of analysis, the methodology suggested for this study is ethnographic 





Ethnography and Discourse Analysis 
The main reason for why CDA and ethnography can be combined is the multimodal 
nature of texts within CDA. Since discourse is both semiotic and non-semiotic, the 
definition of texts in CDA puts aside the primacy of language, and gives attention to 
other semiotic systems as well, such as bodily semiotics (gesture, touch, and proximity), 
visual semiotics (static and moving), semiotics of sound and music (Chouliaraki, 1999, 
Hart and Cap, 2014). In this respect, ethnography would complement CDA, in order to 
provide a deeper understanding of texts and to present more details. 
In addition, in order “to establish mediating links between text and context: one really 
needs to engage in social and ethnographic research over significant periods of time in 
particular institutional settings, and gatherings and in analyzing textual samples and 
information on social and cognitive aspects, of their production and interpretation, as a 
part of this more broadly defined research” (Jaworski, 1999: 208). In fact, Fairclough’s 
definition of text as including linguistic analysis, visual images analysis, and body 
language analysis shows how the multimodal nature of texts in CDA can be served most 
by the use of ethnography (Fairclough, 2010: 234). “Discourse analysis here works 
together with ethnographic research that locates discourse as a part of wider set of social 
practices” (Chouliaraki, 1999: 45). In order for CDA to link the findings to its “text 
producers and institutions, it has to empirically involve the social world engaged in the 
production and reception of the text,” and here lies “the importance of an 





Section Three: Ethnographic Research  
Ethnographic research is suitable to study DS as a religious movement that entered 
politics officially and for the first time in 2011, since ethnographic methods are of 
particular use in situations “in which the social issues or behaviors are not yet clearly 
understood” (Angrosino, 2007: 26). In addition, it is also useful in “accounting for 
unpredicted outcomes,” “identifying participants in a social setting,” “and documenting 
a social process” (Angrosino, 2007: 26). In addition, despite the rare use of 
ethnographic research on the side of political scientists, it is an appropriate research 
strategy in situations of studying small groups that are marginalized in the political 
system, and that might also be secret groups (Burnham, 2008: 249), and Salafis were 
always marginalized politically and now are a new political actor that needs to be 
explored, while being understudied over their history. Also, ethnography proved to be 
useful in providing more precise results than confining research to semi-structured 
interviews in cases of studying far right groups, revolutionary groups, and small social 
movements (Burnham, 2008). Moreover, “interviews should wherever possible be used 
in conjunction with other methods, for example the examination of primary archive 
material or participant observation,” (Stedward, 1997: 152) both are techniques of 
ethnographic research. 
Thus, ethnography is the most convenient method to study DS for a number of reasons. 
First, Salafis have been subject to generalizations, since most of the previous literature 
and the media dealt with Salafis as one bloc. That is why there was a motivation for this 
study to focus on only one group, and to go beyond the packaged answers in interviews, 
through adopting ethnography that gives the chance to grasp more details and allows for 
a deeper understanding as a result of a long term, closer interaction with the 
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movement’s members. Second, they are newcomers to the Egyptian political scene. 
Third, ethnography provides details about the settings, the symbols, clothing, gestures, 
and all the issues that might help in understanding these groups, particularly with the 
importance of the cultural dimension in this movement (Hart, 2014; Richardson et al, 
2014). Finally, it is also interesting to see how these groups will interact with a female 
researcher, coming from a British university, affiliated with Cairo University, and 
having a different political and religious attitude. Accordingly, a closer look at the 
interaction within DS and NP can lead to interesting conclusions, and might take the 
researcher to new areas and topics. Such expected results stemmed out of the 
characteristics of ethnography, as field-based, personalized, multi-factorial (involving 
two or more data collection techniques), long-term connection, inductive, dialogic 
(subjects can comment on the researcher’s findings), and holistic (an attempt to cover 
the fullest details as possible of the group studied) (Angrosino, 2007: 15).  
Data Collection 
Concerning data collection in ethnography, it is done through observing and recording 
the behavior of the people in a natural social setting, and this might be supported by 
formal or informal interviews, and the collection of documentary materials (Burnham, 
2008: 265). Angrosino believes that “good ethnography is usually the result of 
triangulation- the use of multiple data collection techniques to reinforce conclusions” 
(Angrosino, 2007: 33), and that there are three key skill areas that should be part of the 
repertoire of all fieldworkers: observation, interviewing, and archival research 





“Observation is the act of perceiving the activities and interrelationships of people in the 
field setting through the five senses of the researcher,” (Angrosino, 2007: 37), while 
keeping professional distance that allows the researcher to observe and record data 
(Fatterman, 2010).  
Types of participant observation: 
Participant observation varies between passive and active participants, and between the 
complete participant (covert method), and complete observer (Burnham, 2008, Burgess, 
1982).  
Concerns about Participant Observation 
In case of adopting a covert method there might be ethical problems, such as being 
concealed, the researcher cannot pose questions to subjects, and it puts the researcher in 
the position of a spy (Burgess, 1982). As for the participant observer “personal 
characteristics” might  influence “roles, relationships, and data” (Burgess, 1982: 46). 
For instance, how the factors of gender, age, and ethnicity of the researcher can 
influence the fieldwork. There is also the risk that the participant observer might be 
driven towards the involvement in situations in which “his values are being questioned 
or attacked” (Burgess, 1982: 47). Nevertheless, a non-participant observant may be 
alienated in a Salafi context, where people are skeptic of outsiders due to long history of 
marginalization, negative social images, state repression, and security prosecution. 
Hence, a minimum participation or silence might hinder a successful rapport, and the 
researcher may not be able to gain the subjects’ confidence. For, in cases of successful 
integration in the community, the “subjects of the study will learn to take the researcher 
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for granted and will thus behave almost as though he or she were not there, and the 
researcher will get ‘under the skin’ of the subjects and learn to think almost as they 
think” (Burnham, 2008: 267-268).   
In the light of these concerns, the researcher assumed a participant observant role, 
where she was open about her identity. 
b- Interviewing: 
Types of interviews: 
Interviews cannot be confined to structured or unstructured typologies. They would 
rather fall onto a continuum. At one end of this continuum is the free interview, where 
the respondent is allowed to lead the discussion within broad lines set by the 
interviewer; while at the other end is the tightly structured interview, in which the 
interviewer cannot deviate from the questionnaire (Stedward, 1997). In case of elite 
interviews, deciding the type of interview depends on a number of factors, such as the 
time available for the interview and the level of rapport between interviewer and 
interviewee (Stedward, 1997). However,  political research mostly uses semi-structured 
interviews, particularly in cases of elite interviews, where there is a schedule of a 
“limited number of topic-related questions and pre-determined, alternative 
supplementary questions” (Pierce, 2008: 118, Burnham, 2008: 231).  
According to Burnham (2008) in semi-structured interviews, first, interviewers will 
have to prepare a list of topics or questions, but unlike questionnaires the “interview 
guide is used as a check-list of topics to be covered, although the order in which they 
are discussed is not-preordained” (Burnham, 2008: 240). Second, interviewers should 
prioritize the topics. Third, the interviewer must not impose a rigid framework in order 
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to allow the opening of new topics and areas that can lead to new questions. Generally, 
interviews differ according to the cultural contexts that they are held in  and it is useful 
to take notes of the context of the interview as regards to the location and the 
impressions of the interviewee (Stedward, 1997: 161). 
Interviews in Ethnography 
As regards to interviews in ethnographic research, Angrosino (2007) sees that the 
ethnographic interview is an open ended interview by nature, however, it might be also 
a semi-structured interview. Yet in ethnography, semi-structured interviews should 
develop out of open–ended interviews in order to clarify issues that were discussed, and 
this gives the interview a more conversational format. This study tried to apply this type 
of interviews whether with elite, whenever possible, or with rank and file members of 
DS and NP. Otherwise, the researcher carried out semi-structured interviews, depending 
on the time that the interviewee was willing to spend. Sometimes also the interviews 
developed from the situations such as a meeting in the party discussing a certain agenda, 
or in a visit in one of the homes where the researcher gets introduced to family members 
of the interviewee.  
Archival research: 
“Archival research is the analysis of materials that have been stored for research, 
service, and other purposes both official and unofficial” (Angrosino, 2007: 49). In this 
study archival research was carried out in order to be able to retrieve the foundational 
texts of DS on social change, the main concept of this study, and to follow up the 
variations on such texts over the movement’s history, through following the 
movement’s and the party’s statements, articles, lessons, religious rulings, and Friday 
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speeches in this regard. This archival research also would complement the interviews in 
putting a narrative of the movement’s history within the framework discussed above. 
Sampling and Case Study 
Concerning sampling “the research questions shape the selection of a place and a people 
or program to study” (Fatterman, 2010: 35). First, the researcher can choose who and 
what not to study, second, to select who and what to study. In view of ethnography, 
judgmental sampling is mostly used where ethnographers depend on their judgment to 
select the most appropriate members of the group studied according to the research 
question (Fatterman, 2010, Burgess, 1982). Using this approach of sampling, the 
researcher simply collects information about the individuals and what they do 
(Fatterman, 2010). In this study, the researcher decided on the field upon following up 
the situation, and collecting information about the various Salafi political parties from 
media, officials, the public, and previous experience. There is also snowball sampling 
whereby researchers use informants to introduce them to other members of their groups. 
Such an approach is found in studying groups that are difficult to contact (Burgess, 
1982), which was the case in this study as will be discussed in the next section. 
In addition, the rigorous randomized strategy can be used if the researcher already 
knows a great deal about the culture or unit they are studying (Fatterman, 2010). 
However, if the people were under-studied, the use of highly structured randomized 
design might lead to narrowing the focus of the study, hence will lead to losing 
important details, and the chance of talking to relevant people. Therefore, in order to 
carry out efficient sampling besides studying the previous literature, it is crucial to go in 
the field and to explore the people (Fatterman, 2010: 35-36), therefore, in the case of 
47 
 
understudied Salafis, the case study was decided upon arrival in the field, through 
judgmental sampling. 
The Case study: 
The case study in this thesis is Al-Da’awa Al-Salafyya (Salafi Call) in Alexandria, that 
established Al-Nor (Light) party, the first Salafi political party.  
 
Section Four: The Fieldwork and Analysis 
The Fieldwork 
The researcher passed the University of Birmingham ethics committee review process 
and was prepared and authorized to start the field work in July 2013. The arrival of the 
researcher in Egypt was on July 3rd: this transpired to be the day when President 
Mohammed Morsi was officially removed from power, General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi’s 
speech was delivered and the political powers’ meeting was held with NP’s obvious 
presence. After one day of celebrations, unrest and violent reactions started from the 
side of Morsi’s supporters,6 where gunshots were heard in the neighborhood of the 
researcher in the middle of Cairo. Under such conditions and due to ethics committee 
instructions, the researcher could not move around, especially given that there was a 
curfew in place. When security conditions relatively improved, the researcher had to 
select one of the politicized Salafi groups and to start to contact them. As mentioned 
above this study focused on the Salafis who adopt political means, rather than militants 
or apolitical Salafis. At this stage of the fieldwork one would see Salafis on the Raba’a 
sit-in that was organized by Morsi’s supporters, threatening the use of violence if Morsi 
                                                             
6 According to media sources. 
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does not get back to the palace, and their sit-in was broadcasted live on TV. There were 
talks in media that it is an armed sit-in, in addition the researcher was advised not to 
approach this sit-in or to contact their leaders who might be targeted by the police due 
to claims about their involvement in violence or at least violence incitement, in addition 
there was popular outrage against them. Thus, avoiding such contacts was not only 
because of security reasons but also so as not to look suspicious in front of the security 
institutions in the country.  
However, with the development of the situation excluding the Salafi supporters of 
Morsi (Al-Asala, Al-Fadila, Al-Raya, Construction and Development, and Al-Watan 
parties) was not only for practical and security reasons, but also because events proved 
them to be first, an extension to MB,7 and this study is not interested in analyzing MB 
political thought and strategies. Second, as mentioned above many of the ex-Jihadi 
elements threatened the use of violence. Finally, none of these parties survived in 
politics, and they disappeared from the political scene. Also, this comes in the light of 
the researcher’s experience of Salafis from previous research, and the fact that she was 
able to meet a number of their leaders before her PhD program, for research purposes, 
e.g. Mohammed Abdel Maqsoud (March 2011), Mohamed Hassan (March 2011), Tarek 
Al-Zumur after a protest (September 2011), and members of AS, besides attending 
lessons in one of the Salafi schools in 2010 as part of an ethnographic research, as a 
research assistant. The understanding of their general orientations and classifying them 
in view of the events that took place starting January 2011 provided the researcher with 
some guiding lines to decide the case study.  
                                                             
7 This will be discussed in chapter 2. 
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Such givens made the most suitable case for this study DS and NP which through the 
field work and the analysis proved to be presenting a new Islamist model that diverted 
from the thought of MB and the rest of Salafis on the local and the global levels. Thus, 
the selection of the case study was for both practical reasons, as well as for fitting into 
the scope of this study.  
As for NP being part of the July 3rd, 2013 Road Map, this made them under threat from 
their fellow Islamists on one hand, and adhering to their appearance as bearded men or 
women wearing Niqab made them targeted by the public who might think that they are 
Morsi supporters on the other hand. Under such conditions, it was difficult to reach the 
party’s headquarters or to find any contacts. The researcher used the telephone guide 
and headed to three available addresses but no one of them was right. In one of the three 
places, it was a cupping centre in Al-Zawya Al-Hamra,8 in Cairo, where the owner of 
the centre was known to his neighbours as “Al-Nor member who goes every day to 
Raba’a,” which was contradicting in the light of his party’s official position. The 
researcher was able to reach him over the phone while he was in the sit-in, and he was 
angry, and promising that “Morsi will come back,” he criticized NP and said that he is 
now a member of Al-Raya party, who might be classified as revolutionary Salafis 
(Lacroix, 2016). The researcher was then able to reach the number of a DS’ office in 
Alexandria, and was guided to the NP’s secretariat general in Imbaba, Giza, where there 
were no banners or any signs that shows that this is NP headquarter. The place was new 
and not fully furnished, and there through the help of an office boy, the researcher was 
put in contact with Mr. Mahmood Shaltoot one of the party’s youth members, the head 
of NP’s Al-Tablyya office, Giza, and who carried some administrative work in the 
                                                             
8 Visited on July 11th 2013. 
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secretariat general of the party. The first meeting9 was on July 20th, 2013, and was more 
of an introduction to the researcher and the project, and general chat about the history of 
the movement and the party, besides discussing the events taking place in Egypt. The 
researcher then started to have extended meetings with middle level members and 
young leaders, since the activities of the party was almost frozen except for the supreme 
committee meetings that the researcher was not allowed to attend and she was told that 
their timing and place are not known except in the last minute for security reasons. By 
August 25th the researcher started to see young members of the supreme committee of 
NP, and to have various visits to see her contact in the secretariat general and exchange 
talks with whoever present there. However, some of the members were still cautious 
and had security concerns, as the researcher was once told “why would we let you in 
and make you meet the leaders, even if we trust you and you have good intentions you 
might be used and exploited by anybody, research is also a sensitive area.” However, by 
time the researcher gained more of the members’ and young leaders’ confidence 
especially with developing personal contacts, acting informally, being open about her 
project and identity, and even directly asking them for help and cooperation with the 
project. On August 28th, the researcher attended a press conference in the party 
secretariat general where she was introduced to some of the leaders as a researcher 
writing the first PhD thesis on NP and DS. In September, the researcher managed to 
meet more young leaders, visited the party’s secretariat in Giza, and attended a youth 
meeting in Al-Talbiyya. Despite spending time in the headquarters, seeing members of 
the party in their offices and work places, having phone calls to exchange conversations, 
and attending a youth meeting, under such conditions in Egypt, the researcher needed an 
                                                             
9 The researcher was able to meet over 56 members from both DS and NP in different situations and places. 
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extension of the field work, especially that she was able to make herself familiar and 
present in the party, which would widen the scope of the field findings and 
observations.  
The first three months of field work came to an end in September 2013, and the 
researcher had to go to the UK for a short visit in October 2013 to meet her supervisor 
and report back, consult on some issues, and ask for an extension of the field work, 
particularly when there were concerns over the security situation in Egypt due to an 
attempt to assassinate the minister of interior at the time. However, the researcher as per 
ethics committee, and supervisor’s instructions put her security first and moved only 
when it was safe to go around, respected curfew timings, and avoided places of unrest, 
while accompanied by family members or a driver, and by making herself accessible all 
the time through the phone. By time the researcher’s contact in NP was also 
accompanying her in many meetings. Being accompanied was also a religious 
requirement to meet some of the members. Besides, while knowing that the researcher 
is unveiled they asked her to wear the veil in some meetings.  
After three more months, in the field the researcher had already gained confidence, 
contacts and made her network in NP. The second part of the field work was intensive, 
it witnessed visits to Alexandria, two cities in Al-Buhayra, and Al-Fayyom. In this part 
of the field work, the researcher had access to the female community not only on the 
leaders’ level but also among the young female members, where the total number of 
female members met was thirty-three women. Beside home visits, the researcher 
attended one of their meetings in Alexandria NP’s secretariat general. The researcher 
also was able to meet two of the founders of DS; Sheikh Yasser Borhami in a ministry 
of health clinic, and then on a highway drive to a religious lesson. Sheikh Ahmed Farid, 
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also exceptionally agreed to meet a researcher, and the meeting was in a mosque, where 
being spontaneous and non-politicized sheikh Farid meeting was representative of the 
religious side of DS, and gave account of the history and development of the movement 
and the decision to participate in politics. However, Sheikh Abu Edris, the head of DS, 
does not like to talk to media or researchers, and Sheikh Al-Moqaddem also 
exceptionally expressed willingness to meet the researcher yet when he could not, he 
sent his secretary with a book about the foundations of Salafism, and promised to meet 
later, which did not happen for time limitation of the field work. The researcher in this 
part of the field also met a number of second generation sheikhs who became party 
leaders, among them the chairman of NP in his home in Abu Hummus, and this meeting 
helped in opening other meetings with second DS’ generation sheikhs and party leaders, 
middle level leaders, females and young members of DS and NP. The researcher was 
welcomed to spend a day in some of their homes seeing their families, chatting and 
sharing them meals, where the presence of the researcher’s mother at times gave them a 
sense of comfort and familiarity. The researcher also visited a DS’ kindergarten and had 
some notes and observations on the educational system and the activities of DS at an 
early age. As a typical ethnographic research, the researcher established informal 
relationship with some of the members of DS and NP, while being open about her 
identity as an independent researcher who has no political affiliations, who is not an 
Islamist, unveiled, belong to mainstream Muslims, has intellectual and religious 
differences with them, who is going to write a critical analysis about the party and the 
movement, and while keeping a distance since in all cases she is around only for 
research. As long as the researcher did not touch upon any of the security concerns of 
the members, they welcomed her, even if she is different, particularly when they show 
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respect to academia and many of them are post-graduate students or planning to be, or 
are researchers or already have masters and PhD degrees. On the field also the 
researcher went with her husband in outings in public places in Cairo with an NP 
contact, and he visited them for farewell. Where none of the researcher’s family 
members are Salafis or have any Islamist orientations, however they were also 
welcomed in the different settings.  
The fact that the researcher had a prolonged and close contact with the members of NP 
and DS, and was able to attend and watch various situations, and to be present in 
various places was treated at times not only as a researcher but also as a fellow citizen at 
a time of fear and unrest in the country, where the special historical moment when the 
field work started gave a different perspective, and highlighted many aspects of the 
movement and the party. Sometimes the researcher was treated as a student taking them 
serious through this methodology that they praised as they say no one can know them 
except through interaction, and this might explain their success in their close 
neighbourhoods where the main tool of their call for God was through face to face 
interactions as the researcher was told, and that they are not as successful in their media 
contributions. The researcher was sometimes treated as a friend or as a ‘sister’, and 
there was some sympathy especially on the side of women that she is seeking a degree 
on a topic they see as “controversial” in the west. The researcher was also at some 
occasions a subject of da’awa (call for God), especially among female members. 
Another observation was that they were not always politically correct, sometimes they 
asked to stop recording, and allowed the researcher to derive conclusions but not 
mention what they said exactly, and sometimes not to mention their names. Getting the 
same set of ideas and messages all the time sometimes in unplanned meetings and 
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conversations, and the fact that they have always been apolitical made them more 
spontaneous, thus, helped the researcher to go beyond the packaged, well prepared 
answers that one can get in interviews, and limited formal interactions. Long hours of 
talking, where meetings sometimes passed three hours helped in breaking the ice, 
particularly when participants were invited to go beyond the clichés of media and 
traditional research questions. The researcher was also keen on getting brief biographies 
from individuals on how and when they joined DS and when they were aware of their 
belonging to the movement and on what basis, and how they perceived things after 
political engagement, particularly post-July 3rd, 2013. Finally, there were a number of 
conversational interviews with random individuals who do not belong to DS or NP, 
about how they perceive NP and how they feel about their religious discourse, in 
attempt to have a more complete picture.10 
The observations that the researcher took as concerns the places, the behaviour, the 
male-female relationships, and the way they treated the researcher at the different stages 
of the field work, all complemented the texts collected through conversational and semi-
structured interviews. In addition, the researcher was directed to Darb Al-Atrak to 
collect DS’ sheikhs’ books, some of the members of DS also gave her books and 
documents. Also, rare copies of the 1980’s Sawt Al-Da’awa (The Voice of Da’awa), the 
DS’ periodical, and a soft-copy of NP’s Al-Fath newspaper archive were collected. The 
researcher was also directed to archival material on YouTube and DS’ websites.  
Analysis 
The data collected was analyzed using Fairclough’s three levels model of analysis 
(Fairclough, 2010, Fairclough, 1992). In the following there will be an adaptation of this 
                                                             
10 This included individuals from different professions and classes, as well as both Christians and Muslims. 
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framework to the study of texts collected from DS and NP, both in standard Arabic and 
the Egyptian accent, besides, ethnographic research notes. 
Analysis looks at, first, the discourse production through exploring the features of the 
texts, interdiscursivity, and intertextuality, second, the discourse distribution through 
investigating intertextual chains, and third, the consumption of the discourse through 
looking at the coherence as the interpretative implications of the intertextual and 
interdiscursive properties of the discourse sample. Finally, this analysis will link these 
discourse practices to the conditions of discourse that are the social and institutional 
aspects of discourse, for instance what sort of non-discursive effects the sample has? All 
these levels of analysis will be contextualized within the social context in the social 
level of analysis.  
Textual Analysis 
The text 
The analysis of texts is divided into two levels. First, the construction of social relations 
and self, for instance, the ethos within the texts is discussed in order to explore the 
social identity of DS’ and NP’s members and leaders (self-identification, the we and the 
other). Texts collected in meetings and visits will be analyzed as concerns turn taking 
and topic control, that will be mainly derived from ethnographic research notes, where 
these factors can reveal the hierarchy, the type of organization, and the framing 
processes within both NP and DS, the female-male, and sheikhs-members relationships. 
The second level is connectives and argumentations, where the argumentation within 
the texts is discussed. In addition, there will be occasional presentation of the strategies 
used. Moreover, some grammatical aspects were analysed such as modality, transitivity, 
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theme, and cohesive markers. However, word meaning, wording and metaphors were of 
primary importance to this study (what are the new terms, their meanings, which 
meanings and words disappeared and which survived). 
Intertextuality 
This part of analysis explores the construction of subjects and social groups through 
texts, and the contribution of changing discursive practices to changes of social identity. 
This is done through specifying which texts are overtly drawn upon within the text or 
influenced the texts analysed, such as Quran, Sunna, and certain Muslim scholars. 
Intertextual chains also are studied in this part through following the distribution of a 
type of discourse sample, and the series of types it is transformed into or out, to answer 
questions about the sort of transformation, and the expected audience.  
Discursive Practices  
At this level, interdiscursivity will be analyzed in order to explore which discourses, 
genres, and styles do NP and DS mainly draw upon, and how the combination of these 
factors can help in addressing the research question, and the hypothesis, for instance, the 
relationship between the religious and the political in DS’ discourse. 
Social Practices 
This level aims at exploring certain issues in view of the main questions of the study: 
First, the social matrix of discourse as whether the context is conventional, innovative, 
or oppositional, to see how DS and NP’s discourse interacted with other discourses 
within their context and the implications of this on their relationship with political and 
social groups. Second, the reproduction or transformation of orders of discourse, where 
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this part will take place through comparing the orders of discourse, and textual features 
of DS’ and NP’s texts, with the foundational texts on change, within the changing social 
and political context in Egypt, and how such context influenced the interdiscursivity and 
intertextuality within the sample. Third, the ideological and political effects of 
discourse, as to what extent NP was influenced by DS’ ideology and original discourse, 
and the consequences of this on the party’s policy choices, and future prospects. Where 
there are two visions on ideology and discourse, a one-sided imposition and 
reproduction of dominant ideology in which ideology constitutes an universal social 
cement, and a site stake in which there is constant struggle, contradiction, and 
transformation. 
This three level framework of analysis aims at providing a deep analysis of the 
construction of DS’ ideology and its framing processes, while contextualizing them in 
their social and political context, in the various stages, through focusing on the concept 




CHAPTER 2: DS ON THE MAP OF GLOBAL AND EGYPTIAN SALAFISM 
Introduction 
This study is interested in DS’ vision for social change in the sense of how it was 
constructed and how it evolved with the development of the movement and its framing 
processes in the Egyptian context. In order to provide a thorough understanding for the 
history of DS as a social movement and the history of its discourse on social change, in 
relationship with other discourses, it is important to situate DS on the map of Egyptian 
Salafism, and to explore the foundations that shaped the movement.  
Accordingly, this chapter begins with a presentation of the main tenets of Salafism, and 
how these are connected to the concept of social and political change. Then, the second 
section discusses how the aspects and different definitions of change contributed to the 
classification of Salafi movements and to the development of the main trends within 
global Salafism. Finally, section three will present DS’ intellectual background, in view 
of the trends of global Salafism, and DS’ narrative of the history of Egyptian Salafism 
and of how they perceive other Salafis. This is not only for the sake of providing a 
historical account, but rather to explore DS’ self-identification, how they see other 
Salafis, and how they situate themselves on the Salafi map as concerns the concept of 
social change. Doing this, it will be possible to connect DS to its roots in global 
Salafism, and to understand its position within the Egyptian context, as an introduction 
to a focused historical chapter on the emergence and development of DS, as a social 
movement, and until it entered politics. The chapter concludes that DS does not fully 




Section One: Salafism and Social Change: 
Salafism a Contested Concept: 
Salafism is used to signify the ‘purist concept of Islam.’ Despite the medieval origins of 
the concept, meaning “doctrine of the forefathers” (Madhab Al-Salaf), it cannot be held 
synonymous to the present connotation which did not exist until the 20th century. The 
contemporary concept of Salafism is much broader and includes theology, law, morals, 
and etiquette (Lauzi`ere, 2010). The Salafi narrative, however, rejects this 
differentiation and insists on the continuity of Salafism, which can be traced back to the 
second Hijri century and although it witnessed several fluctuations and challenges, it did 
not completely disappear at any point. Such challenges, sometimes repression and 
discursive conflicts with other Islamic groups (Feraq), encouraged Salafi scholars to 
use the word “Ahl Al-Salaf” or “Salafis” to distinguish themselves from the deviating 
groups (Tawfiq, 2012b). However, according to a Salafi scholar, “Salafis cannot be 
considered a sub-sect or group within Islam. On the contrary, Salafism denotes the right 
approach to understanding Islam” (Abdel Hamid, 2013). It can be concluded from this 
Salafi narrative that discursive conflicts contributed to the development and the 
crystallization of the Salafi methodology and concepts, where scholars had to produce a 
wide literature in order to survive debates and arguments, and to stand in the face of 
rulers and opponents or “deviant groups” (Tawfiq, 2012b, Abdel Hamid, 2013). Such a 
legacy helped contemporary Salafis in the process of identifying themselves, deciding 




The starting date of Salafism and the issue of continuity versus separation between the 
medieval Madhab Al-Salaf and contemporary Salafis is not the only problem in tracing 
the history of Salafism. There is also the problem of who is a Salafi and who is not? 
And what are the intellectual contours of Salafism? 
The lack of precision in the secondary references resulted in a loose concept which was 
used to describe contradicting meanings and different groups. For instance, at a certain 
point the literature confused Salafism with Modernist Islam of Mohamed Abdou and 
Gamal Eddin Al-Afghani 11  (Lauzi`ere, 2010, Abdel Hamid, 2013). There was a 
tendency to trace Salafism back to Abdou and Al-Afghani, yet assume that rational 
reformist Salafism transformed over history into puritanism, and later Wahhabism (Abu 
El-Fadl, 2005). This definition not only considers Modernist Islam as a starting point to 
Salafism, but also reduces Salafism to Wahhabism, which is only one part of the wider 
Salafi movement, or could be considered one of the intellectual waves that shaped the 
movement. Such assumptions can be refuted through Salafis’ narrative of the history of 
the concept, which gives much weight to Muhammed ibn Abdel Wahhab, and considers 
him one of their main references. Yet, Salafis do not call themselves Wahhabis. 
Moreover, they emphasize the distinction between Salafism, and Modernist or 
Rationalist Islam, which is based on the use of human reason, rationality and 
observation, while Salafis give priority to the texts (Tawfiq, 2012b). 
 
                                                             
11 Abdou and Al-Afghani did not adopt the anti-rationalist literalist theology of Ibn Taymiyya, yet shared with him 
the importance of Ijtihad (individual interpretation), and they were focused on the renaissance of the Muslim society. 
Accordingly, they neither dwelled much into theological issues nor did they give much attention to the study of 
Hadith (quotes and sayings of Prophet Muhammad) but rather fought superstitions. Thus, they differed from 
traditional Salafism. However, their anti-Sufis’ superstitions position put them in the same camp with traditional 
Salafism. Later on, one of Abdou’s students, Rashid Reda was inclined to traditional Salafism and focused on the 
works of Ibn Taymiyya. Thus, according to Salafis’ narrative, Reda is considered the father of “Egyptian Salafism” 
(Tawfiq, 2012, Haykel, 2009). Yet, despite Reda’s intellectual inclination, the literature mentions that there is not 
enough evidence of his full affiliation to traditional Salafism (Lauzi’ere, 2010, Haykel, 2009). 
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The Definition and Main Aspects of Salafism: 
Salafis consider that Quran and Sunna (words and acts of Prophet Muhammad) should 
only be understood through the interpretations of the ‘good precedent Muslims’ (Al-
Salaf Al-Saleh), who are the first three generations of Islam (companions of Prophet 
Muhammad and companions of the companions). Salafis believe that by confining 
themselves to these sources of Islam, they would evade any human biases or deviations 
and will be confident that they abide by God’s orders, and by the purist version of Islam 
(Wiktorowicz, 2006, Meijer, 2009, Conv. int. Shaltoot, 2013, Abdel Hamid, 2013). 
Nevertheless, according to a Salafi scholar “any Muslim group can assume that their 
main references are Quran and Sunna regardless of their source of understanding, 
whether it is through logic, philosophy and rational thinking, revelations, or emotional 
preferences, but the fact remains that the only true understanding is the one provided by 
the Prophet and his companions (Abdel Hamid, 2013).”  
This statement implies that the difference between Salafis and any other Muslim groups 
is the adoption and observance of the interpretation of Al-Salaf Al-Saleh. In this regard, 
Al-Salaf Al-Saleh should be the ideal for all Muslims since there is a tendency to 
consider the “temporal proximity to Prophet Muhammad” as an indication of the purity 
of Islam, for the fact that they learned directly from him (Haykel, 2009). Besides the 
Salaf’s ability to seek clarification from the Prophet on the various issues of Islam, 
Quran and Prophet’s teachings came in Salafs’ version of Arabic language, and this 
makes them the most capable of interpretation (Abdel Hamid, 2013).   
Moreover, texts are central to Salafis and they warn against the use of human reason to 
speculate beyond the text (Conv. int. Shaltoot, 2013, Abdel Hamid, 2013). According to 
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Wiktorowicz (2006), Salafis perceive the application of “human intellect” or 
“rationalism” to the original sources of Islam as the most threatening danger to its 
purity. Thus, through avoiding the use of human logic and metaphorical interpretation 
of the holy texts, they guarantee that they do not suspend the connotation and the 
authority of the texts, where human reason should only be employed within the limits of 
the text (Abdel Hamid, 2013, Conv. int. Shaltoot, 2013). Doing this, Salafis are 
“literalists not only scripturalists” (Meijer, 2009). This literal approach was connected 
to the issue of Tawhid, or the oneness of God and his names and attributes that is the 
core of Salafis’ theology. In this respect, Salafis, unlike other Islamic groups, insist that 
God’s names and attributes should be literally understood and that any deviation from 
this puts one at risk of unbelief (Haykel, 2009). Salafis also, by limiting themselves to 
Quran and Sunna with the understanding of Salaf rather than any other sources, avoid 
the dangers of innovations (Bid’a) in the moral and ritual spheres (Wiktorowicz, 2006, 
Gauvain, 2013). 
Accordingly, Salafis would not rely on the Four Law Schools of Islam (Madhahib), 
since such schools derive their rulings from the ‘opinion’ of their founders and their 
disciples. Thus, blind imitation of such schools (Taqlid) is rejected by Salafis, who 
consider legal imitation as the reason for Muslims’ decline. Therefore, Ijtihad 
(individual interpretation) is much encouraged; however, it should follow certain rules 
(Lacroix, 2009, Meijer, 2009, Haykel, 2009). In this regard, Salafis see Quran and 
Sunna as ‘self-explanatory.’ Thus, if the necessary training and religious knowledge are 
acquired, the majority of religious rulings can be directly derived from the holy texts, 
and will be clear and incontrovertible. Salafis go through this process as if it is a 
“scientific enterprise governed by hard laws of nature (in this case divinity),” where 
63 
 
they make sure that the methodology is sound and that the conclusions are based on 
strong evidence from the holy texts and the consensus of the Salaf (Wiktorowicz, 2006: 
214). That is why they see that it is not impossible to become a scholar, and religious 
self-learning is encouraged as a duty for every Muslim (Haykel, 2009).  
This focus on ijtihad, the priority of the text over the human agent, and self-learning, are 
factors that can explain the intellectual independence among Salafis, and the “shallow 
and limited hierarchy of scholarly authorities” (Haykel, 2009: 36). Such aspects give 
weight to the individual level of analysis in studying Salafis, and the organization of the 
Salafi movements and their political mobilization and performance if they happen to 
enter politics.  
To sum up the main aspects of Salafism, as regards Salafis’ theology, the key concept is 
Tawhid12 (God’s oneness). As for Law (Fiqh) and how religious rulings are derived, 
they prefer individual interpretation (Ijtihad) over imitation (Taqlid) or adherence to the 
teachings of a particular school of law (Madhabyya) (Haykel, 2009). In addition, it is 
common among Salafis in general that they propagate ideas of the obligation of Jihad, 
the necessity of “purification of the heart” through prayers, the dangers of innovation in 
ritual issues (Bid’a), the “fragility of the human condition”, the “threat of 
westernization” and “the ethical and spiritual weakness of modern Muslims”. While 
such aspects and definition of Salafism are global, they tend to apply to Salafis in Egypt 
as well (Gauvain, 2013). 
 
 
                                                             
12 The oneness of Lordship, the oneness of Godship, the oneness of names and attributes of God, and the literal 
interpretation of names and attributes without any metaphorical explanations, fighting unbelief and association of 
God with anyone or anything (Shirk/polytheism) (Haykel, 2009) 
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Waves of Salafism and the Salafi Literature: 
As mentioned above, Salafism is sometimes confused with Wahhabism, a religious 
tradition established by and named after Muhammed ibn Abdel Wahhab, the co-founder 
of the first Saudi state (in 1744). For Ibn Abdel Wahhab, who was deeply influenced by 
Ibn Taymiyya, the purification of Islam solely meant pure Tawhid that should be both 
recognized and practised by a true Muslim. He stressed that religious judgement can 
only be based on Quran, Sunna, and consensus of the pious ancestors as the only 
sources of Islam. While he recognized Ijtihad, he himself followed the Hanbali school 
of law13 (Lacroix, 2009). The centrality of creed (‘aqida) and the adoption of Hanbalism 
were two main characteristics of Wahhabism, until recently, and can be used to 
distinguish Wahhabism from the rest of Salafi waves that followed (Gauvain, 2013). 
Among these, for instance, there was Ahl Al-Hadith (partisans of Hadith), established in 
India in the 1860s, which focused on Law (Fiqh) rather than creed, and advocated 
Ijtihad and complete rejection to the imitation of the four law schools, where Quran and 
Sunna are the main sources of religious rulings without intermediaries. Accordingly, it 
focused on the study of Hadith (words and quotes of the Prophet) that can provide 
answers to all legal and interpretation questions (Lacroix, 2009). Some Wahhabi 
scholars went to study in India and were influenced by Ahl Al-Hadith, among them 
Abdel Aziz ibn Baz the prominent Saudi and Salafi figure. This paved the way for 
change, however challenging and politically loaded it was, in the Wahhabi stance 
towards the Hanbali school of law (Lacroix, 2009). Ahl Al-Hadith also influenced 
Muhammed Nasir El Din Al-Albani who became the most important contemporary 
Hadith scholar and authority, whose efforts in studying and authenticating Hadith, and 
                                                             
13 Which meant a strict literal reading of the holy texts (Lacroix, 2009). 
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his purification and education strategy had a profound influence on modern Salafism 
(Lacroix, 2009). Al-Albani disciples founded the Neo Ahl Al-Hadith, whose presence 
was clear in Al-Madina, Saudi Arabia in the 1960s. However, with the increasing 
number of Al-Albani disciples who initially emphasized an apolitical stance, they were 
divided into two groups as regards their position from the regime; Al-Jama’a Al-
Salafyya Al-Muhtasiba (apolitical, yet anti-royal family in Saudi Arabia), and the 
Madkhalis (pro-regime) (Lacroix, 2009). The latter was the reason behind the Saudi 
regime’s encouragement of Al-Albani’s approach, despite of the fact that his thought 
was previously restricted in Saudi Arabia for opposing Wahhabi Hanbalism, promoting 
Ijtihad and questioning Ibn Abdel Wahhab’s Hadith understanding and capabilities. 
However, for political reasons, Al-Albani disciples were empowered in Saudi 
universities and institutions. Neo Ahl Al-Hadith, as the most recent intellectual wave in 
Salafism, was exported through the personal influence of Al-Albani, and through the 
institutions and universities in which this trend was empowered, which can explain its 
outreach in Europe and the Middle East (Lacroix, 2009).  
To sum up, Salafism took place in three intellectual waves. It derives its theological 
background from Ibn Taymiyya, and his student Mohammed ibn Abdel Wahhab, who 
for long were marginal sources for the Sunni community. Salafis then emphasized 
hadith scholarship through the efforts of Ahl Al-Hadith that led to the writings of Al-
Albani. Finally, the third wave could be the obvious political phase for Salafis, where 
Al-Albani thought was used to face the revolutionary tendencies and political 
aspirations of Al-Salafiyya Al-Muhtasiba, and Al-Sahwa, movements in Saudi Arabia. 
In fact, Al-Albani was supported by the influential figures in Saudi Arabia, Ibn 
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‘Uthaymin and Ibn Baz, who are also among the main Salafi references (Gauvain, 2013, 
Lacroix, 2009). 
The presentation of the waves of Salafism and the development of the concept through 
the interaction among these waves, is an attempt to determine the intellectual contours 
of this movement in its entirety, and to trace the main figures and writings that 
constitute the literature of the Salafi groups from which they derive their ideologies and 
on which they base their framing processes. In addition, this historical and conceptual 
presentation will help in understanding the political implications of Salafism, even of 
the most apolitical groups within the movement. In this regard, Salafism is viewed as a 
“social and religious movement whose activities have long term political effects that are 
not obvious at first glance” (Haykel, 2009: 34). They have a certain dress code, social 
and religious habits, prayers postures, and content and form of speech. Thus, focusing 
on the political aspects only leads to missing the ideational, theological and legal 
aspects, which results in misunderstanding of the fact that, politically, Salafis are 
usually divided between the Jihadis, and the politically submissive. Thus, the term 
Salafi loses its value and the variations in between these two categories are not 
presented (Haykel, 2009). For these reasons, this thesis puts equal emphasis on the 
ideational and political aspects of the Salafi movements, and attempts to root their 
political aspects in the Salafi intellectual background that was shaped through discursive 
and political interactions.  
In the following part of this section there will be a discussion of how the main 
intellectual issues and tensions in Salafism contributed to the contemporary divisions of 
the Salafi movement, and the political implications of such Salafi divisions, particularly 
as concerns the concept of social change.  
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The Religio-political Questions Splitting the Salafi Movement: 
In view of the historical overview of Salafism, contemporary Salafism was influenced 
by Wahhabism as regards the literalist tendency, doctrinal purity and internal splits 
(Meijer, 2009). Salafism also inherited the tensions that started within Wahhabism, such 
as the doctrine regulating the relationship with non-believers “loyalty and enmity” (Al-
Walaa wal Baraa), the issue of “ijtihad” which had political implications, the 
condemnation of “Shi’ism” as heresy, and the politicization of this issue, “Al-Hisba” or 
commanding virtue and preventing vice (Al-amr bel m’arouf wel nahy ‘an al-Monkar) 
that was propagated by Ibn Taymiyya and in its extremist interpretation led to the use of 
violence (Meijer, 2009). In this respect, “Salafis spend a considerable amount of time 
and energy on doctrinal disputes” (Meijer, 2009: 12), which are in this thesis the 
discursive conflicts that led to the formation of the ideology and identity of the various 
groups within the Salafi movement. Such discursive conflicts are mostly along the four 
main issues mentioned above, which all signify a difference in what is the right method 
to apply the religious beliefs to contemporary issues and contexts. Since there is only 
one legitimate religious interpretation, pluralism does not exist in Islam. However, the 
application of religion to the various issues depends on the subjective understanding of 
the context. Therefore, Salafis are divided into factions over “contextual interpretation 
and analysis.” Each faction considered itself the only one that practises and implements 
Tawhid, while all other factions may share the same creed and beliefs but are unable to 
apply them to their behaviour and contexts in the right way, thus are not “real Salafis”14 
(Wiktorowicz, 2006).  
                                                             
14 This mindset leads to “exclusivist understanding of Islam” (Wiktorowicz, 2006: 217). 
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Accordingly, Salafis are united on matters of theology (‘aqida), and as regards Law 
(Fiqh) most Salafis adopt ijtihad, however the difference is as concerns Manhaj by 
which Salafis mean “the path or method they live and implement their beliefs and call 
(da’awa)” (Haykel, 2009: 47). The split among Salafis as concerns Manhaj, or on how 
to “engage the world” and “how to make Salafi teaching pertinent to political life and 
questions of power,” makes Manhaj the relevant concept for questions on Salafis and 
politics (Haykel, 2009: 51). 
Salafism and the Concept of Social Change: 
One of the dilemmas for Salafis in which the difference in Manhaj is obvious is social 
and political change. Such an issue can be linked to the concept of Tawhid in Salafis’ 
theology, for if a Muslim should abide by Tawhid, would he follow the ruler even if he 
is not Islamic, and when he does not apply the rulings of Islam and orders of God? 
Would a Muslim face this by education and da’awa to purify and change the society, or 
by changing the ruler through verbally opposing him, or even through rising against 
him? (Meijer, 2009) 
This dilemma is also connected to the debate on Takfir (declaring a person, society, or 
an act as infidel). Despite the fact that there are conditions and strict rulings for 
practising Takfir, the difference among Salafis is not whether to use Takfir, or over its 
conditions, but rather whether to declare the ruler as Kafir (non-believer/infidel) or not. 
This difference emanates from their different evaluations of the ruler’s behaviour and 
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beliefs, in the light of the nature of faith, which requires both belief in God, and living 
according to His orders15 (Wiktorowicz, 2006) 
Another concept that is of relevance to social change is Al-Hisba or commanding virtue 
and preventing vice, which in its development started as a socially conservative 
principle, then an instrument for social activism (through persuasion and da’awa or by 
hand), and which in its ultimate form was connected to Jihad, or the use of violence 
(Meijer, 2009).  
Such differences16 among Salafis on Manhaj, particularly as regards social and political 
change led to the formation of the Salafi main political trends.  
 
Section Two: Salafi Political Trends 
Salafism, in its political dimension, can be divided into “quietist and discrete Salafis” or 
“purists” who are apolitical but might advise rulers behind the scenes (Meijer, 2009, 
Wiktorowicz, 2006). The quietists, or purists, prefer proselytization and advising 
leaders over rebellion and overt opposition or any political organization or actions. For 
them, political opposition or organization might lead to civil strife among Muslims, and 
might provoke the regime, thus might be leading to the destruction of the movement. 
This is while change is aimed at attaining better conditions for Muslims, and not the 
                                                             
15 For mainstream Muslims requires both belief in Islam, and acting according to God’s orders. However, as long as 
one believes in Islam, he remains a Muslim, and when he fails to abide by God’s orders in his life he is just sinner, 
not a non-believer (Wiktorowicz, 2006).  
16 Such differences were obvious in the third wave of Salafism, which is the political phase 1960s-1970s and 
onwards, which Lacroix called the “the birth of Salafism”, and by that he meant the intellectual contributions that 
came out due to the Islamic solidarity policy in Saudi Arabia against the progressive leftist regime of Nasser in 
Egypt. In this period, Saudi Arabia was a meeting point of Islamist activists and religious figures who were 
persecuted by Nasser’s regime, and in the case of Al-Albani, he was fleeing Assad’s regime in Syria. Thus, the 
interaction between Wahhabism, Ahl Al-Hadith influence represented in Al-Albani, Ibn Baz and others, and MB, 
who influenced Al-Sahwa movement in Saudi Arabia, as political Islamists (Lacroix, 2009), played a decisive role in 
shaping the current political map of Salafism.  
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opposite. Therefore, they advocated that actions should not lead to greater evil, defined 
as “weakening of propagation (Al-Da’awa).” Accordingly, it was understandable that 
they do not declare the regime or the ruler as Kafir (infidel). Moreover, obedience to the 
Muslim ruler is a religious obligation, even if the ruler is unjust (Wiktorowicz, 2006, 
Haykel, 2009). The quietists who are connected to Al-Albani, and groups such as Jamis 
and Madkhalis, are sometimes called ‘scholastic Salafis’ or ‘al-Salafyya al-‘ilmiyya’, 
since they focus on educating individuals and correcting them with almost no interest in 
current political issues, particularly, international ones. They believe that Islamic revival 
would only happen through adopting Al-Albani’s purification and education strategy 
(Haykel, 2009) or “Al-Tasfya wal Tarbiya”. This strategy should occur in two parts, 
first, the purification (Al-Tasfya) of Islam from everything that is alien to it, through the 
elimination of all forged or weak Hadiths and the interpretation of Quran along this 
authenticated Sunna and the concepts of Al-Salaf Al-Saleh. Second, Al-Tarbiyya, or 
education, is teaching “authentic Islamic creed” derived from Quran and Sunna to 
Muslim youth. This strategy gives priority, again, to the individual over the state 
(Lacroix, 2009).   
The second trend is the “Covert Salafis” who advocate quietism, yet, act politically 
without open or full political participation for the fact that they condemn hizbyya 
(partisanship/political parties) on the basis that it leads to fitna (factionalism) (Meijer, 
2009). Finally, there are the “openly activists” who call for political reform, are also 
known as Harakis (activists), and they advocate non-violent political activism both in 
Muslim and non-Muslim countries. These politicized Salafi groups usually fall in the 
orbit of  Islamism (political Islam) of MB, such as in the case of Al-Sahwa movement in 
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Saudi Arabia or Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya in Egypt17 (Meijer, 2009). Since they usually 
adopt some of the teachings, the political consciousness and the political organization of 
MB in seeking political reform and aspiring to power (Haykel, 2009), they are usually 
“labelled as Ikhwanis (Muslim Brothers) or Bannawites (followers of Hassan al-Banna, 
the founder of MB) (Wiktorowicz, 2006, Haykel, 2009, Meijer, 2009). Such politicized 
groups’ weakest aspect is their “underdeveloped political vocabulary.” In addition, on 
some occasions, their political activism goes beyond politics to the use of violence and 
Jihad (Meijer, 2009). Jihadis, like political activists, have been influenced by MB’s 
organizational teachings and political concepts especially those of Sayyid Qutb (Haykel, 
2009). Nevertheless, their Manhaj of change is the use of violence against the current 
political systems in order to establish a unitary Islamic state in the form of a caliphate. 
Al-Qaeda is the most obvious example of this trend, yet their Salafi training 
distinguishes them from Sayyid Qutb’s followers as concerns sticking to conditions of 
Takfir, whereas Qutbis denounce the entire society as infidel without necessarily 
applying Takfir’s strict conditions (Haykel, 2009, Wiktorowicz, 2006).  
Contra the political activists and Jihadis, the quietists were highly critical of MB, as 
shallow and deviant (Meijer, 2009). This is because quietist Salafis see that MB are 
putting politics over creed and religious knowledge. Since they are pragmatic, they 
adopt a political approach and are more in harmony with local cultures, and national 
causes. In contrast with MB, quietist Salafis were de-territorialized, de-culturized, and 
are apolitical (Meijer, 2009). Accordingly, MB was seen as one of the sources of 
Salafis’ divisions, and as causing political tensions among them. Therefore, MB is seen 
as an external enemy, and as a competitor for resources and influence. However, such a 
                                                             
17 Or as the Shubra School in Cairo, as will be discussed later. 
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problematic relationship with MB pushed the apolitical Salafis to eventually form 
political views (Meijer, 2009). Al-Albani was known for criticizing Al-Banna and Qutb 
(Lacroix, 2009), and provided a counter-discourse to that of the Brotherhood. Such 
relationship between Salafis and the MB was manifested in Egypt post-January 2011 
revolution, and can help in understanding the relationship between the Salafi political 
parties and MB before and after June 30th revolution. 
It remains to be said, however, according to Meijer (2009), that these trends and 
divisions among Salafis should not be taken as rigid, but rather to be seen on a sliding 
scale from quietist ‘minimalists,’ who put doctrinal purity first, to political and violent 
‘maximalists.’ However, Salafis’ variations are not only concerning Manhaj and 
methods of change, but also along geographical areas where Salafis adapt to their local 
circumstances.  
In this regard the following section will discuss Egyptian Salafism, with a focus on DS, 
in order to see how it can be connected to this global Salafi scale and political trends, 
particularly as concerns methods of social change.  
 
Section Three: Salafism in Egypt 
Despite the long history of Salafism in Egypt, there is almost no systemic academic 
contribution within western academia that deeply and clearly studies the workings of 
Egyptian Salafism (Gauvain, 2013). This can be attributed to the fact that usually there 
is no distinction among Egyptian Islamists, and that for instance, Salafis, MB, and Al-
Tabligh wel Da’awa tend to be studied in the same way (Gauvain, 2013). 
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The literature reviewed on Egyptian Salafis divides them into four major categories. 
Traditional Salafi organizations, which are AS (founded in 1926) and Al-Gami’yya Al-
Shar’yya, 18  that is not typically a Salafi organization. In addition, the recently 
established schools; the Salafi School in Alexandria (DS) and Salafis in Shubra, Cairo; 
that started in 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, there are the independent Salafis, or Al-
Albani disciples and their followers. Finally, there is a number of Azhari sheikhs 
influenced by Saudi Wahhabism (Gauvain, 2013).  
This chapter aims at situating DS both intellectually and ideologically on this Salafi 
map in Egypt. Thus in the following section, there will be a discussion of the 
intellectual references of DS, in order to determine both the global and the Egyptian 
Salafi intellectual influences on the movement. Then, DS ideological position will be 
discussed through examining its position on the Qutbi-Madkhali conflict in Egypt and 
how this position situates DS on the map of global Salafism.  
The Intellectual Background of DS: 
DS’ narrative of the history of Salafism reflects a connection between the medieval and 
the contemporary connotations of the concept, rooted in the Wahhabis’ attempts to 
penetrate Egypt back in 181819, and highlighted a historical rivalry with the embedded 
mystical Sufism in Egypt. Such Sufi-Salafi rivalry, besides having a political 
dimension, constituted a challenge against Salafism throughout its history in Egypt, 
since Sufism is connected to cultural heritage and is supported by Al-Azhar (Abdel 
                                                             
18 According to DS’ narrative that conformed to the literature, Al-Gami’yya Al-Shari’yya is human reason based 
Asha’ari, organization and represented the official Al-Azhar religious discourse. Thus, there were theological 
differences between AS and Al-Gami’yya Al-Shari’yya (Tawfiq, 2012a). 
19 When the Egyptian army defeated Wahhabis and the Wahhabi captives according to the Salafi narrative took the 
opportunity and tried to spread their thought in Al-Azhar through attending sessions and participating in discussions. 
Wahhabi captives also tried to counter-Sufism and mystics. Among these captives were Al-Zubaidi and Al-Jabarty 
(Tawiq, 2012b). However, there is no evidence on the precision of this narrative. 
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Hamid, 2013, Tawfiq, 2012b). Despite of the fact that according to DS’ narrative the 
real beginning of Salafism in Egypt goes back to Rashid Reda20, there is not much 
evidence on the Salafism of Reda in the literature (Lauzi`ere, 2010). Nevertheless, 
according to the literature and as per Salafis’ narrative it was indisputable that AS that 
was established by Mohammed Hamid Al-Fiqqi21 in 1926 for the purpose of spreading 
the understanding of Tawhid, fighting heresy, and Sufism, and which referred to Ibn 
Taymiyya as its intellectual reference, is the first Salafi organization in Egypt, and the 
main source of Salafism, particularly for DS (Abdel Hamid, 2013, int. Al-Shahhat, 
2013, Gauvain, 2013). In this regard, AS libraries provided “huge stockpiles of Salafi 
books, available for DS’ young sheikhs, starting from Ibn El Qayyem, Ibn Taymyya, 
Ibn Abdel Wahhab and Rashid Reda” (int. Al Shahhat). They were active in Moharram 
Bey in Alexandria22 (Abdel Hamid, 2013), and provided a space for the young people 
who had religious inclinations especially after the 1967 defeat (int. Al Shahhat). 
However, AS, from DS’ founders and followers’ point of view, was just a simple 
organization responsible for the management of some mosques and its leaders were 
against a more sophisticated collective action, especially given the state restrictions 
during Nasser’s era (1954-1970). In addition, most of AS’ sheikhs and leaders were 
elderly and unsuited for activism, which paved the way for the foundation of the 
younger DS movement. Moreover, young DS’ members had a number of religious 
reservations against AS, particularly as concerns Hadith, in addition to some minor 
                                                             
20 Through his Salafi contributions in Al-Manar magazine, the formation of a Salafi front with other intellectuals, 
among them Mohammed Hamid Al-Fiqqi. In 1912, Reda established the school of Dar Al-Da’awa Wl Ershad le 
Tadrib al-A’emma (School for Training and Guiding Imams) and he kept spreading Salafism until he died in 1935 
(Abdel Hamid, 2013) 
21 According to Abdel Hamid (2013), Al-Fiqqi graduated in Al-Azhar in 1917, and learned about Salafism from an 
average farmer in his village, so he got back to Cairo and started his research, and was highly influenced by Moheb 
Eddin Khatib and Rashid Reda. El-Feqqi started to spread Salafism among small groups of workers and farmers, 
since Salafism was not much welcomed in Egypt. As a role model for DS’ followers, it seems that they adopted his 
method of working with small groups, later in their propagation activities. Al-Feqqi then taught Quran interpretation 
in Saudi Arabia (Abdel Hamid, 2013). 
22 One of the main leaders of AS, Abdel Razzak Afifi, was responsible for Alexandria. 
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intellectual differences. These reasons might explain why despite sharing the same 
references and Salafi background, young DS’ sheikhs did not join AS, yet preserved a 
“cooperative relationship” with the organization (int. Borhami, 2013, Abdel Hamid, 
2013). It is worth saying here that DS shared Al-Albani’s criticism of AS, as focusing 
on theology rather than on Hadith (Lacroix, 2009). This directs the attention to the 
influence of Al-Albani on DS, where they consider him one of the main sources of 
Egyptian Salafism. In addition, DS members saw the evolution and institutionalization 
of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia through the establishment of the Saudi Fatwa 
Committee, and the Da’awa Council, as a strong source of Salafism in the region, and 
recognized this influence in Egypt and as one of their sources (Tawfiq, 2012b).  
To sum up, DS’ narrative supports the “continuity of Salafism” rather than a separation 
between the medieval and the contemporary, and insists on the deep roots of the concept 
in Egypt, and that they are an extension for it. They share the same references of 
modern global Salafism; mainly Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn El Qayyem, and Ibn Abdel Wahhab, 
in addition to the influence of Rashid Reda, and AS, the first Egyptian Salafi 
organization, particularly the contributions of Hamid Al-Fiqqi and Abdel Razzak Afifi. 
However, they are also highly influenced by Al-Albani, and recognize the influence of 
Saudi Wahhabism. Yet, it can be concluded from their narrative that, like AS’ 
followers,23 DS believes in the mutual influence between Wahhabism and Egyptian 
Salafism (Gauvain, 2013, Abdel Hamid, 2013). 
That said, surveying the intellectual contours of DS does not answer the question of 
what is their political position on the map of global and Egyptian Salafism. As 
mentioned above, Salafis share the same creed and adopt Ijtihad as the method of 
                                                             
23 Many AS’ members believe that Wahhabism was influenced by their sheikhs such as Abdel Razzaq Afifi who 
became the vice chairman of the prestigious fatwa committee (Gauvain, 2013). 
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deriving religious rulings. However, they differ among themselves as concerns Manhaj, 
or as to how they engage with the world, and how they deal with the question of change, 
and its relevant concepts. Therefore, to situate DS on the map of Egyptian Salafism and 
to connect it to the categories of global Salafism discussed above, the following section 
will discuss how DS perceives the various Salafi and Islamist groups, and how DS’ 
followers situate themselves on the ideological spectrum of Islamists in Egypt. This will 
be done through focusing on the method of social change, and the relevant concepts of 
Takfir, and Al-Hisba.  
DS on the Egyptian and Global Salafi Map: 
According to the Salafi narrative, after years of restricting religious activities during 
Nasser’s era (1954-1970), despite signs of a more religious inclination among Egyptians 
after the 1967 defeat, the “real religious resurgence” was during the Sadat era (1970-
1981), when he wanted to get rid of Nasser’s legacy and leftist followers, through 
facilitating the activities of Islamists (Abdel Hamid, 2013, Tawfiq, 2012a, int. Al-
Shahhat, 2013). Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya (GI)24, as a religious student organization, 
was thus established in Egyptian universities to counterbalance the leftist dominated 
student unions. Yet, this religious university activity was focused on religion, and there 
were no political orientations or divisions within the group, which was an independent 
body, supported and supervised by the university, and constituted the early beginning of 
systematic da’awa (Tawfiq, 2012a, Al-Naquib, 2011).  
However, according to DS’ narrative, such religious da’awa activities were not 
problematic until MB came out of prisons later during Sadat’s era and wanted to take 
control of this university activity (Tawfiq, 2012a). According to a Salafi Scholar, “MB 
                                                             
24 This is different from Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya, the violent Islamist group that used the same name later.  
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prefers to dominate rather than cooperate or work side by side with any Islamist group 
on the ground. Thus, they wanted to transform GI, that was an umbrella for all religious 
Muslim students, into a sub-section within MB, and intended to call it the university 
wing of MB” (Tawfiq, 2012b). In this regard, the six founders of the Salafi school in 
Alexandria (Al-Madrasa Al-Salafyya -MS) studied MB’s thought, and reached the 
conclusion that it deviates from Salafi methods and approach to Islam. Accordingly, 
they left GI, and founded their own school, thus, were subject to pressures from MB25 
(Tawfiq, 2012b, Abdel Hamid, 2013). 
In the light of this historical narrative and of the interviews held in the field, my 
research has found that DS’ founders and followers accuse MB of being responsible for 
the restrictions on Islamic activities during the Nasser’s era, and for hindering da’awa, 
because of their political aspirations (Abdel Hamid, 2013). In addition, DS classifies 
MB as an Asha’ari, thus, combined Salafi and liberal rational Islam (int. Al Shahhat), 
which led to many theological confrontations with DS, who also criticized MB for 
diluting and manipulating Islamic rulings (int. Shaltoot, 2013). Such criticism can be 
rooted not only in Al-Albani’s harsh criticism to the MB’s founder Hassan Al-Banna, 
and to Sayyid Qutb, but also in Al-Fiqqi’s position on MB since its emergence in the 
1920s. In this regard, Al-Fiqqi condemned MB as a highly politicized group, one that 
gives priority to power-seeking and makes use of Islam for this purpose. Al-Feqqi also 
said that MB is not a da’awa group and its members are “Muslim traitors rather than 
Muslim brothers” (Abdel Hamid, 2013). Thus, it can be concluded that the current 
                                                             
25 According to the biography of Sheikh Ahmed Farid, one of DS’ founders, MS was faced with threats, antagonistic 
actions, and defamation from MB, since it was fighting all those who refused to join its ranks, and they argued that all 
Islamists should be united within one group. However, in Farid’s words “Al-Madrasa Al-Salafyya favoured the right 
theological methodology and thought, over the unity of an Islamic group” (Farid, 2012). 
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conflict between DS and MB had its intellectual and ideological roots back in the 1920s, 
1960s and the 1970s.  
The way DS perceives MB not only reflects the historical rivalry between the two, but 
also constitutes a reproduction of the global and regional Salafi quietists’ discourse on 
MB discussed earlier, where the presence of MB represented for them a threat to da’awa 
activity, and brought about the unwelcome politicization of the religious movement.  
However, there was also a strong confrontation between MB and GI in upper-Egypt 
universities, and the latter resisted MB’s domination, yet was transformed later to Al-
Jama’a Al-Islamiyya (JI), the Jihadi group (Tawfiq, 2012a). Thus, DS’ leaders and 
followers see that the 1970s witnessed the formation of the Islamist groups and of the 
structure of their map and areas of influence in Egypt. The three major groups that came 
out during this period were; MB in all lower-Egypt universities (int. Farid, 2013, int. 
Shaltoot, 2013), JI in upper-Egypt universities, and the independent Salafi school in 
Alexandria, which refused to join any of the large Islamist groups (int. Shaltoot, 2013). 
These three streams had varying influences on the formation of the Islamist groups that 
appeared over the following two decades, as will be shown in the following part of this 
section, with a focus on DS’ narrative and position on such groups.  
The Criminalization of Militant Islamist groups: 
For DS’ followers, “There is nothing called Jihadi Salafism, and adding the word 
Salafism to Jihad is a decoration to attract more followers” (Abdel Hamid, 2013), for 
“not every bombing or crime is considered Jihad” (int. Borhami, 2013). 
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Thus, DS’ sheikhs refuse to use the words Jihadism or Jihadi Salafism, but rather use 
the expression the “military confrontation groups”26 to describe groups that believe in 
change through violent confrontations with the society and the governments, believe in 
toppling rulers, and adopt the idea of coups. Among these groups were those who 
considered themselves Sayyid Qutb’s disciples, and organized themselves while in 
prison, prior to their release during the 1970s and the beginning of their interaction and 
strong intellectual confrontations with Salafis (Abdel Hamid, 2013, int. Borhami, 2013). 
One of the founders of DS, Yasser Borhami said “I first heard the concept of Jihadi 
Salafism in 2002 in the official state security interrogations” (int. Borhami, 2013). For 
Borhami, such coinage is a conspiracy against Salafism in order to limit their resources 
and to make them vulnerable to security persecution. However, there are major 
differences between Salafis and militants as concerns Takfir, the use of violence, cost-
benefit analysis, or evils versus benefits calculations (Masaleh and Mafased). This is in 
addition to differences as concerns all the concepts militants get from the Qutbi 
framework, which Salafis never adopted (int. Borhami, 2013).  
Besides the difference with such groups on issues of declaring societies and rulers as 
infidel thus permits the use of violence as means of social change, DS’ sheikhs and 
followers have differences with such militant groups on the concept of Al-Hisba. For 
instance, JI in Upper Egypt, adopted the principle of preventing vice through direct 
action, or “by one’s hand” (Enkar Al-Munkar bel Yad). On the contrary, DS said that 
this leads to corruption, bloodshed, and chaos, and that the state and the police are the 
                                                             
26 Among the violent groups that emerged in this period was Al-Jihad, which was also condemned by DS as seeking 
change through violent confrontations following a fatwa of Takfir (int. Shaltoot, 2013). In addition to Jihad and JI, 
some Qutbi and Takfiri groups were formed inside prison. DS sees that Qutb’s writings were mostly literary, and 
were full of general expressions that may have contradicting meanings and connotations. This led to the creation of 
various groups, generally Takfiri (inclined to declare society or certain figures as infidel), such as Al-Tawaqqof wl 
Tabayyon, and Al-Takfir wl Hijra (Abdel Hamid, 2013). 
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only institutions responsible for fighting crimes and illegal actions, while Hisba should 
be carried out through persuasion and propagation (int. Shaltoot, 2013).  
As concerns cost-benefit analysis, and in line with the quietists’ logic and with Al-
Albani argument discussed above, DS’ followers saw that the highest cost of such 
violent method of change is the weakening of da’awa. This is because violence against 
civilians and assassination of politicians in Egypt led to defamation of Islamists, and 
made them lose "people’s sympathy” (Abdel Hamid, 2013). In addition, according to a 
female leader “adoption of violence, not only hinders da’awa, but also destroys the 
families of the followers of violent Takfiri groups and exposes them to torture, 
humiliation, and prison. Therefore, because such methods deviate from true Islam they 
do not even deserve this sacrifice (int. F. leader, 2013).”  
Thus, DS’ position and arguments against all the militant Islamist groups particularly 
those with a Salafi background, voiced Al-Albani’s arguments, which might put DS in 
the category of purists or quietists, especially, with regard to their position on MB 
discussed earlier.  
In view of the above, DS decisively criminalizes militants, and refutes the revolutionary 
ideas and infidelity of the society, both on religious and practical levels. In addition, it 
rejects the political nature of MB, in line with Al-Albani’s and Al-Fiqqi’s arguments. 
Nevertheless, such conclusions do not put DS within the pro-regime or politically 
submissive Madkhali trend that is connected to global Salafi quietism as discussed 
above. Put differently, such position does not put DS among the pro-Mubarak 
“Madkhali” Salafis in Egypt, who appeared to counterbalance the effect of Qutbism 
(Gauvain, 2013). Where, Qutbism, as an ideological Salafi trend in Egypt, does not 
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necessarily mean full affiliation to Sayyid Qutb (Gauvain, 2013), since the development 
of the connotation of Qutbism moved beyond the area of Takfir and violence discussed 
above, to signify the broader meaning of the  legitimacy to rebel against the established 
political authority (Meijer, 2009). Thus, as concerns Salafis’ approach to politics the 
real question then was to what extent a Salafi should consider Mubarak’s regime as 
legitimate? Those who considered the regime as illegitimate and announced this were 
punished by the regime that managed also to penetrate their groups, so that even 
questioning the legitimacy of the regime privately had a high cost. Therefore, those who 
believed that the regime was illegitimate had to wait patiently, spread da’awa and teach 
cautiously until they build the strength of the Egyptian Muslim community until it 
eventually changes itself: whether this change was to occur through revolution or 
through peaceful means differed among individuals and groups within Salafism 
(Gauvain, 2013). 
The Qutbi-Madkhali confrontation in Egypt will be discussed in the following part of 
this section, with focus on how DS reacted to these two major political trends within the 
Salafi movement in Egypt, and how this connects DS to the global Salafi map.  
DS on the Qutbi-Madkhali Spectrum: 
The Pro-regime Madkhalis:  
Madkhalis are Salafis who were highly critical of Sayyid Qutb and MB and employed 
the doctrine of “la khuruj ‘ala al-hakim” (full obedience to the ruler) to denounce 
anyone who voiced criticism against the regime or considered alternatives to it. The 
Shubra Salafis called this trend, the Madkhalis. However, Egyptian Madkhalis who 
shared the thought of Rab’i Al-Madkhali, did not have direct connection with him, and 
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despite being mild Madkhalis, the word was used as an accusation to anyone who seems 
to be ‘in the pocket of the regime’ (Gauvain, 2013). The book Al-Hakimyya wal Syassa 
al-Shar’iyya (Governance and Legitimate politics) was written by one of the prominent 
sheikhs in AS to advocate loyalty to authority even if it does not live according to 
Shari’a, and was directed against Qutbi revolutionary ideas (Gauvain, 2013). In this 
regard, DS criticised Madkhalis for not giving priority to the rule of God issue, which 
for DS was a central issue and was connected to issues of faith and Tawhid. DS’ 
followers mentioned that for Madkhalis the rule of God is irrelevant to true belief, thus, 
the ruler who replaces God’s rules by others and obliges people to follow such non-
divine rulings commits minor infidelity (Kufr Asghar). Consequently, he is just a sinner 
and he is left to God to judge whether to punish or forgive him. This trend is 
represented in Egypt by Sheikh Muhammed Raslan and Mahmoud Amer, and such 
figures considered that revolution is prohibited by religion. Currently, this trend is 
present in AS (int. Shaltoot, 2013, Gauvain, 2013, int. Borhami, 2013). Nevertheless, 
despite sharing the same intellectual background with AS, DS did not approve of such 
Madkhali ideas and positions, which implies that DS adopted a rather revolutionary or 
at least oppositional political approach. Thus, the question here is to what extent DS’ 
approach conformed to Qutbism with its revolutionary connotation? The following part 
of this section will try to answer this question through discussing Qutbism as 
represented by Shubra School, and its relationship with DS.  
Qutbism and non-Violent Salafis: 
From the 1970s to the 1990s, Shubra, Cairo, was known to be a hub for JI and Al-Jihad 
political revolutionaries, yet their influence declined and they disappeared, and local 
Salafi scholars filled the vacuum that they left behind. In view of the interaction with 
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these earlier revolutionary or violent movements, the forms of Salafism in Shubra 
become highly politicized and rejected the regime repression of the people. Pro-
government sheikhs were present in Shubra as well, but without much significant 
Madkhali influence (Gauvain, 2013).  
As mentioned above, activists and violent Salafis who might be classified also as 
revolutionaries were influenced by Sayyid Qutb. Therefore, due to the influence of the 
earlier revolutionary groups in Shubra, “within many Shubra circles Sayyid Qutb is still 
regarded as a hero” (Gauvain, 2013), however they see that his mistake was his 
willingness to pronounce Takfir on other Muslims. So in Shubra it was not wrong to 
speak positively about Sayyid Qutb as long as one makes sure that he does not use 
excessive Takfir. Therefore, being a moderate Qutbi is considered the right way to 
approach politics among the Shubra Salafis, without necessarily transforming this 
approach into revolutionary or violent actions (Gauvain, 2013). Accordingly, Salafis in 
Shubra can be classified as non-violent political activist Salafis, who oppose the regime, 
and are influenced by MB political thought, yet they are neither organized nor 
harmonious, and are divided into circles around individual sheikhs (Gauvain, 2013).  
DS and the Shubra School: 
The lack of coordination and organization among Shubra Salafis was supported by DS’ 
narrative about the Shubra School, which according to Borhami emerged in the mid-
1980s (int. Borhami, 2013). Generally, DS’ followers perceive Shubra School as Salafi 
scholars who came late to da’awa27 post-DS, and, unlike DS, were unable to create a 
comprehensive social movement with organized disciplined collective action and 
                                                             
27 They admit that they joined da’awa and contributed to it, years after the Alexandria school, and Mohamed Abdel 
Maqsod the most prominent figure among them used to ironically tell DS sheikhs, “we were in the café when you 
were already established sheikhs” (int. Borhami, 2013). 
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networks in the Egyptian governorates. Accordingly, Shubra School did not have a real 
popular base or a strong constituency. Nevertheless, DS shared the same theological 
background, Ijtihad method, and the same intellectual references with Shubra Salafis 
(int. Borhami, 2013, int. Shaltoot, 2013). Yet, the differences between Shubra and 
Alexandria Salafi schools were concerning collective action, Takfir and Qutbism. 
According to Borhami, DS and Shubra School differed as concerns collective action as 
means of social change, where a number of Shubra scholars considered organized 
collective action an innovation in religion (Bida’a). Despite the fact that some Shubra 
scholars respected collective action, they preferred to be independent and to work as 
individuals. Therefore, the Shubra School developed around individual sheikhs and 
followers who were not disciplined or organized. Thus, when they established political 
parties and even the Salafi Front as an organization post-January 2011, such entities 
evolved around individuals and disappeared with them after July 3rd 2013 (int. Shaltoot, 
2013, int. Borhami, 2013). That is why DS’ sheikhs see that the term ‘Harakyya’ or 
activism, that was used to describe the Shubra School, does not apply to a group that 
does not believe in collective action in the first place. Whereas DS’ founders see their 
movement as the only representative of Salafi organized scholarship and activism, and 
to a lesser extent AS that focuses on scholarship rather than activism. In fact, Borhami 
sees DS as the modern young version of AS (int. Borhami, 2013).  
Accordingly, in a departure from the quietists, DS approves of organized action and it 
classifies itself as an activist in the field of da’awa. Nevertheless, unlike the general 
categories of global Salafism discussed above, being activist does not mean that DS 
approves of the revolutionary connotation of Qutbism, since, for DS, Qutbism has a 
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different definition. Thus, despite DS’ oppositional position to Mubarak’s regime, 
Qutbism was one of the differences between them and fellow Salafis in Shubra.  
Despite the Shubra Salafis’ cautious approach to Takfir discussed in the literature, 
Borhami mentioned that Qutbi thought generally provides a frame for Takfir and the use 
of violence and that Qutbis are usually closer to MB when it comes to political 
alliances, which is not the case with DS (int. Borhami, 2013). Sheikh Ahmed Farid one 
of the founders of DS also sees Shubra school as more inclined to Takfir (int. Farid, 
2013). This is because they used to declare as infidel Muslims who do not pray (int. 
Borhami, 2013). In addition, as concerns the issue of the rule of God and applying 
God’s rules, which is connected to Tawhid and Takfir of the ruler, DS see that most 
Islamist groups are inclined to describe ruling against God’s orders as Major infidelity 
(Kufr Akbar). However, Shubra School declares specific persons (Kufr Ayn) as infidel. 
Such Takfir practice directed towards persons was criticized by DS, which despite 
considering ruling against God’s law a Major infidelity, would declare actions rather 
than persons as infidel (Kufr Mo’ayyan). That is why Shubra School proved by 
evidence that Mubarak is Kafir (infidel), while DS says that the actions of replacing 
God’s rulings by others, and obliging people to follow them is an infidel action, or act 
of Kufr. This is because DS’ scholars are pro the opinion that Takfir should be subject 
to strict conditions, particularly when it comes to individuals (int. Shaltoot, 2013).  
DS’ members also criticised Shubra Sheikhs’ discourse on Raba’a sit-in platform, and 
said that it implicated Takfir and an antagonistic approach towards the society. Thus, 
even if they do not adopt violence they weaken da’awa through losing people’s 
sympathy and acceptance, which makes it more difficult to approach sinners (int. Al 
Shahhat). Thus, according to the literature and to DS’ narrative, Shubra School’s 
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independent sheikhs adopted a Qutbi approach and were influenced by MB thought and 
policy choices as concerns politics. Such an attitude did not conform with DS’ political 
preferences, and clear differences appeared when both DS and Shubra school entered 
politics (int. Borhami, 2013, int. Farid, 2013). This can explain why the Salafi political 
parties that joined the MB’s alliance, after June 30th revolution, were left out of the 
scope of this study28. 
To sum up, the main differences between DS and Shubra School concern collective 
action as a method of social change and propagation or da’awa, and the Qutbi and 
Takfir attitude in Shubra circles. More recently, DS’ followers said that the difference 
with Shubra Scholars’ was due to their inclination towards MB political approach. 
 
 
Figure (1) Types of Takfir 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter presented the main concepts and references of global Salafism as an 
introduction to the study of Egyptian Salafism, in order to situate DS on the Egyptian 
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Salafis ideological spectrum, to determine its intellectual contours, and to connect the 
movement to the broader global Salafism map.  
This was done through exploring DS’ narrative of the Islamist resurgence, and the 
consequences of the main trends within the Islamist movement, particularly on issues of 
social change, and the relevant issues of Takfir, and Hisba, in order to determine DS’ 
position that developed through the interaction with the other Salafis and Islamists in 
general. In addition, DS’ position on these issues and its arguments help in locating it 
among global categories of Salafism.  
It can be concluded that DS’ position on the various Islamist and Salafi groups, and 
their choices as concerns social change, Takfir, and Hisba, does not fully conform to the 
attitude of the quietists who forbid organized action as an innovation, even if DS meant 
by activism a religious one. Such departure from the quietists’ thought is reinforced by 
DS’ opposition to the regime, and by calling the regime’s actions Kufr or infidel, due to 
the fact that DS’ followers do not compromise the issue of God’s rule, in addition to 
adhering to the issue of loyalty and enmity as core issues of belief. Such major issues 
made DS a target for state persecution. However, DS did not suffer the same level of 
restrictions and state repression as other Islamist groups during the Mubarak Era (int. 
Borhami, 2013). 
Accordingly, DS neither fully belongs to the quietists nor to the covert Salafis who 
preach quietism while being politically activists. This is because DS neither propagated 
a typical quietist approach, despite the clear influence of Al-Albani on DS’ political 
views, nor carried out political activism. Thus, DS also does not fall in the political 
activists category which, as per the literature, falls in the orbit of MB political thought 
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(Haykel, 2009, Meijer, 2009). Nevertheless, DS, while abstaining from political 
activism, still held an oppositional position against Mubarak’s regime. Yet, on the 
Egyptian Salafi ideological spectrum they cannot be considered mild Qutbis as 
suggested in the literature (Gauvain, 2013) since they consider Qutbism as a negative 
label.  
Therefore, while adopting an oppositional position that matches the objectives of 
January 2011 revolution, they did not participate in the protests (int. Shaltoot, 2013), 
which clearly makes them an openly opposition movement, that verbally criticizes the 
ruler, yet, abstains from political activism, or actual participation. However, this anti-
protest attitude made the public confuse them with Madkhalis, and they were situated in 
the quietists category.  
Even more, in contrast with both the quietists’ and the covert Salafis’ ban on Hizbiyya 
(partisanship), DS established a political party. Thus, confusion about situating DS and 
its references might be responsible for the misunderstanding of the movement and the 
expectations about it. Therefore, the fact that DS does not fully conform to any of the 
Egyptian Salafi groups, or global Salafism categories, makes it an interesting case 
study. This makes an in-depth study of the ideational side of DS crucial not only for 
understanding its distinct nature among other Salafis’, but more importantly to make 
sense of its policy choices as a political actor on one side and the nature of its role in the 
political scene on the other. However, to investigate DS’ ideology and its formation, it 
is crucial to study DS’ as a social movement within the Egyptian context and to explore 
both its cultural and materialistic aspects in order to clarify the internal dynamics of the 
movement, its decision-making mechanisms, and intellectual formation, and which of 
these aspects have more weight through the movement’s development. 
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CHAPTER THREE: DS’ DEVELOPMENT AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
Introduction 
In view of the discussion of DS’ location on the Salafi map, the previous chapter 
concluded that DS does not belong fully to any of the standing categories of global and 
Egyptian Salafism. This raises questions about DS’ formation and development as a 
distinct movement. Such a distinct position on the Salafi spectrum requires a closer look 
at the conditions within which DS as a social movement emerged, and developed its 
method and vision for social change. In this regard, this chapter finds that DS emerged 
as a social movement with the aim of protecting its Manhaj, and that the grievance that 
accompanied the movement was from a fellow Islamist counter-movement, not from the 
state. In addition, DS’ Manhaj developed through interactions and discursive conflicts 
with fellow Islamists and the dominant conservative discourse. However, DS-state 
relationship witnessed fluctuations which required that DS’ leaders and followers had to 
sacrifice parts of their organizational structure, but did not offer any intellectual 
concessions as concerns their Manhaj that is the cement of the movement. Therefore, 
Manhaj was always central in the movement’s mobilization, decision making, and 
framing processes of the opportunities and constraints that results from its context. 
Therefore, this chapter aims at understanding the socio-economic and political context 
in which DS emerged. This analysis of the context will discuss the institutionalized 
relations between the state and religion in general (Kniss, 2007), and DS-state 
relationship in particular. Moreover, DS’ interaction with counter-movements, seculars 
or fellow Islamists alike, will be explored, in the sense of how DS’ discourse developed 
due to interaction with the competitors’ discourses as well as with the dominant 
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discourse. Such contextualization of DS is an attempt to clarify the political 
configuration and the opportunity structures (Snow, 2000) in which the movement was 
formed, which contributed to the construction of its identity and Manhaj (ideology), and 
the resulting method and strategies of propagation (da’awa) and social change. 
Consequently, the concern is with how this Manhaj influenced the movement’s framing 
of the opportunities and the constraints within this context. This understanding of DS’ 
context also helps in understanding the dynamics of the movement in the sense of its 
resources, mobilization, and organization, and how they were shaped by the Egyptian 
conditions, as well as the movement’s Manhaj, and how they contributed to the 
movement’s survival under an authoritarian regime. 
Accordingly, this chapter sets the scene for a focus on DS’ ideological dimension in the 
following chapters, through explaining the conditions within which DS’ discourse 
(Manhaj) or vision for social change was constructed and how it was crystallized. This 
ideological dimension will be examined through discussing the means and processes of 
framing that DS carried out in the different periods in view of its Manhaj or original 
discourse, and in reaction to the different issues and sometimes challenges or new 
developments. Such a focus on framing comes as it is the key discursive mechanism 
that links ideas, values, ideology, and events in order to guarantee the support of 
adherents and bystanders, and to facilitate mobilization (Snow, 2010).  
This chapter begins with a presentation of the Egyptian context in which DS’ emerged 
and developed as part of a wider Islamist resurgence movement. In this regard, there 
will be a discussion of the structure and political configurations within which DS’ 
emerged, and how the consequent opportunities and constraints influenced DS’ 
development, selection of its Manhaj and the formation of its identity, in view of its 
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interaction with the rest of the Islamist movements and the dominant discourse. In 
addition, there will be a discussion of DS-state relationship pattern. The second section 
will discuss DS’ internal dynamics and strategies in light of its socio-economic context 
and relationship pattern with the state. This will be done through discussing the 
movement’s resources, mobilization, and organization, which all served in its survival, 
and were connected to its Manhaj.  
 
Section One: DS’ Emergence and Development in the Egyptian Context: 
The political context is formed of a number of components that are interlinked, first, 
structures, which encompass the international context, political institutions, cultural 
models, and cleavage structures, second, the configuration of political actors which 
determines the forms of alliances and conflict structures, and third, the interaction 
context that links both structure and configuration. This third level of analysis includes 
the strategies of public authorities and policy makers, and the opportunities that 
influence the choice of the strategies of collective political actors. These collective 
actors’ strategies, in turn, influence strategies of public authorities and political actors 
(Kriesi, 2007). Therefore, this section will discuss the socio-economic and the political 
context in which DS emerged, in order to understand how its ideology was constructed 
or how its Manhaj was formed, through the interaction with the various components and 
actors within this context, and what were DS’ opportunities and constraints, and 
consequently, what were the strategies that DS employed to deal with them. Finally, 




The Transitional Stage and Setting the Structure: 
The historical moment when DS emerged signified a transitional stage in Egyptian 
history from Nasser’s socialist to Sadat’s rightist semi-authoritarian regime that 
sponsored a religious conservative discourse to eradicate Nasser’s legacy. Nasser’s 
regime represented a post-colonial state and society that emphasized modernization, 
populism, and nationalism, and in which there were corporatist arrangements where the 
state was the sole welfare provider (Ismail, 2004: 388). According to DS’ narrative, 
such an atmosphere was challenging to the founders of DS, since they grew up in a 
socialist state that imposed its discourse through all institutions of socialization. Thus, 
young sheikhs, particularly Mohamed Ismail Al-Moqaddem29, who came from religious 
families and were sent to AS’ mosques to memorize Quran during their early 
intellectual formation, developed a negative position towards socialism and secularism 
and a belief that Islam is the answer for all their questions in resistance to the dominant 
discourse (Tawfiq, 2012b).  
However, by the mid-1960s there were signs of change in the structure, that were 
manifested in a decline in the nationalist narrative (Ismail, 2004), which for DS’ 
followers constituted the collapse of Nasser’s Arab nationalist and socialist project after 
the defeat of 1967. Such a demise from DS’ perspective resulted in a “religious 
inclination in Egyptian society, which found its references in the Salafi books and 
contributions that were available in AS libraries” (int. Al-Shahhat). Thus, the 1967-
1973 war constituted a favorable condition for the initiation of Islamist mobilization. 
                                                             
29 Al-Moqaddem is the founder of DS and studied in AS mosque in Alexandria, and had access to its library. He was 
challenged by his leftist teacher, who saw that Islam defies science and women’s rights. As a result, Al-Moqaddem 
carried out a research in AS library to prepare a counter-argument that defends Islam in an academic way. This 
confrontation escalated; however, with the support of his father, it was settled in favour of Al-Moqaddem. Such a 
tough experience resulted in his convictions that Quran has answers for all questions and criticisms and that non-
Islamist ideologies hate Islam. Therefore, Al-Moqaddem developed a tendency to fight the leftist hegemonic 
discourse, particularly because of the suppression of his religious beliefs (Tawfiq, 2012b).  
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Not only that such a long war had negative implications on the Arab nationalist project, 
it might have also contributed to the exhaustion of the regime’s resources; and its 
capability to suppress the opponents (Oberschall, 1973). This might explain the decline 
of the statist and corporatist arrangements, particularly in the beginning of the 1970s 
where the state was no longer the sole provider for economic resources and was not the 
main employer: this resulted in rising autonomy in the society, both on the cultural and 
economic levels. This situation continued in the 1980s where the state capacity of 
exerting control over the people through coercion and providing services weakened, 
thus giving space for the informal economy, and for the social activities and services 
and informal employment provided by Islamists and centered around mosques (and 
churches for Christians) (Ismail, 2004: 388). 
On the political level, in the 1970s Sadat’s shift from leftist to rightist orientation, the 
adoption of the economic open-door policy and a multiparty system constituted a 
transformation of the Egyptian political system from an authoritarian system with rigid 
state control to a semi-authoritarian one (Brown, 2012). This shift was also seen as part 
of a wider shift of alliance away from the communist USSR towards the USA, which 
was applauded by Islamists. Meanwhile, on the regional level, the Egyptian-Saudi 
relationship witnessed significant improvement, particularly during the 1973 war (the 
Oil Embargo), and until signing the peace treaty with Israel in 1978. Such Egyptian-
Saudi rapprochement paved the way for a flow of Muslim scholars, ideas and resources 
between the two countries and, thus, the support of Islamists in general30  (Tawfiq, 
2012b, int. Farid, 2013).  
                                                             
30 Despite the fact that DS leaders stressed their financial and intellectual independence from Saudi Arabia over their 
history. However, they mentioned that one aspect of the Saudi support to the Salafi thought in Egypt was through 
funding AS organization (int. Farid). 
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Sadat’s rightist orientation and manipulation of religious symbols, due to his tendency 
to get rid of Nasser’s legacy and of his leftist opponents (Ismail, 2004), signified a shift 
in the alignments, which constituted an opportunity for Islamists (McAdam, 1996, 
Tarrow, 1998) during that transitional stage. In this context, state-religion relations 
developed in two main directions: the establishment of state-controlled religious 
institutions, which eventually developed as relatively autonomous bodies, yet under 
direct presidential control. This is in addition to religious social actors who were 
allowed to express their religious views yet within the limits defined by the state 
(Brown, 2012). In this respect, the state sponsored a conservative religious discourse, in 
which religious figures such as Sheikh Sha’rawy appeared to be independent from the 
state apparatus yet were responsible for the production of state ideology (Ismail, 2003). 
As a result of such new arrangements, Sadat established Al-Gama’a Al-Dinyya in 
schools31  and GI in universities, in addition to releasing MB from prison (Tawfiq, 
2012b). Besides turning a blind eye on the Leftist-Islamist clashes in university, the 
state relatively supported the rise of GI that was considered a university student 
association parallel to the students’ union, thus, it benefited from the financial 
allocations that were available at state universities to support their camps and activities 
(Tawfiq, 2012a, Farid, 2012, Al-Naquib, 2011). 
Thus, it can be said that the employment of “Islamist articulations in the constitution of 
political forces” started in the 1970s with GI, the return of the MB to the political scene, 
                                                             
31 Sheikh Yasser Borhami and Sheikh Ahmed Hotayba, two of DS founders, were the products of Al-Gama’a Al-
Dinyya. They were availed the opportunity to write and to deliver religious speeches in their school, and they became 
the religious references for their colleagues. At the university level, sheikh Al-Moqaddem joined GI when he became 
a student in the school of medicine in Alexandria University. Al-Moqaddem had a clash with the leftist students’ 
union over tearing Quran posters hung on the walls by GI. This clash escalated when Al-Moqaddem was violently 
beaten, and it turned into a battle between the leftists and the Islamists in the university. The result of this fight was 
that Al-Moqaddem became the main leader in GI (Tawfiq, 2012) 
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Sadat’s use of Islamic slogans and symbols, and the rise of Jihad (Ismail, 2003: 55, int. 
Shaltoot, 2013). 
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the confrontation between the radical Islamists and the 
state, and in order to control radicals, particularly after Sadat’s assassination in 1981, 
the state used both repression and dialogue, and propagated its own version of Islam. 
Thus, the state sponsored the conservative religious discourse that served in the 
construction of the Muslim identity, or the “Muslim subject in ethical and cultural 
terms,” in which conservative figures particularly Al-Azhar sheikhs introduced an 
“alternative frame of ordering the world as guardians of moderate Islam” (Ismail, 2003: 
32). Eventually such a version of Islam, identity, culture, and morality constituted the 
ideology of the state. This discourse evolved around the narrative of the confrontation 
between the correct or moderate Islam and the mistaken or radical Islam (Ismail, 2003).  
Political Configurations and Strategies of the State and Islamists: 
Such conservative discourse was represented mainly by Al-Azhar sheikhs, and the 
moderate opposition, mainly Al-Ahrar party and elements of MB (Ismail, 2003). Also, 
the number of thinkers who called themselves moderate or “wasati” was large and 
encompassed, besides MB’s figures, liberal intellectuals who had religious inclinations 
as well as television preachers, and since this category is wide many Salafis would fit in 
it as well (Brown, 2012). The dominant bloc which was not homogenous included 
several fractions that were connected to the rentier economy and parasitic economic 
activities (petite bourgeoisie, parasitic bourgeoisie, transformed labor aristocracy and 
professionals), who, for tactical reasons, also supported this conservative discourse. 
Thus, the conservative figures served as the link between the bourgeoisie and the state 
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(Ismail, 2003: 51, 57), and were emphasizing the status-quo (Ismail, 2004). In the 
meantime, the moderate Islamist opposition or MB served as the guardian of the pious 
youth, condemned violence, and criticized state transgressions against shari’a. In this 
regard, MB chose to function from within the system, through its “formal structures 
such as party organizations, professional syndicates and the Parliament.” And to 
overcome state restrictions on them, they made alliances with other parties who were 
not necessarily Islamists (Ismail, 2004: 396-397). Such conservative ideology was also 
reflected in state institutions. For instance, the parliament and courts were responsible 
for legislations and rulings that conform to shari’a as per article 2 of the constitution. In 
addition, the Ministry of Education had to ensure the instruction of Islamic practice and 
content to Muslim students (Brown, 2012). 
In view of such political configurations, the state’s strategy was to sponsor the 
conservative discourse and its convergence with the moderate Islamist opposition aimed 
at “neutralizing radicals,” “containing Islamic left,” “circumventing secularists,” 
“displacing social and national struggles” and “producing a religious identity,” which in 
turn led to the reproduction of power relations (Ismail, 2003: 32). Accordingly, 
Muslims’ activities became bounded by the limits of the teachings of some Islamic 
authority (Ismail, 2003: 81), and it was under the control of the state except for the 
revolutionaries or the violent groups, who were subject to state repression.   
Within this context, Islamists represent wide loose networks that have common 
references and positions as regards morals, yet they might differ as concerns the state 
and method of activism as mentioned in the previous chapter. Thus, they used various 
strategies ranging from direct confrontation with the state and violent attacks, to 
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propagating tension in the public sphere, to penetration of societal spaces (Ismail, 2003: 
176). 
This structure and political configuration resulted in a number of opportunities and 
constraints that were responsible for DS’ emergence, the formation of its Manhaj, or 
ideology, its identity, its transformation into a social movement, and its strategies and 
choices. In the following part of this section, there will be a presentation of DS’ 
opportunities and constraints and how they influenced DS’ Manhaj, and its interaction 
with fellow Islamists and the rest of the components of its context. Then, there will be a 
discussion of the state-DS relationship pattern.  
DS’ Opportunities and Constraints: 
According to DS’ narrative, the young sheikhs32 who later established DS, considered 
the shift of alignment in the regime, the consequent support of Islamists against the 
leftists, and the establishment of GI, as the opportunity that made Islamists’ revival 
possible. Nevertheless, most Islamists did not realize it at the beginning, thus they were 
cautious and fearful of state repression if they were open about their religious 
orientations.33 On the contrary, the later DS’ founders who were then enrolled in GI, 
were able to understand the opportunity, and to make timely use of it. Thus, within this 
vibrant Islamist atmosphere, GI sheikhs established committees and groups, divided up 
work, and participated in students’ unions and in all kinds of university activities. This 
gave them sufficient experience of how organized work is carried out and they became 
                                                             
32 Mohammad Ismail Al-Moqaddem, Ahmed Farid, Mohamed Abu Edris, Yasser Borhami, Ahmed Hotayeba, and 
Sa’id Abdel A’zim, are the six founders of DS.  
33 Arresting Sayed Qutb (MB prominent figure), and his group, then his execution during Nasser’s era was always 
present in Islamists’ memory (Tawfiq, 2012b). 
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familiar with administrative structures34 (Tawfiq, 2012b). Such access to institutions 
through working within the university, and freedom of expression, constituted open 
institutional and discursive opportunities for Islamists that meant access and 
concessions according to Koopmans’ (1999) model.  
This success and the impartial nature of GI continued until MB came out of prisons 
starting 1974 (Tawfiq, 2012b, int. Al-Shahhat, 2013) and found out that a new 
generation continued Islamic da’awa, and were active and dynamic (int. Farid, 2013). 
At the beginning, MB’s members started to practice da’awa on an individual basis 
through GI without revealing their identity or trying to recruit any student in their 
organization. This policy continued until they got a green light from President Sadat to 
resume their activism. Such state tolerance with MB made the political opportunity 
more obvious for the rest of Islamists, and they decided to step up their activities 
(Tawfiq, 2012b).  
Forming an alliance with an influential ally is considered one of the dimensions of 
political opportunity (McAdam, 1996, Tarrow, 1998). This makes MB’s return to the 
political scene, while being supported by the regime and part of the dominant discourse, 
an influential ally for fellow Islamists. Nevertheless, DS’ founders did not see this as an 
opportunity and refused to turn GI into a sub-section of MB organization, while the 
majority of GI members agreed to join MB. Therefore, GI was split between those pro 
the formation of an umbrella Islamist front, and those who did not support 
unconditional alliance with no regard to theological and methodological differences 
among the various groups. The latter was the minority. In fact, eleven members left GI 
                                                             
34 At that time, GI main influence was in schools of Medicine and Engineering, and then spread to other schools and 
GI’s members were elected for the cultural and the student services committees in the students’ unions. Moreover, 




in 1977 and established MS (Tawfiq, 2012b). It can be inferred then that instead of 
considering MB an opportunity, it became a constraint since it turned into a counter-
movement (Oberschall, 1993b), that worked on defaming MS’ members and managed 
to make them lose their main platform, and to be ejected from several mosques. This 
was done through employing the moderate versus radical dominant narrative, where 
MB spread the image that MS’ sheikhs are young, inexperienced, and radicals (Tawfiq, 
2012b), while MB constituted part of the dominant conservative discourse that acted as 
the guardian of moderate Islam (Ismail, 2003), and conformed to the common 
understanding of religion in Egypt at that time as went earlier. Moreover, MB was seen 
by the rest of Islamists as heroes who were imprisoned for the sake of Islam, while MS’ 
sheikhs lacked such a legacy (Tawfiq, 2012a). Therefore, fellow Islamists, rather than 
the ministry of Endowments or the police, fought MS (Tawfiq, 2012b). 
Yet, since 1977 MS focused its efforts in two directions. First, the preparation of 
preachers using references to Quran and Sunna, and finding evidence. Second, 
publishing Salafi books to spread their methodology in a series titled “Salafis talk”35 
(Abdel Hamid, 2013). They also pursued three strategies to counter MB’s pressures. 
First, they insisted on delivering their speeches and preached even in means of 
transportation and on the streets.36 Second, they worked on reinforcing and deepening 
the friendship among the founding sheikhs of the school and the people who come to 
the mosque in what they called enhancing unity, fraternity, and faith meanings (ma’ani 
                                                             
35 Among the books published were 37 volumes of Ibn Taymiyya, each volume was sold for one Egyptian pound. 
Each week students read a volume, and would buy another in the following week, which was one of MS educational 
methods (Abdel Hamid, 2013). 
36 For instance, Sheikh Ahmed Hotayba used to give two lessons for a large number of people in the tram on his way 
back and forth from university (Tawfiq, 2012b). 
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Imanyya)37, and from DS’ point of view, this was one of the ways in which MS’ sheikhs 
made their ways back to the mosques. Finally, according to their narrative, they used the 
“Bonaparte strategy,” attack is the best means of defence. Thus, sheikh Al-Moqaddem 
decided that he would face MB’s defamation campaign through a series of lectures in 
which he objectively criticized the twenty principles of Hassan Al-Banna, founder of 
MB, using evidence from Quran and Sunna. At this time, since criticizing Al-Banna 
was a taboo even on the official level, this decision attracted people’s attention to MS, 
and they gradually started to accept Al-Moqaddem’s arguments. Later on, they adopted 
his opinions, and some of them became Salafis. Afterwards, people came to his lectures 
in order to learn how to counter-argue the MB, and this series of lectures, from DS’ 
point of view, was one of the main reasons for the spread of Salafism in Alexandria 
(Tawfiq, 2012b). This has also helped with the return of MS’, later DS’, sheikhs to 
mosques, as they were largely seen as adhering primarily to religious, rather than 
political discourse, and that their focus is on ‘ilm (legal sciences). Thus, people seeking 
answers to religious questions would prefer DS’ mosques over those of MB, who were 
more involved in politics than in preaching and religious lessons (Gawwad, 2013).  
Such clashes between DS and MB were mainly ideological and mirrored the regional 
clash between Salafis, particularly Al-Albani’s followers, and MB and the movements 
of politicized Salafis that evolved in MB’s orbit, as mentioned in chapter 2. This sheds 
light on the importance of DS’ Manhaj that the founders were not willing to sacrifice for 
the sake of the formation of a unified Islamist front under the leadership of MB as an 
influential ally. In contrast, they turned MB into an enemy for the sake of preserving 
                                                             
37 sheikh Yasser Borhami (one of the six founders, known for having high communication skills), always stressed the 
necessity of “taking care of those who enter the mosque, know their names and addresses, give them perfume, and be 
there for them in times of need” (Tawfiq, 2012b). 
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their thought. Nevertheless, the conflict was not solely with MB since in its early 
beginning as MS, DS entered into discursive conflicts with fellow Islamists as well as 
with the dominant conservative discourse.  
Discursive Conflicts among Islamist Groups and the Dominant Discourse:  
According to DS’ narrative, there were major differences with Al-Azhar, the official 
Islamic institution that led the dominant conservative discourse and was responsible for 
the production of the state ideology (Ismail, 2003). These differences were about issues 
of interpretation, Sunna, the issues of the rule of God, and the principle of loyalty and 
enmity (Tawfiq, 2012b). Such differences were highlighted in the interviews as a 
concern about the Ash’ari approach (rationalism) of Al-Azhar and the encouragement of 
Sufism (mysticism), in addition to reservations on the choices and statements of some 
of Al-Azhar figures (int. Makhyon, 2013, Talibbya, 2013). Thus, such differences can 
explain why DS did not join the conservatives’ alliance. However, the dominance of the 
conservative discourse, particularly when sponsored by the state, and the re-islamization 
of the society, has served DS in its propagation activities, where the society was ready 
for the acceptation of a religious discourse. Yet, this state led conservatism was seen by 
DS’ followers as a state of nature, since they always repeated that “the Egyptian society 
is conservative by nature” (Int. Mekki, 2013, int. Makhyon, 2013, Ismail, 2003). This 
means that they did not recognize the construction of this conservative Islamic identity 
that was sponsored by the dominant bloc, and which facilitated DS’ mission. One of the 
reasons was that DS’ followers see that they adopt a comprehensive definition of Islam, 
one that does not differentiate between “core and crust” (int. Shoukri, 2013). Thus, they 
pay attention to all aspects of Islam including appearance, emphasizing purity, priority 
of the texts, and avoiding any concessions or deviations from the right path of Al-Salaf 
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Al-Saleh (int. Nasr, 2013, int. Al-Shahhat, 2013). Such claims to purity and 
comprehensiveness were DS’ reason for entering into discursive conflicts, not only with 
the dominant conservative discourse that was not up to their standards, but also with the 
rest of the Islamist groups that for them misunderstood some Islamic concepts and 
rulings, thus, deviating from the right path. This falls in line with Wiktorowicz’ 
understanding that each faction among Salafis considers itself the real Salafi and the 
most capable of applying the Islamic rulings to contemporary contexts (Wiktorowicz, 
2006). 
In this respect, the differences among Islamists were generally on the priorities of 
da’awa and the sources of Islam and of Sunna (Tawfiq, 2012b). Such differences 
revolved around the method of social change (Manhaj Al-Taghyeer), and the position on 
the state. Since its early days, DS had three main intellectual distinctions that set it apart 
from the rest of Islamists, and such positions were mainly drawn from its Manhaj. First, 
unlike the rest of Islamists, particularly MB, DS criticized the Iranian Revolution for 
being a Shiite sectarian revolution rather than an Islamic one; thus, DS was accused of 
serving Sadat’s regime and it suffered a negative image for a long time, until it became 
known that the Iranian regime is suppressing Sunnis. Second, DS had a clear position 
against Jihad and Takfir groups, thus, due to harsh criticism of such groups, DS was 
accused of dividing Islamists’ unity, while it made it clear that priority goes first to its 
Manhaj. Third, DS’ approach to social change, unlike other Islamists was a bottom-up 
approach rather than imposing change through parliaments or coups. DS was also 
subject to Islamists’ suspicions for adopting this approach to social change and its 
loyalty to Islamists was questioned. This is because such an approach implied a mild 
position against the state, which was for other Islamists the main obstacle in the face of 
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their efforts to establish an Islamic state, and that changing it should be Islamists’ main 
target (Tawfiq, 2012b). However, again this moderate position on the state did not mean 
that DS joined the dominant bloc or the conservatives’ alliance, as mentioned above. 
Yet, in view of the dominant narrative of radical versus moderate Islam (Ismail, 2003), 
DS’ non-violent position made it relatively evade state repression, and facilitated its 
survival, as will be discussed in the following part of this section. 
Finally, in view of the structure and political configurations of DS’ context, there is no 
evidence that they benefited from the opportunity of the bourgeoisie support to the 
conservative discourse. For although the alliance between the bourgeoisie and 
conservative figures (Ismail, 2003), and the changing composition of JI to encompass 
tradesmen and benefit from their resources on the radicals side (Ismail, 2004), DS 
suffered from limited resources over their history (Women's committee, 2014, int. 
Makhyon, 2013, int. Farid, 2013). Moreover, based on field work meetings and 
ethnographic notes, the information available on DS composition is that it was 
composed of students like other Islamist movements, and continued to draw upon 
middle and lower middle class professionals, and even the businessmen in the 
movement were originally professionals rather than tradesmen, at least as concerns the 
leaders and the core members of DS (Field notes, 2013-2014). However, with DS’ 
limited resources they were able to carry out social activities and charity work in their 
neighbourhoods through mosques, where, like other Islamists, the social disengagement 
and the limitation of the role of the state as economic provider gave space to such 
activities (Ismail, 2004).  
To sum up, DS’ Manhaj formation evolved in interaction with its context, i.e. with 
alternative Islamic discourses whether that of the dominant bloc, the moderate or radical 
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opposition. Such interaction shaped DS’ framing of the opportunities and constraints, as 
well as its strategies and alliances or cleavages with the various components and actors. 
Accordingly, DS did not join the conservative dominant discourse, thus did not benefit 
from the resources and the support of the state, Al-Azhar, and the bourgeoisie. 
Nevertheless, it benefited indirectly from the state conservative ideology and the re-
islamization of the society, where DS mission was facilitated, through the creation of a 
fertile space for its propagation and through giving it access to discourse, particularly 
given it was non-violent. In addition, DS did not join the Islamist front and rather 
entered into discursive conflicts with fellow Islamists, and considered MB’s return to 
the scene as a constraint and an obstacle to propagation. Thus, it is necessary to look at 
DS’ methodology that makes it distinct among other Islamists, and that is responsible 
for DS strategies and is core to its framing of opportunities and constraints. 
The Formation of DS’ Manhaj and Identity: 
DS’ founders invested heavily in selecting their methodology and intellectual approach. 
This process of approach formation took place within a context characterized by 
profound discursive conflicts among Islamists, and in a transitional period, that allowed 
Islamists unprecedented freedom of expression and action. Thus, new Islamist trends 
and ideas emerged and interacted (Tawfiq, 2012b).  
In this context, DS founders were able to develop a narrative of Islamic history and 
decided on the references for the interpretation of its main sources. So the Salafi 
methodology to interpret and to form positions on the various issues was based on 
finding evidence from the main sources of legislation in Islam; Quran, Sunna, 
consensus of scholars, analogy (qiyyas), convention, considerations of public Interests, 
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and Madhhab Al-Sahaba (The doctrine of the companions), which come in an ordered 
ranking (int. Al-Shahhat, 2013). They focused on literal study of the texts of Ibn El 
Qayyem, Ibn Taymiyya, and Mohamed Ibn Abdel-Wahhab, and used to revise and 
check their understanding of such texts with senior sheikhs 38  (Tawfiq, 2012b). In 
addition, they adopted Al-Albani’s purification and education strategy (Omar, 2013). 
Accordingly, they defined the contours of their thought within the Salafi references. In 
addition, they were keen on producing a simple clear religious discourse, based on 
trusted references that could be easily communicated to the public through simplifying 
events and realities (Snow, 2000, 2007). According to Sheikh Adel Nasr, “their main 
message was that they call for a path that conforms to human instinct, which would 
normally lead to God’s way, and since He created humans, He knows what grants them 
internal peace. Such an objective can be attained through going back to Quran and 
Sunna with the understanding of Al-Salaf Al-Saleh (pious predecessors) away from 
Bida’a and moral anomalies” (int. Nasr, 2013).  
DS’ followers and leaders mentioned that people of different backgrounds could 
understand such simple and straightforward call and religious discourse. Moreover, 
linking it to human instinct does not make Salafism exclusive to a certain superior 
group but rather normalizes this approach and makes it more feasible, and does not 
assume superiority over their society which contradicts ideas of Takfir, and isolation. 
Therefore, the main objective was to work from within the society in order to introduce 
                                                             
38 In order to guarantee precision, the founding sheikhs, besides copying the texts in their exact wordings, they used 
to revise their understanding with the students of Mohamed ibn Abdel Wahhab in the world and in Saudi Arabia, in 
particular. In this concern, they referred to “AL-Fatwa committee” in Saudi Arabia, which was for them a trusted 
authority, and was respected by AS, Al-Gami’yya Al-Shar’yya, and Al-Azhar. For that reason, sheikh Al-Moqaddem 
visited Saudi Arabia five times, and the rest of the founding sheikhs used to go for Umra (Mecca, and Medina) in 
Ramadan and to stay there until pilgrimage (two months) during their summer vacation when they were still students. 
In this period, they interacted with the most famous Saudi scholars, and discussed their understanding of their main 
texts. Among them was Sheikh Ibn U’thaymin, the prominent Saudi religious reference, who used to spend long 
hours with the youth, to discuss the various religious topics, and answer controversial questions (Tawfiq, 2012b). 
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a gradual bottom-up social change (int. Nasr, 2013). Thus, their appeal comes from the 
clarity of their doctrine and claim to purity, like fellow Salafis on the global level 
(Meijer, 2009). Accordingly, religious sciences dissemination through public lectures, 
and specific curriculums in their kindergartens, Quran schools, and Al-Forqan institute 
became the main tool of spreading DS’ Manhaj and such educational programs start at 
the age of three, and continues in the different stages of DS follower’s life 
(kindergarden, 2013, int. F. leader, 2013). Eventually, they developed a full vision of 
reform that started to be applied gradually (int. Al-Shahhat). The sheikhs started by 
teaching U’lum Shari’yya (Islamic religious sciences) for non-specialists. Accordingly, 
DS was distinguished by a school that provided academic Shari’a studies, through a 
curriculum equivalent to that of standing Universities with the same speciality, thus, 
was able to provide civil university graduates with a solid religious background (int. Al-
Shahhat).   
As for identity construction, DS’ leaders and members defined themselves as those who 
follow the comprehensive and disciplined approach to Islam (int. Shoukri, 2013). In 
addition, they were keen on defining themselves against the “Other,” in order to set the 
limits between them and all groups that defy Manhaj Al-Salaf such as Shiites, MB, 
liberals, or Takfir and violence groups (Tawfiq, 2012b, int. Al-Shahhat, 2013). DS’ 
decisions were all attributed to its leaders’ and members’ strict abidance by Manhaj Al-
Salaf, whatever the losses can be, since sacrificing Al-Manhaj for them is an existential 
threat, as was emphasized in all the interviews held in the field. Thus, all the framing 
processes of DS’ choices evolved around this explanation, as will be explained further 
in the analysis of DS’ and NP’s framing processes in the following chapters.  
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DS’ narrative of the process of methodology selection, meaning making, and the 
formation of the intellectual approach of the young Salafi sheikhs results in a number of 
observations. First, the founders’ exposure to AS’ libraries determined their selection of 
their approach and intellectual contours. Second, the improvement in the Egyptian-
Saudi relations, besides availing resources for AS the main Salafi institution then, 
allowed for the flow of ideas and thought from Saudi prominent Salafi figures. Third, 
encircled by leftist secular discourse where the discussion of science, research, and the 
importance of concrete evidence was at its peak in the Egyptian society, the young 
sheikhs were keen on adopting scientific thinking, and on proving that being religious 
does not contradict being systematic. This was reinforced by the nature of their 
educational disciplines, which were mostly in medicine and engineering (Tawfiq, 
2012b). Therefore, they decided that there were a number of problems within Islamists’ 
discourse and their understanding of Islam. They undertook expansive research of their 
own and produced a list of references and a methodology to study and interpret Islam. 
Thus, their scholastic approach was not only a result of their adoption of Al-Salafyya 
Al-‘ilmiyya school of Al-Albani that was flourishing in Saudi Arabia, but also due to 
the cultural and political context during Nasser’s era that might have influenced their 
intellectual formation. Finally, the crystallization of DS’ Manhaj took place due to 
interaction with other Islamists, and particularly, in opposition to that of MB. 
In conclusion, DS’ sheikhs exerted serious efforts in selecting and forming the 
intellectual approach and methodology. However, this school, in order to survive, and to 
resume and widen its activities, had to turn into a complete social movement. This 
transformation was a form of resistance to the counter-movements’ pressures that 
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threatened the outreach and even the existence of MS’ Manhaj; therefore, organized 
collective action became necessary.  
The Transformation of MS into a Social Movement: 
In view of the importance of Manhaj, MS as a school of thought was transformed into a 
social movement through the adoption of collective action, according to DS’ narrative, 
just for the sake of immunizing their Manhaj against counter-movements’ campaigns, 
particularly that of MB (Tawfiq, 2012b). This is because when MS tried to resume 
university activities, MB challenged them. Such confrontations did not stop at 
defamation, but escalated into a violent clash in which MS members were brutally 
beaten, and emerged from this fight determined to start an organized collective action 
for the sake of protecting the existence of their Manhaj, to resume da’awa, and to prove 
that they are not powerless. However, the decision to pursue organized collective action 
caused polarization among sheikhs. In this regard, a group preferred to stick to 
academic work within the school and to avoid any confrontation with MB. The other 
group insisted on establishing organized collective action and a complete da’awa 
movement, with wider activities that bypass academic ones, and are more systematic 
and structured. Accordingly, they turned MS into DS movement (Tawfiq, 2012b, 
Tawfiq, 2012a, Abdel Hamid, 2013). 
Thus, the main reason for the establishment of the social movement was confrontation 
with the main counter-movement, MB, and the adoption of collective action, which 
relatively departed from the purely scholastic approach of Al-Albani, was framed by the 
existential threat to da’awa and Manhaj, which required collective action to confront it. 
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Accordingly, the grievances that accompanied the emergence of the movement came 
from a counter-Islamist movement rather than from the state (Oberschall, 1993b).  
Awareness of the Social Movement: 
There were variations in the timing of the awareness of the existence of DS as a 
complete social movement among the sheikhs of the various generations, and among 
male and female members of the movement. The female DS’ narrative39 tends to avoid 
exaggeration or making up facts as concerns their role at the emergence stage, because 
they had no awareness of the existence of DS since all their activities were carried out 
through GI, which encompassed all Islamists except for Al-Takfir wl Hijra. In addition, 
female students’ activities were religious and impartial40. However, women were not 
aware of the differences among Islamists, discussed in the previous chapter, and nobody 
explained these divisions to them (int. F. leader, 2013). Yet, they were attracted to DS’ 
simple, apolitical religious discourse, but, were not aware that there is a specific Salafi 
entity, at the beginning (Gawwad, 2013). 
Accordingly, women did not develop an independent position during the DS’ 
emergence stage, and each one adopted her husband’s affiliation and views, shared his 
books, and believed in them, be they MB, JI, or Salafi. There were no other sources 
available, until all the Islamist groups were activated, and among them, DS, and each 
got its own mosques and produced its books and ideas. Subsequently, members of the 
various Islamist groups started to exchange books and ideas, and to argue against each 
other (int. F. leader, 2013). This was the way DS benefited in its emergence as a social 
                                                             
39 Due to the low profile of DS’ women, their narrative of DS’ history and their contribution in the movement was not 
studied, which led to misconceptions about women of DS as will be discussed in the following chapters. 
40 For instance, they were not studying certain religious subjects, but were only learning how to read Quran, used to 
fast on Mondays and Thursdays (Sunna), maintain the morning and evening prayers (Azkar), visit patients, and 
support the newly married. Moreover, they wore Hijab, and those who wanted wore Niqab (int. F. Leader, 2013). 
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movement from the conservative atmosphere and social re-islamization, discussed 
above, which was signified by the employment of religious cultural products such as 
religious speeches, and publications, cassette tapes, the appearance of religious actors 
who claim “religious authority” and contributed to the construction of “identity frames” 
that were based on religious elements. Such frames and products were also used by 
Islamists (Ismail, 2004: 401), thus promoting DS’ members’ awareness of their 
belonging to the movements.  
According to DS’ women, the various intellectual approaches developed when each 
expressed and exchanged their views, and presented their principles and books through 
public lectures. Thus, by the end of the 1980s, the ideas of the different groups were 
fully crystallized, and the new generations came out with the legacy of their groups 
represented in books, principles and responses to suspicions (int. F. leader, 2013). By 
the turn of the 1990s religious sciences students started to seek knowledge in DS’ 
mosques, among them females’ lessons, leaving behind the politicized MB’s discourse. 
In addition, fully convinced with the Salafi discourse, women in Alexandria University 
formed a group without any political intentions by 1986. They highlighted also that 
their awareness of their affiliation to DS was motivated by religious differences and 
clashes with MB in university (Gawwad, 2013, Women's committee, 2014). Therefore, 
based on DS’ historical narrative, the two main components in DS’ framing starting 
from the adoption of collective action and members’ awareness of the movement and of 
their identity, were connected to Manhaj, and to the threat from MB.  
There were also variations in the awareness of DS’ emergence as a social movement 
among the elite. However, most of them dated it back to the late 1970s/early 1980s (int. 
Al-Shahhat, 2013, Abdel Hamid, 2013, Tawfiq, 2012a, int. Borhami, 2013, int. Farid, 
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2013). Moreover, there were differences among them as concerns DS’ definition and 
nature, and whether it is a social movement, or it resembles Islam as a whole. For some 
of them, there was a significant rejection of the western concept of “social movement,” 
which is seen as limited relative to the comprehensive nature of Islam. This is because 
they perceived DS’ main aim as the application of Islamic shari’a to all dimensions of 
one’s life (int. Al-Shahhat, 2013), or the operationalization of Manhaj Al-Salaf to reality 
(int. Nasr, 2013), which led to the diversification of DS activities, and broadened its 
scope (int. Al-Shahhat, 2013). This implicates their inclination to stress the all-inclusive 
nature of Islam in the face of the western understanding, which for them tends to 
marginalize religion and limit DS’ areas of specialization. Despite the fact that their 
description of DS (int. Al-Shahhat, 2013, int. Nasr, 2013) conforms to a typical social 
movement, they were defensive against this western concept. This is while some of 
them would give priority to DS’ structure, collective organized action, and networking, 
over its scientific production, and religious reference. The latter narrative highlights DS’ 
activism as a movement in order to distinguish it from the rest of Salafis, who share the 
same references but differ in nature (int. Borhami, 2013).  
In conclusion, the above-mentioned narratives about DS’ emergence conform to the 
definitions of a social movement. Despite their sensitivity towards the concept, they 
constituted a collective challenge to existing social, political, and even religious 
definitions and arrangements in the Egyptian context. They developed a common 
approach to Islam, with the purpose of applying it to society. Accordingly, they invested 
in creating solidarities and networks, and interacted with their secular and Islamist 
opponents, as well as with the state (Jenkins, 2005). As a group struggling over the 
definition of meanings, concepts, and the approach to Islam, they give special attention 
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to building Muslim identity and lifestyle that matches their Manhaj, on reforming 
society, and consequently state arrangements and institutions (Nash, 2010). 
Nevertheless, when the movement became more formal, it attracted state attention, 
where according to Brown (2012) the state gave Islamists, except for MB, the choice 
between either organization or political participation, i.e. Islamists who carry out 
organizational work should not participate, and who participate are not allowed to 
organize. Thus, in the following section there will be a discussion of DS-state 
relationship pattern upon becoming a social movement. 
State-DS Relationship, 1984-2011: 
According to DS’ followers’ narrative, DS-state relationship witnessed fluctuations that 
varied from restriction to facilitation; however, facilitation did not mean supporting the 
movement at any level, but rather turning a blind eye on its activities and members (int. 
Borhami, 2013). Yet, even the periods of facilitation were not problem-free, since the 
early 1980s, which was considered the golden age of the movement, witnessed 
detentions of young members and leaders to keep DS under control. DS’ activity was 
stalled due to Jihadis’ assassination of Sadat in 1981. As a result, Islamists were 
generally detained, and among them DS sheikhs, who were imprisoned from 1981 until 
1984, despite being proven innocent. Such activism was subject to restrictions again in 
1994, and their open organizational work was banned. This meant the state allowed 
them to exist without any official cover or licence which made DS vulnerable to 
security prosecution. The second largest attack came in 2002 when DS University 
activities were prohibited. Therefore, there were periodical limitations to DS but 
without complete eradication of the movement, so the state left the mosques under the 
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DS’ influence, on condition that security personnel are fully aware of the details of its 
actions (int. Borhami, 2013). Thus, State Security had reports about DS’ preachers, 
occasionally prohibited DS’ educational hand-outs and entertainment trips, and put 
restrictions on the topics preachers can discuss. As concerns charity work and social 
services, DS’ members had to carry them on individual basis not under the banner of 
DS, and could not use any slogans. However, in all cases, they had their Salafi 
appearance, that distinguishes them. Meanwhile, to limit their influence, Salafis were 
subject to media defamation and accusations of being sectarian (Gawwad, 2013).   
Such DS’ narrative interprets the fluctuating state position by its desire to maintain a 
balance among Islamists, since a full abolition of DS may drive many individuals to join 
the violent and Takfir groups. In addition, the state was resisting Shi’ite thought through 
Salafis. That said, it remains also obvious that DS was not a pro-government group, 
whose sheikhs had clear political positions as concerns loyalty and enmity, and the rule 
of God, and were keen on discussing these issues in all cases, which made it impossible 
that state would grant them freedom to expand (int. Borhami, int. Makhyon, int. Nasr, 
2013). Such security approach resulted in denying sheikhs access to media, despite of 
the fact that many non-DS independent Salafi sheikhs had access to TV programs and 
newspapers (int. Borhami, 2013). However, there is some evidence that access to media 
was not absolutely denied (Farid, 2012; 67); but the presence of DS sheikhs on TV was 
rare.41 However, in view of the above-mentioned policy towards DS and Islamists, the 
state would allow media access to individual sheikhs rather than leaders of a large 
organized Salafi movement, which openly opposes the government.  
                                                             




In addition to DS’ tense relationship with state security entities, its relationship with Al-
Azhar and the Ministry of Endowments, the official religious bodies, was also subject to 
fluctuations. In view of the dominant narrative of correct versus mistaken Islam, in 
which Al-Azhar was the moderate authority, in 1984 the state announced that Al-Azhar 
would evaluate the Islamist groups’ thought through public intellectual debates, and 
would recognize those who prove to be abiding by the true Islamic teachings and they 
would be allowed to practice da’awa, whereas extremist violent groups would be 
excluded from preaching. Thus, DS was recognized as moderate by Al-Azhar (Tawfiq, 
2012a, Ismail, 2003), and some of DS’ sheikhs became official preachers (Nasr, 2013). 
Consequently, in order to gain credibility and to acquire legitimacy, sheikh Borhami 
and sheikh Al-Moqaddem studied in Al-Azhar. After that, other Salafis started to apply 
to Al-Azhar, but later on a number of DS applicants were rejected with the argument 
that Salafis were trying to infiltrate Al-Azhar (int. F. leader, 2013).  
In this regard, DS in its relationship with the state diverted from the Koopmans and 
Statham model that assesses the different reactions of the elite to the actions of the 
movements and the opponents, in the various opened-closed discursive and institutional 
opportunities (Koopmans, 1999). First, because access to both institutional and 
discursive opportunities during the 1970s-1980s neither led to any concessions from the 
side of the government, nor to DS full empowerment, because it did not constitute a 
stable facilitation pattern within an authoritarian regime. Second, the combination of 
restricting institutional opportunity while allowing access to discourse in the 1990s did 
not lead to any intellectual concessions from the side of DS. Despite the fact that young 
preachers abided by state security rules in their public lectures (Gawwad, 2013), DS 
maintained organized collective action, through private actions and discourse (conv. int. 
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Rashwan). Nevertheless, these private activities remained not secretive or underground 
(int. Thabet, 2013), yet only on a scale that did not incite security intervention, 
particularly because they are not interested in being a political actor in the first place 
(Brown, 2011). Thus, unlike Koopman’s model, despite setting red lines for DS’ 
discourse, the state failed to repress the ideas that did not conform to its interests. In this 
regard, Snow (2007) mentions that framing and ideological work can still proceed even 
within a repressive political structure in private contexts. This means that whether the 
structure helps or not, these processes will take place but in different ways and degrees. 
Therefore, when both the institutional and the discursive opportunities were blocked in 
2002, organized work continued at a smaller scale, and even during detention, sheikhs 
started schools in prison. In addition, there were no concessions as concerns DS’ main 
tenets, whereas other Islamist groups carried out revisions to their thoughts. Fourth, DS-
state relationship did not witness the combination of open institutional opportunity and 
closed discursive opportunity in which the state selects some figures of the movement to 
enter polity as long as they adhere to the prevailing rules, since DS was not ready to 
exchange intellectual concessions for political gains.  
Accordingly, the nature of the role of the state in the emergence and development of a 
social movement in an authoritarian system, and DS religious apolitical targets, made 
the facilitation-restriction mechanisms produce different results. Thus, DS provides an 
interesting model of movements’ survival strategies within an authoritarian regime, 
where state restrictions indirectly empowered the movement. 
In the following section there will be a presentation of the internal dynamics of DS over 
its history, in view of such DS-state relationship.  
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Section Two: The Internal Dynamics of DS 
Resources, Mobilization and Decision-making 
DS’ financial resources draw mainly on members’ donations. At the beginning of the 
movement, all members were students and were generally on an equal footing in terms 
of their limited financial capabilities. But as they graduated and worked, then several 
generations joined, making larger internal donations became possible (int. Al-Shahhat). 
DS’ policy assigns such internal donations, e.g. membership subscriptions, in-kind 
donations and free services, and relatively large donations of some members, to funding 
the da’awa activities (preaching). Funds collected in mosques’ charity boxes are 
directed towards the poor and social services. According to DS’ narrative, such policy 
contributed to DS’ credibility, since the community felt that DS would not exploit them, 
but rather sufficed by the role of the mediator between them and the poor (int. Al-
Shahhat). In addition, this awareness of the limited resources as one of the main 
obstacles to da’awa, made DS’ members more motivated to think of creative ways to be 
self-sufficient, and to achieve tasks with the least cost (int. Al-Shahhat). Moreover, DS’ 
regulations confine speeches, preaching, teaching, and working as Imams (leading 
people in prayers) to volunteers, and never allows such tasks turn into a source of living 
(int. Al-Shahhat).  
Generally, DS prefers self-sufficiency through physical-efforts, and members’ donations 
(int. Al-Shahhat, int. Makhyon, int. Borhami), and decisively denied receiving any 
Saudi funds, considering this a form of defamation (int. Makhyon). Even though 
sheikhs used to visit senior sheikhs of Saudi Arabia, their relationship was friendly, and 
was confined to exchanging books, and religious discussions. However, there was no 
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coordination or funding of any sort. This was because DS’ leaders saw that whoever 
funds them would direct their agenda, and they were keen on keeping their 
independence, and distinctive intellectual approach (int. Farid, 2013). In this regard, 
Haykel finds it simplistic to consider that Wahhabism was spread because of Saudi 
funding, since Salafism appeared before the establishment of Saudi Arabia, and because 
not all Salafi groups accept or benefit from Saudi funds (Haykel, 2009). 
Despite there being no concrete evidence that DS did not receive any foreign funds, 
their activities, headquarters, and lack of facilities prove their limited financial resources 
(int. Makhyon, 2013). For instance, because of the cost, DS did not open a headquarters 
in Cairo 42  (int. Borhami, 2013). In addition, they have been always under police 
supervision and restrictions, thus, the fact that they might have received foreign fund, 
could have been a good chance for their detention and for the media and counter-
movements to defame them. Finally, DS’ leaders do appreciate the Saudi senior sheikhs, 
yet they are keen on stressing the independence of their school of thought, and that they 
do not ascribe, neither politically nor religiously, to Saudi Wahhabism. On the contrary, 
there are points of disagreement between them as concerns Takfir (int. Borhami, 2013), 
balance among the various Islamic sources, interpretations, practices, and priorities of 
da’wa activities (int. Farid, 2013).  
To sum up, DS managed to free itself from the domination of any of the other Salafi 
schools that might have stronger financial capabilities, being keen on preserving their 
                                                             
42 Even when the political party was established, most of its headquarters were hired from DS’ members who 
contributed the rent and in cases where there were no volunteers; they did not open one (int. Al-Shahhat, 2013). In 
addition, due to lack of resources, the party could not have a media platform in order to defend itself against the MB’s 
defamation campaign, especially after the June 30th Revolution (int. Makhyon, 2013). Also the field observations 
show that the general secretariat of the party in Cairo, is in a relatively popular area, and is very simple and was 
gradually furnished since July 2013 and until the end of the field work in January 2014, yet, was not luxurious. The 
party headquarter in Alexandria is in a relatively strategic area, still was not luxurious either. The party headquarter in 
Giza was significantly poor and simple. 
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distinct Manhaj. In addition, it was obvious that the quality of its human resources was 
making up for the lack of financial resources. However, the intellectual connection with 
Saudi Arabia and the influence of its prominent sheikhs on the intellectual formation of 
DS sheikhs were highlighted in the interviews, which is something DS’ members are 
clear about. Nevertheless, as concerns the issue of financial backing, the literature 
discussed earlier did not provide a definite answer and this issue tends to be a matter of 
speculation not supported with evidence. In line with this, this dissertation also adopted 
a sceptical position in this regard. Nonetheless, the tight restrictions on foreign funding, 
particularly to islamists in Egypt and the security limitations on DS, besides the field 
observations through which the researcher discovered that they have few offices that are 
poorly and gradually furnished, in cheap rental areas, in addition to the researcher’s 
observation of their cars, clothing and homes, all might imply that they are not a rich 
organization if compared to other Saudi-funded Salafis in Egypt. Moreover, the 
researcher knew informally from her sources outside DS and NP, after the field work, 
that NP, despite their fears of MB defamation, were not able to pay for launching a TV 
channel or taking a media strategy offer that was presented to them by a media agency 
in August 2014, and they are still unable to do that; yet, they later launched a YouTube 
channel instead, and the party does not have a website, but rather a Facebook page. In 
addition, NP experienced pressures during 2015 elections especially with vote buying, 
(Nabil, 2015a, Al-Shahhat, 2015), which might imply that if they were supported by any 
actor in the region they might have been funded and pushed to gain more seats in the 
2015 elections. Finally, in view of the recent fluctutions in the Egyptian-Saudi relations 
(Ali, 2016; Habboush, 2016), NP is still active on the Egyptian political scene and 
present in presidential conferences and events, which can say something about their 
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relationship with Saudi Arabia, and with other regional rivals of Egypt, namely Qatar 
and Turkey who embrace MB (Ghitis, 2014, Tol, 2016), DS’ historical rival. However, 
nothing can be inferred about their relationship with UAE and Kuwait for instance. 
Therefore, so far there is no credible and clear information available in this regard and 
the researcher suggests that such information might only be available to a security 
institution with potential access to private data, but not to an individual researcher. 
However, in view of the observations collected in the field and of following up the case 
in Egypt, the researcher is still more inclined to think that DS is not foreign funded and 
is a financially poor organization that makes up for this through its human resources and 
in-kind donations from its members (including some successful businessmen). 
Nevertheless, this is an issue that remains undecided.  
As for human resources mobilization, DS does not depend on the recruitment approach. 
This is because recruitment contradicts DS’ belief that it should be a social reform 
movement rather than a “cocoon” within this society. Thus, DS directs its discourse 
towards building intellectual convictions and educational preparations (int. Al-Shahhat, 
2013). Accordingly, the irregular audience for the lectures of DS would gradually turn 
into a permanent audience and subsequently into actors within the movement once they 
ask or get asked to express their opinions, and then participate in the activities. 
Nonetheless there were no intentional organized recruitment processes to urge the youth 
to join (int. Al-Shahhat, 2013). As for decision making mechanisms, according to its 
leaders, DS has always applied “Shura” mechanisms (int. Borhami, 2013). And in case 
the resulting decisions are not popular, leaders gave special attention to feedback from 
DS’ popular base. In fact, communicating decisions to the different levels of the 
movement takes place through various types of interactions that range from public 
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lectures, to one-on-one friendly communications (Women's committee, 2014). 
Therefore, leaders were keen on keeping a bottom-up decision-making process, not only 
for the reason that Islam requires Shura, but also because the movement’s human 
resources are its main asset, and their intellectual mode would not tolerate blind 
obedience (int. Farid, 2013). 
In conclusion, DS’ discourse is mainly directed towards the public, for the sake of 
building convictions and not mobilizing people or recruiting them to join its ranks, and 
those who become fully convinced with its religious discourse would ask to join, which 
reflects again the centrality of DS’ Manhaj as the cement of the movement (Gawwad, 
2013, Shams, 2013, int. Al-Shahhat, 2013). Moreover, the decision-making process 
takes into consideration the opinion of the followers, who adopt the individual reason 
approach of Salafism, leading to shallow hierarchies, and empowering followers vis-a-
vis leaders, as mentioned in Chapter 2. Such intellectual decentralization requires that 
leaders’ framing processes be connected to DS’ followers Manhaj and intellectual 
approach in order to keep the connectedness of the movement. 
The Two Phases of Organized Collective Action: 
Phase One (Pre-1994): 
Once activated as a social movement, similar to other Islamists at this period (Ismail, 
2004), DS started to expand its activities. It established social and media committees to 
contact public figures, started Islamic investment (Tawzif Al-Amwal), and Zakat (levy 
on the property of Muslims) committees. Gradually, regional committees were 
established, and there was a central council to manage them (Tawfiq, 2012a). 
Accordingly, activities such as commanding virtue and prevention of vice, and Shari’a 
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courts to settle and resolve conflicts among people (not to apply Islamic penal laws 
“Hudud”), were organized, yet were not official. In addition, Sot Al-Da’awa magazine 
was published to spread the main DS’ intellectual issues and convictions (Tawfiq, 
2012a). Moreover, in 1984 Al-Forqan institute for preparing and educating preachers 
was established, where the founding sheikhs taught and trained the first class that 
included almost 300 students and later various classes graduated 43  (Abdel Hamid, 
2013). 
Moreover, students who studied in Alexandria University transferred DS’ thought, thus, 
it became strong in most of the important governorates in the north coast and delta, then 
Suez Canal governorates, while having a weak presence in Cairo and Giza. Despite 
Sheikh Sayyed Al-Afani efforts in 1970’s, it was difficult to move within JI dominated 
Upper Egypt, particularly in the presence of armed clashes with the police. There was 
also no presence for DS in Sinai and the Red Sea areas (Abdel Hamid, 2013). However, 
DS started to spread its activities abroad as well, and had visits and centres in Europe 
and USA (Abdel Hamid, 2013, Farid, 2012).  
As for women’s activism44 and collective action, each region had its female preacher 
that was famous in her area, and this local activism could be explained by shari’a 
restriction on women’s travelling as well as state pressures on all DS’ members (int. F. 
leader, 2013). 
                                                             
43 DS also managed to take charge of mosques all over Alexandria, and opened up in the various governorates 
through lectures delivered by DS sheikhs and envoys (int. Farid, Abdel Hamid, 2013). 
44 Women’s’ narrative shows that they suffered discrimination in jobs, their children’s opportunities were limited, and 
they were exposed to verbal harassment in the streets because of their outfit (Niqab). In addition, they experienced 
other types of pressure when their husbands were detained, and they had to take the responsibility of their families, to 
raise new generations, and to support their imprisoned husbands. This means that women, despite being latecomers to 
DS, proved to be dynamic actors within the movement, particularly in studying and teaching religious sciences, and 
in social services activities, and through providing a back-up to male members when they were arrested. Thus, DS’ 




Thus, DS had high access and outreach before its open collective action was restricted 
in 1994 (Abdel Hamid, 2013). In addition, DS’ activities were frozen, except for the 
university and the youth ones that remained until 2002 (Tawfiq, 2012b). However, after 
dissolving the social committee, charity continued and this promoted people’s loyalty to 
the movement and increased its popularity (int. Farid, 2013). 
Therefore, the year 1994 marked a new phase of activism, where the leaders and 
members managed to maintain their movement and to survive all the restrictions until 
January 2011 Revolution.  
Phase Two (Post-1994): 
DS sheikhs saw that it was not wise to be intransigent with the state, or to insist on 
keeping all their gains. Therefore, they decided to keep what guaranteed DS’ survival 
and continuity, which was the university activities that helped in the development of the 
movement (Abdel Hamid, 2013). Moreover, in order to minimize risk and cost of 
activism, DS sheikhs were making use of social events such as weddings, and funerals, 
and of other religious organizations to deliver their lectures and speeches (Abdel 
Hamid, 2013, Nasr 2013), as well as establishing their own small licensed charity 
organizations (Nasr, 2013). They also held private sessions, and sometimes youth had to 
disguise to attend them (conv. Int. Rashwan). In addition, the board of directors that 
included seven members used to hold bi- and tri-lateral meetings to avoid the state 
pressures (int. Borhami, 2013).   
In order to make up for the shutdown of Al-Forqan institute, the courses were divided 
into a larger number of mosques, thus, lessons took place quietly without irritating the 
police (Abdel Hamid, 2013). However, this alternative plan benefited DS more than the 
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existence of the institute itself, because it increased DS’ outreach in new areas. In 
addition, Salafi books were published, and intensive courses, as well as four-year ones 
were held, then post-graduate studies were introduced, with a thesis and a supervisor 
(Abdel Hamid, 2013). 
Within such restrictions, it seemed that sheikhs and organizations that were banned by 
the government were more attractive and credible to people than official ones. In 
addition, the strategy of targeting smaller numbers of students, in larger numbers of 
mosques, spread in different areas, and without attracting attention of the authorities, 
was one of the main reasons of DS’ outreach. Moreover, keeping the university activity 
contributed significantly to this success. For despite the fact that authorities restricted 
the movement of senior sheikhs, Alexandria University students spread DS’ Manhaj all 
over the country. This was in addition to the continuous publishing of Salafi books that 
assisted in spreading the word (Abdel Hamid, 2013). 
Thus, when DS’ sheikhs were imprisoned in 2002, which constituted the second attack 
in DS history, they discovered that they have many followers, whom they were not 
aware of, and who recited DS’ lessons and books. Therefore, the sheikhs started a 
school inside the prison. In addition, they had the chance to communicate with Jihadis, 
and influenced some of them. Later, DS’ sheikhs were released on condition that they 
give up on university activity as well as their administrative structure, and the result was 
the relative weakening of DS (Abdel Hamid, 2013).   
This situation remained without significant changes until there was an unprecedented 
escalation in 2010 after the bombing of Al-Qiddissin (Saints’) Church in Alexandria on 
December 31st (Abdel Hamid, 2013), when the state security investigation service 
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arrested Sayyed Bilal, the young Salafi who was suspected to be responsible for the 
bombing, and was tortured until death (AhramOnline, 2012), despite being innocent. 
Such torture incident took place three weeks before January 2011 revolution.  
Thus, such tight conditions continued until DS experienced both open institutional and 
discursive opportunities after January 2011 revolution, which constituted the second 
major opportunity in DS’ history. However, within a different political context that was 
subject to radical structural changes, and again during this transitional stage, DS 
established an NGO, a political party, and expansively participated in all TV channels. 
Due to its previous experience in organized action, the shift to institutionalization was 
smooth, and it already had a clear methodology that predated the January revolution, 
influence on the ground, and a wide popular base (int. Al-Shahhat, int. Borhami, int. 
Nasr, Nasr, 2013).  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter presented the structure of the Egyptian socio-economic and political 
context during the transitional stage from Nasser’s era to Sadat’s era, which constituted 
an opportunity for the rise of Islamist movements and among them DS. The following 
period was signified by the dominance of religious conservative discourse, sponsored 
by the state, and propagated by Al-Azhar sheikhs and the moderate Islamist opposition 
represented by the MB. The bourgeoisie’s interests converged with that of conservative 
figures (Ismail, 2003). Such atmosphere created favourable conditions for DS’ 
proselytization. However, DS did not join the dominant conservative alliance since it 
had differences with Al-Azhar, and adopted an oppositional position on the state, even 
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though this position was non-violent and non-Takfiri. The return of MB to the political 
scene constituted a constraint to DS, however, encouraged its leaders to crystallize their 
Manhaj and identity, in opposition to MB and the rest of fellow Islamists, and to adopt 
collective action, where the main difference with the rest of Islamists was on the 
position on state, and the methodology or Manhaj of change. 
The adoption of collective action, which was relatively alien to the Salafi quietist 
references of DS, was framed as a defence of DS’ Manhaj against the existential threat 
of MB. Thus, MS turned into a social movement for the sake of Manhaj and to 
withstand MB pressures. These two components of DS’ framing processes were 
employed by DS’ members in different instances through their narrative of the 
movement’s history, and of their awareness of their affiliation to it (Gawwad, 2013, int. 
Shoukri, 2013, int. Shams, 2013).  
Nevertheless, despite being apolitical and non-violent, DS’ organized collective action 
provoked occasional state repression (Brown, 2012). Yet, this did not lead to the full 
abolition of the movement since according to DS’ narrative, the state used DS to keep 
the balance among Islamists, and to contain radicals, however without letting it grow 
and expand.  In this regard, DS’ leaders and followers were ready to give up parts of 
their organizational structure, but did not offer any intellectual concessions as concerns 
Manhaj that is the raison d'être of the movement and its cement. Thus, even with the 
limitation of collective action, and breaking the link between Alexandria and the rest of 
the governorates, sheikhs and their followers in the various governorates continued to 
teach a specific curriculum, that included certain intellectual issues and to prepare and 
educate cadres according to it, even in private sessions and through informal networks. 
Yet, their activities were not secret, so as not to raise security suspicions (int. Thabet, 
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2013, int. Makhyon, 2013, conv. int. Rashwan, 2013). This is how DS managed to 
survive within an authoritarian regime and through the fluctuations of DS-state 
relationship.  
To sum up, DS’ differences with the dominant discourse as well as fellow Islamists, 
particularly MB, were because of its Manhaj. Thus, DS neither framed state-sponsored 
conservatism as an opportunity, nor joined the Islamists’ front under MB’s leadership. 
Accordingly, DS preferred limited resources over sacrificing the independence of their 
intellectual agenda if, for instance, they receive Saudi funding. Finally, Manhaj was 
always central in the movement’s mobilization, decision making, and framing 
processes. 
Such conclusions give more weight to the intellectual aspect of the movement over the 
materialistic one since studying DS as a social movement showed that its main point of 
strength is its Manhaj or ideology, rather than its structure or organization. This was 
especially the case when members of the movement gave up parts of its structure and 
institutionalized work for the sake of survival at the different stages of the movement’s 
development, and the movement survived through the continuous education of its 
curriculum and literature in informal and private rather than secret means to the 
different generations. This makes it necessary to carry out an in-depth investigation of 
DS’ Manhaj and how it is employed in the various framing processes that DS carried 
out when it entered politics, in order to test whether the new arrangements after January 
2011 transformed DS’ Manhaj, how the movement carried out its framing processes in 
the various occasions and how DS’ Manhaj eventually influenced NP’s policy choices. 
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Thus, as mentioned in chapter one, the definition of framing adopted in this thesis and 
contextualizing the framing processes within the Egyptian context can best be 
understood through operationalizing Norman Fairclough’s framework. Norman 
Fairclough’s CDA framework is a means of keeping a distance between the researcher 
and the texts collected through applying a three-level framework that investigates the 
textual features, the discursive practices as semiotic aspects of social practices and the 
societal level or contextualizing of DS’ discourse within the Egyptian context.  
The following chapter aims at highlighting the main concepts and characteristics of DS’ 
discourse or Manhaj on social change as the main concept that can explain their political 
plans or intentions, and how this discourse developed alongside the development of DS 
in the Egyptian context. This will be done through applying CDA to the texts produced 
by the two ideologues of DS who are the main references on social change, Yasser 
Borhami and Abdel Moneim Al-Shahhat. This will provide an overview on how the 
concept was framed and how the ideology of the movement was developed through a 
continuous process of framing over the movement’s history. This chapter constitutes a 
point of reference to which the discourse of the movement on social change will be 
compared in the various stages of its history, on the different levels of the movement 
(elite, middle level, and rank and file), and age and gender categories, especially when 
the movement entered politics as will be shown in chapters 5 and 6.  
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CHAPTER 4: DS’ FRAMING AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF MANHAJ FOR 
SOCIAL CHANGE 
Introduction 
In light of the conclusions of chapter 3, the protection of DS’ Manhaj proves to be key 
in the framing process of MS’ decision to adopt collective action. In addition, Manhaj 
was present in the movement’s subsequent framing processes, resource mobilization, 
and decision making and organization. However, the founders’ initial articulation of 
their Manhaj as simply the belief in the comprehensive nature of Islam, and judging all 
issues depending on evidence from Quran and Sunna with the interpretation of the pious 
predecessors, makes DS closer to the quietist Salafis, particularly with their adoption of 
Al-Albani’s purification and education theory (Lacroix, 2009, Haykel, 2009). Although 
DS’ initial activities were purely scholastic, this initial articulation is not reflective of 
the movement’s Manhaj for social change that represents DS’ plan of action or 
ideology, which has in fact developed and crystallized though the movement’s 
evolution.  
One of the main contributions of this thesis is that it argues that DS has an established 
vision for social and political change, which was formed in interaction with other 
Islamists approaches to change, and was elaborated as the movement developed within 
the Egyptian context. In this regard, DS presents its approach as primarily religious, 
gradual, and is based on cost-benefit analysis and weighing consequences of actions, 
and reality requirements. This social change project is based on da’awa as sole means of 
change, and takes place in three levels the individual, the social, and the state, where the 
latter is fatalistic and should not be imposed on society. This makes it a bottom-up, non-
Takfiri, thus non-violent approach to change. Also the framing of such an approach, in 
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comparison to other Islamist approaches, involves a self-identification process of DS’ 
followers as scholastic, realists, rationalists, non-violent, and non-Takfiri. However, 
DS’ discourse shared the features of the Islamists’ discourse as regards the Other (the 
West, Christians, and seculars), and the tendency to adopt conspiracy.  
Therefore, in departure from some existing literature that deals with DS in view of 
MB’s experience, this thesis argues that DS has a clear distinct ideology. Thus, this 
chapter is providing a narrative of DS’ vision and the main features of its pre-revolution 
discourse for social change, a vision that gives priority to the religious over the political 
and to the individual and the social over the state. This chapter also provides a spectrum 
of Islamists based on their approach for social change.  
Accordingly, this chapter focuses on the construction of DS’ Manhaj for social change, 
which constitutes the movement’s ideology, as well as the framing processes that were 
carried out towards the crystallization of this Manhaj. Such ideology does not exist in 
vacuum, and is not a set of abstract ideas, values, and beliefs, but is rather a result of 
interaction (Ismail, 2004, Wiktorowicz, 2006) between DS’ discourse and the rest of 
Islamists, seculars, and the dominant conservative discourse within the Egyptian context 
discussed in the previous chapter.  
Thus, this chapter operationalizes the framing concept, which implies that social 
movements are not defending “preconfigured” ideas but are developing and producing 
meanings, organizing experience, and guiding action, through simplifying the events 
and realities with the intention of mobilization. Thus, the framing process is dynamic, 
and is a continuing process in which frames are constantly articulated and elaborated, to 
generate meanings that are not only different from the existing frames but are resisting 
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them as well (Snow, 2000, 2007). Such framing processes involve discursive processes 
that include talk and conversations, speech acts and written communications of 
movement members that are developed through linking events and experiences, leading 
to a new vision or interpretation and highlighting some issues, events, or beliefs as 
being more important than others. Another aspect of framing is that it is responsible for 
identity construction (Snow, 2000). Therefore, framing processes of DS, being the 
movement’s discursive practices, will be studied through the CDA of DS’ foundational 
texts on Manhaj of social change. 
Looking at the construction of DS’ Manhaj for social change through the 
operationalization of CDA to its key texts on the subject is fruitful. This approach not 
only highlights the broad lines of DS’ vision for change, its argumentation and the 
aspects of its plan of action, but also shows how the foundational texts of the movement 
- published almost ten years after its transformation into a social movement - 
contributed to the construction of the social reality, social relations, and the self or 
identity of DS. Attention is also drawn to DS’ social context (Fairclough, 2010, 1992); 
the late 1980s and early 1990s was a period of increasing distinction between the 
various Islamist movements and groups. 
This analysis aims at setting a point of reference to which DS’ discourse for social 
change in post-January 2011 revolution Egypt will be compared. Understanding the 
main features of DS’ discourse and clarifying its ideology or Manhaj, is the first step to 
examining how the Manhaj was employed in the movement’s framing processes of the 
opportunities and constraints that resulted from the structural changes of both January 
2011 and June 2013 revolutions. This examination will be informative as to what extent 
the framing or discursive processes of DS and its political arm, NP, are linked to this 
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Manhaj, and whether the discursive practices of the movement and the party functioned 
as extensions to or departed from it due to political interactions and calculations (Snow, 
2007).  
Accordingly, tracing the construction of DS’ Manhaj, and its framing processes through 
applying CDA to its foundational texts, this chapter starts with an overview of DS’ 
foundational texts on Manhaj of social change. The second section will discuss how 
DS’ foundational texts framed the different Islamist approaches to social change, 
through discussing how DS reacted to the main concepts and intellectual issues that 
were subject to tensions among Islamists, as mentioned in chapters 2 and 3, resulting in 
the crystallization of DS’ Manhaj of social change. The third section will discuss how 
DS’ discursive interactions and framing processes contributed to the formation of DS’ 
identity, and of its relationship with the other political powers, social groups, the state, 
the dominant conservative discourse, and various more specific concepts, such as 
democracy and citizenship.  
 
Section One: DS’ Foundational Texts on Social Change 
The main foundational text of DS’ concept and methodology of change is an article 
entitled, “Salafism and approaches to change,” (Borhami, 1992) written by Sheikh 
Yasser Borhami, and was initially published in DS’ non-regular magazine, Sawt Al-
Da’awa in 1992. This article constitutes a comprehensive and a clear statement of DS’ 
position on the Islamist controversial concepts and intellectual issues and defines DS’ 
Manhaj for social change. It came out after nearly decade on DS transformation from a 
school into a social movement, in view of debates with other Islamists. In fact, the 
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author’s name was not mentioned despite the fact that the article was highlighted on the 
cover. The article was republished online, and in handouts exchanged among DS’ 
followers, on Salafi online forums and websites from 2001- present with its original 
wording, eventually identifying the author, who became the main authority in the topic 
of change. The version analyzed in this chapter is the one published by Al-Baraha 
forum, and was collected in the field and compared to all other versions, where all 
proved to be identical.  
The author re-introduced the foundational text in a lecture delivered in 2009 and then in 
a book in 2010 (Borhami, 2009a, 2010a). CDA45 (see appendix 1) applied to such texts 
shows that the new versions evolved around the same broad lines and argumentation, 
but there were some differences as concerns the textual features 46 , strategies, 
interdiscursivity 47 , and intertextuality 48 . The lecture: ‘Salafism and Approaches to 
Change: Political Participations,’ focused on the approach to political participation in 
light of MB’s success in winning seats in the people’s assembly in 2005. It also 
addressed that preparations for the 2010 parliamentary elections aroused various 
questions among DS’ followers about the subject. Such spoken text, that was directed to 
a mostly Salafi audience, proved to be different from Borhami’s written texts, since he 
was more open about his beliefs, and less politically cautious in choosing his wording. 
                                                             
45 For the details of CDA of DS’ foundational texts on Manhaj of Social change, see appendix (1). 
46 The textual analysis explores the argumentation, the strategies and the grammatical aspects such as modality (high 
or low affinity), transitivity (who is the main subject), theme (priorities, and common sense), and cohesive markers 
(coherence, type of text). However, word meaning, wording and metaphors were of primary importance to this study 
in the sense of what are the new terms, their meanings, which meanings and words disappeared and which survived, 
since framing processes of articulation and amplification are directly connected to the choice of wording, linking 
concepts and words, definitions, and metaphors that serve in the construction of reality (Fairclough, 2010, 1992, 
Snow, 2000). 
47 Interdiscursivity means here what combinations of discourses, genres, and styles were employed and whether they 
changed over time. Discursive combinations are reflective of the movement’s identity, relation to the other, and 
representation of reality (Fairclough, 2010, 1992). 
48 Intertextuality explores the construction of subjects and social groups through texts, and the contribution of 
changing discursive practices to changes of social identity. This is done through specifying which texts are overtly 
drawn upon within the text or influenced the texts analysed (Fairclough, 2010, 1992). 
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In his book: “The Prerequisites of Calling for God,” Borhami reintroduced the article in 
a book, whose two editions were published in 2010 (1st edition in February, 2nd edition 
in July), a few months before the January 2011 Revolution. The new version of the 
article lies within the first part of the book, Pp. 40-119. The book as a written text was 
much closer to the article, yet it was more technical and depended on a wider range of 
quotes from Quran, Hadith, contributions of Salafi and prominent scholars, in addition 
to classical Islamic books. It was also loaded with implicit criticisms of the state and 
MB, but without making direct reference. 
Moreover, Sheikh Abdul Moneim Al-Shahhat delivered 22 lectures about reform in 
2010, and DS followers transcribed them and made them available online in 240 pages. 
Al-Shahhat was actually reproducing the foundational article of Borhami in his own 
way and was contextualizing DS’ methodology of change within DS thought, where his 
contribution constituted the most important second to Borhami’s. This chapter will 
focus on the last four lectures, 19, 20, 21, and 22, of Al-Shahhat's contribution since 
they are the ones that directly dealt with DS’ methodology of change, while also 
summarizing the main tenets of the rest of the series. 
A survey of ''Ana Al-Salafi'' DS’ website, under the section entitled ''The complete 
collection of explanations of the intellectual issues of the Salafi methodology,” shows 
that there is a sub-section for the contributions about the issue of ‘change.’ The content 
of this section further confirmed the findings of the fieldwork and the results of the 
archival research, where Borhami is the main reference for Manhaj on social change, 
followed by Al-Shahhat, who uses the concept “reform” instead.  
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Thus, the texts discussed above constitute the main reference to social change for DS’ 
followers, and covers all that was produced in this regard over the period from 1992 to 
2010. The following section will discuss how DS perceives other Islamists’ approaches 
to social change and, accordingly, how such critical views and evaluations paved the 
way for the formation and the development of an alternative definition and 
methodology of change.  
 
Section Two: Inter-Islamists Discourses on Social Change and DS’ Manhaj 
This section discusses how DS’ foundational texts framed and interacted with the 
tensions among Islamists: primarily their position on the state, and methods or Manhaj 
of social change. These two issues were connected to the concepts of Tawhid, Takfir 
and Hisba, as mentioned in chapter 2. Thus, in the following, there will be a discussion 
of how DS’ texts frame political participation, Jihad and how both are connected to 
Tawhid and Takfir, and whether they are the right approach to Hisba. There will also be 
a discussion of collective action versus da’awa and persuasion on the individual level. 
Finally, DS’ Manhaj for social change will be presented in view of such frames and 
interactions. 
Dilemmas of Social Change: 
DS’ Contextualization of Political Participation: 
Political participation and involvement in legislative bodies is connected to the concept 
of Tawhid or oneness of God. Thus, Borhami’s article (1992) states a number of facts 
that emphasize this concept: legislation is the absolute right of God, man-made laws are 
against shari’a, and ruling by such human laws would by necessity stir God’s wrath. 
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However, there was a differentiation between the administrative and the legal religious 
systems, where administrative systems should be allowed as long as they respond to the 
general good of the people. Similarly, there exists a difference between secular rule, 
where the nation is the source of power, and Islamic rule, where both the Quran and 
Sunna represent the main terms of reference. Accordingly, Islamic rule does not allow 
any separation between state and religion. Instead of Democracy, Islam applies Shura, 
which is based on consulting regarding earthly issues. Yet, Shura never discusses 
whether to apply Shari’a laws or not. Therefore, such legislative councils that impose on 
the people anti-Shari’a laws are considered infidel ones, notwithstanding the fact that 
they are based on majority rule. Accordingly, those who abide by the decisions of such 
councils are judged as committing polytheism (Shirk), since they obey someone else 
other than God.  
Despite the fact that Borhami (2009) based his criticism of parliamentary participation 
on the same argumentation in the foundational article (1992), mainly based on Tawhid 
or monotheism, he gave in the new version special attention to the absence of the so-
called "Ahl Al-Hal Wl-A’qd" (the elite, formed of experts and specialists who can elect 
the ruler, and whom he should consult) in Shura, versus the public in Democracy. In 
addition, he discussed in an extensive way the issues of Shura and consultation, 
stressing that Shura should never be made through majority rule of unqualified 
parliament members, particularly when the criteria of such candidates is not based on 
education, experience, specialization or piety. In this concern, he is closer to Plato’s 
ideas of the virtuous city where elites only can rule. 
One of the repercussions of framing political participation in connection with Tawhid is 
the fact that anti-shari’a rule involves defying the principle of loyalty and enmity. In this 
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respect, such rule leads to the rise of political parties that are based on secular, 
democratic, socialist, or communist man-made principles, which are adversarial to 
Islam and are thus considered as being against belief. Such parties promote the 
separation of the social system and the state from religion. Meanwhile, they advocate 
equality among all religions and would show respect to infidelity under the false claim 
that the "difference in opinion does not mar the ties of friendship.” In Borhami's (1992) 
opinion, such political parties are considered as possessing a “degree of ignorance 
(Jahelyya), fanaticism, and loyalty to infidels and hypocrites, a situation that by 
necessity every Muslim must abandon, fight, and repudiate.” Meanwhile, commanding 
virtue and preventing vice (Hisba) constitute an obligation, which is dependent on the 
believers’ capacity and capability, and should be carried out in a legitimate way that 
maximizes benefits and minimizes both loss and corruption. Accordingly, parliaments 
might not always be the most suitable means for undertaking this task, in view of the 
above mentioned violations of Tawhid, and the principle of loyalty and enmity. 
Going a step further, Al-Shahhat (2010) associated the parliamentary approach with 
“lubricity,” “compromises,” “concessions,” and “transforming fixed religious constants 
into relative issues subject to difference in opinion,” such as indulgence with loyalty 
and enmity, governance of God, and artistic production (songs and literature). Thus, the 
parliamentary approach is linked to concessions either because Islamists might 
recognize sins but promise that they would not use their power to ban them once in 
parliament, or through redefining sins, in order to gain votes. For the first time, Al-
Shahhat mentioned the concept of “double standard discourse,” and linked it to the 
parliamentary approach, which is clearly represented in MB. He said that proponents of 
such discourse deliver a certain message to their followers and another to the public and 
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since technology made it impossible to keep two contradicting discourses, followers of 
the parliamentary trend started to unify their discourse through using the mildest and 
softest religious discourses even with their followers. For him, this harms Da’awa and 
dilutes it (Al Shahhat, 2010). 
In view of such contradictions between Tawhid, loyalty and enmity, and even Hisba, 
they did not result in declaring those who participate as Kafir (infidel) since DS’ leaders 
and followers perceive Takfir of individuals as a long, complicated process that should 
be subject to scholars’ meticulous religious judgement, and divine argument (Borhami, 
1992, int. Shaltoot, 2013). Thus, they conform to the purists’ position on Takfir that 
tends to discuss this issue “in terms of categories of actions, rather than specific 
individuals” (Wiktorowizc, 2006: 231) or the infidelity of actions (Kufr Mo’ayyan), 
rather than infidelity as the belief of a certain and a particular person (Kufr A’yn) 
(Borhami, 1992). 
The framing of DS’ position as regards political participation came as a religious ruling, 
where Borhami (1992) stated that the evaluation of parliamentary participation usually 
depends on the intentions of participants. If the intention behind participation is 
achieving democracy through allowing legislation for humans not God, drawing on 
majority rule, participants are then committing polytheism, unless they are ignorant, and 
thus they cannot be judged as infidels unless a scholar deals with their case and provides 
adequate evidence. Whereas in the case of participants who join the parliament with the 
intention of calling for God and establishing shari’a therein, depending on them voicing 
loyalty and enmity, they might be subject to one of two legal evaluations. The first is 
that parliamentary participation is absolutely forbidden by religion, since participants’ 
belief remains in their hearts, and is not applied in reality. Second, in case joining the 
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parliament would achieve the interests of Islam, such membership shall be considered 
an indication of obedience to God.  
In view of such aforementioned evaluations, DS elected to abstain from political 
participation in the “so called legislative councils,” either by casting votes or through 
supporting candidates, since intention is not the sole criterion, but also the context that 
might make of political participation a path to evils, rather than benefits. In this respect, 
the articulation of events, past experience and real practices of Islamists proved that “the 
most probable scenario” is that more corruption would occur instead of securing Islam's 
interests. This is because seculars will never allow Islamists to achieve any progress or 
achieve interests. On the contrary, seculars would drag them into a series of extreme 
concessions without any reward. Borhami referred to the Turkish and the Algerian cases 
where military coups took place to abolish Islamists’ success. However, the author 
asserts that despite the option to which it resorted, DS still pays respect to all opinions 
that are pro and against parliamentary participation, since they share good intentions 
and have consensus, as regards the aforementioned postulates and facts (Borhami, 
1992). DS’ position on political participation conforms to that of Al-Albani who saw 
that under certain circumstances “the good policy is to stay away from politics” 
(Lacroix, 2009: 70).  
Thus, Borhami argues that in the Egyptian context Shari’a is not applied to all laws, and 
that there is a gap between theory and practice. He even said that Egyptian law still 
facilitates adultery. However, he asserted that, in theory, members of parliaments that 
announce respect to Islamic Sharia’ cannot be considered infidels. Yet, he still criticized 
the parliament at that time for a number of reasons. First, because the functions of 
parliamentary oversight of the executive branch, and fixing the budget might be 
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acceptable as a human task, but the legislative task is exclusively for God. Second, the 
1981 amendment of article 2 of the 1971 Constitution, which listed Shari’a as the main 
source of legislation, was only applied to laws issued after 1981. Third, ‘majority rule is 
against Shari’a,’ especially in view of the quality of parliament members. Fourth, he 
had reservations on the parliament oath that does not mention respect to Shari’a. Fifth, 
he considers the capacity of parliament membership as one aspect of guardianship; and 
since Christians and women should never be legal guardians and are not among Ahl Al-
Hal wl-A’qd, they should not be allowed membership to parliament49. Thus, he refused 
allowing parliament membership to some groups on sectarian, gender, and education 
grounds. Finally, he thinks that contesting in elections with an Islamist profile and 
agenda with others, would put Islam in comparison with other ideologies, and this 
harms its sacred nature and makes it void of its meaning. So, in his opinion, this 
contradicts monotheism since people are never in a position to judge Islam and Shari’a’ 
in the first place, let alone voting for it once and against it the following time50. Such 
arguments are usually supported by a narrative about previous Islamists’ experiences in 
politics, with a hint about Egypt, without going into specifics (Borhami, 2009a). 
In line with the general Islamists’ tools of validation, Borhami used the argumentative 
discourse that defines secularism as foreign and alien (Ismail, 2003: 43). He framed 
parliamentary elections as “seasons” that distract Muslims from their real priorities, 
while election slogans and principles of secularism were never mentioned in Quran, but 
are rather imported to Muslims from the West. However, there has been a division 
among Islamists as concerns principles of participation between groups which think that 
                                                             
49  Guardianship of women and Christians, and denying them full citizenship rights was not mentioned in the 
foundational article (1992) or in Borhami’s book (2010), and was only discussed in his lecture (2009). 
50 Such argument in particular raises questions about how DS managed to frame political participation in post -
revolution Egypt in view of this fatal violation of Tawhid. 
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participation in elections is a necessary positive action, and others who believe that the 
balance of power already determines the results of the elections against Islamists. 
Therefore, participation would not make any difference, but would instead lead to 
Islamists’ concessions without serving the main purposes of da’awa in return. Given the 
timing of the lecture, it is reasonable to think Borhami was referring to the experience of 
MB in Egypt, where their success in 2005 elections seemed attractive at that time to 
DS’ youth, however, he neither openly named nor attacked MB (Borhami, 2009a). 
Therefore, political participation is not forbidden in principle and is not allowed based 
on the “intentions of the participants,” but is dependent rather on context. Such 
emphasis on context came out clearly in Borhami’s (2010) reaction to criticism directed 
to DS as passive and isolated group because of its choice to abstain from political 
participation. In response, he asserted that DS’ apolitical position could never be 
attributed to what he calls secular claims about the religion-politics separation, but 
rather to the inconvenient balance of power on the international, regional and local 
levels, which would not allow their political participation, except with a sacrifice of 
their beliefs and principles, in return for temporary benefits or political positions. In this 
regard, he stressed that DS would not trade values for seats in parliament, or for 
presence on the international scene, since this would not serve DS targeted reform. 
Thus, being positive for him is possible through being able to preserve their tenets 
through “taking no action.” This argument reflects the context-based, rational thinking 
and cost-benefit analysis based on religious calculations, that proved to prevail in DS’ 
framing processes and decision making as will be shown in the following chapters. This 




In sum, DS’ texts framed political participation as a contradiction to concepts of 
Tawhid, the rule of God, loyalty and enmity, as inefficient means of holding Hisba, and 
are associated in their discourse with concessions and indulgence in religious issues, 
thus leading to more losses (evils) than benefits to Islam. Nevertheless, they have been 
clear that such evaluation is dependent on the context, not only the intentions of 
participants; and that the fact that political participation implies polytheism does not 
necessarily mean that participants are infidels. Thus, unlike quietists and coverts, DS 
did not absolutely ban political participation in the pre-revolution texts, yet, did not 
adopt it as means of social change. 
Disengagement of Military Confrontation from Jihad: 
In the midst of militant Islamists attacks in the 1990s in their confrontation with the 
state, came the first foundational text on DS’ social change Manhaj. It provided an 
account of such an approach that mainly aimed at disengaging the concepts of Jihad and 
Military confrontation as means of change, discharging military confrontation as 
religiously invalid and as associated with fatal losses. This came also in reaction to 
Islamists criticisms of DS’ followers as opponents of Jihad and as dividing the Islamist 
front as mentioned in chapter 3. In this regard, DS’ adopted a scientific approach 
through providing a genealogy of the concept of Jihad, rooting it in Islamic history and 
comparing it to the concept and the consequences of Islamist militants’ violent 
confrontation.  
This framing not only discredited militants, but also serves in framing DS’ leaders and 
followers as Muslim scholars who would never compromise the definitions of Quran 
and Sunna. This, as well as the previously discussed framing of political participation, 
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goes in line with purists’ framing of both Jihadis and politicos as rationalists, who tend 
to bring about social and religious change through the adoption of human reason-based 
strategies and “then selectively misappropriate religious evidence to support their 
decision.” Thus for them, “strategy drives religious evidence rather than the other way 
around” (Wiktorowicz, 2006: 220). 
In this regard, Borhami’s (1992) argumentation was based on two points. First, stressing 
the “love of Jihad” as a religious obligation connected to faith, in order to prove that he 
is not against “Jihad” in principle, and to find a common ground with such trends, prior 
to subjecting them to criticism. Meanwhile, emphasizing the pre-requisites of Jihad as a 
duty imposed upon the Muslim nation, in as much as it has potential. This is dictated by 
the fact that Jihad depends on the estimation of capability and calculation of potential 
benefits (Borhami, 1992). In this regard, he explained the various stages51 of Jihad 
legislation in Islamic history, where reference to history is one of Islamists’ discourse’s 
tools of validation (Ismail, 2003: 41). Second, he mentioned that the definition of Jihad 
in the last stage, which meant launching an offensive against infidels, is irrelevant to 
contemporary Islamist military confrontations in view of scholars’ opinions on 
managing relationships with infidels in times of weakness. This indicates that Jihad 
depends on cost-benefit analysis, reality requirements, comes in stages and is limited to 
infidels, in order to avoid inter-Muslim conflicts that lead to defeats and spread of vice 
and corruption, without achieving the main aim of Muslims, which is spreading God’s 
                                                             
51 Jihad passed by various stages of legislation, starting by resorting to patience, while continuing da’awa, then 
allowing for voluntary fighting, up to compulsory call to Muslims to fight in defense of their life and religion against 
those who attack them. In a final stage, Muslims are obliged to launch offensive attacks against infidels until they are 
converted to Islam, and against people of the book (Ahl Al-Ketab, or Christians and Jews and Magi) until they either 
convert or pay taxes (Jizyah), in “submission” and “humiliation.” This last stage constituted the definition of Jihad. 
According, however, to the Salaf, Muslims should never carry out Jihad if they are weak, since the Realities dictate 
the rules applicable. In this regard, Borhami discussed a technical issue about abrogation "Al-Naskh" in the Quran. 
Such issue was further elaborated later on in other versions of the text (Borhami, 1992). 
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word. Therefore, the reckless rushing to militarized Jihad might lead to more evil and 
corruption, instead of safeguarding Islamic interests. 
In sum, a military confrontation approach to social change is framed in terms of cost-
benefit analysis, capability and balance of power. As such, the approach is framed as 
not conforming to the right definition of Jihad, but rather is an invalid top-down 
approach to social change that would lead to the loss of lives and money, and the 
violation of religious teachings (Borhami, 2009b). To emphasize this position on 
Jihadis, Borhami over time expanded his evidence and references, and elaborated on 
technical issues, reflecting the development of his experience and the interaction with 
DS’ followers and counter-movements (Borhami, 2010a).  
Revolution, Takfir, and Ousting the Ruler: 
Relevant to Jihad or military confrontation is the dilemma of abiding by Tawhid under a 
non-Islamic rule, which is one of the main controversial issues among Islamists, and 
one that is closely connected with approaches to social change (Meijer, 2009). This 
dilemma aroused debates on the issue of declaring the ruler as Kafir if he fails to apply 
shari’aa which implies the duty to take action against him, thus is one of the main 
reasons of the rise of militants (Ismail, 2004). This in turn also gives rise to discussions 
on the legitimacy of revolt and ousting the ruler, which are raised by revolutionaries or 
Qutbis, and militant and politicized Salafis in general, as opposed to the propagation of 
the obligation of the Muslim subject’s obedience to the legal guardian advocated by 
Madkhalis (Gauvain, 2013).  
In this regard, DS’ foundational texts on social change Manhaj took a position in the 
middle between these two extremes. Thus, DS’ texts do not absolutely dismiss ousting 
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the tyrant ruler; however, they mention that there are certain restrictions on such an act. 
First, there is the evaluation of motives for ousting the ruler. In the event the 
justifications prove to be valid, Muslims must then make sure that they can possess the 
capability of confronting such a ruler. They should also calculate the gains and losses 
involved in taking such action. Such calculations must assess whether action would lead 
to reform, or would pave the way to gross harm, corruption and chaos. Again, dealing 
with an authoritarian ruler depends on realistic calculations (Borhami, 1992). This 
intersects with the purists’ tendency to weigh the consequences of ousting rulers on the 
well-being of Muslims (Wiktorowicz, 2006). As previously mentioned, DS departs from 
quietists or purists as regards declaring the state’s actions openly as infidel, and not just 
sufficing by considering the rule that defies shari’a as a sin. However, DS does not 
declare the ruler himself as a Kafir. By this distinct position on issues of Takfir and the 
position on the state, DS detaches itself from both revolutionaries as well as quietists. 
Despite the fact that framing this position comes in the form of precise religious 
definitions, it might be also explained in light of DS-state relationship discussed in 
chapter 3. However, to decide whether this position is an ideological and religious one 
or is the result of the repression of the authoritarian regime, the next chapter will trace 
DS’ framing of January 2011 revolution, and its position on June 2013 revolution after 
it entered politics, in order to examine how such farming processes departed or 
conformed to this ideological stance.  
Da’awa and Persuasion: 
In contrast with militants who see that violence is the only way to promote religious and 
social change, and to defend DS against criticism that it abandons Jihad which is a 
religious obligation, Borhami refers to Ibn El Qayyem’s types of Jihad that starts by 
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“Jihad of the self”52. Thus, Jihad should not be undertaken unless certain stages are 
fulfilled, and the first stage is that of Al-Da’awa, based on spiritual and physical 
preparation, establishing beliefs, self-purification, in addition to filtering religious 
teachings from Beda’a and systematic education for the promotion of Tawhid 
(monotheism) (Borhami,1992). This was the extension of DS’ adoption of Al-Albani’s 
purification and education Da’awa theory (Lacroix, 2009). Borhami’s argumentation for 
Da’awa was based on the obligation to observe priorities and appropriate preparations in 
order to materialize the rules and restrictions of Jihad. Thus, da’awa, being the means of 
spreading the word of God and his religion through persuasion, could be considered one 
type of Jihad (Borhami, 1992). However, the adoption of da’awa and persuasion as the 
means of social change brings about the debate on whether to carry out da’awa 
individually or to adopt collective action.  
Individual Da’awa Approach to Change: 
This approach to change takes place through Individual work in da'awa and education 
which sees that the main role of scholars and sheikhs is to reform individuals. 
Proponents of this approach have differences among themselves as concerns the 
priorities of reform and whether it should be belief reform and spread of legal sciences 
on a theoretical level, or education of rituals, and good deeds on a practical level. They 
also see that the spread of pious individuals in a society would spontaneously lead to its 
reform. Among supporters of the approach are those who ban or put limits to collective 
action, under the pretext that it involves partisan and fanatic tendencies, which might 
easily render it targeted by secular governments. Hence, the potential harm of collective 
action might exceed its expected benefits. DS’ texts give credit to such an approach for 
                                                             
52 Ibn El Qayyem mentioned various types and priorities of Jihad that starts first and above all by “Jihad of the self,” 
“Jihad of the Satan,” then “Jihad of infidels,” and finally “Jihad against the hypocrites” (Borhami, 1992). 
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focusing on education and following up small groups, yet, they criticize them for 
avoiding any political involvement, even by giving comments. Thus, DS sees this 
individual level as limited in scope, failing to undertake sufficiency duties,53 ((fard al-
kifāyah), or religious obligations that if are not fulfilled within a Muslim community 
even by only one person, the whole community collectively sins. Nevertheless, Islamists 
tend to link this concept to collective action (Reinhart, 2009). For DS, such duties are 
not confined to education and should be carried out at all social levels, which requires 
organized work and coordination. Moreover, DS sees this approach disregarding issues 
of the rule of God, and loyalty and enmity due to their reluctance to assume the duty of 
denouncing the vices of contemporary governments, due to fear of the government 
repression. Such reluctance renders da'awa as void of its real content (Borhami, 1992). 
In Borhami’s book (2010), he elaborated expansively on the concept of Gama’a (group) 
and collective action, both on the linguistic and on the Islamic legal levels. He defended 
collective action as a means of coordination to fulfil sufficiency duties. However, he 
also introduced another type of extremism as concerns collective action where a certain 
group of Islamists considers itself the representative of Islam, the all-inclusive group, 
despite the fact that it is just one among numerous Islamist groups that all try to 
accomplish the extensive sufficiency duties, until the unity of the community is 
achieved. He stressed that when loyalty is given to groups and names rather than to 
Islam, this will give rise to fanaticism and extremism. He also used strong literary 
                                                             
53 “In Muslim legal doctrine the farḍ al-kifāyah (lit., “duty of the sufficiency”) defines a communal responsibility. 
According to this doctrine, within a community of Muslims, if some religious obligation belonging to the category 
of fard al-kifāyah is not fulfilled, the whole have collectively sinned. If a sufficient number of the community 
undertakes the duty, however, the responsibility on the community is discharged. For example, it is necessary that at 
least one Muslim recite the funeral prayers. If no one does, the entire community is at fault.” “Farḍ al-kifāyah was 
one of the major vehicles used by jurists to talk about society in the aggregate, as a collective entity.” “In recent 
Muslim literature, there is some evidence of a reconsideration of this doctrine as a way to discuss social 
responsibility.” (REINHART, A. K. 2009. Farḍ al-Kifāyah. The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World. Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press.  
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expressions, analogies, and exaggerations that reflected his bias for collective action, 
which he considered the core of DS method (Borhami, 2010a).  
Da’awa through Collective Action: DS’ Manhaj for Social Change 
According to Borhami, DS’ Manhaj is a call for the understanding of and response to a 
“comprehensive” meaning of “belief”54, requires fighting polytheism and superstitions 
in all their aspects, polytheism of cemeteries (belief in powers of dead pious figures), 
and of governance (obeying laws and regulations which are adversary to Shari’a). This 
understanding of the main objective of DS is again based on Tawhid, however, it goes 
beyond the traditional confrontation with mystic Sufism, that DS shares with AS for 
instance, to the issue of the rule of God and denying state religious transgressions. 
DS’ approach to change through da’awa is framed as the one adopted by prophets, and 
this should be the very first priority of Islamic actions and duties that should be attained 
by all means. In addition, in all the foundational texts from 1992 to 2010, da’awa is 
linked to “the superiority of the Ahl Al-Sunna,” or  superiority of Muslims, since such 
superiority comes from their duty in combating social deviations (Borhami, 1992), or 
duty of commanding virtue and prevention of vice. Thus, the only way out would be 
‘change’ through da’awa (Borhami, 2010a). Accordingly, da’awa should be carried out 
by all means, both in public, through speeches, lessons and lectures, books, brochures, 
in addition to Da’awa envoys, or through private lessons, educational institutes, and 
educational groups. This implies that DS’ Manhaj is connected to education, learning 
and legal sciences, which again highlights DS’ adoption of Al-Albani’s purification and 
education theory (Borhami, 2009a, Lacroix, 2009).  
                                                             
54 Which involves belief in God, his angels, holy books, prophets, Doomsday, the fate and destiny. In addition, belief 
means following Sunna, approval of inference methods, in addition to self-purification (as concerns rituals, morals, 
together with behavior and human interaction). 
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However, as mentioned above DS departs from this theory as it advocates collective 
action for the sake of achieving higher coordination in order to cover a wider scope of 
sufficiency duties on all social levels. DS’ Manhaj of da’awa and persuasion through 
collective action is operationalized along three levels that begin with education of the 
individual, which resonate with the idea of starting by the stage of Jihad of the self, and 
of Al-Albani emphasis on the individual level, and on education (Lacroix, 2009). This 
level is followed by the social or community level, which means finding and founding 
the community of believers who will cooperate and coordinate to promote rendering 
sufficiency duties. Among other things, such duties must observe cost-benefit analysis 
based on shari’a, including the performance of social duties, formation of an Islamic 
financial system, inculcation of team work and collective action concepts, the 
prevention and resolution of conflicts by applying shari’a rather than resorting to man-
made laws. Furthermore, Jihad must be established as long as the conditions thereof are 
availed. Eventually, empowerment and triumph will be attained in the third level as a 
result of the stages of educating individuals and founding the community of believers. 
However, DS does not think of the Islamic state in a deterministic way. On the contrary, 
DS’ members focus on the incontestable accomplishment of such duties, in view of 
their belief that empowerment is a grant from God that they should just wait for to 
materialize, and that the Islamist state is a fatalistic issue that cannot be imposed on a 
certain society, but should rather emanate from the society, albeit depending on God’s 
will (Borhami, 1992). 
The features of DS’ Manhaj for social change are highlighted as the movement 
developed within its context. For instance, framing da’awa as an aspect of Jihad and 
one of its essential stages appeared since the first foundational text was published in the 
149 
 
early 1990’s at the peak of Jihadi activities, as mentioned. Still, such connection 
between da’awa and Jihad was again brought up in Borhami’s 2009 lecture. Throughout 
the 1990s and 2000s, the emphasis on education and the priority of the individual level, 
despite being a fundamental part of DS’ Manhaj, was highlighted in reaction to 
seculars’ criticism of Islamists, particularly those who were not part of the dominant 
conservative or “moderate” discourse, in view of the radicals versus moderates narrative 
that dominated the 1990s (Ismail, 2003). In this regard, the secular nationalist discourse 
associated Islamists with fundamentalism, hypocrisy and corruption, and religious 
extremism that goes against mainstream Islam, and was sometimes taken to the media 
and cinema movies as a way to manage their personal psychological disorders (Khatib, 
2006, Ahmed, 2011). In reaction to such discourse, Borhami (2009) admitted that 
Islamists do have problems, and that the solution is through a more in-depth religious 
education and the infiltration of the aspects of the Muslim personality in Muslim 
individuals, as a first step towards a more comprehensive reform. Borhami’s (2009) 
recognition of the problems of “emotional superficial religiosity” or “pseudo-religion” 
that characterized some of the Islamic resurgence followers, led to highlighting the 
focus of DS on education and the priority of the individual level.  
In addition, in the 2000s and particularly since MB’s success in the parliamentary 
elections of 2005, DS started to clarify “the gradual and the bottom-up” nature of their 
approach to social change. For despite the fact that, on the state level, they saw that each 
nation should apply its systems that shape the individuals, and in Muslim countries it 
should be Islamic systems55 as part of worshiping God and of submissiveness to Him. 
However, the change of the current system to an Islamic one should be “gradual and 
                                                             
55 For instance, there are the Islamic judiciary, social (gender, class, and power relations), political (choosing the 
leader and deciding the targets), and war and peace systems.  
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bottom-up,” rather than through struggling to get positions in order to impose it from 
above, since it has been proven that top-down approaches would lead to illusionary 
empowerment that would soon disappear (Borhami, 2009).  
Finally, Borhami’s book in 2010, provides a more elaborate explanation of “collective 
action,” and its conditions, and the concept of Al-Gama’a (an organization, or organized 
group), while providing references and evidence from Quran, Sunna and many scholars 
in order to approve such a method, since this is one of the controversial issues among 
proponents of da’awa as a means of social change. 
In this sense, da’awa as a means of social change is a long-term project and is no easy 
task, as the Do'aa (preachers) might be exposed to harm, or, at least met with a reluctant 
audience. Since da’awa is associated with “lenience, patience and forbearance” as its 
main conditions, it can never work if it involves Takfir, violence or top-down imposition 
of Islamic values. Thus, da’awa is a means for social change based on Quran, which 
states that God does not change people’s conditions until they exert effort on changing 
themselves, and that no matter the degree of piety, a Muslim should denounce vice 
(Borhami, 2010a). 
Thus, the presentation of DS’ methodology of change in the 2010 book was more 
detailed and technical than was the article, and less confrontational than the lecture. Yet, 
despite the fact that DS’ Manhaj throughout its development in the foundational texts 
became more crystallized and elaborate, with well-defined concepts, priorities and a 
value system, it still revolves around the same broad lines and main argumentation of 
the original foundational text published in 1992. Based on this DS’ perspective, a 
spectrum of Islamists can be drawn using their approach to social change, whereas at 
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one end there are those that adopt da’awa and persuasion and on the other those that 
undertake violence, while in the middle the political participation approach exists. The 
main criteria for social change on this spectrum is a bottom-up approach, position on 
Takfir, and undertaking violence, where the more a group engages in a bottom-up 
approach, the lesser its tendency for exclusion, Takfir, and violence. 
  
Figure (2) 
As for Al-Shahhat’s series on reform lectures, he followed the same argumentation, 
titles and broad lines as in Borhami’s foundational article. However, in his lectures, he 
elaborated expansively on each point, through giving examples, analogies, and linking 
the ideas to reality, especially as regards well known cases and incidents that attracted 
public opinion. This was intended to get the audience engaged, and to reflect DS’ 
Manhaj on their daily life. Al-Shahhat clearly focused on a practical articulation of DS’ 
methodology of change rather than the theoretical approach of Borhami. However, 
besides Al-Shahhat’s straightforward explanation of DS’ Manhaj of change, his lectures 
were characterized by the use of a confrontational tone when it comes to other social 
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groups such as Christians, Sufis, and seculars. Moreover, he criticized Al-Azhar, and 
the West. Thus, Al-Shahhat’s lectures were useful in understanding DS’ identification, 
perception of the Other and representation of reality, in the period that preceded January 
2011. 
To sum up, this section has argued that DS’ framing processes that took place in 
interaction mainly with Islamists led to the formation of DS’ Manhaj for social change, 
and such dynamic processes continued to carve out and elaborate the main features of 
this Manhaj. Framing of the Islamist approaches took place through connecting each 
approach with certain concepts and providing certain definitions and narratives of 
events. Therefore, political participation was connected to religious concessions within 
their context, thus, Islamists’ experience in parliaments, as per DS’ narrative, are 
necessarily a failure. Moreover, military confrontation is not Jihad, is associated with 
bloodshed and evils, and is proved religiously irrelevant. While discrediting the other 
approaches, da’awa is framed as the only accepted approach to social change, and is an 
aspect of Jihad. However, for the sake of carrying out a comprehensive da’awa, and to 
fulfill sufficiency duties, da’awa should be done through collective action. Thus, da’awa 
is introduced as a long-term gradual project of social change that focuses on the 
education of individuals, thus, founding the community of believers. Accordingly, 
change on the state level will eventually come as a divine grant. However, DS’ Manhaj 
is not deterministic as concerns the Islamic state. As a result, they give priority to the 
individual and the society over the state and to religion over politics.  
As part of the movement’s framing processes and in view of the abovementioned 
representation of DS’ methodology and definition of social change, the following 
section will discuss aspects of DS self–identification and views of the ‘Other,’ and 
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consequently the nature of DS’ relationship with the various social groups within the 
Egyptian society. This will be done through discussion of CDA findings as concerns 
these issues.  
 
Section Three: The “We” and the “Other”: DS’ Identity and Representation of 
Reality 
The DS’ Manhaj for social change conforms to the understanding of Salafis’ reform 
project as primarily religious, and is based on creed, or as mentioned above, and 
connected to Tawhid. Such a reform project aims at forming a Muslim “subjectivity,” 
which has deep social and political influences. Thus, while being “religious and social 
reformers,” they are engaged in producing and reproducing certain “authority and 
identity both personal and communal” (Haykel, 2009: 34-35).          
The results of CDA of the foundational texts reflect the religious nature of their project 
through the central position of shari’a, the stress on the comprehensiveness of Islam and 
that the superiority of Muslims comes from their duty to spread da’awa, command 
virtue and prevent vice, since God does not change people until they change themselves. 
This makes ‘Change’ the core concept of DS’ foundational texts, since, in DS’ 
narrative, Muslims’ reality is characterised by weakness and humiliation and the only 
way to change this situation is through da’awa or religious propagation rather than 
political participation or military confrontations. 
Moreover, the gradual nature of DS’ discourse for social change is based on the 
evaluation of the consequences of Muslims’ actions, the cost-benefit analysis guided by 
religious values and principles, and consequently weighing the benefits and the evils of 
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the change methods adopted. All these foundations reflect the rationalist identity that 
DS’ sheikhs emphasize all the time through the texts in comparison to the reckless 
militants, or the indulgent politicos who end up offering religious concessions for no 
significant reward. In addition to the cost-benefit analysis that is always present in the 
choices and framing of DS’ method of change, there is also the awareness of the context 
or the “reality requirements.” Thus, the texts reflected awareness of the opportunity 
structure where the movement exists and of the possible opportunities and constraints, 
however without necessarily using this wording and where the definition of constraints 
and opportunities depends on religious evaluation. This, for instance, explains their 
decision to be apolitical. In addition, they were keen on avoiding confrontation with the 
state or other Islamists. Thus, the critical view of other Islamist approaches to change 
emphasized the fact that DS does not fully reject all their principles, or language. On the 
contrary, the texts’ strategy was to state the common facts, and share the same 
fundamental principles, wording, and even metaphors. Nevertheless, there were 
differences in the definitions of the concepts, objectives and methods. This might have 
helped in avoiding confrontation through creating a common ground. Moreover, the 
texts did not mention MB, their historical rival, but was rather highly critical of their 
trend, approach to social change, and their actions. The focus on actions rather than 
particular individuals or entities, applies to the state where they repeated issues of the 
rule of God and loyalty and enmity, and denounced state religious transgressions, but 
never mentioned the name of the president for instance. Such a non-confrontational 
approach might be one of their survival strategies; however it reflects that survival for 
them was meant for propagation activities which take precedence over entering into 
political confrontations.  
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Moreover, it can be understood from the texts that they were keen on emphasizing the 
scholastic or scientific identity of DS; for instance through the presentation of the article 
as an academic paper (genre) in the form of its cover, using the title (Dr.), rather than 
sheikh, for Borhami. The texts also present an overview of all other approaches in a 
neutral tone and then criticize each of them before presenting DS’ Manhaj of social 
change. Thus, they wanted to present themselves as neutral and impartial. In addition, 
they defined concepts, used technical words or religious jargon, numbering, and clear 
cohesive markers and nominalization which all give a sense of a scientific exposition. 
This emphasis on the scholastic nature is supported by excessive referencing from 
Quran, Sunna, and Salaf and prominent Muslim scholars. Moreover, in the spoken texts, 
for instance Al-Shahhat’s lectures were systematic and pedagogic56as if he is writing 
rather than speaking. This reflects that the scientific discourse seemed to colonize the 
religious, thus resulting in a scientific religious discourse. In this regard, Al-Shahhat 
introduced self-criticism to DS concerning their focus on legal sciences, that takes more 
space to the detriment of actual training, follow-up and education of individuals, and 
that they give more attention to complex scientific issues over simple daily life issues.  
Besides being scholastic, such findings also emphasize the intellectual contours of the 
movement that are mainly Salafi, and their Manhaj that is based on providing evidence 
from texts and religious authorities. In this regard, it was clear that the hierarchy and 
authority is in the text57, where quotes from Quran and Hadith as a proof, are enough as 
a tool of validation of their opinion. Nevertheless, next in importance comes a 
continuous stress on the authority of prominent Salafi scholars as the references to 
                                                             
56 In each lecture, he provided an overview of the previous one, and in the concluding part, he summed up the main 
points, and gave a hint about what is going to be discussed in the next lecture. 
57 For instance, Quran as a source comes before the rest of sources. 
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Islam. For instance, quotations of Ibn Taymiyya or Ibn El Qayyem are taken for granted 
and are a proof by themselves to the author’s arguments. This is what Haykel calls 
“hypertextuality” (Haykel, 2009: 45). Thus, there is a clear hierarchy and asymmetry 
within the texts or among the Islamic main sources (Quran, Hadith, and Salafi scholars), 
where the text is the main source of authority. Nevertheless, there is also a clear 
distinction between Muslim scholars and the public. 
However, this has two implications. First, heavy referencing to holy texts and religious 
authorities or scholars gives high assertiveness to what they say. The views of the 
authors were stated as facts, rather than their own understanding or opinions about 
various issues and concepts58. Second, there is an elitist approach that confines full 
rights and governance to educated pious Muslim men, or Ahl Al-Hal wl-A’qd while 
considering the public incapable of choosing or ruling, thus there is discrimination on 
the basis of gender, education, and belief.  
However, the questions and answers in the spoken texts (lectures) did not reflect a strict 
hierarchy within the movement where the relationship between the sheikh and his 
audience was more of a mentor-student relationship in a classroom setting. However, 
the pedagogic style, that was another indication of the scholastic nature and focus on 
education, was maintained59, yet, goes side by side with an argumentative style that 
might be addressing the intellectual mode of the Salafi audience (individual reason). 
Also, the foundational texts varied ranging from the simple article that is reproduced 
and taught as part of the movement’s educational curriculum to the book that is more of 
                                                             
58 Assertiveness and high affinity are clear in modality (see appendix (1)). 
59 Through explanation, asking questions to attract attention and to make the audience think of the answer until the 
scholar gives them the way out. There were also negative questions directing the audience to reject and disrespect 
some aspects and ideas, or to show wonder and sarcasm. 
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a specialists’ text60. In addition, there are the informal lectures that adopted a daily 
conversation informal style.61 This reflects the features of DS’ pedagogy and leaders’ 
endeavours to keep their followers connected to DS’ Manhaj, through repeating the 
same ideas in multiple ways until they are normalized (Borhami, 2010a).  
From the above representation, DS’ discourse included almost all features 62  of the 
general Islamist and conservative discourse, particularly as concerns the 
comprehensiveness of Islam as the only religion capable of leading humanity as well as 
their sense of superiority discussed above that was expressed directly as “Muslims’ 
superiority” or “Ahl Al-Sunna superiority”. In addition, there is the elitist approach that 
discriminates on gender and belief basis (Ismail, 2003).  
Such features of the Islamist discourse led to a number of implications as concerns 
women, Christians, and seculars. One of these is the reproduction of the relations of 
domination based on gender (Ismail, 2003), and the traditional division of labour 
between men and women, which was clear as regards the arguments for the rejection of 
women’s right to guardianship. In this regard, Borhami criticized the participation of 
women in parliaments, since “women should not become guardiansm,” and are not 
supposed to enjoy full political rights. He based his argument on the fact that women 
could not go anywhere without permission, and that their first priority should be 
childcare, thus, they could not become judges or parliament members. He referred to the 
                                                             
60 which might explain why the article is preferred as a main reference, particularly in training and educational 
courses. 
61 That was sometimes ironic, where sheikhs were always keen on engaging the audience and eventually they moved 
from the use of formal Arabic, to Egyptian accent and to including texts from media and public opinion issues. 
62 For instance, the comprehensiveness and the superiority of Islam, confrontation with the other, corrupting effects of 
interaction with the other, conspiracy against Islam (infiltration, distortion, misinterpretation), danger of annihilation, 
the multi-faceted other: the other is (secularists, crusaders, proselytisers (Christian west), Zionism, Marxist, 
communists, atheists). Arab Marxist nationalist secularists are associated with the west and have a foreign character. 
And tools of validation: History, argumentative discourse secularism as foreign and alien, Islam contradiction with 
the other, Islamic identity and the discourse. Framing in terms of the permissible and the forbidden (legal ruling), and 
reproducing patriarchal and hierarchical relationships (Ismail, 2003: 35-46). 
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hadith that says “No people would thrive if they ordain a woman as their Sovereign”. 
However, Borhami was not as open about such wording in his written texts.  
Such features, which put Islam as superior and as the only source for people’s good and 
interests, calls in also the conspiracy against Islam plotted by the multi-faceted other, 
especially the West, Christians and Jews (Ismail, 2003). At some point, this led DS’ 
sheikhs to considering that Al-Azhar unknowingly is used as a tool by the West to 
weaken Salafis who bring strength to Muslims, while empowering Sufis who are 
associated in DS’ discourse with “mysticism and superstitions,” “hysteria” and 
“polytheism of cemeteries,” thus resulting in the weakening of Muslims (Al-Shahhat, 
2010). Despite the conformation of DS’ discourse to the dominant conservative 
discourse in almost all the aspects and tools of validation, the tension with Al-Azhar 
was articulated in the foundational texts particularly that of Al-Shahhat (2010), who 
rejects the dominant narrative of moderates versus radicals, and of describing Islamic 
resurgence as an extremist Wahhabi thought, versus the moderate Asha’ari thought of 
Al-Azhar. In this respect, he used “Islamic resurgence” instead of Salafis or Islamists. 
This framing reflected a sense of victimization. However, Borhami appreciated the court 
rulings that imposed censorship of conservatives on seculars (Brown, 2012, Ismail, 
2003). In this respect, he esteemed the Egyptian judiciary system that acknowledged 
Shari’a as the main source of all legislations, and issued a series of rulings against 
authors who were considered infidel, such as Nasr Abu Zayd, saying that such rulings 
pleased the Islamists in general at that time (Borhami, 2009a).   
As concerns other religious groups, one of the striking features of Borhami’s lecture, 
when it comes to wording and metaphors relevant to these groups, was that he 
characterised Jews, polytheists and even Christians as 'enemies of humanity,' who ‘try 
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to shut off the light of God, live in aberration, delusion, sins’, saying that by so doing, 
they do not promote virtue or prevent vice (for him this duty is only forborne to 
Muslims). Even more to reinforce this frame, there was an incident of contradiction 
with the meaning of the holy text.63 For Al-Shahhat (2010), as concerns Christians, he 
provided his narrative of Christian laws and regulations, stressing that they contradict 
human nature. His argument was that for instance forbidding divorce, second marriage, 
and polygamy must lead to the complication of marriage, thus facilitating adultery. In 
addition, he adopted media narratives about conflicts within the Egyptian church, 
particularly as concerns divorce and second marriage.64 Thus, he concluded that when 
problems arise people realize that Islam provides the most suitable solutions to humans’ 
lives. It is obvious that his main sources as concerns the church were mainly based on 
media, rather than checking Christian legal regulations, or undertaking a dialogue with 
Christians. In addition, for him “People of the book,” or Christians and Jews, are 
“polytheists” and that Islamic Shari’a is the one from God and is the one that achieves 
people’s interests. Thus, he framed the Egyptian church as weak and its actions as 
defying human instinct, and focused on all media narratives that support this.65 
Regarding seculars, it is expected that they are belittled in the Salafi discourse that 
considers them their main enemy, and a danger to Islam. For instance, Al-Shahhat 
                                                             
63 In this incident where DS’ texts contradicted the content of holy texts, Borhami’s comment on non-believers in the 
2009 lecture, which was mainly influenced by the wording and style of verse 82 in suret Al-Ma’edah in the Quran 
(implicit intertextuality), explained the antagonism between the dominant polytheists and Jews on one side and 
pioneer Muslims at that time. Despite that such verse excluded Christians from this category; and spoke positively 
about their friendliness and support, and the modesty of Christian priests and monks, Borhami said that Christians 
also belong to the enemies’ category, which defied the content of the verse. In this regard, the researcher contacted a 
DS’ member to clarify this contradiction, and to ask about the generalizations and judgments in that part of the text, 
however, there was no answer (conversation, October 15th 2014), which was uncommon, since this contact has been 
responsive all the time.  
64 He gave the example of a famous divorce case raised by an Egyptian Christian actress. 
65 Such attitude to frame Christians as enemies might have been augmented due to concerns about missionary 
activities, seculars’ discourse that equates Muslims and Christians, or may be within the Egyptian Muslim-Christian 
discursive conflicts that were at their peak in 2010, in view of the crisis of Christian women who converted to Islam 
as will be discussed in chapter 5. 
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(2010) said that seculars say that Quran was written by humans, and that this is the way 
that seculars variously think about such a claim. 66  From the above, in rejection to 
seculars’ discourse, Christians and women should never be legal guardians and are not 
among Ahl Al-Hal wl-A’qd. Therefore, they should not be allowed membership to 
parliament,67 thus do not enjoy full citizenship.  
Such a definition of citizenship raises questions about democracy in DS’ pre-revolution 
texts. In DS’ discourse for change before January revolution, democracy was absolutely 
rejected by the movement’s scholars, and they believed that Shura is the most suitable 
political system. However, since democratic institutions constituted the current political 
framework, they can only be valid if amended to follow Shari’a and to abide by Shura 
conditions. Yet, in all cases, DS decision was to boycott such a system, because real 
experience proved that the losses bypass the gains it could bring to Islam (Borhami, 
1992, 2009, 2010, Al-Shahhat, 2010). In this regard, Borhami always compares 
democracy to a ‘fetish’ made of ‘Ajwa’ (dates) that the infidels in Jahilyya, before 
Islam, used to worship and sanctify, but when they are hungry, they just eat it. This 
metaphor reflects his view of democracy as contradictory and fake. Whenever, 
democratic mechanisms go against the interests of the more powerful, they easily 
sacrifice it. This simile aims at discrediting democratic claims, and is highly ironic. It 
also brought about expressions such as ‘abortion of democracy by the military,’ and ‘the 
democracy that they invented.’ More on rejection of Democracy came in a whole 
lecture in Al-Shahhat’s series on reform. In addition, in his series, he defines Muslims’ 
reference as only Quran and Sunna with the understanding of the pious predecessors of 
                                                             
66 This generalization implies a contradiction as it defies the scientific identity of DS. 




the nation, rather than the United Nations documents and agreements or the secular 
thought of human rights. In the following chapter, this will be discussed in detail, as 
well as compared to DS’ post-revolution framing of democracy and entering politics. 
Despite expressing objectivity regarding other groups, in both the lectures of Borhami 
and Al-Shahhat 68  there were certain generalizations, imprecisions, as well as some 
apparent mistakes in giving figures, dates, and in stating principles and regulations, 
specifically in definitions of concepts relevant to other social, political or religious 
groups, which came as part of their efforts to push for and stress certain frames for the 
other. However, this also indicates either that their scientific profile might be limited to 
legal sciences and to their professional specializations, or might be a sign of high self-
regard and taking opponent groups lightly. The later explanation might be more 
probable in view of the intertextuality, in the sense of the sarcastic representation of 
texts and quotes of counter-movements, seculars and MB. In addition, reference to 
MB’s actions, as mentioned above, came always under the title of the parliamentary 
approach, which was associated with religious concessions, and fake success.  
Moreover, there seems to be incidents of contradiction within the texts as concerns 
Jihad that were mainly connected to intertextuality, wording and word meaning. For 
instance, events in Afghanistan were mentioned positively in Borhami’s foundational 
                                                             
68  Regarding Christians, for instance, where the researcher held conversational interviews with two Egyptian 
Christians belonging to two different churches to double check Al-Shahhat narrative about divorce regulations, and 
the controversial stories of divorce within the Egyptian Christian community. In this regard, their reaction was that 
what he mentioned is not precise, and that they themselves do not have much detail about the different cases that he 
explained, since the church prefers to keep quiet about divorce regulations and issues. This implies that Al-Shahhat 
(2010) adopted media narratives rather than a scientific approach to understand this issue.  
In addition, Borhami’s lecture reflected a sense of superiority over the rest of intellectual systems. This is clear in his 
sarcastic tone, and in the mistakes he made in reporting certain historical facts, ideas, numbers, and dates relevant to 
opponent groups or systems. This could be attributed primarily to his rejection of such groups. Hence, being precise 
in his narrative about them is not important. For instance, slogans of the French Revolution included democracy and 
left out fraternity, and the number of the first Turkish Islamists who entered parliament was different from the one he 
mentioned later in his book. Furthermore, there are mistakes in some dates related to historical developments and 
constitutions (Borhami, 2009).  
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article in 1992, which might be understandable because it was at a time when Mujahidin 
were fighting Russian occupiers. However, again he positively mentioned military 
confrontations in Afghanistan and Iraq in his book in 2010, which was a clear 
contradiction of his rejection of violent groups, especially those who do not understand 
or study Islam. However, Al-Shahhat seemed to be answering this question in particular 
in his 2010 lectures. He said that mentioning Afghanistan as an example is confined to 
combating and fighting the occupier. In this regard, both the Russian and American 
occupiers are equal, yet, each situation and time period will always have its special 
evaluation and legal religious positions and judgments. Thus, for instance, Al-Shahhat 
(2010) mentioned the concept of “Safety visa”69 in countries of infidels, as an argument 
against those who permit executing terrorist attacks in Western countries. The 
researcher held a conversation with one of DS’ followers (anonymous, 2014), in this 
regard, and he directly repeated the same argument of Al-Shahhat.70 Thus, Al-Shahhat’s 
argument on how each situation requires a different ruling might relatively justify such 
contradiction, in addition, it gives an example of DS’ practical and flexible attitude in 
dealing with reality. This attitude is crucial in understanding DS’ political choices in the 
post-revolution period as will be discussed in the following chapters.   
In addition, from the conversation the researcher held with the young DS’ member, it 
was noticed that he spontaneously repeats Al-Shahhat’s and, in probability, other DS’ 
scholars’ exact argument, and wording. Such an observation might imply the efficiency 
of DS’ education and framing processes, and to the way they infiltrate their arguments 
                                                             
69 which means that once such countries grant a visa, then it is a safety and security agreement that a Muslim should 
respect upon arrival in these countries.  
70 Moreover, this anonymous interviewee, besides considering fighting Americans in Afghanistan as Jihad, he said 
that there is no evidence that Taliban is involved in drug trafficking or any crimes, and that these are media 
narratives. However, he did not comment on the reports about human rights, and particularly the violation of women's 
rights, and the destruction of Budha statutes, which so far goes against the studied DS’ discourse. 
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among their youth members, which can serve in their mobilization. However, in view of 
the Salafi intellectual mode discussed earlier, this does not imply full obedience or 
acceptance71 of all the ideas of leaders. Moreover, framing processes are not the sole 
means of connecting the individual member to the movement. This leads to variations 
among DS’ individuals as regards receiving and adopting DS’ leaders’ frames and 
arguments. Accordingly, DS’ members might not necessarily equally share the same 
arguments or frames as this interviewee (Miethe, 2009 ). Thus, the efficiency of DS’ 
framing processes and how individuals within the movement react to them, and are 
consequently mobilized or de-mobilized will be discussed in the following chapters 
through discussing DS’ management during January 2011 and June 2013 revolutions.  
Finally, in view of the CDA results, it is clear that DS was not an isolated group, but 
was rather the result of the interactions and dynamics of the Egyptian context. For 
instance, the foundational texts started to draw upon legal72 and political discourses, 
which reflect DS’ scholars’ awareness of their political context, and the fact that 
abstaining from political participation did not mean isolation from the legal and the 
political system in the country. In addition, referring to media narratives73 as concerns 
incidents, events, and social issues, in order to engage the audience, shows DS’ close 
connection to their social context, and that DS was not directing its call solely to Salafis 
but also to the Egyptian public. Besides conforming to aspects of the conservative 
discourse while refusing to join the conservative alliance as mentioned in chapter 3, DS’ 
narrative of recruitment and education in the militarized confrontation groups presented 
                                                             
71 For instance, in Borhami’s lecture in 2009, (that was relatively open to non-DS followers), his opinions about 
women’s political rights, among other issues, aroused many questions from the audience who seemed to be arguing 
back and resisting some of the ideas discussed in the lecture. Thus, it gave an impression that there is a space for 
arguments and discussion. 
72 For instance, refer to articles from the constitution, and discuss elections (see appendix (1)). 
73 Even if they were obviously imprecise or contradictory, which, sometimes defies their scientific profile, and to 
their critical approach to the current system, through giving credibility to the media they see as corrupting. 
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the same dominant discourse that is even shared by seculars, the media, and Egyptian 
cinema in this regard (Khatib, 2006, Adil, 2007). Such points reflect DS’ connection to 
their cultural and social context, and the possibility of having common ground with 
their opponents, rather than being an isolated fundamentalist group. This could also 
explain their smooth entry to politics later on. Nevertheless, it was observed that 
Egyptian nationalist expressions and patriotic ones are absent in these texts, where the 
expression “interests of Muslims” prevailed even over the Islamist expression of Umma 
Islamiyya (Islamic nation). 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that DS’ Manhaj for social change developed due to 
interactions with other Islamists and within the dynamics of the Egyptian context, where 
the various influences over DS contributed to refining and elaborating DS’ Manhaj 
features, its identity construction, and representation of reality. 
In this regard, the chapter offered a presentation of how DS’ foundational texts framed 
the alternative Islamist approaches to change, through connecting them to certain 
wording, word meanings, and metaphors, and where narratives of the consequences of 
such approaches focused on negative aspects and events. Accordingly, the texts 
associated political participation with religious concessions, and presented narratives of 
Islamists’ participation in parliaments as necessarily a failure and leading to 
contradictions with and dilution of religious rulings. In addition, DS’ foundational texts 
disengaged the concepts of Jihad and militarized confrontation, where militants are 
associated with bloodshed, destruction, and losses, while such confrontations are non-
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Islamic and irrelevant to Jihad in the first place. By so doing, DS’ foundational texts 
frame da’awa as one real aspect of Jihad and as the sole means of change for the time 
being. However, da’awa is also connected to sufficiency duties that Muslims should 
cooperate to carry out on a broad scale, across all social levels, which requires the 
employment of collective action. Thus, DS’ Manhaj for social change is da’awa through 
collective action, and it takes place on three levels: the individual level, finding and 
founding the community of believers or the social level, and thirdly the state level. The 
first two levels would spontaneously be conducive to the empowerment of Islam, to 
facilitate the adoption of its laws and teachings on the third, i.e. state, level. Yet, DS 
will not induce this state level stage, since it is a grant from God and a reward for their 
industrious work on the other two levels. Such Manhaj is characterized by the focus on 
education at the individual level, and by giving priority to the individual and the social 
over the state levels. It is signified by a non-Takfiri, non-violent and bottom-up nature. 
Such frames of Islamists’ approaches to change and the interaction with them, not only 
clarified DS’ Manhaj for social change, but also provided a spectrum of Egyptian 
Islamists based on their social change methods. 
Based on tracing DS’ framing processes within the Egyptian context, this chapter also 
discussed DS’ self-identification and representation of reality in the sense of how it 
perceives the Other, and how it understands the various concepts. This was done 
through the presentation of the results of the CDA of DS’ foundational texts, which 
showed that they mainly draw upon the religious scientific discourse, and that they 
emphasize an identity that is primarily religious, scholastic, rationalist, and realist. 
Furthermore, there is no strict hierarchy within the movement, but rather a mentorship. 
CDA results also reflect that DS’ discourse conforms to the main features of the general 
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conservative and Islamist discourses, while criticizing both. In this respect, DS is keen 
on distinguishing itself from the rest of Islamists, and criticizes Al-Azhar. In addition, 
they showed an anti-democratic attitude and rejection of full citizenship for women and 
Christians. Moreover, there is a confrontation with the seculars, and a belief in a 
western conspiracy that uses all means to weaken Islam. Finally, it is observed that DS 
is closely connected to the Egyptian context and is a product of interactions with its 
components. 
This presentation provides the main features of DS’ pre-2011 revolution discourse and 
its positions as a point of reference to which the features of DS’ post-revolution 
discourse and framing processes will be compared in the following chapters. This is in 
order to understand DS’ vision for social change in post-revolution Egypt, and to what 
extent it conformed to or departed from its original discourse, and the implications of 
this on NP. 
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CHAPTER 5: DS’ MANHAJ OF GRADUAL REFORM WITHIN A 
REVOLUTIONARY CONTEXT 
Introduction 
As was explained in previous chapters, DS’ interaction with the rest of the Islamists, 
seculars, the dominant conservative discourse, and the state, contributed to the 
formation of its Manhaj for social change. Such Manhaj was crystallized and its features 
were refined due to the dynamic processes of framing associated with interactions with 
other groups and events within the Egyptian context. This resulted in DS’ gradual 
reform, primarily religious, context-based Manhaj that takes place on three levels, the 
individual, the society, and the state, where empowerment on the state level is a matter 
of fate and a divine grant. However, DS Manhaj prescribes unconditional commitment 
to the first two levels, where change is feasible. Thus, CDA of DS’ foundational texts 
on social change reflected that they give priority to the individual and society over the 
state and to the religious over the political. This made religious propagation and 
education the sole means of change, rather than political participation, or any radical 
means of change be it military confrontation, or revolutions74 and ousting the ruler on 
basis of declaring him Kafir. In this regard, DS stressed the importance of the 
conditions and the context of political participation, and disengaged the concepts of 
Jihad and military confrontation while legitimizing ousting the ruler, but on the 
condition that this action conforms to the religious rulings in this regard, particularly 
considering the consequences of, the capabilities to, and the cost-benefit analysis of 
undertaking such a step. This way DS is closer to the purists’ Manhaj, yet while 
                                                             
74 As mentioned in chapter 3, one of the main differences between DS and the rest of Islamists was DS’ rejection to 
the Iranian revolution not only because it was Shi’ite, but also because they did not approve of the method, which 
implies conspiracy as well (Tawfiq, 2012). 
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condemning vices and state transgressions, especially with regard to the issues of the 
rule of God and loyalty and enmity.  
In view of these main features of DS’ Manhaj for social change, this chapter argues that 
DS’ framing processes (discursive practices), in the pre- and post-revolution contexts, 
constituted an extension to this Manhaj or ideology, and reinforced the basis of self-
identification and perception of the Other that were established in the foundational texts 
(Snow, 2000). This is done through tracing DS’ framing processes in the years leading 
to January 2011 revolution, during the revolution, and when DS decided to enter politics 
later in 2011, comparing these processes to the findings of the foundational texts 
discussed in chapter 4.  
The first section discusses DS’ framing of a number of issues and major events in the 
2000s: DS’ position and religious ruling on the rising protests and the wave of social 
mobilization that started in Egypt from 2003 until January 2011 revolution; DS’ 
framing of assumptions about Mubarak’s plans to pass power to his son Gamal 
(inheritance); their position on the political opposition alliance and their main 
differences with them; the discursive conflicts with Christians and the Kamillia Shehata 
issue; and finally the two interlinked issues of the church bombing in Alexandria and 
the arrest and torture to death of Sayed Bilal, the young DS’ member who was accused 
of undertaking the bombing. Within the pre-revolution context, DS’ positions and 
frames reflected the relationship between the religious and the political in DS’ 
discourse, and their perception of the Other (Christians, seculars, and MB). This 
overview paves the way to understand how DS dealt with January 2011 revolution 
within this discursive field, and how it decided to enter politics afterwards.  
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Thus, the second section will provide a CDA of DS’ texts (articles, statements, religious 
rulings, Friday speeches and conference recommendations) 75 produced in the period 
from January 21st, five days before the outbreak of protests, until February 17th, six days 
after the toppling of Mubarak and ending the eighteen days Tahrir square sit-in. This 
analysis reflects the relationship between DS’ Manhaj for social change and their 
framing processes during and immediately after January 2011 revolution, through 
shedding the light on the main features of the movement’s discourse, definition of 
concepts, and narrative of events, and how such events were linked (articulation 
process), then which concepts and events were given priority as being more important 
that others (the amplification processes) (Snow, 2000). Finally, we shall see how DS’ 
self-identification process and perception of the other took place. This section also deals 
with the question of whether DS’ position on protest reflects a vision on means of 
change, or was the result of state repression. To answer these questions, the focus will 
be on the texts DS produced at the specific historical moment of January 2011 
revolution, in order to understand DS’ position on revolution as a means of social 
change in view of its wider discourse on change, and amidst a revolutionary context.  
Among the consequences of the revolution was what DS framed as an existential threat 
to shari’a and to the Islamic identity of Egypt. However, due to the structural changes 
                                                             
75 The list complied by the researcher includes: 
• Ruling on participation to January 25th, Revolution to Support a Number of Activists on the Internet, in 
Imitation of the Tunisian Revolution (21-01-2011);  
• Borhami, Sages of the nation, Save the Country before it is late (26-01-2011); 
• First Statement by Alexandria-based DS on Current Incidents (29-1-2011);  
• Second DS Statement on Treatment of Current Situation (31-1-2011);  
• Third DS’ Statement on Treating Current Situation (01-02-2011); 
• A Statement by Al-Hay'a Al-Shari'ya on Rights & Liberties (05-02-2011); 
• The Salafi Rally Conference in Alexandria (08-02-2011); 
• A.R. Alaa El Din, Advice about January 25 incidents-Friday prayers' speech (11-02-2011); 
• M. Sarhan, Attitudes towards January 25 events, Friday prayers' speech (11-02-2011); 
• Al-Shahhat, Al-Salafyon w Kashf Hesab Al-Azma (17-02-2011); and 
• Al-Shahhat, Youth and Revolution (17-02-2011). 
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brought about by toppling Mubarak’s regime, DS’ framed the revolution as an 
opportunity to enter politics without the need of providing religious concessions. Thus, 
January 2011 is the second opportunity in DS’ history, after the one that permitted the 
beginning of their collective action, and is the turning point of the movement to become 
an official political actor. Nevertheless, such developments represented a challenge to 
the movement’s Manhaj of social change, and raised a number of questions: have they 
changed their means of change? How have they framed political participation after 
years of abstaining from politics and of criticizing political participation as a means of 
change? Have the framing processes that were associated with political participation 
departed from the movement’s Manhaj for social change, or acted as an extension to it?  
To deal with these questions, the third section traces DS’ discourse on social change 
after January 2011 in an attempt to understand the movement’s vision for social and 
political change after it established its political party, NP, and engaged in political 
interactions. The focus will be on Borhami’s and Al-Shahhat’s texts, as well as a 
number of DS members’ media contributions. This is because Borhami and Al-Shahhat 
are the ones who put the foundational texts on the issue of social change, previously 
analyzed. Moreover, as mentioned in chapter 4, and through archival research, and the 
field observations, both can be considered the ideologues of the movement, whose 
major contributions to DS’ meaning production processes and discourse on social 
change are reproduced by the rest of DS’ members. 76   
In the same way that chapter 4 presents a point of reference through providing the main 
features of the foundational texts, this chapter again constitutes a point of reference, 
                                                             
76 In the field, young leaders and members saw Al-Shahhat as systematic and is able to link issues and to explain 
concepts in an organized way. They all referred the researcher to his contributions on reform as one that comes 
second to that of Borhami on that main issue on DS’ curriculum and understanding of Al-Syasa Al-Shar’iyya.  
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providing the features of DS’ Manhaj and framing processes after January 2011. This 
aim is to assess the influence of DS’ Manhaj on NP’s policy choices, the relationship 
between the movement and the party, and the nature of NP as a political party 
established by a religious movement, to be tackled in chapter 6. 
 
Section One: DS’ Pre-Revolution Context and the National Debate on Political 
Change: 
DS’ Discursive Field: 
The framing process cannot be understood except through contextualizing it in its 
discursive field or discursive opportunity structures, in which meaning contests happen 
(Snow, 2000, 2007). In this regard, DS’ framing processes in the period between 2004 
and 2011 took place within a period of significant political mobilization and protests. 
Such protests were divided into, firstly, pro-democracy protests that were led by the 
opposition alliance (encompassing seculars, mainly leftists, Marxists, Nationalists and 
Nasserites, in addition to MB). And secondly, labour protests resulting from the 
Mubarak regime’s neoliberal policies, and the wave of privatizations that led to 
deterioration of the conditions of labour and the rise of poverty, spurring also basic 
citizenship rights protests (Abdelrahman, 2009, 2013, Shehata, 2010, Aoudé, 2013). 
Such movements were initiated by a wide popular rejection of any Egyptian 
involvement in the war in Iraq in 2003. This foreign policy issue expanded to a wider 
demand for comprehensive reforms at the national level, seeking to pave the way for the 
rise of an alternative regime, to propagate for new policies, together with a leadership 
that could respond to the nation’s choices and demands. In addition, there was a wide 
172 
 
concern about the state of economic injustice, the spread of corruption, and the 
prevalence of emergency law. That is why the amendment of article (76) of the 1971 
Constitution came to provoke anger, as the move was seen by the opposition groups as a 
mechanism to allow Mubarak to stay in power for a longer period (Al-Agaty, 2011, 
Ismail, 2010, Badran, 2014, Hafez, 2013).77 
In this context, a survey of ‘Ana Al-Salafi’ and ‘Tariq Al-Salaf’ websites, the official 
online media outlet of DS, shows that DS distanced itself from the social and political 
mobilization process that was taking place in Egypt at that time. Nevertheless, it 
rigorously followed developments, commented on events and calls for protest in a 
number of speeches and articles78 (see appendix 2) and criticized the activists’ ideas and 
demands. This, in a sense, makes DS a contributor to the national debate on social 
change. Such a survey reflects an ongoing contestation of meanings and an indirect 
dialogue between DS and other political powers, in which DS was keen on clarifying its 
position on change, and to respond to the continuous misunderstanding, or accusations 
alleged against the movement. In this regard, they framed the national debate as 
polarized, with them being portrayed as either joining the opposition alliance 
unconditionally, or being in Mubarak’s camp, whereas in reality they belonged to 
neither bloc. Alternatively, they emphasized that they provide an alternative approach 
and are insisting on resisting the dominant secular discourse for change, through 
propagating their gradual, primarily religious, discourse on social change instead. At 
                                                             
77 In this regard, a number of movements were formed such as, Kefaya (Enough) and the "April 6th Movement", 
which was established parallel to the labor protests which were triggered in Mahalla industrial city in the spring of 
2008. Moreover, there was also “The Popular Movement for Change” that embraced diverse political actors 
belonging to various ideological backgrounds, calling for democracy and freedom. In addition, there were factional 
economic and social demands, particularly of labor. Such demands were related to the daily needs of life, rather than 
direct political demands and protests. In such case, protestors had no affiliation to political parties, organizations, or 
social movements. Protests in the Egyptian street in general took an upward curve, escalating from 202 protests in 
2005 to around 650 protests in 2009. Such protests involved demonstrations, sit-ins, strikes, hunger strikes, collecting 
signatures, and even detaining factory owners (Ismail, 2010, Al-Agaty, 2011, Hafez, 2013, Badran, 2014) 
78 See Appendix (2) for details of the survey and the analysis of the selected pre-revolution texts.  
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that time, DS’ texts also reflected the fear of the secular threat to article (2) of the 
constitution, and to shari’a and Islamic identity. Accordingly, the movement was not 
silent before the revolution, and was keen on expressing its views (Abdel A'zim, 2008, 
2009 , 2010b, 2010a, Abd El-A'al, 2010). 
In the light of DS’ reservations on the “concept of change” introduced by the secular 
movements, for the lack of a religious component, and DS’ opposition to the rising 
number of protests, DS’ position on protest as a means of change and of expression was 
framed as a religious ruling, or fatwa, expressed in Al-Shahhat’s comprehensive article 
titled “Waqfa Ma’a Al-Mozaharat (A Pause to Discuss Protests)” (Al-Shahhat, 2009). 
This ruling, while legitimizing protest on religious basis, proves it to be an inefficient 
method, and one that defies shari’a in practice. Such a religious ruling, besides being 
based on shari’aa restrictions and cost-benefit analysis, is also context-based; thus 
reflecting DS’ primarily religious nature, rationality and realism. In line with this, 
Borhami answered a question concerning protest and its religious ruling, where he 
emphasized the same position, and clearly mentioned that DS chose not to participate in 
demonstrations and protests (Borhami, 2010b).  
Nevertheless, DS supported and participated in the protests against what Salafis called 
the church’s pressures on Christian women who convert to Islam, where the most 
famous case was that of Kamilia Shehata in 2010 (Spencer, 2011). However, it is 
obvious that the main reason that drove followers of DS to protest was purely religious 
(The captive sister Kamilia Shehata, 2010b, 2010a, AnaAlsalafi, 2010).79 Such angry 
reaction went on for around three months before the bombing of the Two Saints Church 
                                                             
79 One of the occasions in which DS’ leaders expressed their opinions in Kamilia Shehata issue was in Sheikh 
Mahmoud Abdel Hamid’s daughter’s wedding, for weddings and funerals were among occasions that DS’ sheikhs 
use to deliver their speeches away from permissions and state restrictions (int. Nasr, 2013).  
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in Alexandria took place on new year’s eve prayers of 2011 (AhramOnline, 2012). 
Following the bombing, and in line with their anti-violence approach, DS’ leaders 
issued a statement in which they condemned the attack, on the basis that such attacks 
defy the Islamic approach based on da’awa and advice, would lead to the spread of evils 
in the whole society, open the door for accusing Islam of violence and bloodshed, and 
would only serve enemies of Islam80 (statements, 2011). Nevertheless, despite their 
non-violent history, Sayed Bilal, one of DS’ young members, was arrested as a suspect, 
and was tortured to death (AhramOnline, 2012). 
As mentioned in chapter 3, the state-DS relationship was characterized by fluctuations 
and periodical attacks on the movement in order to limit its capabilities and influence.  
In view of the sequence of events and speeches that preceded the bombings, it was easy 
for the state to take DS as a scapegoat, on one side to absorb the anger of public 
opinion, and on the other to restrict DS. Despite the consistency of the pattern of the 
DS-state relationship, the death of Sayed Bilal seemed to be an unprecedented 
escalation that constituted a shock to DS’ followers, particularly the youth, who 
considered it an incident requiring prompt reaction from senior sheikhs. However, DS’ 
leaders framed it as mere act of injustice that should not distract the movement from its 
much wider objective of da’awa and social change (Borhami, 2011g, Al-Moqaddem, 
2011b). Thus, DS did not call for protests or any confrontational action against the 
regime in the light of Bilal’s death. On the contrary, the rest of the political powers, 
focused their activism on the case of Khaled Said’s torture to death in June 2010, where 
                                                             
80 DS’ statement reminded of the centuries long Egyptian Muslims and Christians coexistence, and the tolerance and 
security that prevailed, despite of the different beliefs, except for rare incidents of violence, that could be easily 
understood using a “scientific objective and fair treatment” to each crisis. DS also condemned calls for foreign 
intervention in Egyptian affairs and considered it a justification to attack Muslims’ lives, money, and mosques. In 
addition, they prayed that God protects Egypt from all conspiracies that aim at spreading fitna (sedition), and 
threatens its stability 
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they made use of this shocking incident to mobilize people to protest against Mubarak’s 
regime, and made him the icon of January 2011 revolution (BBC, 2014, Online, 2011). 
To sum up, this overview shows that DS’ position in its pre-revolution context was that 
it did not remain silent but rather did participate in the national debate on political and 
social change, where DS adhered to the features of its discourse and to its framing tools. 
Thus, it gave priority to the religious over the political and human rights concerns and 
basic material needs. In addition, the pre-revolution texts reproduced DS’ Manhaj for 
social change as in the foundational texts, criticized both seculars and MB, as well as 
the state. The sense of victimization was also present due to state restrictions as well as 
misconceptions by opposition powers and the media. In this regard, DS’ leaders used 
the tools of cost-benefit analysis and emphasized reality requirements in framing protest 
as religiously legitimate while practically resulting in defying shari’aa, and thus it is 
dismissed as a means of change. However, they would participate in protest if it is for a 
religious cause, such as in the case of Kamilia Shehata. Furthermore, their opposition to 
the state and church practices and their first participation in protest led to an escalation 
with security, as in the torture and killing of Bilal, which was framed by leaders as a 
mere act of injustice, with their own objectives being much wider. Moreover, the 
dominant religious discourse that always lists rituals among solutions to major crises 
and calamities was also observed. 
With regard to the type of DS-State relationship, particularly under the Mubarak regime 
and in view of DS’ cost-benefit analysis approach, refraining from protest and the 
exclusion of revolutions as a means of change for DS might not reflect a consistent 
approach for the movement. In other words, the high cost of participation in public 
action under Mubarak regime may still be the reason for such a choice. Therefore, DS’ 
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position on confrontational or radical means of change could be better understood when 
put into action, during and after January 2011 Revolution. 
In the following section, there will be a discussion of the results of CDA of DS’ texts 
during January 2011 revolution, to see how the revolution was framed, and how 
concepts and events were defined, narrated and linked, as the situation developed. This 
will be in order to see to what extent DS’ framing was an extension to its Manhaj, and 
thus to what extent refraining from protest as a means of change represented a vision, 
rather than a more pragmatic fear of oppression.  
 
Section 2: DS’ Discourse in a Revolutionary Context 
The analysis of DS’ texts during January 2011 Revolution reflected the fact that DS’ 
leaders maintained their reservations over protest (AnaAlsalafi, 2011c). On January 
26th, following the outbreak of protests, Borhami (2011e) in an article warned against 
bloodshed as a major sin, which triggers rage and disruption, especially in absence of an 
aware leadership. DS’ statements that followed adhered to the same position, and 
focused on security, particularly after January 28th violent clashes between the police 
and protesters, withdrawal of the police from the streets and the occurrence of looting 
(Reuters, 2012). 
DS’ Narrative of January 2011 Events 
DS’ statements on January 29th and 31st (AnaAlsalafi, 2011b, AnaAlsalafi, 2011e) 
addressed protesters as a separate group, expressing its concern about the consequences 
of the protesters’ actions. Such a stance on protest was maintained through the 18 days 
of sit-in in Tahrir Square. In an article by Al-Shahhat (Al-Shahhat, 2011), five days 
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after toppling Mubarak, he repeated that “DS has a principled position that does not 
consider protest as an illegitimate action. However, in most cases, protests in practice 
lead to religious concessions, and to breaching shari’a in return for no gains, or for 
slight gains and interests.” For him, corrupt actions which are associated with protest 
were, for instance, flawed slogans, finery, singing, and the high risk of bloodshed, and 
arbitrary detentions. Meanwhile, for Al-Shahhat, the experience over decades before 
January 25th was that protest never achieved even its minimum demands, while most of 
the time it led to bloody clashes. In the meantime, he stressed that Islamic groups’ main 
duty is to protect religion and to manage everyday life in accordance with religious 
rules. In view of such a position, Al-Shahhat (2011) justified DS’ absence in January 
2011 protests, while praising Kamilia Shehata protests. He did this through comparing 
the givens of the two cases, as concerns weighing the consequences of the action, and 
the religious objective where they had to balance “extremist Christians” in the media. 
Thus, the risk was low and the objective was crucial for the Shehata case. Also, DS did 
not adopt protest as means of change, since protest does not conform to the nature of 
DS’ role and methods. On the contrary, DS’ main tools are conferences, lectures, and 
writings: this was not to the satisfaction of DS’ youth enthusiasm, yet they achieved 
most of the gains that could have been achieved through protest (Al-Shahhat, 2011).  
Al-Shahhat’s framing of January 25th protests was that they did not come up with 
anything new to the pattern of protests that took place over a decade with no reward, 
and that they were organized by the “internet activists” who do not care about the 
opinion of the traditional powers, among them the Islamists. However, the turnout this 
time (January 25th 2011) was more than expected by both the organizers and the regime. 
Al-Shahhat added that in the meantime the fellow Islamists, MB, initially decided not to 
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participate in the protests. Later on, they decided to contribute a symbolic number of 
their followers. However, they claimed, after the acceleration of incidents, that it was a 
tactical maneuver, which Al-Shahhat does not believe was their real position. In this 
part of Al-Shahhat narrative of January 2011, it appears that he was responding to DS’ 
youth, who seem to have blamed the leaders for non-participation in January 2011 
Revolution, which implied that they were comparing themselves to MB and other 
Islamists. In addition, Al-Shahhat seemed critical about MB’s attempt to hijack the 
revolution, particularly given that MB were their historical rival (Al-Shahhat, 2011). 
Another point in Al-Shahhat’s narrative of the revolution events, or justification of their 
choice of abstaining from protest, was that after the obvious turnout of protesters, there 
were clear signs that the regime would resort to violence, and clashes actually erupted 
between the police and the “internet activists,” with slight MB participation. He made it 
clear that MB participation was confined to the organizational level, and under the 
condition that they never present Islamic slogans, or reveal any Islamist identity. For 
Al-Shahhat (2011) “what was worse, were the slogans that represented deviation from 
faith, such as “The crescent hand in hand with the cross”. In fact, equating Islam to 
Christianity was among the deviations that DS can never tolerate. Such DS’ reservations 
on protesters’ practices were also highlighted in the February 11th 2011 Alaa El Din’s 
Friday speech (Alaa El-Din, 2011). 
According to Al-Shahhat (2011), such developments made DS direct its followers to 
refrain from participation in protests, since they would not accept any religious 
concessions, nor would they be willing to give up their Islamic identity and outlook, 
which indirectly served the protests since it did not make them vulnerable to the state’s 
oppression of Islamists. In addition, DS was mainly occupied with guarding the internal 
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front through securing homes, people, and properties (AnaAlsalafi, 2011b, AnaAlsalafi, 
2011e) which, for him, was in itself an indirect contribution from DS’ point of view81 
(Al-Shahhat, 2011). He added that DS also decided not to warn or praise any party, 
since it was too late for such actions, when each has already chosen their position. 
However, with the development of the situation, DS praised those who went out to fight 
corruption and to demand justice, and considered those who died for this purpose as 
“martyrs” (AnaAlsalafi, 2011a, Al-Shahhat, 2011). 
In addition, DS’ fears of the secular threats manifested in demands to isolate religion, 
together with discussions about the annulment of article (2) of the Constitution were 
highlighted in the movement’s framing of the situation (AnaAlsalafi, 2011d, Alaa El-
Din, 2011, AnaAlsalafi, 2011a, Sarhan, 2011, Al-Shahhat, 2011). As mentioned above, 
such fears have characterized DS’ comments on the definition of the concept of change 
and the nature of the political demands that have been dominating the scene since 2004. 
Therefore, as per Al-Shahhat (2011), such secular intentions, besides the rest of 
reservations on protest and revolution, were the reasons why DS did not actually 
participate in the January protests. However, “such secular targets, in fact, served DS 
and its followers to come out of the revolution with the least losses and the maximum 
gains,” according to the recommendations of the Alexandria rally conference 
(AnaAlsalafi, 2011d) that proclaimed DS’ position and demands as concerns shari’a and 
the reforms generally recommended to the regime. 
DS’ statements and articles during the Revolution days reflected that the “cost-benefit 
analysis approach,” that signified DS’ choices throughout their history, continued to 
                                                             
81 For DS, the protection of the internal front (DS’ statements 1 and 2), and containing people’s rage, through 
providing them with their basic needs (food, goods, and fuel), helped in evading the country a possible civil war since 
the pressures of the situation could have provoked some people to fight the protesters in order to end their sit-in and 
bring back life to normal. 
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direct their attitudes. So, DS’ narrative of the events of January 2011 revolution focused 
on the security threats and disruption brought about by protests. This narrative reflected 
that DS was committed to and guided by the cost-benefit rules, as defined by shari’a.82 
Compared to other Salafis, such as Madkhalis, DS did not have reservations in principle 
on toppling the president, or the legal guardian. Yet, they see that, in Islam, toppling the 
governor should follow specific regulations that the protestors obviously ignored. 
Therefore, according to DS’ argumentation through the texts, despite the fact that DS 
does not rule out toppling governors or opposing them, and that DS also recognizes the 
injustices of the regime and rejects them, its calculations of gains and losses and the 
nature of DS’ religious role resulted in the exclusion of protest.  
Thus, DS’ narrative of the revolution leads to the conclusion that DS represented a third 
path on the map of social and political change in Egypt. This is owing to the fact that 
they do not reject protest as a means of expression but, simultaneously, do not adopt it 
as one of DS’ means of change. In addition, while they accepted protest in principle, 
and gave support to the protesters’ targets, they refused the protesters’ practices, which 
for them constituted deviation from Islam. Meanwhile, they were against Mubarak’s 
regime, but did not offer absolute support to the protesters’ demands, since for them a 
certain part of such demands was in defiance of shari’a. Moreover, they were worried 
about chaos and fitna, but did not find this an excuse to accept injustice and oppression. 
Finally, as part of their unique position, they did not approve of the position of their 
fellow Islamists, MB and some Salafis, who agreed to put aside their Islamic identity, 
demands and slogans just for the sake of being part of the revolutionary alliance. 
                                                             
82 This was clear in the argumentation of the religious judgment issued by DS calling its followers not to participate 
in January 2011 protests before the beginning of the revolution, and in Al-Shahhat’s article, after toppling Mubarak, 
where cost-benefit analysis was the key argumentation. 
181 
 
However, DS’ adherence to the position of defending a shari’a-guided change, to be 
enhanced through campaigns, statements, conferences, and lectures, seemed unwelcome 
amidst the polarization that characterized the revolutionary climate of the time. 83  
CDA Results: 
With the breakout of January 2011 Revolution, CDA of the texts (see appendix 3) that 
the movement produced during the 18 days of protest reveals a detachment from the 
revolution during the first 12 days. In these days, DS focused on dealing with the 
“disastrous consequences of wide protest,” without discrediting or approving of the 
protesters, or their demands. On day 12 of the protests, DS’ texts started to discuss the 
demands of the protesters, and their direction, and connotations. Such a turning-point 
occurred when DS realized the dominance of secular powers, and their comments on 
Article (2) of the Constitution, which represented an existential threat to Islam in Egypt 
from DS point of view. 
The religious rather than the political motives of DS’ actions were obvious in their 
discourse. Moreover, in the middle of the overwhelming situation of the revolution, DS’ 
leaders were keen on attracting the attention of followers and focusing their efforts on 
the main issue for the movement: Islam and the future of religion in the Egyptian 
society. Thus, DS’ activism during the days of the revolution used the movement’s 
usual means such as conferences, lectures, statements, and Friday speeches, which 
focused on sticking to shari’a, the importance of Article (2) of the Constitution, and 
projecting the defects of secular demands. This was the case before the revolution, in 
                                                             
83 According to Al-Shahhat (2011), “supporters of protest asked us not to prohibit protest as long as we are not 
participating, and we complied, and even more… So we hope that our brothers would accommodate our conferences 
and lectures, which explain the issue of the rule of God, clarify the benefits of Shari’a, to overcome the flaws 
blemishing secularism, and the prevention of any retreat (in Shari’a application) in order to secure the minimum of 
people’s demands. Even if our brothers see such conferences as waste of time and effort, these events would not lead 
to any expected evil. If they do so, they would be maintaining the spirit of brotherhood based on faith”. 
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Al-Moqaddem’s speech in the wake of the shocking incident of Sayed Bilal’s torture, 
where he wanted to draw followers’ attention to the core of their struggle rather than 
being dragged into issues which he considered as secondary. It could be understood that 
their take on that human rights issue was that it was a fatal incident, and a sign of 
suppression. In other words, as can be deduced from their texts, DS’ main mission was 
defined as one that goes beyond resisting one aspect of injustice, to the wider cause of 
“applying Shari’a, maintaining Islamic identity, and achieving social reform” (Al-
Moqaddem, 2011b). 
The CDA of DS’ discourse at the specific historical moment of January 2011 
Revolution, in view of the wider DS’ discourse about change over its history, led to the 
conclusion that DS’ discourse on change, as concerns its meaning and methods, and 
DS’ position on revolution and protest, was maintained even within a revolutionary 
context. This signifies that DS has a vision on the means of change, and that their 
position might not be attributed only to fear of Mubarak’s regime, or was formed as a 
momentary reaction to events. Actually, with all the dynamism and the changes that 
took place in Egypt in the wake of January 2011 protests, DS preserved a counter-
discourse, one that resisted the mainstream. Therefore, they continued their pre-
revolution reservations on seculars’ definition, direction, and means of change, and 
resisted the polarization that prevailed on the political scene since 2004, which divided 
the society into revolutionaries and regime supporters, with no regard to different 
change methods and movements. 
Within this context of polarization, as framed by DS, and after the fall of the Mubarak 
regime, the absence of a leader for the revolutionary movement and the lack of a clear 
ideological orientation, political life suffered from a vacuum, and conflicts started 
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between Islamists and seculars over who was to lay the foundation of the post-
revolution regime. Such a situation, while framed as a threat to shari’a, was also framed 
an as an opportunity for DS to politically participate, and to introduce the application of 
shari’aa as the “project that guarantees the unity of the nation,” especially in the light of 
DS perception of revolutionaries’ lack of a “vision or an ideology” (Al-Shahhat, 2011 
). 84  Consequently, while rejecting protest as a means of change, DS’ members 
cautiously85 participated in protests after January 2011 (Borhami, 2012a); yet, this was 
religiously motivated and came as part of DS coordination with the Islamists’ coalition 
(AnaAlsalafi, 2013b) for the sake of emphasizing the Islamists’ demands vis-à-vis those 
of the seculars. Underlining their appreciation of “institutionalism,” DS eventually saw 
protest as meaningless, especially given the presence of an executive institution 
(AnaAlsalafi, 2013b) and reaffirmed their belief that protest is inefficient and 
unsustainable. Rejecting participation in June 2013 protests and describing them as 
fitna, even though they agreed with their cause (AnaAlsalafi, 2013a, Party, 2013 ), 
shows that DS maintained its position in this regard. 
If DS rejects revolution as means of change, then the question is what does DS offer as 
an alternative within such a revolutionary atmosphere? The next section attempts to 
answer the question of what is DS’ vision for change post-revolution, and how they 
perceive their position on this issue relative to other powers. In particular, this question 
is examined from when DS became a political actor: this enables examination of 
whether their discourse on change has been transformed due to political interaction, in 
comparison to their foundational texts and historical discourse discussed in previously. 
                                                             
84 In this respect, the revolutionary alliance was seen as fragmented and unorganized in DS’ texts (Alaa El-Din, 
2011), which might be understandable in view of the loose nature and heterogeneity of the Egyptian social change 
movements (Abdelrahman, 2013).  
85 See details on this in Appendix (3). 
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Section Three: Framing of Political Participation and Post-Revolution Self-
Identification: 
The consequences of the revolution represented a challenge to DS’ core values86, yet 
also constituted a political opportunity to institutionalize the movement, and to 
officially enter politics. However, such a decision was not taken immediately after the 
revolution. On the contrary, the leaders were cautious and preferred to follow the same 
decision-making mechanisms discussed in chapter 3. Borhami, in a lecture on February 
26th, 2011, spoke about claims that they would change their foundations, and he denied 
that they could compromise any of their core beliefs. But when the balance of power 
changes, as a new regime emerges, then political participation “might become a matter 
of discussion, depending on the changes that might happen, and in view of the overall 
image of the political scene (Borhami, 2011f).” In this regard, Sheikh Borhami 
compared the ambiguous situation in Egypt after the revolution to a “foggy road,” to be 
navigated slowly and cautiously, and requiring consultation with each other before 
taking any step forward. He added that senior sheikhs would share opinion with the rest 
of DS’ followers, once they reach a final decision. Thus, the leaders were keen on 
communicating their intentions about political participation to the rank and file of the 
movement. On March 22 2011, DS released a statement announcing that after 
consultation and discussion, in view of current developments, they had decided to 
participate “positively” in political activity, despite the fact that DS was still considering 
the convenient form of political participation it would take (AnaAlsalafi, 2011 ). 
However, such decision seemed to contradict DS’ means of change, and raised 
questions about possible transformation in DS’ Manhaj, and the nature of its role and 
                                                             
86 Particularly as concerns rejecting radical change, besides what the movement saw as deviant practices associated 
with protest, and above all the movement’s rising fear of seculars’ threat to Islam. 
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targets. Therefore, at this turning-point towards a new phase for the movement, and to 
answer such questions, DS’ leaders were keen on framing their political participation 
decision in order to secure the interconnectedness of the movement, and win the support 
of its followers and sympathizers.  
Accordingly, in order to understand DS’ post-Revolution vision for change, it is useful 
to explore the main features of the framing process of their decision to participate in 
politics, and the self-identification that the movement had to undertake, as a new 
political actor, within such a polarized and transitional political context. The tracing of 
transformations in DS’ discourse and methodology of change, in the light of their new 
role, will be placed in comparison to DS’ pre-revolution foundational texts about 
change analyzed in chapter 4. This comparison will help in tackling the questions of: 
whether DS, as a movement, has a vision for change; what the contours of such a vision 
are; and whether such a vision was influenced by DS’ political interactions. 
 
CDA Results: 
The CDA results87 of DS’ post-revolution texts88 (see appendix 4) revealed that they 
preserved their core argumentation and word meaning, and the religious and spiritual 
wording was obviously present in all texts. They maintained the movement’s social 
                                                             
87 See appendix (4) for the details of CDA of DS’ texts on Social change and reform in the post-revolution period. As 
will be discussed in chapter 6, it is difficult to separate the movement from the party. Thus, at parts of the analysis of 
DS’ contributions in media, there is an overlap between DS and NP membership at some points.  
88 Al-Shahhat reform series: (27-9-2013) «An Introduction to Reform; (08-10-2013) Religion includes the goodness 
of Individual, Society; (21-10-2013) Iindividual Goodness; (02-11-2013) Change Milestones; (09-11-2013) State 
Reform Milestones; (15-11-2013) State Reform under New Systems; (23-11-2013) A full review of total reform ways 
and other reform ways.  
Borhami, (26-2-2011) Salafyyon and Politics.. have attitudes changed?; BORHAMI (20-04-2011) Interview by 
Islamyyon.Net with Sheikh Yasser Borhami on Salafyyin from Political boycott to Participation; (22-03-2011) 
Statement by DS regarding political participation; (07-12-2011) Manhaj of Change in the light of first round of 
elections  . 
AL-Moqaddem, (9-12-2011) Comment on results of the first round of parliamentary elections. 
Besides a number of other media contributions. 
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change methodology at least on the discursive level. However, the fact that they entered 
politics made them look at the order of the social change levels as parallel, rather than 
consecutive. Thus, they would continue da’awa and instead of waiting until social 
reforms reached the state level, after entering politics they said that they would work on 
reflecting whatever reforms already achieved on such a level. Such variation in the 
order of change levels might indicate change in the importance of the components of 
their change methodology. However, they continued to give priority to da’awa and to 
put more weight on religious and social reform over the political in their discourse. 
Nonetheless, the possibility of achieving this combination in practice within their 
political reality remains questionable. This is particularly so when they stress that they 
adopt a normative perception of politics, and would never offer any religious 
concessions in search for political gains. Such statements could not explain their 
acceptance of female participation in parliament, despite declaring their rejection to 
women’s guardianship in principle. However, it was obvious that the religious cost-
benefit analysis approach, that has been the common factor in DS’ discourse, seemed to 
be the way out for bridging the gap between their fixed religious discourse and their 
actual actions and reality requirements. Adopting such an approach, they stressed that 
the application of shari’a is context based, and takes into account benefits versus evils 
calculations, together with the conditions of the people. Nevertheless, if this approach 
proved to be efficient for them as a movement, its effectiveness, when they became 
political actors, became questionable. In particular, they faced the challenge of having 
to convince the whole society, not only their followers, and at a time when the scale of 
challenges to their thought and enduring discourse would definitely increase. 
187 
 
In this regard, while maintaining the core principles of the movement, there was, 
however, a slight change in their discursive combination, mainly in the genre, since they 
had more access to media and enjoyed an obvious presence in talk shows in the post-
Revolution period. They also used an everyday conversational style rather than a 
tutorial or preaching one, and were trying to embrace components of the popular 
culture, yet this was confined to an inclination to the use of Egyptian accent, metaphors, 
and proverbs, in addition to the sense of humor. However, they maintained a religious-
political discourse where the proportion of the political increased, yet, the priority was 
given to the religious, where the reality was represented through Islam, and all their 
arguments were based on Islamic logic and references. In sum, the observed changes in 
DS’ discourse as concerns change were apparent or superficial, and did not go deeper to 
the core of their methodology (Manhaj). 
Such findings indicate that they have a vision for change that continued with the 
movement even after its institutionalization, and after it had established a political party. 
Despite the fact that maintaining a consistent discourse reflects having a project and a 
vision, it was also a double-edged sword, since adhering to all the movement’s 
definitions and principles led to issuing several statements that were shocking to 
Egyptian society. Moreover, other general features of DS’ discourse continued, such as 
victimization, criticizing media, the fear of conspiracy, an anti-west and anti-secular 
approach, and their understanding of Christians and other social groups that for them 
represented the “Other”, even if they were Muslims or Islamists. Accordingly, the 
relationship between DS and the other political powers and social groups did not 
change, in spite of the increased interaction and forming alliances or mutual 
188 
 
understanding at some points, and the tireless effort on part of DS’ leaders and members 
to integrate into the society.  
The fact that DS’ social change discourse is non-violent, non-Takfiri, and is a bottom-
up approach, makes it a promising platform for political participation. In addition, 
according to their media statements, their openness and willingness to interact and 
cooperate with various actors indicate that they are a tolerant, non-exclusive Islamist 
group. However, being able to maintain consistency in their discourse, and adherence to 
their methodology of change could be better tested through exploring the discourse of 
DS as a political actor, since the essence and the nature of DS’ vision becomes clearer 
when implemented under political pressures and public opinion challenges.  
In sum, following up the discourse of DS’ post-revolution texts, it is observed that they 
constituted a reproduction of the movement’s discourse on social change. It also proved 
that, despite the apparent changes represented by taking part in talk shows and building 
upon political discourses, they did not change their argumentation and word meaning. 
In addition, the religious discourse, or the religious representation of reality, prevailed 
over the political and legal discourses. Thus, change was confined to the genre, style, a 
relative increase in the political component depending on the position of the person. 
Framing and Self-Identification: 
DS’ Framing of Political Participation 
The CDA results reflected DS’ definitions of concepts, the representation of reality and 
of the self and the other. In addition, DS’ narratives of the revolution and the post-
revolution period, proved that religion is the centre of DS’ framing processes, and that 
these processes are closely connected to the movement’s Manhaj of social change, both 
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on the level of reproducing its components and on taking actions and decisions to 
protect its survival. The main tools employed in this regard were the cost-benefit 
analysis guided by religion, weighing consequences, and employing the reality 
requirements law (Fiqh Al-Waqi’), in addition to changing the wording, while 
preserving the word meanings and argumentation.  
Therefore, the framing of political participation was based on framing the revolution led 
by seculars as an existential threat to shari’a and the Islamic identity of Egypt, which at 
the same time came to represent an opportunity to politically participate without 
necessarily providing any religious concessions. Thus, the decision of political 
participation was framed as a change in Fatwa (religious ruling), based on the Changing 
of Fatwa with the Change of the Eras, Places, Conditions, Intentions, and Habits section 
in Ibn El Qayyem’s book E’lam Al-Mowaqq’in89 (int. Nasr, 2013). On his February 26th 
2011 lecture, sheikh Borhami said that as concerns political participation, DS boycotted 
politics and abstained from participation, originally as a “Fatwa” issued due to a certain 
political reality, and for specific reasons. As a continuation of the approach on cost-
benefit analysis, guided by shari’aa, Borhami mentioned that in this issue, DS based its 
calculations on the assessment of expected evils and interests, DS’ capacity and the 
possibility of achieving a true influence, and the cost they had to pay for having such 
political influence (Borhami, 2011f). In addition, Borhami in his justification of this 
historical decision based his argument on linking political participation to DS’ 
methodology of change as well as the foundational text. Meanwhile, he maintained the 
same features of DS’ discourse. By so doing, he aimed at assuring DS’ followers that 
                                                             
89 see (EL JAWZIYYA, I.-E. Q. 2006. Changing of Fatwa with the change of the Eras, Places, Conditions, Intentions, 
and Habits In: EL-SABAYTI, E. E.-D. (ed.) E'lam El Mowaqqi'n. Cairo: Dar-El-Hadith. 
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they are not facing a radical change in the movements’ orientations and methods, and 
are not going to sacrifice their core beliefs. 
Accordingly, when Sheikhs pursue the same calculations, under the new conditions, and 
within a different balance of power, their decision to participate would not be a 
deviation from DS’ original path. This also highlights their practical approach that 
considers fatwa to be context specific, conditioned by maximizing interests and 
minimizing evils. This underlines their realist approach, which might have facilitated 
their framing processes afterwards when they were involved in politics, and might 
comply with their strategy of survival as political actors. 
In line with asserting consistency of DS’ methodology of change, Sheikh Borhami, in 
an interview (Borhami, 2011c), mentioned that DS’ apolitical nature was due to its 
sheikhs’ rejection to offer any faith or Manhaj concessions. DS refused to enter politics 
due to the fact that political participation was just a formality to decorate the regime, 
despite its corrupt actions of forging elections, in addition to the full domination of the 
ruling party. Yet, the change brought about by the revolution eliminated such fears, 
consequently, large numbers of DS’ followers participated in the post-revolution 
constitution referendum. In addition, taking part in politics was not completely new to 
DS, since according to Borhami, DS was not politically isolated, and their political 
participation was through expressing their views concerning public opinion issues, such 
as the Gulf war, and the wars on Iraq and Afghanistan (Borhami, 2011c). However, he 
did not mention DS’ senior sheikhs’ contribution in the societal debate on change, and 




Thus, Borhami aimed at maintaining the consistency, and the continuity of DS’ 
discourse on change through mentioning the same argumentation of the foundational 
texts to justify boycotting parliamentary elections before the revolution. In addition, he 
said that DS already had precedents in political participation, through issuing comments 
and advice on certain occasions. By so doing, he wanted to assure the followers that the 
nature of the movement’s role did not change, but it was just subject to limited 
adjustment, to keep up with the developments that occurred in the post-revolution 
context. 
Accordingly, it was necessary to emphasize full commitment to the movement’s 
original levels, direction, and objectives of social change. Thus, Borhami stressed that 
political participation does not mean that DS is replacing its bottom-up method to social 
change with a parliamentary approach. On the contrary, running for parliament and 
seeking existence in governmental institutions is, in itself, a means, not an end. Thus, 
such representation in parliament and presence in institutions avail one of the tools that 
facilitate da’awa. Therefore, failure to achieve political success does not mean the end 
of DS, since elections and entering politics would not replace DS’ original 
methodology, and vision for social change. Accordingly, DS’ members should never 
offer any religious concessions to attract the public and gain votes. They are, in fact, 
required to adhere to the morals and values of the movement, even if they would lose 
(Borhami, 2011d). This was obvious on the occasion of MB’s domination of the first 
round of the parliamentary elections in December 2011. At their first exposure to 
politics, Borhami had to deal with the frustration DS’ followers suffered due to the 
results of their first experience in elections. In this regard, he laid emphasis on the 
continuation and the consistency of DS’ methodology for change, where he clarified 
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that political participation is merely a tool of change, but would never replace the core 
of their methodology of change, which is da’awa. Thus, he stressed the methodological 
differences between DS and MB, stressing that any sacrifice of DS’ principles would 
render its social reform efforts as devoid of meaning, particularly considering the 
parliament a means, not an end. He told his followers that by adhering to the 
movement’s values, they have the “upper hand” like Moses and those who followed 
him, compared to those “who won over” in this round, like “Qaron and the Pharoah” 
who apparently seemed victorious, but were destroyed as a result of disobeying God. 
Accordingly, he wanted to assure DS’ followers that political failure does not mean the 
collapse of the movement, since da’awa and call for God will continue, and the “real 
victory is the presence of “Manhaj Al-Haq” (the path of truth) in the society, and the 
existence of committed Muslims, rather than securing seats in parliament and presence 
in government institutions” (Borhami, 2011d). 
Al-Moqaddem, in his comment on the first round of the parliamentary elections, 
supported Borhami’s argument as concerns the priority of da’awa over political 
participation, where he considered da’awa as resembling a river, while politics are no 
more than a stream. He assured that despite of Al-Shahhat‘s loss in the parliamentary 
elections, he would be able to continue his da’awa activity. Nevertheless, he warned 
against divisions among Muslims, saying sowing discord among Islamists, under 
current developments, would cause much delight for their anti-Islamist rivals. 
Accordingly, he focused his lecture on clarifying the issue of “loyalty and enmity”. In 
this context, while avoiding criticism to any group, he defined the criteria of loyalty and 
support to any of the actors involved in the political process. He stated that loyalty is 
faith-based, rather than political party- or alliance-based. He urged DS’ followers to 
193 
 
support whoever follows the teachings of Prophet Mohammed, and to denounce 
whoever and whatever that goes against it (Al-Moqaddem, 2011a). 
In addition to prioritizing da’awa as a means of change, DS’ interest in the individual, 
as the first level of social change, is clear, and demonstrates adherence to the original 
order of social change levels, even after they became political actors. This is observed in 
Borhami’s emphasis on the importance of investing in individuals to avoid having weak 
personalities that could be easily manipulated and misguided through media and 
education. In this regard, he holds media and education responsible for frightening 
people of Islamists. For him, in absence of a sound religious background, media and 
education make people  believe that Islamists would cut people’s tongues and legs 
(Borhami, 2011d). In addition, Al-Shahhat, in his reform lectures after two years of 
practicing in politics, was committed to the original levels of social change, even if they 
would be carried out simultaneously, rather than consecutively as could be understood 
from the foundational texts (Al-Shahhat, 2013f). 
Such commitment to social change signifies that DS gave priority to the religious and 
the social over the political components, at least on the discursive level. However, this 
leads to the question of to what extent they successfully acted according to this order of 
priorities in reality, particularly in the light of their involvement in state institutions. 
 
The Formulation of the Relationship between Social and State Levels in DS’ Manhaj: 
Al-Shahhat (2013f) managed to introduce a formulation of the relationship between the 
level of social reform and the level of state reform, where the latter was in DS’ 
discourse absolutely fatalistic and left to God, especially when the foundational texts 
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indicate that they would not aim at establishing an Islamic state. While recognizing the 
difficulty of reaching the idealistic state founded after Islamic standards and values, Al-
Shahhat said that one of the targets of reform is that the state must be a true reflection of 
its society. For instance, if 60% to 70% of the women are veiled then their rights should 
be respected, and legislations should protect them (Al-Shahhat, 2013f). He added: 
“Therefore, we could participate in state institutions in order to bridge the gap between 
the belief and the values of both the society and the state, just to make the state as a 
reflection of the society, as it is. However, imagining that dominating the state can help 
in bringing about further reform and to change society is nothing but an illusion.” For, 
according to Al-Shahhat, those who believe in top-down reform think that participation 
could bring about reform, however, DS do not see a necessary link between “reform” 
and “participation”, since social reform is the ultimate target, and politics is just one of 
the tools that might be of help. In this context, he repeated the same religious judgment 
about political participation that was first presented in the foundational article (Al-
Shahhat, 2013f). Within this framing of political participation, he laid emphasis on the 
cost-benefit analysis approach, the rejection of any religious concessions, together with 
the aspiration to maximize the movement’s benefits from the post-revolution political 
situation. 
In sum, from DS’ point of view, the relationship between reform and political 
participation is that participation is the sole means of transferring social reforms to 
government bodies, which was not welcome before January 2011 Revolution. 
Therefore, adopting this approach, they were keen on stressing their rejection of top-
down change, and to make it clear that maximizing DS’ social reform achievements 
through transferring them to the state (a bottom up reform) is the motive behind their 
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involvement in politics. In addition, they attributed their participation in politics, after 
the revolution, as motivated by the apparent tendencies of some political powers to 
marginalize shari’a, even more than it was under Mubarak’s regime (Al-Shahhat, 
2013h). Thus, for DS’ sheikhs, such a decision was fruitful since a positive role in 
politics allowed the movement to carry out its main mission of defending shari’a. In 
addition, they were able to express their vision that rejects western democracy, 
meanwhile, they were able to defend Article 2 of the Constitution and to introduce 
articles 4, 81, and 219, and to maintain both article 2 and 11 in 2012 Constitution90 (Al-
Shahhat, 2013h). Moreover, it gave them an opportunity to interact with various sectors 
of the society, thus widened their scope of da’awa (Ramadan, 2012, Ramzi, 2013). 
Therefore, besides stressing that DS’ participation conforms to its Manhaj of change, 
and to its previous actions and practices, they highlighted the religious motive behind 
participation, through expressing concern over the seculars’ intentions. In this regard, 
Borhami discussed the secular calls for the annulment - or at least the amendment - of 
article 2 of the Constitution, and named the opponents of this article. Therefore, he said 
that when the constitution draft came out with article 2 “untouched”, DS’ sheikhs and 
                                                             
90 “Article 2: Islam is the state’s religion, and Arabic is its official language. The principles of Islamic law (sharia) 
form the main source of legislation. 
Article 4: The noble Azhar is an independent Islamic institution of higher learning. It handles all its affairs without 
outside interference. It leads the call into Islam and assumes responsibility for religious studies and the Arabic 
language in Egypt and the world. The Azhar’s Body of Senior Scholars is to be consulted in matters pertaining to 
Islamic law (shari’a). 
The state guarantees the financial means needed to fulfil these tasks. 
The Sheikh of Al-Azhar is independent and cannot be dismissed from his position. The law determines the process by 
which he is selected from among the members of the Body of Senior Scholars. 
All this will proceed as stipulated by law. 
Article 11: The state promotes morality, decency, and public order, as well as a high level of education and religious 
and patriotic values, scientific truths, the Arab culture, and the historical and civilizational patrimony of the People. 
All this as specified by law. 
Article 81: The rights and freedoms that attach to the citizen must not be impaired. No law regulating the practice of 
these rights and freedoms may narrow their intent and essence. 
The rights and freedoms are to be practiced in such a way that they do not conflict with the provisions of Part One of 
this Constitution, which covers the elements of state and society. 
Article 219: The principles of Islamic law (sharia) include general evidence, the foundational principles of Islamic 
jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), the reliable sources from among the Sunni schools of thought (madhahib).” 
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followers decided to vote yes in the referendum (Borhami, 2011c). Moreover, he said 
that the issue of the rule of God was suppressed for years and they were not allowed to 
express it, but after the revolution, it is no longer banned, and they have the opportunity 
to defend it in absence of the restrictions that characterized Mubarak’s regime 
(Borhami, 2011c). Borhami added that his earlier criticism and reservation on Islamists’ 
political participation, were general, and were confined to Islamists’ participation in 
secular regimes, such as in Turkey and Tunisia, as well as Egypt before 1996. However, 
in the Egyptian case shari’a became the main source of legislation by virtue of a 
constitutional court ruling in 1996 (Borhami, 2011c). Thus, Borhami clarified that he 
was not against participation in principle, on the contrary, he approves of political 
participation as long as shari’aa is the ceiling. Projecting the religious motive, 
discussing the rule of God issue, and considering shari’a as DS’ condition for political 
participation, all constituted another justification for the argument that there is no 
contradiction with the foundational text. 
In an attempt to include and frame the concepts associated with political participation, 
DS’ leaders provided definitions and links that made democracy and state connected to 
DS’ Manhaj. This was done through re-wording, while preserving the same word 
meaning and argumentation as in the pre-revolution texts.  
 
Democracy and Shari’a in DS’ Post-Revolution Discourse 
In an attempt to find a common ground between shari’a and democracy, Borhami 
mentioned that in the past, Islamists’ loyalty to democracy, liberalism, and all what 
contradicts Shari’a, was tested, whereas democracy has taken many of its principles 
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from Islam (Borhami, 2011c). In this regard, Borhami called in the ‘comprehensiveness 
of Islam,’91 making democracy one, even partial, derivative of Islam rather than tracing 
the common ground between both. However, the difference between Islam and 
Democracy is that the latter gave the right of legislation to the people with no regard to 
shari’aa, which is considered ‘polytheism’. Such a definition of democracy also 
conforms to Borhami’s pre-revolution definitions and reservations on democracy in the 
foundational text, particularly linking it to polytheism. Preserving this firm position on 
the concept, Borhami clarified that DS’ political participation in a democratic system is 
only possible if democracy is limited by shari’a (Borhami, 2011c). After two years of 
political participation, Al-Shahhat (2013h) also introduced an adaptation to the concept 
of democracy, through saying that some of its mechanisms exist in Islam. Unlike 
Borhami, he refuses slogans of “our goods are back.” Thus, for Al-Shahhat, democracy 
is irrelevant to an Islamic context. For despite the fact that it prevailed in contemporary 
states as a governance system that all nations pursue, being the dominant system does 
not make democracy the only possible option for good governance. For him, Shura 
remains an alternative to democracy, and is not one of its versions or adaptations, but is 
rather a distinct one. Meanwhile, the way democracy is applied in the Muslim world 
deprives the nations of any benefits of democracy, bearing in mind that some Islamists 
do not even see any positive sides to democracy (Al-Shahhat, 2013h). This conforms to 




                                                             
91 As one of the main features of the movement’s discourse and Manhaj. 
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Deconstruction of Democracy: 
At this point, to face the reality of the domination of democracy, Al-Shahhat dealt with 
the question of the religious legitimacy of “applying partial reform to the state using 
modern constitutional systems, and the possibility of deconstructing the concept of 
democracy,” and accepting some of its components. However, he asked whether 
Islamists would approve of “the deconstruction of democracy” as a way out to deal with 
their political reality (Al-Shahhat, 2013h). In this regard, he mentioned that there are 
two Islamist approaches towards democracy, one that absolutely rejects it, and another 
that treats it as a complex concept, which could be deconstructed, thus, could be 
partially accepted through approving some of its mechanisms. However, those who 
strictly reject a partial acceptance of democracy, base their argument on fears of 
religious confusion and fitna, particularly if media misrepresented this as an absolute 
approval of all aspects of democracy, on the part of the Islamists. Accordingly, such 
misrepresentation might put pressure on Islamists who have to provide religious 
concessions and reform compromises in this case (Al-Shahhat, 2013h). 
Nevertheless, while recognizing that democracy includes “infidelity components,” Al-
Shahhat sees that democracy is a complex concept, and one should be selective about its 
components, depending on the benefits versus evils calculations. He argues that it does 
not matter if Muslims refer to “people of the book” in some issues. In addition, Ibn 
Taymiyya redefined and clarified some Sufi concepts since not all of them defy shari’a 
and faith. Thus, Al-Shahhat believes that the problem with democracy is conceptual and 
lies in the misuse of some concepts and the intention of the user. Moreover, Ibn 
U’thaymin and Ibn Baz, while aware of the existence of constitutions and the uses of 
the concept of democracy, accepted political practices on condition that they promote 
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virtue and prevent corruption and immorality. He concludes from such evidences that 
those who participate in politics should be fully aware of the definitions of the concepts 
and their real connotations, and to be selective in a way that serves the religious 
purposes (Al-Shahhat, 2013h). Thus, he says that DS allowed participation after the 
revolution, while being keen on denying vice, and without praising democracy in its 
abstract meaning, particularly its philosophy of the “sovereignty lies in the nation”. 
Even for the mechanisms of democracy, DS’ sheikhs believe that there is no religious 
consensus about the fact that such mechanisms conform to shari’a, and DS never 
claimed that they are. However, participation with such democratic mechanisms is 
based on the benefits versus evils calculations, since they are the lesser of two evils. Al-
Shahhat explained that accepting democratic mechanisms is like accepting excess salt in 
the food, which is inconvenient, but is still a better option than poison for example. This 
is why DS accepted parliamentary elections as a mechanism, instead of selecting the 
group of Ahl Al-Hal Wl-A’qd, which for him represented excess salt, but refused the 
democratic philosophy that is for him like poison (Al-Shahhat, 2013h). 
Such flexibility and willingness to be selective about democracy, conforms to Al-
Shahhat’s pre-revolution stand on democracy and participation92 (Al-Shahhat, 2010), 
                                                             
92 Despite of the emphasis on rejecting democracy, he showed flexibility in dealing with the concept in his pre-
Revolution lecture about democracy, through linking the acceptance of democracy to a number of conditions. In this 
regard, Al-Shahhat stated that accepting, or prohibiting democracy could be conditioned by violations expected or 
associated with it. Among such violations is the formation of alliances with secular parties, and the acceptance or the 
silence on their falsehood. What is worse for him is the recognition of issues that defies Shari’aa, such as allowing the 
guardianship of the infidel, or of women, or the acceptance of the freedom of expression and opinion, without any 
restrictions. Thus, if there are any of such violations, democracy should be prohibited, however, such prohibition is 
not absolute in all times and places, for he stated a number of conditions under which Islamists can participate in a 
democratic system. For instance, if the electoral system is a single member district system, or if the country allows 
the formation of an Islamic political party, where participants are not pressured to support issues that defy Shari’a. If 
such conditions existed then participation would be subject to evils versus benefits calculations. Therefore, in the pre-
Revolution period, Al-Shahhat said that DS’ evaluation of the situation is that the expected corruption and evils 
overruns the possible benefits of participation in a democratic system, thus, they would probably tend to prohibit 
democracy. However, there are occasions when those who participate in a democratic system commit clear sins and 
violations that require condemnation as in the case of breaching the religious foundations, and sometimes there are 
cases when an action could be subject to discussion to decide if it is really a fatal violation (Al-Shahhat, 2010). Thus, 
their strict position on democracy was not absolute as it availed some space for context based flexibility and 
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where Islamists could never adopt democracy in principle, and all Islamists should 
abide by this attitude. Thus, DS’ pre-revolution general position on democracy; gives 
the impression that they contradict DS’ current position. In addition, in the pre-
revolution texts, there is an intersection between their perception of democracy, political 
participation, and religious concessions, since they have been dealing with them as 
counterparts. Nevertheless, the comparison of the post and pre-Revolution texts, as 
concerns democracy, reflected a consistent approach towards the concept, and this was 
clear in the continuity of the core argumentation, and the word meaning. However, there 
was a slight difference in the wording used, which implied that the inevitable 
connection between democracy, political participation and religious concessions, was 
adjourned in their post-revolution texts, particularly, through the introduction of the 
concept of “deconstruction of democracy”. Such a concept, despite conforming to their 
core argumentations, helped in providing an elaborate articulation of them through 
dividing the concept of democracy into “mechanisms”, which could be, temporarily, 
and conditionally adopted, and a “philosophy” that they have been always open about 
its rejection, being an act of polytheism.  
In sum, DS’ leaders maintained their core argumentation, yet, with a new formulation 
through breaking down the concept of democracy. Thus, they are dealing with the 
decision of participation as an act that would be practiced within a democratic structure. 
Yet, reservations over such a structure were muted since, after the revolution, the 
features of the political context started to conform to their initial conditions for a 
legitimate, or at least an acceptable, political participation. 
The Religious and the Civic State in DS’ Post-Revolution Discourse: 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
understanding, depending on specific conditions. Such roots of the concept in DS’ thought might have paved the way 
for their involvement in politics after the Revolution, and that was clear in DS’ post-Revolution discourse. 
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As for the definition of the state and its nature, Al-Shahhat (2010) mentioned that the 
Muslim state is faith based. However, he rejects the religious state in its western 
definition, that is connected to the transgressions of the Catholic Church historically, 
which makes it irrelevant to Islamic culture. The state in Islam, for him, is neither an 
autocracy nor a theocracy, but one where the whole nation and the ruler are subject to 
shari’a and no one can speak in the name of God. After the revolution, the refusal of 
using the term “civic state” in the Constitution was obvious in DS’ comment on Al-
Azhar document that supported such approach. In this concern, DS’ statement 
mentioned that the word civic is the Arabic translation of the English concept of 
“secular” or “non-religious,” and DS strictly rejected that the Constitution includes the 
word civic, for it contradicts Islamic shari’a reference 93  (AnaAlsalafi, 2011g) 94 . 
Moreover, in TV interviews during MB rule, Borhami stressed that DS does not aim at a 
religious state in the European or western sense, and that secularism is irrelevant to 
Islam (Al-Laithy, 2012 ). This is because da’awa, which can be launched everywhere 
using lenient and kind words, is the only means of change that DS recognizes and they 
hold the state responsible for it. In fact, all socialization means should serve this da’awa 
purpose. In addition, he clarified in few words what he means by the application of 
shari’a, that is, determining the permissible and the forbidden, assuring that such 
application takes into account the cost-benefit analysis, the capabilities and weaknesses, 
and is context base, thus, it pays attention to people’s conditions (Ramadan, 2012). 
                                                             
93 Al-Shahhat was DS’ representative in this discussion.  
94 In a debate with the liberal figure Amr Hamzawy, Al-Shahhat adhered to the same definition of democracy and to 
his position and arguments on secularism. He further insisted on a constitution that gives Shari’a as the upper hand in 
legislation, since that under Islam freedom is restricted by Shari’a, while under liberalism liberty is restricted by 
public interest. He also mentioned that he is open to all ideas, and methods, if they guarantee that legislation is for 
God (AL SHAHHAT, A. M., HAMZAWY, AMR Jul 9, 2011. مناظرة بين الشيخ عبد المنعم الشحات و عمرو حمزاوى. 
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Thus, in line with DS’ gradual reform approach, despite its continued rejection to what 
the sheikhs call the “philosophy of democracy,” and all its relevant concepts, they 
expressed clear commitment to the democratic mechanisms, although they consider 
such mechanisms as non-Islamic. Also, against the history of DS-state relationship, DS 
sheikhs were keen on institutionalism and constitutional procedures; thus, were against 
any radical steps against MB, but were pro changing the regime through the constitution 
and elections (Al-Laithy, 2012 , Ramzi, 2013). 
In addition to employing the same argumentation and word meaning, prioritizing the 
religious concerns and mission, and the commitment to the movement’s social change 
Manhaj, the post-revolution texts shared other aspects with the pre-revolution ones, for 
instance, the aspects of victimization, considering media an enemy, as well as the 
conspiracy and plots against Islam and the religious people. Such insistence on their 
original position on democracy, social change, and the priority of the religious and the 
normative components over the political, which consequently led to issuing 
controversial statements, all raise questions about the nature of the relationship between 
DS, and NP, and the rest of political powers and social groups in their new political 
context after the revolution.  
The “We” and the “Other”: 
Being open about anti-Western democracy, the conspiracy of the West, Christians, 
Jews, and the liberals against Islam, and the priority of keeping Islamic identity, 
Borhami said that members of DS, who are not directly involved in da’awa, can 
contribute through political participation on condition that they do not become members 
in secular or liberal political parties (Borhami, 2011c). In his reform lectures, Al-
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Shahhat’s criticism to the secular powers was analyzed on basis of making secularism 
as devoid of meaning, and denying its feasibility in an Islamic context (Al-Shahhat, 
2013d, Al-Shahhat, 2013h, Al-Shahhat, 2013f). Al-Shahhat also criticized leftists 
indirectly, for instance, when he rejected their slogans of “the revolution continues” 95 
(Abdelrahman, 2013), saying that “the possible violent confrontations that might result 
from such an approach could be accepted by believers in class conflict (meaning 
leftists), but never from owners of a da’awa methodology whose project is mainly 
educational, focused on individual reform and solidarity of the society” (Al-Shahhat, 
2013c). He criticized those who consider themselves revolutionary, and who put much 
weight on protest, strikes, and seem to be proud of getting detained, without being clear 
about the demands, agenda, or long-term objectives. In this regard, he said: “it is not 
about protest, strikes or detentions, it is rather about what is meant by them.” Moreover, 
he admitted that there was an accumulation of reform efforts, and limited protests 
against Gamal Mubarak’s intended power inheritance, and even if such accumulative 
reform work turned into a revolution, it can never continue forever (Al-Shahhat, 2013c). 
The fact that Al-Shahhat was criticizing the dominant revolutionary discourse and the 
activists’ slogan, was largely swimming against the tide, and implies an adherence to 
their counter-discourse, that rejects all types of radical change, irrespective of the 
political and the social contexts. It also indicates that the relationship between DS and 
seculars did not change after political interactions, especially when DS’ post-revolution 
discursive field remained almost the same as the pre-revolution one, with more or less 
                                                             
95 Such slogan was raised by leftist revolutionaries who were desperate due to the dominance of the organized and 
established entities (the military, MB, and the remnant of Mubarak’s regime) who hijacked the political scene after 
the revolution, leaving the revolutionaries out since they were under-organized movements with no leadership or 
clear structure (Abdlerahman, 2013). 
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the same actors and meaning contestation, despite the structural changes in the Egyptian 
context.   
In addition, according to the post-revolution reform texts analyzed, unlike the pre-
revolution ones, Al-Shahhat declined to mention controversial issues as concerns 
women and social groups, for instance, Christians’ and the women’s guardianship. 
However, with female candidacy in the 2011 parliamentary election, DS’ leaders 
insisted that it is not accepted with regard to shari’a, and their justification to this DS’ 
women participation step was centered on cost-benefit analysis and context based 
choices96 (Abu El-Enin, 2011 , Borhami, 2011a). Nevertheless, Borhami was all the 
way clear about the rejection of non-Muslim guardianship, and said that DS would not 
change its position on the right to guardianship in order to please the public or to 
politically market themselves (Borhami, 2011d). Borhami also mentioned several times 
that Muslims should not greet Christians in their feasts (Borhami, 2013b), and DS’ 
sheikhs supported this opinion.97 The fact that NP’s electoral lists included Christian 
candidates running for parliamentary elections in 2015, and that they have already 
allowed women candidates in 2011, made questionable NP’s and DS’ framing 
processes, and the relationship between the party and the movement.  
As for Sufis, Borhami recognized the belief differences which Salafis have with the 
various Sufi trends, yet, he stressed that such differences would not escalate to the use 
                                                             
96 As will be discussed in detail in chapter 6. 
97 As concerns Christians, Al-Shahhat said that Muslims are not supposed to attend Christian ceremonial prayers or to 
greet Christians in their feasts, since they have no evidence on this from the Prophet’s biography on this issue. He 
argues that, out of their own beliefs and sectarian divisions, the followers of Protestant or Catholic churches will not 
attend the prayers at the Orthodox Church, so why would a Muslim attend to a Christian church? Christians are 
partners in homeland and their feast would survive even if we do not greet them, and, from his point of view, this 
constitutes no harm to them. Borhami also supported this argument (AL-DEMERDASH, M. 2012. Interview between 
Sheikh Abdel Mone'm  el Shehat and Mo'itaz ad-Demerdash, BORHAMI, Y. 2013b. Opinion   by Sheikh Yasser 
Borhami on according greetings to Christians  on their feasts.Referring to Field Notes, in reaction to such fatwa, 
average men on the street were resistant and said they have never been that divided on belief basis. Furthermore, they 
assure that they would not think twice before greeting Christians (Field Notes August 2013). 
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of violence, and all deputy attorney (magistrate) investigations proved the innocence of 
Salafis in cases of dismantling Sufi shrines after the Revolution (Borhami, 2011c). 
Borhami also clearly stated that there could be a Sufi with correct faith (Al-Laithy, 2012 
). A mild take on Sufis was also clear in Al-Shahhat’s example about Ibn Taymyya’s 
redefinition and clarification of some Sufi concepts that do not necessarily defy shari’a 
and belief, if defined in the right way (Al-Shahhat, 2013h). However, as concerns 
Shiites, extreme rivalry with that Islamic sect expressed itself in DS’ historical position 
against the Iranian Revolution and the Shiites98, and such antagonism continued after 
January 2011 revolution. In this regard, Borhami said that Shiites have clear faith 
deviation in the foundations of Islamic belief and the relationship with the companions 
and family of Prophet Mohamed. Thus, he does not welcome any reconciliation and is 
not interested in a dialogue with them. Also, Borhami mentioned that the main 
difference with MB in the 1970s was on the Iranian Revolution, that MB praised, and 
DS criticized (Ramadan, 2012). 
Borhami also highlighted the diversified nature of Salafis, and was keen on 
distinguishing DS from the rest of Salafis, since they do not necessarily represent the 
same set of ideas adopted by other Salafi groups. He said that AS99 was one stage in 
Salafis’ da’awa, but was later dominated by the Madkhali100 trend, who considered 
Mubarak the Emir of the believers (Borhami, 2011c). In this regard, Borhami was keen 
on defending DS against claims that they share AS’ argument against the revolution, 
that was based on the religious illegitimacy of protesting against and toppling the legal 
guardian. He mentioned that DS’ members were subject to suppression and prison 
                                                             
98 See Chapter 3. 
99 See Chapter 2. 
100 See Chapter 2. 
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because they refused to support that argument. On the contrary, they were rather 
fighting for the issues of God’s governance, and loyalty and enmity. Such issues 
constituted the political position of DS and were unwelcome by Mubarak’s regime (Al-
Laithy, 2012 ). He even mentioned that DS was closer to non-Islamists than to 
Madkhalis on the issue of denouncing oppression, and in rejecting calling oppressors 
the emirs of the believers (Al-Laithy, 2012 ). He also added that Madkhalis had access 
to media and that their views were widespread, giving the wrong impression about 
Salafis (Al-Laithy, 2012 ). 
As concerns MB, Borhami said that DS does care to avoid conflict with MB, and that 
each works on his own to reach to its Islamic form of society (Borhami, 2011c). Al-
Shahhat also emphasized the distinct nature of DS and NP, through speaking about the 
diversity within the Salafi trend, and through saying “we are not MB” (Al-Warwary, 
2012). Such an approach to fellow Islamists emphasizes the historical pattern of DS-
Islamists’ relationship, and DS’ keenness to express their distinct position within 
Islamist activism101.  
As concerns the relationship with the state and society, Borhami said that, after the 
revolution, there was a breakthrough in the relationship with the state and the Ministry 
of Endowments. He also described Al-Azhar as the guardian of Islam, and that they 
hoped that Al-Azhar continues tackling his mission, in spite of some intellectual 
differences with its sheikhs (Borhami, 2011c). It is to be said also that Salafis, and 
particularly DS, were understudied and were not known to non-specialists. Even in 
media, there was a difficulty in accepting the concept “Salafi,” as compared to Sunni or 
Muslim, since it was perceived as an unnecessary fractionalization of Muslims 
                                                             
101 See chapters 2 and 3. 
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(Ramadan, 2012). This is especially true given that the connotation of Salafi and the 
nature of Salafi groups was ambiguous and loaded with various impressions, mostly 
linked to “extremism,” “radicalism,” “non-Egyptian Wahhabism,” and “rigidity” versus 
the “Egyptian moderate” and “popular Islam” connected to a mix of “Sufi mystical,” 
“spontaneous,” “simple” and “rationalist” practices, that is basically related to Al-
Azhar, the official and the main religious authority in Egypt (Al-Malyka, 2012, Field 
notes, 2013-2014) . 102  Among the factors that augmented this position came Al-
Shahhat’s culturally shocking comments that added to DS’ cultural exclusion (Al-
Qarmoty, 2011, Al-Warwary, 2012, Al-Demerdash, 2012)103. 
In view of this DS’ relationship to the various actors within their new political context, 
a process of self-identification and conceptual clarifications was required at this 
transitional stage. First, the sheikhs had to keep the integrity and the identity of the 
movement within such political momentum. Second, they had to introduce themselves 
and their approach to the society and the actors that they interact with. After June 30th 
Revolution, which brought an end to MB rule, Al-Shahhat wrote a series of seven 
articles about reform, starting in September 2013. Marking two years of DS’ 
involvement in politics, such a series represented an emphasis on the movement’s 
                                                             
102 See also chapters 3 and 4 on this. 
103 He criticised the writings of the Nobel Prize-winner, Naguib Mahfouz, saying that his novels are full of violations 
to religion, and that he propagates “prostitution and drugs”. When faced with people’s reservations, he insisted on his 
view and argued that no one would dare to read Naguib’s novels on air. Naguib was not the only national and cultural 
figure that Al-Shahhat criticized, as he also criticized Om Kolthoum, and other prominent artists. He also mentioned 
that music is banned by religion, except for chanting accompanied by tambourine. Al-Shahhat was also accused of 
propagating the idea of effacing ancient Egyptian statutes, and his comment on this accusation was that, despite the 
religious evidence in this regard, he would not call for destroying such monuments if they bring about benefits and 
are a source of income to the country. However, he would suggest covering the faces of such statutes with a “wax 
mask”, and that would be a practical way out. Nevertheless, he denied that he was defaming the ancient Egyptian 
civilization; however, there is a difference between being proud of ancestors’ achievements and civilization, and of 
boasting about their infidelity. Thus, he is selective as concerns the Egyptian history (Al-Demerdash, 2012, Al-
Warwary, 2012). In addition, Al-Shahhat, refused to be interviewed by any unveiled female TV anchors, and when he 
was invited to present his platform during the elections, in Alexandria local channel, he asked the anchor to wear a 
veil. Such situation exposed him to wide criticism, in addition to rumours that he refused to appear with a Coptic 
figure, which the anchor denied (Qarmoty, 2011).  
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reform methodology. Meanwhile, it constituted a self-identification process through 
defining the “We” in opposition, and in comparison, to the “Other.”  
In this process, unlike other Islamists, DS identified itself as the group that accepts 
gradual change, while recognizing the faults and shortcomings of the existing system, 
and rejecting any religious concessions (Al-Shahhat, 2013d). This description of DS’ 
position was in view of its participation in politics, within a democratic structure, while 
openly rejecting democracy for being non-Islamic. Accordingly, they had to comply 
with election laws and regulations, while stating that such laws and regulations are not 
Islamic. Meanwhile, they were keen on reproducing DS’ Manhaj (as in the foundational 
text), with a focus on the bottom-up approach and the consequent non-Takfiri, non-
violent nature of its members, besides emphasizing DS willingness to cooperate with 
other powers. This was meant to compare themselves to or to distance themselves from 
MB’s exclusionary behavior and the tendency to Takfir that dominated Islamist media 
under MB’s rule (Borhami, 2013c, Abdulla, 2014, Ramzi, 2013). DS’ sheikhs also 
stressed the catastrophic consequences of a sudden application of shari’aa, emphasizing 
instead the gradual nature of their approach, and the rationality and realism of their 
members (Al-Demerdash, 2012). In addition, they would not impose their own religious 
concepts, but rather the interpretations issued by the Al-Azhar-based Islamic Research 
Complex, as a neutral and trusted religious authority (Al-Demerdash, 2012). 
Thus, despite entrenching this image of having a tolerant nature and openness to other 
political powers, and of being a distinct Islamist model, there was an obvious social 
resentment to DS’ discourse, and the relationship between the religious and the political 
in such discourse was questionable. In fact, the DS-NP separation that DS’ members 
always emphasized was not convincing. Thus, there were questions on the relationship 
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between the party and the movement, and between DS’ vision for social change and 
NP’ policy choices, particularly with the party’s controversial decisions during and after 
June 2013 revolution, as will be discussed in the following chapter.  
Conclusion 
The main argument in this chapter is that DS’ framing processes constituted an 
extension of DS’ ideology or Manhaj for social change. Such framing processes center 
around religious argumentations, and mostly take the form of a religious ruling, based 
on evidence from Quran and Sunna, with the interpretation of Salafi scholars. Thus, 
framing came to follow DS’ Manhaj, aiming at its preservation along with the 
protection of shari’a and Egyptian Islamic identity. The main tools of framing were 
cost-benefit analysis guided by religious rulings, evaluating reality requirements (Feqh 
Al-Waqi’), and the re-wording of the movement’s definitions which preserved the core 
argumentations, and word meanings, while using different wording such as the 
introduction of the concept ‘deconstruction of democracy’, and the formulation of the 
relationship between the social and state levels of change in DS’ Manhaj.  
In this respect, DS’ framing processes were traced through a survey of its texts on social 
and political change pre-January 2011, and applying CDA to DS’ texts during the 
January 2011 revolution, and texts on reform and means of social change in the post-
2011 revolution. Such framing processes were contextualized in DS’ discursive field 
that was shaped through contestation on political and social change meanings, and the 
relevant concepts and means among the various actors in the 2000s, the decade that 
witnessed the rise of protests and social mobilization in Egypt, and paved the way for 
the revolution.  
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Thus, this chapter explored DS’ framing of protests as a means of social change, the 
framing of the Christian-Muslim discursive conflict and the protest for “liberating 
Christian converts” and the framing of Bilal’s torture in 2011, which was connected to 
DS’ position on Alexandria Church bombings, and the state and media reactions to it. 
Such framing processes within the Egyptian context at this period showed DS’ self-
identification and relationship with the Other. The givens of the framing processes 
analysis reflected a consistency and continuity in DS’ relationship with the other, self-
identification, and discourse. This could be understood in the light of the fact that the 
main features of DS’ discursive field persisted through the revolution and post-
revolution periods, with the same actors and meaning contestations largely intact.  
The focus was on DS’ framing of the revolution as constituting an existential threat to 
shari’a, while in the meantime an opportunity to politically participate. Thus, DS’ 
framing of the adoption of collective action in the early 1980s and its decision to 
participate in politics were both framed as attempts to protect da’awa, Manhaj and 
shari’aa against an existential threat. In view of cost-benefit analysis and context based 
evaluation, political participation was introduced as one of DS tools to preserve da’awa 
and Manhaj under the new conditions. Yet, it does not replace its Manhaj of Social 
change that is based on education and propagation and stays bottom-up. In this regard, 
DS’ members were assured that DS’ Manhaj will never be sacrificed, a message that 
can be said to come at the core of DS’ framing of political participation. Thus, DS’ 
original Manhaj was reproduced in all the movement’s post-revolution texts analyzed, 
however, with an adaptation to explain the parallel rather than the consecutive order of 
the levels of social change, which again was an elaborate articulation to the necessity of 
carrying out da’awa at all levels of the society. There was also the re-wording of the 
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definition of democracy and the nature of the state, as the structures in which DS will 
participate. Moreover, adopting democratic mechanisms, with a background of a 
gradual change ideology, DS aligned itself more with the constitutional procedures of 
regime change rather than protest or revolution. Accordingly, they refused all the 
arrangements of June 2013 revolution and did not participate in the protest.  
As part of the post-revolution framing processes, DS’ leaders’ self-identification was 
that they are the group that adopts gradual long-term social change and, while 
participating in the current structure, denounce vice and religious transgressions. They 
also highlight the flexible and rationalist, limited by shari’a, nature of DS’ members. 
Moreover, they stress that they are anti-violent, anti-Takfiri, anti-exclusionary and are 
open to all political and social groups. This openness and tolerance emphasized by DS’ 
leaders was also associated with an emphasis on the distinct nature of DS among other 
Islamists, where they are highly critical of MB, their historical rival. This also explains 
why their alliance with MB did not last for long. While being open, they would not 
enter into alliances with seculars, whom they preserved their hostile discourse on and, 
while interacting, they kept a distance. In addition, while allowing women to participate 
in politics, they stressed that it is banned by religion. Moreover, they kept the same 
discourse about Christians, Shi’ites, and a rather mild discourse about Sufis. Finally, 
DS’ discourse was received with caution, and sometimes resentment, from the media 
and society. Such givens raise questions about the relationship between DS and NP and 
the influence of DS’ Manhaj on NP’s policy choices, relationship with the various 
actors, and framing processes. The CDA framework adopted in this dissertation helped 
in revealing the textual features of DS’ texts in the various stages: this was particularly 
as concerns wording, word meaning and argumentation, in addition to tracing its ethos 
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and relationship with the other in comparison to the results of chapter four. It also 
showed the change in the discursive combinations of DS within a changing Egyptian 
context, where the structure of the Egyptian system was transformed, yet while 
preserving the same discursive field so DS seemed to be sticking to its discourse on 
social change, its self-identification as a religious actor, and its relationship with the 
other or the various social and political groups within the Egyptian context. This 
conclusion was not to be reached without applying CDA to DS’ texts on social change 
over its history. In the following chapter, such conclusions will be tested through CDA 
of the content of the interviews carried out in the field with DS/NP’s members on the 
various levels (elite, middle level, and rank and file), and age and gender categories. 
This will investigate to what extent the characteristics of DS’ discourse survived when it 
entered politics, and how the various members relate to such discourse and reacted to 
the movement’s framing processes for political mobilization within the sweeping 
changes in the Egyptian context particularly from 2011 to 2013. Testing the results of 
CDA through applying a comparison of DS’ texts throughout its history until its entry to 
politics along the CDA textual, discursive and societal levels allows not only for an 
understanding of the main question of this thesis on what is DS’ vision for social 
change, but also answers the sub-question of whether DS’ discourse was transformed or 
reproduced during a period of change for both Egypt and the movement. Such 
discussion brings about three issues, first, the intellectual and structural relationship 
between DS and NP. Second, the nature of NP’s role, and finally how NP’s few policy 
choices, since its establishment in 2011-2013, could be understood in light of the 




CHAPTER 6: DS’ VISION FOR CHANGE AS A POLITICAL ACTOR 
Introduction: 
The CDA of post-revolution texts on social change produced by DS’ prominent sheikhs, 
namely Borhami and Al-Shahhat, in addition to media contributions by DS’ members, 
proved to be consistent with the pre-revolution texts. Thus, they constitute a 
reproduction of DS’ foundational texts on the Manhaj of social change. Moreover, they 
shared the same features of DS’ discourse throughout its history, with seeming changes, 
while maintaining a religious representation of reality, as demonstrated in the 
domination of the religious discourse over the political and legal discourses, which they 
have increasingly drawn on after the revolution. This indicates that DS’ framing 
processes are an extension of its ideology, and that the influence of political interaction 
and media access has been upon the form, rather than the core content, of the 
movement’s discourse. Such a persistent religious inclination raises questions about the 
nature of NP, the political front of DS, particularly in the light of the party’s, and DS’, 
figures’ contestable position within Egyptian society, and among other political powers 
after June 2013 revolution. 
As mentioned in chapter 5, the analysis of DS’ discourse concerning social change has 
shed light on DS’ vision for gradual reform, and the positive indications of its non-
Takfiri, non-violent and bottom-up nature. However, the relationship between NP’s 
conduct in various situations and such a religious vision, became questioned in the 
literature, in the media, by various political powers, and even lay citizens, particularly 
as concerns NP attitudes during June 2013 revolution. On the one hand, Islamists 
criticized the party as having a pragmatic tendency, letting down its fellow Islamists and 
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abandoning shari’a: the claim was that it became partner to the new regime that killed 
Islamists in the Raba’a sit-in (Al-Affani, 2013, Brown, 2013). On the other hand, non-
Islamists considered the NP as a fifth column trying to support MB through hindering 
the road map (notes, 2013-2014, Talibbya, 2013). This adds to the current impressions 
about NP, as one that does not respect citizenship, due to DS’ previously discussed 
views about the political rights of Christians and women. Moreover, there is the 
widespread perception of Salafism as a strict understanding of Islam, which departs 
from the moderate, or rather mild interpretations of Al-Azhar, in addition to DS’ open 
rejection of the elements and figures of Egyptian popular culture. All of the above has 
augmented the ambiguity of DS’ vision and NP’s political choices. However, such 
social resentment is quite puzzling in view of DS’ historically non-violent, non-Takfiri, 
and gradual social change vision. 
This chapter attempts to explore the vision of DS as a political actor through a deeper 
look at the discourse of NP’s members, to understand the relationship between the 
overarching ideology of the religious movement (Manhaj for social change) and the 
vision of NP members and their policy choices. This will be done through presenting 
the CDA of the discourse of NP’s members at the various levels of the party, according 
to age and gender, in a number of governorates with varying levels of DS’ presence in 
Egypt, in addition to ethnographic research observations. The objective is to address the 
question of whether the party conforms to, or departs from, the original vision of the 
religious movement, and to explore the extent to which political interactions influenced 
the relationship between DS’ discourse and that of the political party. This will draw 
attention to DS’ vision when put into action in a political context, and to any changes to 
its discourse as a political actor. Such analysis will also help in understanding the 
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relationship between DS and NP, as one model of a religious social movement that 
entered politics. In addition, this analysis will contribute to understanding the party’s 
controversial policy choices within the Egyptian context, given their vision for social 
change and the structural relationship between the party and the movement. Finally, the 
analysis can also help to solve the puzzle of social resentment towards DS’ vision. 
Therefore, this chapter will start with a discussion of the relationship between DS’ and 
NP’s discourses. The discussion will provide an understanding of the features of the 
relationship between the political party and the religious movement, helping to clarify 
the nature of NP. In view of such a vision and the structural relationship between the 
party and the movement, the social resentment to DS’ discourse and NP’s presence on 
the political scene will then be discussed. This will be done through presenting the CDA 
results of DS’ and NP’s discourse as concerns three controversial issues in Egyptian 
society, namely, the status of women, Christians, and art and culture. The chapter 
argues that DS and NP are intellectually and structurally connected, thus NP is a 
religious actor within a political context and is a shura model party, rather than a power 
seeking one. This primarily religious identity led to contradictions and controversial 
policy choices that were negatively received by the public and fellow political actors, in 
view of the Egyptian context discussed in previous chapters. Such public resentment 
and the problematic positioning of DS/NP constitute a challenge to their political future.  
Section 1: The Relationship between NP’s and DS’ Discourses 
This section presents the analysis of spoken texts collected through conversational and 
semi-structured interviews, carried out in four Egyptian governorates (Alexandria, Al-
Buhayra, Giza and Al-Fayyom), during the period from July 3rd 2013 to January 8th 
216 
 
2014. Moreover, it discusses ethnographic research observations from NP’s meetings, 
visits to NP’s headquarters, and the homes and offices of NP’s and DS’ members, in the 
same areas and time-period. 
The Intellectual Connection Between NP and DS: 
The Vision for Social Change, and Self-Identification 
An overview of NP’s members’ discourse has revealed a number of features. First, a 
dominant religious component through stressing the importance of shari’aa, 104  the 
Islamic identity (Talibbya, 2013),105 and the religious motive106 and objectives of their 
involvement in politics (Women's committee, 2014).107 When met in the field, one of 
the young NP leaders stated that DS and NP are against politicizing religion, even 
calling for criminalizing this act, while they aim at religionizing politics, where the 
general policy of the state should conform to shari’a108 (Shams, 2013, Talibbya, 2013, 
Shokry, 2013),109 (Int. Mekki, 2013),110 (Gawwad, 2013). Second, DS’ Manhaj of social 
change was central in NP’s members’ discourse, particularly as concerns focus on the 
individual level, the importance of religious education, and the priority of the social 
                                                             
104 In all the interviews, shari’a was considered the main condition and reason for political participation. 
105 One of the main topics on the Talibyya young NP’s members’ meeting agenda was the preparation for Islamic 
identity campaign in which the leader of the group said that he will send them files on shari’a rules and identity 
conflict, the article of Al-Moqaddem on Islamic identity, among others, for them to study before they attend a 
“training camp” with their leaders, in order to them for the campaign, before the constitutional referendum 
(TALIBBYA 2013. meeting. 
106 One of the female members said “since the 2011 constitutional modifications, we all came out of our homes to 
participate, even before founding the party, for the sake of God, and even if DS des not mobilize us, we do this with 
for reward, except from God.” Another female member added that they contribute financially to sustain the party’s 
activities, and they do not get any personal rewards or benefits (WOMEN'S COMMITTEE, N. 5-01-2014 2014. RE: 
NP Women's committee meeting. 
107 A young female member said, “we needed a party for DS” 
108 “There should be a framework for organizing the relationship between the governor and the governed, and there 
should be a superior reference, other than the human one. This should be shari’a.” He summarized the same 
argumentation, and explanation of Al-Shahhat’s articles on reform, analyzed in chapter 5 (SHAMS, I. 2013. 
Interview withSecretary General of NP in Badrasheen center. 
109 During discussions in a young NP’ leaders meeting, they showed keenness on the conformity of NP’s positions 
with shari’a, and they were concerned over article 219 of the constitution that interprets the principles of shari’a in 
article 2, to the extent that some of them insisted on the withdrawal of NP’s representative in the Fifty’s constitutional 
committee, if the committee insists on cancelling this article (TALIBBYA 2013. meeting. 
110 Amr Mekki, the Chariman’s adviser on foreign affairs, said that NP’s ideology is Salafi (INT. MEKKI, A. 2013. 
RE: int. Mekki. 
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over state reform (Talibbya, 2013, Shams, 2013), 111 (Women's committee, 
2014),112(Bakkar, 2013), (int. Thabet, 2013, Shokry, 2013)113. This was obvious in their 
preference for a bottom-up method of social change, while maintaining factors of 
containment and accommodation of individuals which reflected a non-Takfiri 114 
approach to society (Gawwad, 2013),115(Int. Mekki, 2013, Women's committee, 2014, 
Gawwad, 2013, int. Nasr, 2013, Omar, 2013). In view of this approach, they stressed 
that the purpose of entering politics was reaching out to more social classes and sectors, 
and accessing national figures. Thus, with political interactions, they were widening 
their scope of da’awa, which conformed to DS’ framing of political participation 
discussed in chapter 5 (Shams, 2013, Women's committee, 2014) 116 . They also 
mentioned that their approach to other political powers was based on da’awa rather than 
conflict or political competition, and it was for the sake of coordination with the rest of 
the powers (Shokry, 2013, Bakkar, 2013). Thus, da’awa, as the sole means of change in 
DS’ Manhaj for social change, was a key concept in NP’s members’ approach to 
                                                             
111  While reorganizing the administrative structure of the party’s office in Talibiyya after the June 30 crisis, 
Mahmoud Shaltoot, the head of the office, said that he would differentiate between true affiliates of the party and 
other non-reliable sympathizers, based on their understanding and affiliation to Al-Manhaj. Moreover, he mentioned 
that, away from the difference in opinions on what happened after June 30 and the definitions of the concepts, he sees 
that the positive side was that NP preserved Al-Manhaj and protected it, and this would make them forgive any 
pitfalls or wrong management that NP did, as long as the foundations are maintained. No one of the audience opposed 
him on this point, despite that they were arguing all the time about other issues (TALIBBYA 2013. meeting. 
112The Women’s affairs committee meeting was held at the general secretariat of the party in Alexandria, and was 
attended by 27 female members. 
113  Ahraf Thabet said that, in DS, they teach people religion not politics. Thus, they are investing in good 
personalities who would automatically judge things from the perspective of interests versus evils, and Shari’a, as a 
balanced personality that can deal with whatever situation or issue (INT. THABET, A. 29.12.2013, 9.33-10.44 pm 
2013. 
114 This was stressed in all interviews and conversations, besides the interaction with the researcher, who herself 
became subject to da’awa. At the time of the field work, they were working in a campaign against Takfir, where 
leaders, young NP and DS members, and DS’ women were actively involved (CONV. INT. RASHWAN, A. 
7.11.2013  
 2013, DOCTOR, N.-V. O. A. F. F. 2013. 
115 Hanan Allam said “no laws should be imposed on people since they would not respect them, society should be 
changed first, awareness should be spread and people should be prepared before laws are enjoined.” 
116 An NP female member said “In Da’wa, I was a candle lightening up for others. After entering politics, I became 
huge lamp lighting up for more people.” She based her political participation and work in the party on the Hadith: 
‘Who introduces a good custom shall be recompensed by its reward, and the reward of anyone who adopts it until the 
Day of Resurrection.” In addition, NP female members told the researcher that during the June 30 crisis, Allam 
advised women to recite a prayer in order to decide their political position in the middle of the confusing crisis 
(WOMEN'S COMMITTEE, N. 5-01-2014 2014. RE: NP Women's committee meeting. 
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politics. They drew also upon a religious political discourse in which they linked the 
main intellectual issues they studied in DS’ educational curriculum with their political 
acts and choices, such as the Manhaj of social change, Islamic laws on managing 
opinion difference (Fiqh Al-Ekhtelaf), and rules of commanding virtue and preventing 
vice (int. Thabet, 2013, Shams, 2013). This was called by one of the female members, 
Al-Siyasa Al-Shar’yya, or Islamic politics (Women's committee, 2014).117  
Moreover, in line with the scholastic identity of DS, and the tendency to root their ideas 
and principles in social sciences in the post-revolution period118, the narratives and 
definitions of the concepts of the political situation during NP’s crisis after June 30 
revolution were mainly guided by the academic literature on revolutions119 and coups. 
However, some of them decided to go beyond debates on definitions to “realistically 
deal with the status-quo” (Talibbya, 2013). This realistic tendency of NP’s members 
was expressed in various occasions where they always weighed interests versus evils, 
which is a significant feature in DS’ Manhaj as was discussed in chapters 4 and 5. One 
of the young NP’s leaders said that the governor might exceptionally, and temporarily, 
freeze a right granted by religion, or a legal act, if he sees some public interest in doing 
so (Shams, 2013). They also spoke about the wide range of alternatives in Islam, that 
allows coping with practical issues, and the variations of individual cases120 in reality 
                                                             
117 This young female NP member was a new affiliate to DS and NP, and she joined the party after the 2011 
Revolution, after party-shopping in different secular parties, and is enthusiastic about what she called the Islamic 
unique model of politics that NP represents. Thus, she was one of the cases that was not prepared in DS but still 
adopted a religious discourse.  
118 See Appendix (4) for Al-Shahhat’s articles on reform. 
119 What happened on July 3rd 2013 was a coup for most of the young men who attended the meeting in Talibyya, 
despite their recognition of a wide popular opposition to Morsi. However, for Shaltoot, he thought it is a popular 
revolution, but comparative studies have shown that a revolution cannot succeed unless one of the repressive tools 
joins the popular protests, and according to Shaltoot, this is what the Egyptian military did both in 2011, and in 2013 
(TALIBBYA 2013. meeting.  
120 This might explain the exceptional actions taken by NP, which depart from clear religious rulings particularly as 
concerns guardianship, as will be discussed later in this chapter.  
219 
 
where each case has its evaluation and separate assessment (Gawwad, 2013). 121 
However, the flexibility and practicality of the party and the movement are limited by 
the Manhaj. This is supported through an overview of the intertextuality within the texts 
analyzed, which revealed their reference to Quran,122 Sunna, Prophet’s biography, and 
quotes from prominent Muslim Scholars. Nevertheless, as mentioned in chapter 2, all 
Salafis share the same references, but differ as concerns how they engage with the 
world and how they apply religious rulings on their contemporary contexts 
(Wiktorowicz, 2006, Haykel, 2009). Thus, what makes DS distinct among other Salafis 
is its Manhaj of social change. In this regard, a follow up of the intertextual chains also 
reflected that they reproduced Borhami’s (1992) foundational text on DS’ Manhaj for 
social change, where discussions included a manifest representation of that key text, in 
addition to reproducing Al-Shahhat’s texts as concerns democracy and the details and 
definitions of the concepts relevant to DS’ social change methodology. However, this 
went side by side with awareness of non-Islamists’ contributions in opinion articles and 
media messages (Shams, 2013, Shokry, 2013).  
The Other in NP’s Discourse: 
There was a tendency to hold comparisons with the West whenever asked about women, 
Christians, or democracy and human rights issues (Shokry, 2013, Int. Mekki, 2013, int. 
Makhyon, 2013, int. Nasr, 2013). Such comparisons were in favour of Islam and of DS 
understanding, while being highly critical of the West. Accordingly, it was obvious 
from the discourse of NP’s members that it had common features with DS’ discourse, as 
                                                             
121  Such attitude goes in line with the previously analyzed DS’ framing processes, for instance Al-Shahhat’s 
explanation to DS’ position on the militant groups in chapter 4. 
122 particularly Quaranic verses relevant to change and Da’awa. A young man in the Talibyya meeting said that he 
agrees on staying in the constitutional committee on the basis of a religious ruling that one should spread da’awa and 
speaks the truth, and is not to be held responsible for what comes after.  
220 
 
well as with the features of the Islamist discourse in general. NP’s members also 
showed adherence to democratic mechanisms, despite adopting the same definition of 
democracy (all interviews) in the foundational texts. Thus, they refuse the philosophy of 
democracy, but are against any radical changes as well (Talibbya, 2013).123 According 
to NP members’ definition of democracy, they believe that freedom is never absolute, 
even in the West, where the limit is others’ freedoms, the public interest, or may be 
national security concerns. However, for them, freedom should be restricted by shari’a 
(Shams, 2013, Shokry, 2013, Int. Mekki, 2013). They believe that on basis of majority 
rule, they should apply shari’aa and maintain Islamic identity in Egypt, which implies 
limitation of the political rights of some groups such as Christians (int. Makhyon, 
2013), particularly as concerns the presidency, and the restriction of some trends such as 
Shi’ism and Baha’ism (Int. Mekki, 2013). This tendency to adopt exclusionary views 
was seen normal since there is no absolute democracy in practice even in the West.124 
The discourse of NP members also included features of victimization due to state 
repression, social discrimination, and media defamation (Shokry, 2013, int. Makhyon, 
2013, int. Nasr, 2013, conv. int. Rashwan, 2013, Gawwad, 2013, Bakkar, 2013). They 
also shared grievances and historical rivalry with the MB among the leaders and the 
elder generations of the party. Among youths, there was evidence of resentment towards 
and fear of MB’s violent attacks, or harassment, especially after June 30 revolution 
(Gawwad, 2013, Shams, 2013, int. Makhyon, 2013, Shokry, 2013, Women's committee, 
2014, Talibbya, 2013). NP’s members also reproduced the same perception on other 
Islamist approaches to change discussed in DS’ foundational texts. Thus, their view of 
                                                             
123 Young men in the Talibyya meeting insisted that a constitutional democratic way out in June 30 was the best 
management, and they talked about early presidential elections, or at least about holding parliamentary elections to 
counter balance the powers of Morsi. This conformed to the abovementioned position of DS’ leaders before June 30. 
However, the young members had reservations on DS’ and NP’s management following June 30.  
124 This point will be discussed in further details in the following sections. 
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other Islamists, as well as their relationship with them, and with other political powers, 
followed the same pattern as DS (Shokry, 2013, Shams, 2013, Women's committee, 
2014, Gawwad, 2013, int. Thabet, 2013). 
Institutionalism in a Revolutionary Context: 
In line with their choice of adopting democratic mechanisms, and their gradual reform 
approach, NP puts much stress on institutionalism, which conforms to DS’ position and 
choices. This is in contrast with calls for protest or the revolutionary tendencies that 
were propagated by leftists and fellow Islamists as mentioned in chapter 5. The 
implication of this on their perception and relationship with the state is that, while 
having reservations about state institutions and despite denouncing their transgressions, 
NP is keen on protecting them to prevent chaos and instability. In this regard, the 
Egyptian military was praised as one of the state foundations (int. Thabet, 2013). 
Moreover, there is an emphasis on considering Al-Azhar the main religious reference 
and on respecting the institution, while having intellectual differences with a number of 
Azhari figures (int. Makhyon, 2013, Talibbya, 2013). Their argumentation for 
institutionalism is that they are keen on countering the personalization of politics and 
authority through promoting institutional decisions, both within the state and within the 
party (int. Thabet, 2013, int. Makhyon, 2013, leader, 2013). Meanwhile, in view of DS-
state pattern, institutionality and respect for the constitution, law and court rulings and 
legal procedures is not only a reflection of their conservative approach to change, but 
might also be a way of protecting themselves against state transgressions. For instance, 
suspecting a connection between MB and terrorist groups in Sinai, they prefer that 
declaring MB as a terrorist group be made through the judiciary rather than the 
executive branch. They are also against arbitrary detentions, that the party itself suffered 
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from, and emergency policies for the fact that they spread a feeling of insecurity and 
popular outrage (int. Thabet, 2013).  
On both DS and NP levels, the importance of institutionalization and organizational 
structures,125 besides preventing personalization and individualistic decisions, is that 
they engender an efficient division of labour. Thus, they are needed for functional and 
practical reasons of coordination, and not as a source of practising authority over each 
other. This was their experience as an organized movement over time, and is also the 
same way they framed the benefits of collective action in the foundational texts, as 
discussed in chapter 4 (Women's committee, 2014, int. Makhyon, 2013).126 Such an 
understanding of organization within DS and NP matches the intellectual nature of the 
movement, since the rank and file do not take leaders’ opinions at face-value, but are 
always critical and would not necessarily follow. Yet, they remain loyal to the general 
methodology and guiding principles, derived from Quran and Sunna (Talibbya, 2013, 
Meeting Female leaders, 2014, int. Thabet, 2013). Thus, individuals and leaders are not 
sacred (int. Makhyon, 2013),127 despite their spiritual influence, but their opinions are 
considered mere Ijtihad, that is not flawless, whereas the cement of the party and the 
movement is the Manhaj (Talibbya, 2013). Thus, it was clear that the members who 
were educated in DS seemed to have assimilated the methodology; however, they 
differentiate between that methodology and its application. Therefore, the wrong 
                                                             
125 This point will be discussed in detail in section 2. 
126 Female leaders and young female members confirmed that their work in the party is not different at any level from 
their work in DS, and that what was added is a political component to their message where they spread awareness 
about women’s political rights and mobilizing people and spreading their political ideas. In meetings with the public, 
representatives of both the party and DS are present. They added they organize courses on human development, 
illiteracy classes and handicrafts training courses for women; however they never give out money. The nature of their 
work reflected the spirit of a religious social movement more than of a political party.  
127 Makhyon said decisively we do not have individuals. The female members also said that they argue against 
Borhami, and that he tries to answer all their questions, and sometimes they show anger at him, and while being a 
spiritual leader, he still owes them an explanation to whatever decisions taken by the party or DS. They also said that 
they might not follow his opinion and that this does not affect their affiliation to DS or NP. This same opinion was 
repeated in the young members meeting, who seemed to argue against each and every point, and the meeting actually 
was held to transfer their opinion to the leaders. 
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application is not enough of a reason to quit the movement, but members can reject it, 
and might not react positively towards DS/NP framing to it (Talibbya, 2013, Women's 
committee, 2014).  
Keying and Individual Reason in Response to DS’ and NP’s Framing: 
An example individual members’ reaction to DS’ and NP’s framing, is the contest over 
defining the events of June 30th 2013. The majority of the youth met in the field defined 
it as a coup, few others as a revolution, while DS and NP official position is that, while 
preferring constitutional procedures over radical ones, they cannot do anything about 
the escalation on the ground. Thus, both entities chose to disregard this whole debate, to 
distance themselves from June 2013 revolution alliance mobilization and Islamists 
counter-mobilization, and to deal with reality as mentioned above. In addition, they 
drew upon their historical differences with Islamists and their criticism of MB’s 
political approach and intransigence, which led to this escalation (Al-Affani, 2013). It 
was clear that DS and NP individual members varied in their acceptance of such 
framing; however, this does not necessarily suggest a division within the movement. 
What connect individuals to the collective entity is not only the framing processes, but 
rather how the individual actor reacts to the processes of reframing, associated with 
changes to the social movement. Thus, the individual actor might be acting according to 
her own primary frame and her choices might not correspond to those of other 
participants within the group. In this keying process, there are processes of up-keying 
and down-keying that may be adding or removing layers of the frame. Hence, in some 
cases, keying may lead to a fit between the individual and the collective frame, rather 
than the withdrawal of the individual from the group (Miethe, 2009).  
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In this regard, it was understood from the interviews and interactions with DS’ and NP’s 
members that they have carried out a keying process. This involved focusing their 
affiliation on the Manhaj, that is for them the Salafi Manhaj or the Manhaj of prophets, 
and the right way of understanding Islam, which could be understood as their primary 
frame. This made them closer to the collective frame that justifies decisions as being 
dictated by Manhaj, and as being taken for the sake of protecting it. In this way, ijtihad 
of leaders, although not binding on individual members, is accepted by them as an 
attempt to apply Manhaj, yet one that can be questioned by individuals without 
necessarily leading to their departure from the movement (Women's committee, 2014, 
Talibbya, 2013). A young member of NP said “ I am against the decisions of the leaders 
but my differences with them are so far not enough for me to quit NP, and even if I 
leave the party I will never leave DS because I do believe in DS’ Manhaj” (Talibbya, 
2013). 
Such an understanding of the reaction of individual actors or participants to framing 
processes is important in two respects. Firstly, in view of the general Salafi intellectual 
mode that promotes independence from scholars (Brown, 2014). Secondly, it is 
important in view of DS’ resource mobilization discussed in chapter 3, to recall that 
they do not recruit members and do not offer any benefits, and affiliation to the 
movement is based solely on individuals’ conviction of the Manhaj. This intellectual 
nature of DS’ members and the internal dynamics and affiliation criteria lead to a 
number of implications. First is the central position of Manhaj, being the cement of the 
movement, as well as the tool of political mobilization. Second, there is a positive 
relationship between the conviction and adherence to Manhaj as explained throughout, 
and the belonging and mobilization of DS’ and NP’s members. This conclusion helps in 
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explaining the implications of DS’ and NP’s framing processes and mobilization within 
the changing political context in Egypt, during and after June 2013 revolution, on their 
followers and sympathizers, and on the party’s future as will be discussed in the 
following section.  
To sum up, NP’s members shared with DS the same wording and word meaning as 
concerns social change, democracy, political participation, Islamic identity and shari’aa. 
They adopted the same argumentation and drew upon the same discourses that were 
dominated by the religious discourse, in which they provided a religious representation 
of reality, and even the use of political and legal discourses came from a religious 
perspective. Their technocratic approach to the various political and social topics from 
security to tourism, education, and health (Al-Sayyed, 2013, int. Bakkar, 2013, Int. 
Mekki, 2013, int. Thabet, 2013) seemed to be based on research and consultation with 
experts, and on their expertise as businessmen, doctors, and engineers. However, the 
religious component was present, particularly at points of intersection with religious 
issues. For instance, in the case of “conservative tourism,” NP presented a wide range of 
alternatives to beach tourism, without demanding a ban to it (Int. Mekki, 2013, int. 
Bakkar, 2013). This reflects what Roy (2012) suggests about Islamists successful 
balanced combination of technocratic and conservative values, except that in the case of 
NP, the religious component overrides all other values.  
The genre of the texts was close to conversations and discussions, at a time of a 
revolution and instability. Many of NP’s members started their talk with a formal style 
closer to tutoring, but gradually opened up when provoked by arguments about Islam 
and Salafism in the literature, or when the researcher discussed impressions about them 
among the Egyptian public and media. At this point, the style turns into an informal 
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Egyptian accent, a daily conversational style, which is sometimes friendly, and 
sometimes full of joking, sarcasm, 128  enthusiasm, and emotionality. They were 
exchanging ideas and expressing themselves smoothly with a fellow citizen in a time of 
uncertainty and instability in the country. Nevertheless, they would take the researcher 
as rather serious, the more the researcher uses academic terms, and departs from 
journalistic language, since they obviously appreciate academia and research, and they 
are suspicious of and look down at the media. Also, keeping the spirit of approachable 
activists in a religious social movement and accommodating da’awa people was obvious 
in most of the encounters with NP members, where the researcher herself was 
sometimes subject to da’awa.  
The result of the analysis leads to the conclusion that NP shared the same discourse with 
DS, and that such a unified discourse was observed on various levels of the party and 
across varied categories of age and gender, and in different areas, even when DS’ 
presence was not as strong. This means that NP and DS are intellectually connected. 
However, this does not mean that there were no opinion differences within the 
movement and the party on various issues. However, such differences were confined to 
the application of DS’ methodology (Manhaj), as they might have reservations on its 
projection upon their political reality. Thus, the internal differences were on how 
Manhaj is applied to NP’s political context. Such differences were not dividing the 
party into leaders and rank and file, or elders and youth, but were rather spread across 
                                                             
128  For example: When discussing the impression taken about Salafis’ rigidity and rejection to all aspects of 
modernity and culture, Mr. Shams was laughing and said “ohhh do such Salafis still exist?! Of course not” and he 
was sarcastic about such claims. In the Talibyya meeting, they were quoting a secular figure and joking about his 
coinage about June 2013 revolution. They were also open about their sadness and family problems due to divisions 
among Islamists into supporters of NP and MB’s affiliates. One of the young men said “my aunt and her husband told 
us you are kafir!” 
Women also were emotional and were worried that the researcher might face challenges during her studies in the 
west. They also repeated jokes from the movies, and were joking about their struggle to quit listening to music.  
Such impressions also were clear in the field observations due to interaction on a long period of time, and from notes 
about their body language and facial expressions and voice tone. 
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all the levels of NP. Yet, they were all defined by the members as “Ijtihad” and attempts 
that might be right or wrong but are subject to discussion in order to prevent deviation 
from the Manhaj. Thus, despite differences, there is no polarization between two camps 
or visions, but various packages of opinions across all levels, while maintaining 
consensus on Manhaj. These findings raise questions about the structural relationship 
between the party and the social movement, and about the nature of NP as a political 
actor. These will now be explored. 
 
Section 2: The Structural Relationship between DS and NP: 
There are two explanations of the relationship between DS and NP. The first, emerging 
from initial analysis in the wake of DS’ political involvement, saw a conflict between 
the religious movement and the political party (Lacroix, 2012). The second explanation 
presented the relationship between the party and the movement as the beginning of a 
split into two visions:  senior sheikhs’ insisting on preserving the distinct nature of DS 
among the Salafis, versus the more politically oriented leaders of the party who support 
a horizontal expansion among Salafis in order to widen NP’s constituency (El-Sherif, 
2012a). This section will present the two explanations, and will conclude with an 
alternative reading of NP-DS relationship. This alternative reading suggests a structural 
and an intellectual connection between the movement and the party, in addition to a 
clear Shura mechanism of managing both DS and NP. Moreover, both experience 
decentralization on the intellectual level, while on the structural level, and as concerns 




The Explanation of Political-Religious Conflict: 
In contrast to the results of the CDA of NP members’ interviews discussed in section 
one, the initial reading of the relationship between DS and NP was that the party is 
trying to develop  a separate political discourse and strategy from that of DS’ religious 
one, which might eventually lead to a confrontation between DS’ sheikhs and NP 
politicians (Lacroix, 2012). This was during the period of Emad Abdel Ghaffour’s 
leadership of NP. This reading was reinforced by a statement by Nader Bakkar, (seen as 
one of sheikh Borhami’s closest followers), that Abdel Ghaffour could no longer serve 
as the head of NP while serving as President Morsi’s close advisor. This statement was 
understood as evidence of a personal clash between Abdel Ghaffour, the politician, and 
Yasser Borhami, who was accused of disregarding the distinction between religion and 
politics and of giving direct orders to party members, bypassing party leadership. Abdel 
Ghaffour’s approach to politics and close ties with MB, seeing that it is “the time for 
Islamists to leap fully into politics,” went against Borhami’s cautious stand on MB’s 
initiatives (Brown, 2013). Observers started to see such clashes as religious versus 
political, starting fall 2011, particularly when Abdel Ghaffour expressed his desire to 
have Christians run on party lists in the next elections. Meanwhile, Borhami issued a 
statement on his website, as a religious leader in DS, that “only Muslims should occupy 
positions linked to the objectives (maqasid) of the Muslim state” (Lacroix, 2012). 
Nevertheless, the fact that there was a political discourse from NP, and a religious 
discourse coming out from DS, could reflect the division of labour that the movement 
and the party were trying to establish, and not necessarily an internal conflict. 
Borhami’s comment, according to the CDA of DS’ texts, conformed to the religious 
movement’s discourse regarding non-Muslims’ guardianship discussed in previous 
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chapters. Thus, whether NP was going to run Christian candidates or not, it was DS 
sheikhs’ role to explicitly state and confirm the relevant shari’a rule, even if this meant 
the alienation of the electorate.129 Similarly, listing women candidates, in contrast with 
DS’ interpretation on women’s guardianship, came as a result of cost-benefit analysis, 
which DS’ members take as an exception, not the norm. As mentioned in chapter 5, 
they follow the laws and regulations, while condemning vice and rejecting them as non-
Islamic. 
However, the perceived confrontation was considered clearest with Abdel Ghaffour’s 
announcement that he has an intention to form an electoral alliance with non-Islamist 
political parties,130 which was met again with opposition by Borhami who mentioned 
that “any alliance with groups that oppose God’s Law is absolutely forbidden” (Lacroix, 
2012). This is because, while coordination and cooperation are welcomed, no alliance 
with non-Islamists is to be accepted under any condition, particularly when NP had 
other options, and is not compelled to (Sabe'e, 2013, Sultan, 2013). Finally, among 
incidents that fed into the perception of NP-DS clash, was the NP’s then-spokesman, 
Mohammed Nour (seen as an Abdel Ghaffour follower), accepting an invitation to 
attend the anniversary of the Iranian revolution in the Iranian embassy in February 
2012, disregarding Salafi hostility to Shi’ism (Lacroix, 2012). The fact that the 
contradiction between NP and DS statements became more frequent reflected a rising 
internal clash at that point, however questions remained regarding the nature of the 
clash and its scope. 
                                                             
129 Ahmed Farid said: “The one covered by the public is naked” (Farid int, 2013). 
130 Even with the Free Egyptians party, headed by the Coptic businessman Naguib Sawiris (LACROIX, S. 2012. 




In view of this initial reading of NP-DS relationship, these incidents were perceived as 
evidence on NP’s tendency to separate away from DS, and to develop a political logic 
distinct from the religious one, i.e. “political Salafism may be quietly separating from 
religious Salafism,” with NP aiming at “pro-political autonomy” (Lacroix, 2012). The 
first general congress of NP and the election of the party’s president in 2012 were seen 
as the battlefield, where it will be decided which group will dominate (Lacroix, 2012). 
The Explanation on Divisions over the Direction of Expansion and Relationship with 
Other Salafis: 
Obviously, DS’ sheikhs saw in Abdel Ghaffour’s decisions a departure from DS’ 
Manhaj. Nevertheless, others viewed understanding the relationship between NP and 
DS as simply a clash between sheikhs and politicians as not precise: the imprecision 
concerned defining the parties to, and the reasons for and context of, such a clash (El-
Sherif, 2012a). This second explanation tends to see the conflict, which was clear to the 
public at that time, as one that has to do with deeper intellectual, institutional, and 
organizational visions, in light of the transformations brought about by January 2011 
revolution. In fact, the rapid pace of Salafis’ entry to politics hindered their ability to 
undertake the necessary intellectual and organizational revisions (El-Sherif, 2012a). In 
addition, beyond the need for arranging the relationship between the party and the social 
movement, or the political and the religious, there was a need to develop a crystallized, 
unique Islamic model of political participation (El-Sherif, 2012a). According to this 
explanation, the conflict was seen as one between two main distinct trends within the 
party, as concerns the nature of a Salafi party, and the relationship of this party with the 
rest of the highly diversified Salafi movement (El-Sherif, 2012a). The first trend viewed 
NP’s success as lying in a horizontal expansion that accommodates all the different 
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trends, groups and orientations within the general Salafi movement. Thus, the party 
needs to be based on democratic management, opening the door for political and 
organizational mobilization of all its popular base, whatever their views (El-Sherif, 
2012a). The second trend saw that NP should preserve its distinct belief and intellectual 
identity, and to protect its methodology (Manhaj). Such a vision implies that there 
should be a process of selection and filtration based on the criteria of believing in DS’ 
thought (El-Sherif, 2012a). This trend implied a vertical hierarchy and a strict 
management mechanism, centred around DS’ elites for decision making, through a 
particular group of loyal members - the same as in MB (El-Sherif, 2012a). The 
abovementioned explanation, of the nature of DS-NP clash, suggests that the clash is 
between competing visions over the internal structure and management of NP; the 
vertical versus horizontal expansion with regard to relationship with other Salafis, and 
the democratic versus elitist centralized structures as concerns party management (El-
Sherif, 2012a), projecting to an extent MB’s experience on NP.  
This view also implies that DS had undergone changes after becoming a political actor, 
and that it had to introduce intellectual and organizational revisions, which implies the 
need for fundamental changes if NP wants to achieve political success or to maintain its 
unity. This suggestion goes against the “continuity and the consistency” of DS’ vision 
and social change discourse throughout its history. According to previous analysis in 
this and previous chapters, one of DS’ main tenets and the corner stone of their framing 
process of “political participation,” and of mobilizing followers to participate, was 
leaders’ reassurance that DS and its political arm would not give up on the foundational 
principles, and that the religious prevails over the political. Thus, according to their 
discourse, the objective was to conform to their foundational texts, and to maintain their 
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Manhaj, and not to introduce any revisions for the sake of political gains. Previous 
chapters also showed that DS has a crystallized vision about social change and a means 
of promoting this change, and that such a vision was sustained, even at times of crises, 
and even when defying the dominant discourse. Moreover, DS’ Manhaj constituted the 
cement of the social movement, and that DS’ emergence and development were not the 
result of demands or interests, or confined to grievances, but rather were built around 
religious guiding principles, and sacred texts, and for carrying out a religious mission.131 
Therefore, the interconnectedness of the movement is tied to preserving its foundational 
principles, which it is inconceivable that they would sacrifice, especially for politics, 
which is according to their methodology nothing but one tool that serves da’awa.132 
Moreover, in view of DS’ discourse, and the history of discursive conflicts with other 
Islamists, which contributed to the crystallization of DS’ Manhaj, DS is always keen on 
clarifying its distinct position on the map of Islamist activism. From DS’ texts discussed 
in chapters 4 and 5, and interviews with NP’s and DS’ members, the Islamic reference 
is the common factor between them and the rest of the Islamists. However, they have 
obvious fundamental differences with the rest of fellow Islamists as regards the 
application of such a reference, especially against the dominant top-down approach and 
the possible consequent components of Takfir and violence. Therefore, it is unexpected 
that DS’ Manhaj would be sacrificed for the sake of expanding horizontally, and 
gaining the support of fellow Salafis and Islamists, in return for securing votes, or to 
widen its popular base for political purposes: this is particularly so if political 
participation is framed as a means not an end. This implies that such explanations of 
                                                             
131 “DS’ followers also recognize leader’s spiritual value, but their affiliation is to the idea not individuals… Leaders 
are not sacred” (INT. MAKHYON, Y. 2013. interview, LEADER, Y. B. 2013. 
132 This was stated in all interviews and encounters in the field, “the party speaks with the tongue of DS in politics” 
(WOMEN'S COMMITTEE, N. 5-01-2014 2014. RE: NP Women's committee meeting.2014). They all used the word 
“the political arm of DS,” to describe NP and “politics is just means or a tool”.  
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divisions between two distinct trends do not reflect the reality of the relationship 
between the party and the movement.  
In this regard, this thesis recognizes the internal divisions of the movement and party 
particularly in view of the earlier discussion of the characteristics of Salafis as 
intellectually independent, and as having shallow hierarchies, in addition to the 
discussion of the concept of keying processes. As mentioned above keying is a way of 
understanding individual reactions to framing and how this was reflected in the 
divisions over NP’s position on June 30th revolution. The critique of the literature’s 
understanding of such divisions and how it describes them does not mean that this 
dissertation claims by any means that the movement is homogenous, but rather suggests 
a different description and explanation of such internal divisions, and of the nature of 
the relationship between the party and the social movement both on the intellectual and 
structural levels, which is indeed one of the main contributions of the dissertation. This 
thesis, as will be shown in the next section, argues that by tracing the ideology and the 
framing processes over the movement’s history through operationalizing CDA of the 
archival texts and interviews held with members on various levels, particularly the 
youth and the rank and file, Manhaj emerges clearly as the primary frame for the 
members around which mobilization processes are held and which makes up for the 
lack of discipline within the party. Thus, with the special nature of NP, members are 
divided among themselves on the leaders’ choices and application of Manhaj, yet 
despite being allowed to express this, are not punished or excluded, and the core 
members of the movement are still united around the Manhaj despite divisions on the 
application, and this was expressed in interviews across all levels. Thus, divisions are 
not intergenerational or between leaders and rank and file, since even on the level of 
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founders there was a division, yet so far, such divisions do not result in excluding 
members from the movement. Al-Shahhat, during 2015 elections, said that he does not 
deny the internal divisions, particularly due to the influence of Said Abdel Azeim, one 
of the founders of DS, who joined the MB legitimacy alliance. Abdel Azeim was de-
motivating his students who remained in Alexandria, asking them to boycott elections 
and political participation (Al-Shahhat, 2015). Despite the fact that the 2015 elections 
were reflective of the internal divisions, the media attack accusing DS and NP of being 
a failed political actor and the assassination of one of NP’s leaders in North Sinai were 
framed by DS’ leaders as reasons for unity and for defending the movement and its 
Manhaj. According to party leaders, such factors might have positively influenced the 
political mobilization of DS/NP’s members. In other words, it can be seen that leaders’ 
framing of such events had positive influence on members’ mobilization during the 
elections. This was seen as evidenced in the winning of 12 seats despite of the fierce 
competition with all secular political parties, while NP was the only Islamist party. NP’s 
leaders also claimed that many of the members who lost interest in politics and left the 
party re-joined NP during the elections (al Shahhat, 2015, Al Shalma, 2015).  Yet, the 
analysis in the next section is mainly based on the material collected in the field work in 
2013, and questions about 2015 developments might be answered through a second 
round of field work in the future, since media and leaders’ statements are not enough for 
forming a complete picture.   
The following section elaborates on the relationship of DS and NP through tracing the 
structural relationship between both after proving an intellectual connection through the 




Explaining DS and NP Relationship as Structurally and Intellectually Connected:  
In a novel reading on how we understand the party-movement relation, this thesis 
argues that DS and NP are both structurally and intellectually connected, rather than 
split between two trends or between the religious and the political. 
Structurally, DS is more of a social movement than an organized group. Based on 
analysis of DS’ discourse and organization over its history, and through interviews and 
interaction in the field,133 it is clear that DS represents a loose decentralized social 
movement - unified by an overarching ideology - that uses organizational structures 
functionally, and only for coordination purposes (Women's committee, 2014). However, 
there was also an elitist tendency, based on the legacy of Shura, which is preferred over 
democracy, in managing the organization, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
particularly with the concept of Ahl Al-Hal Wl-A’aqd. Such a tendency was illustrated  
by how Borhami, on the occasion of choosing a candidate for the presidency, was 
against the involvement of what he regarded as the choices of emotional youth (Al-
Laithy, 2012 ).134 However, DS and NP members stressed that Sheikhs or elite opinion 
is for consultation and is not obligatory, despite the spiritual value of the religious 
leaders. They added that members of DS and NP are free in their choices and that this 
does not affect their affiliation to DS, in contrast with MB’s members who pledge full 
obedience to the leaders and are expelled or blamed if they act otherwise (Women's 
committee, 2014). Thus, there was not much discipline within the party or the 
movement as concerns political issues135 and on the intellectual level power seems to be 
                                                             
133 where the researcher attended meetings and observed work within the headquarters. 
134 He clearly mentioned that the knowledgeable and experienced people should be those who undertake selection of 
the presidential candidate (AL-LAITHY, A. 2012 90 - Minutes program, Interview with Yasser Borhami 90 - 
Minutes program.). 
135 NP’s and DS’ members met in the field said that they share the same guiding principles and mindset with the 
leaders and by following this way of thinking, they eventually arrive at the same conclusions. They added that even if 
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equally distributed among leaders’ levels, and the rank and file who might choose not to 
support the leaders. This conforms to the bottom-up approach of the movement, and 
reflects a flow of power among all those who adopt the Manhaj and possess religious 
knowledge. 
In sum, there was obvious decentralization 136  on the intellectual level where the 
reference is the Manhaj, as derived from divine texts, not the individual leaders or their 
interpretations, since, as mentioned in section one, application of Manhaj is a matter of 
Ijtihad. This means that it is subject to the judgment of those who share knowledge, 
where power flows among all those who study and understand the Manhaj. Despite their 
recognition of the variation in the level of knowledge, this does not take away their right 
to argue against leaders, and even to oppose them, if not fully convinced. In addition, it 
seems that there is no authority for individuals, even the leaders, who are respected but 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
they have different opinions they argue and ask, and if are not convinced, and this rarely happens due to their 
common strong intellectual background, they do not face any blame and are not expelled from either DS or NP, and 
they were proud that the pattern of their social movement is the opposite of the strict centralized structure of MB, that 
is based on absolute obedience to the leaders, or being expelled. In addition, they all stressed that persons are not 
sacred and that sheikhs owe them an explanation of whatever decisions they take or intend to take. NB: Some of the 
interviewees were members in MB but left and joined DS due to intellectual differences, and some of them came 
from mixed families where some of their relatives are MBs (WOMEN'S COMMITTEE, N. 5-01-2014 2014. RE: NP 
Women's committee meeting, SHAMS, I. 2013. Interview withSecretary General of NP in Badrasheen center, 
TALIBBYA 2013. meeting. 
136A famous example on decentralization in DS and NP was the case of choosing Abdul Moneim Abu El Fotouh as a 
presidential candidate. The researcher was told on the field that the opinion of DS was just advisory, and that DS and 
NP members were free to vote for whomever they choose. Yet, most of them said that few opposed the choice of Abu 
El Fotouh, discrediting media claims. They said that Salafis in general may be did not, but NP supported Abu El 
Fotouh and even worked with his campaign (WOMEN'S COMMITTEE, N. 5-01-2014 2014. RE: NP Women's 
committee meeting, SHOKRY, A. 2013. Secretary General of NP in Giza Governorate, LACROIX, S. 2012. Sheikhs 
and Politicians: Inside the New Egyptian Salafism. Brookings Doha Center Publications Brookings Doha Center, 
LEADER, Y. B. 2013.. One of NP female members said that they did not want an Islamist president, and that they 
wanted someone who appeals to all political powers in order to achieve stability. In addition, they believed that while 
Abu El Fotouh belongs to the same school of thought of Muhammed Morsi, the difference between both for them 
was that Morsi is supported by MB, whereas Abu El Fotouh was an individual candidate. Thus, NP could be more 
influential with the individual candidate, not backed with a strong organization like MB (WOMEN'S COMMITTEE, 
N. 5-01-2014 2014. RE: NP Women's committee meeting.). Nobody denied that some NP members did not support 
this choice; however, their size cannot be determined. Moreover, this narrative conforms to their Manhaj, which 
perceives the society as incapable of accepting an Islamist president, and that they should work on the societal level 
first to prepare the people before imposing an Islamist president, according to their bottom-up approach and where 
state reform comes eventually as a result of societal reform. Therefore, those who held this position did not see that 
Shari’a would be applied after 2012 presidential elections (LEADER, Y. B. 2013.). Thus, assuming a division 
between the leaders and NP’s rank and file in this regard would not be precise. Nevertheless, speaking about 
divisions might be possible as regards the whole Salafi movement, particularly with the defeat of Abu El Fotouh in 
the first round of the 2012 presidential election (LACROIX, S. 2012. Sheikhs and Politicians: Inside the New 
Egyptian Salafism. Brookings Doha Center Publications Brookings Doha Center. 
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not taken as sacred, or are blindly followed. This goes in line with the general 
characteristics of  Salafis, previously discussed, as having ‘shallow hierarchies’ and are 
applying individual reason (Haykel, 2009). However, the 2011 revolution provided a 
chance for the institutionalization of DS and for the development of the functional 
structures, particularly when DS became an NGO and NP was established, as mentioned 
in Chapter 3. 
As for NP, it was structurally a separate entity with its president, presidential council, 
supreme committee, general congress, conflict resolution senate (int. Makhyon, 2013), 
parliamentarians, and gubernatorial secretaries, and chieftains levels (leader, 2013).137 
Such a structure is parallel to that of DS in which the board of trustees is limited to the 
six founders of the movement, the administrative or the executive council, which 
includes the second and third generation of DS’ sheikhs in governorates, who act as the 
decision makers. There is also the general Shura council of DS that is highly diversified 
since it includes DS’ representatives from all Egyptian governorates, and who are in 
direct contact with the rank and file. DS General Shura council is parallel to NP’s 
general congress, and both of them are the ones that elect the executive bodies (leader, 
2013, Shokry, 2013). Thus, on the structural level and decision making, power does not 
lie either in the movement nor with the party’s top councils or leaders, nor at the bottom 
with the rank and file, but resides rather in the middle, where the Shura council and the 
general congress are the link between the elite and the rank and file.  
Therefore, power in view of structure does not lie with the rank and file despite  their 
intellectual independence, since they contribute to decision-making through two-step, or 
                                                             
137The supreme committee is elected by the general congress, which in turn elects the president. The supreme 
committee also elects the presidential committee, to take faster decisions since this committee meets weekly, while 
the supreme committee meets every two months unless there is an emergency.  
238 
 
indirect, voting. Thus, their views on DS’ and NP’s decisions go through the Shura 
council, and the general congress. Nevertheless, hierarchy remains loose within the 
party’s committees and offices (Women's committee, 2014, Talibbya, 2013), preserving 
the nature of a social movement’s management, voluntary work, and informal faith-
based brotherhood/sisterhood, where mentorship dominates (Meeting Female leaders, 
2014, Women's committee, 2014, Talibbya, 2013). 138  Therefore, the structure and 
mechanisms discussed above imply a shura model applied in both DS and NP, rather 
than a democratic model. Yet, it remains not an elitist approach, since spiritual leaders, 
for instance, do not have absolute power. Despite the flexible hierarchies, power is not 
with the rank and file either, but decision-making and electing leaders depends on the 
votes of the middle level.  
In all interviews held in the field, interviewees stressed the structural separation 
between DS and NP, however, they emphasized the intellectual connection and sharing 
of the same Manhaj139 (leader, 2013, int. Shaltoot, 2013, Shokry, 2013, Int. Mekki, 
2013). Thus, despite the fact that theoretically speaking NP can take decisions different 
from DS, the fact that they share the same Manhaj would lead to taking the same 
decisions (leader, 2013, Shokry, 2013). In addition, this might not only be due to the 
common Manhaj, but also owing to the fact that when “DS’ General Shura Council 
established NP, they mainly chose the professional and well educated youth among DS 
cadres, who were trained and religiously educated in the movement and assigned them 
the responsibility of the Party” (leader, 2013, int. Makhyon, 2013, Shokry, 2013, conv. 
int. Rashwan, 2013). In addition to sharing the same cadres, there is sometimes an 
                                                             
138 This was understood from analysing turn taking and setting meeting agendas, and in interviews where leaders and 
rank and file were interviewed together, besides notes on discussions and interactions. 
139 “Al-Manhaj,” the thought, the guiding principles, the mind-set, and the social change methodology, were brought 
up in almost all interviews held during the field work. 
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overlap in membership, since, for instance, Makhyon, the president of NP, is a member 
of the administrative committee of DS (leader, 2013); Ahmed Shokry,140 the secretary 
general of NP in Giza and a member of NP’s supreme committee, is the vice-president 
of DS in Giza and a member of DS executive office in Giza (Shokry, 2013). The 
researcher also learnt from Ahmed Rashawn, NP’s supreme committee secretary, that 
he would deliver a Friday speech and that he works in the anti-Takfir campaign, yet, he 
makes sure that he does not discuss anything that has to do with NP while carrying out 
da’awa (conv. int. Rashwan, 2013).141 In this regard, it is also worth mentioning that 
DS’ Manhaj was even demonstrated in the structure and interactions within the party, 
particularly as concerns the women’s affairs committee, which has a sub-structure 
echoing that of NP; for instance education and health sub-committees for women. Yet, 
NP’s women said that they coordinate and work with their parallel male committees in 
NP, while following the rules of seclusion and male-female interactions in Islam. They 
said men in the party believe that women are more capable of determining fellow 
women’s needs, and that they are asked by NP’s leaders to provide their visions as 
concerns women’s affairs in various party committees (Women's committee, 2014). 
In view of the centrality of the Manhaj, both in DS’ and in NP’s organization, framing 
and mobilization, describing the conflict within NP during 2011-2012 as a polarization 
between two distinct trends as concerns party management and expansion (El-Sherif, 
2012a) becomes questionable. Particularly, when Abdel Ghaffour had to defect from 
NP, along with a hundred members only, and formed Al-Watan (homeland) Party in 
                                                             
140Ahmed Shokry joined DS as a child when he was in grade 2, to recite the Quran and he continued to attend the 
classes and courses at various levels of education, and attending to all the activities. When he joined the university, he 
became DS’ representative in Cairo University, and was once arrested in 2002 because of his university activism.  
141 Rashawn, who is a young medical doctor studying for MA in medicine and has an MBA degree, feels it is 
awkward when people liked his religious speeches and told him that they will vote for NP. It seems that he was 
having difficulty in moving around with the two hats.  
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December 2012 (Brown, 2013). According to NP’s members’ narrative, Abdel Ghaffour 
lived outside Egypt and was away from DS for years, and only came back a few months 
before the 2011 revolution (Shokry, 2013). It was said that he was exposed to various 
intellectual influences that made him depart from DS’ Manhaj, and got inclined to MB’s 
policy choices, something that went against DS position that MB, while a fellow 
Islamist group, commits clear religious violations that DS should openly deny and 
distance itself from (Shokry, 2013). Makhyon also had doubts that Abdel Ghaffour 
might have been manipulated by MB (int. Makhyon, 2013). 142 This might explain DS’ 
opposition to him and his followers in the incidents of Christian guardianship, alliance 
with seculars, and rapprochement with Shiites, that were all MB’s choices that DS’ used 
to criticize, according to its historical discourse analyzed in previous chapters. In 
addition, according to the current NP president Makhyon, as well as young NP leader in 
a city in Al-Buhayra Governorate (leader, 2013, int. Makhyon, 2013), Abdel Ghaffour 
tended to impose his opinion on the supreme committee, and if they disagree, he would 
react with rage. Later on, Abdel Ghaffour started to take decisions on his own without 
consulting with the supreme committee of NP, and ceased to attend the meetings: 
members relied on getting the news of the party from the media (int. Makhyon, 2013). 
The young leader said that one of the affairs that irritated NP’s members was that Abdel 
Ghaffour ignored the institutionality that they appreciate, and that he was acting on his 
own. In Makhyon’s wording “it was a party without a president.” Thus, according to NP 
members, it seemed that the whole party was on one side (Shokry, 2013),143 while 
Abdel Ghaffour and his hundred followers were on the other. Accordingly, Abdel 
                                                             
142 A female leader said that Said Abdel Azim, one of the six founders left DS and join Raba’a sit-in, and now he and 
his wife, who worked in Da’awa as well, left to Qatar. The female leader was extremely shocked. She justified their 
separation from DS on basis of MB’s penetration to DS. However, this implies that whoever defies Al-Manhaj, even 
a founder, leaves the movement, and there was no evidence that any defectors left with Abdel A’zim. 
143 Shokry said “the majority of NP cadres who are brought up on DS’ Manhaj rejected Abdel Ghaffour’s inclination 
towards MB”, Shaltoot confirmed saying “yeah... he is dissolving in MB.” 
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Ghaffour did not belong to the same Manhaj, and this position, together with his 
followers, was closer to MB and was not representative of DS or the NP mainstream. 
Thus, this approach could not be considered a distinct trend in NP facing that of DS’ 
founders, but rather an exceptional one on the margins. What makes this narrative more 
probable is that Al-Watan joined the “legitimacy alliance” of MB after June 2013 
revolution, and joined the Raba’a sit-in (Brown, 2013).  
It is to be said also that, according to Sheikh Ahmed Farid, Sheikh Abu Edris, after 
being arrested, preferred to stay away from activism in DS. At this point, Sheikh Yasser 
Borhami, instead, became the one who took the responsibility for DS’ organizational 
and administrative issues, and was travelling around in all governorates, keeping in 
close contact with the youth (int. Farid, 2013). Furthermore, Borhami was the one who 
appointed almost all the cadres and thus, according to Farid, it was logical that they 
liked Borhami and that they had mutual understanding to the extent that some DS’ 
followers were called Borhamists (int. Farid, 2013). But he sees no problem in this, 
since it is logical and normal and happened for necessity. Adding this piece of 
information to the fact that Borhami was the one who instituted the foundational text of 
social change, which is approved by the rest of the founders, could explain why DS’ 
board of trustees thought dominated, especially with the common cadres and such 
structural and intellectual links, reinforcing the fact that DS and NP had a unified 
discourse. 
Accordingly, due to the importance of Al-Manhaj, filtration of members based on 
affiliation to Manhaj and the entity of NP, is sometimes functional. As Mahmoud 
Shaltoot (Talibbya, 2013) said, a filtration process on the executive level, was carried 
out in all regions through local leaders to differentiate active members from 
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sympathizers. The criterion is that an active member is the one who understands and 
believes in Al-Manhaj; thus, would be reliable and would not distort the work of the 
executive structure. This comes in comparison to the sympathizers, who might defect 
according to emotional reasons or because of lack of knowledge and understanding of 
the situation. This process took place after many NP members, who did not abide by 
DS’ Manhaj, either boycotted the party meetings or joined Raba’a sit-in144 (Talibbya, 
2013). According to NP members, understanding and belief in Manhaj applies to those 
who joined DS on a rational basis and upon a scholarship foundation. For them, this is 
the criteria of being active members, who constitute the core of the movement, as 
compared to bystanders or sympathizers who build their affiliation on an emotional 
basis, and have not acquired enough religious knowledge (Talibbya, 2013, Gawwad, 
2013, Women's committee, 2014, Bakkar, 2013).  
In this regard, as mentioned in previous chapters, differences among Salafis remain on 
the understanding of the contemporary context and the method of applying religious 
rulings to it. Thus, it is a contextual rather than belief difference, and has to do with 
Manhaj, or the way they engage with the world (Wiktorowicz, 2006, Haykel, 2009). 
Therefore, what DS and NP members called “sympathizers” or “emotional,” could be 
describing the general Islamist popular base, which do not have a particular affiliation, 
but have a strong religious inclination. They might be also understood as the “volatile or 
the moving block” (El-Sherif, 2012a), 145 which could support and sympathize with DS 
                                                             
144  The first encounter with NP’s members on the field, was with an NP’s member who defected and joined 
Hazemon, and talked to the researcher on the phone while attending Raba’a sit-in. However, he seemed to be an 
enthusiastic Islamist of those who were unable to express themselves in the same eloquent way of the rest of NP’s 
and DS’ members she met later. He kept repeating with anger that he wants Morsi back, and that he is now with Al-
Raya political party.  
145For El Sherif what he considered NP’s failure in the 2015 elections was attributed to the absence of this popular 
base, or sympathizers and bystanders, and it was not only state restrictions, which was one of the main complaints of 
NP (LINN, E. C., LINN, NICHOLAS. 2015. The Nour Party Goes Dim, Egypt’s last Islamist party is clinging to life. 
But how much longer?). 
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and NP without necessarily sharing the same Manhaj. Thus, they might leave and join 
another Islamist group as their understanding of the context, and of applying religious 
rulings to it, differ from that of DS. That is why formal and informal DS and NP 
framing processes were in operation immediately after June 2013, to maintain the 
interconnectedness of the movement and the party during the crisis. In this respect, the 
Talibyya meeting attended by the researcher was one among others146 held on the levels 
of governorates, centres, and chieftains; the objective being  that leaders at each level 
could convey rank and file opinions to party leaders, and communicate the leaders’ 
points of views as well (Talibbya, 2013). There were also conferences, lectures 
delivered by sheikhs, where the floor was open for questions and answers, training 
camps and informal encounters147 through friends and family visits and phone calls to 
regain DS and NP members who were angry at the party’s management after June 30. 
These informal encounters were carried out by core or active members, where their 
argumentation centred around reminders of DS’ Manhaj and mind-set (Women's 
committee, 2014, notes, 2013-2014). 
To sum up, DS and NP are intellectually and structurally connected, where the internal 
management of both takes place through a Shura model, rather than a democratic one. 
Thus, decision-making is neither confined to the religious leaders’ nor the founders’ 
level, nor lies with the rank and file but is rather dependent on the vote of the middle 
level. However, DS and NP are characterized by loose hierarchies, and intellectual 
                                                             
146 The researcher was not allowed to attend the supreme committee meeting, whose place, and timing was not 
announced for security reasons, and the rest of the meetings on the rest of NP’s levels were halted for security reasons 
right after June 30, and when the meeting started they were less frequent. The Talibyya meeting was held in a 
lawyers’ office member in the executive office, not at a party headquarter. However, towards January, the researcher 
attended a meeting in the secretariat general of the party in Alexandria. 
147 One of the female members said that it was easy for her to talk to fellow DS’ members after the crisis, since they 
knew she is talking to them out of advice because she cares about them out of their faith based and friendly 
relationship, and she said that they knew that her motive was to gain God’s satisfaction, and that she is not aiming at 
imposing her opinion but is giving them the choice. Her colleagues in the party said that this approach started to work 
when they were allowed to explain and when people were in a mood to listen. 
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independence. This would mean low discipline and mobilization; however, the 
interconnectedness of the movement and mobilization is maintained through dynamic 
framing processes that gravitate around DS’ Manhaj, the cement of the movement and 
the main tool of political mobilization. Again, in view of members’ biographies and 
their relationship to the movement, the earlier they joined the movement and the more 
they are trained within its educational structure and curriculum, the more they are 
inclined to DS’ Manhaj and choices. Thus, they tend to fit with the collective framing 
(Miethe, 2009 ), and help in infiltrating such frames, even after joining the party and 
after the political interactions and challenges that came about to DS’ concepts and 
Manhaj. This can explain that bystanders and sympathizers, who are not connected to 
the party or the movement on a Manhaj conviction basis, but rather on general 
emotional Islamist inclinations, tend to fluctuate in their relationship with the party and 
the movement. Thus, their affiliation is volatile and their intellectual formation might be 
influenced by various Islamist sources, particularly in view of the fluidity among Salafi 
groups (Gauvain, 2013, Miethe, 2009 ). 
The Nature of NP: 
In view, of NP’s obvious religious reference, which they put forward, they stress that 
they are a political party that follows the Egyptian constitution, laws and social 
conventions, besides the vision of the party. This is because, with their decision to enter 
politics, they cannot breach such frameworks. Therefore, their membership is open to 
all Egyptians willing to adopt their Salafi ideology (Int. Mekki, 2013, Women's 
committee, 2014). In this regard, Al-Shahhat (2013) drew parallels of the relationship 
between the party and the movement to the one between the British trade unions and the 
Labour party, making it normal that they share a Salafi ideology. 
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Nevertheless, the point to be made here is that NP was not established as a power-
seeking party, according to what NP members described in the field (Gawwad, 2013),148 
(Omar, 2013),149 (leader, 2013),150 (Shokry, 2013).151 In view of Al-Manhaj, da’awa 
comes first and social change is the strategic objective. Thus, a political party is merely 
a tool in the hands of DS, to expand their scope of activism (Women's committee, 2014, 
int. Makhyon, 2013),152 particularly on the level of the state, where they could advise 
leaders (Shams, 2013, Women's committee, 2014). Another side of participation was 
protecting da’awa (int. Farid, 2013),153 and working on a wider scope with a legal 
framework (Gawwad, 2013). This again conforms to DS’ framing of political 
participation discussed in chapter 5, and the framing of adopting collective action 
discussed in chapters 3 and 4. In addition, it reflects DS-state relationship pattern, 
particularly after the 2011 escalation of torturing to death of Bilal, by making the party 
and the NGO a legal cover for da’awa, and a way of protecting their propagation 
activism and members against state repression and restrictions. They also stressed the 
fact that their approach in dealing with political powers was not based on conflict or 
competition but rather on a da’awa approach (Shokry, 2013, Bakkar, 2013). This 
conforms to Al-Shahhat’s (2010) understanding of the role of political parties, as they 
should not be competitors, but would rather cooperate with the governor and 
                                                             
148 “NP’s main position when it participated in the road map, and then the 5O-committee, and in the constitutional 
committee before that, was for protecting the articles of identity. Our participation was mainly for these articles, not 
for holding portfolios. We refused portfolios now and before. The focus is on society, not authority... I will not stand 
and fight for authority. Those who want authority, let them take it. I can talk to people, and explain to them.” 
149 “we do not care who comes to power but rather how he governs” 
150 “The party is something marginal to Da’awa, because for us Da’awa is more important... This makes the easiest 
thing for the party is to freeze its activities if this was in the public interest… we are not aiming at positions or 
authority”. 
151 “we are not entering politics on conflictual or competition basis. This would negatively affect Da’awa. We 
avoided this, and entered politics with the intention of interaction and participation, and this is clear.” 
152 “Among our activities was the establishment of a political party to express DS’ point of view on reform.” 
153 Farid said after the Revolution, we knew that if MB participated and DS did not, they would withdraw the 
mosques from DS, and this already happened during MB’s rule. MB replaced all Salafi managers and Imams in the 
Ministry of Endowments to be occupied by an MB’s affiliate. 
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complement his role, as in the case of shura model of governance (see chapter 5 and 
appendix 4). 
Therefore, it could be understood from the definitions and reasons for establishing a 
political party mentioned in the interviews, that the party wanted to represent a “Shura 
model” within a democratic framework and a competitive party system. It was obvious 
that all that they are aiming at is a foothold in politics, and presence even with 1% 
representation154 (Talibbya, 2013), to be inside the political process (int. Farid, 2013).155 
Additionally, if they are able to advise or to prevent corruption they will, since it is their 
duty. In this respect, they do not regard themselves as responsible for political 
outcomes. Rather, they convey the message but they are not aiming to controlling the 
state. This is because controlling the state would not help in establishing the Muslim 
state they aim for, since in any case top-down state-led changes are ineffective (leader, 
2013, int. Nasr, 2013),156 (Shams, 2013, Shokry, 2013).157 Again this conforms to Al-
Shahhat’s formulation of the relationship between the social and state levels of DS’ 
Manhaj of social change discussed in chapter 5. 
In sum, NP could not be judged as a typical political party according to western 
standards, or as an Islamist power-seeking political party. Thus, NP does not fully lie in 
the politicos, or the politicized Salafis category (Haykel, 2009, Lacroix, 2009), since it 
                                                             
154 A young member in the Talibyya meeting said that he agrees on staying in the constitutional committee, even with 
a single person representation based on the Quranic verses 164-165 of Surat Al-A’raf: “A group of them said to 
another that used to deny their actions and warn them against the punishment of Allah: Why do you forbid those 
disobedient while they deserved the destruction from their Lord or a painful torment, so there is no need to remind 
them. When they did not pay attention to the advice and turned away from what they have been reminded, we saved 
the group which used to remind them and forbid them from their bad actions, then we took their aggressors to a 
severe torment because of their continuous lewdness.” He perceived contribution to the constitution as part of 
da’awa.  
155As Farid mentioned, they wanted to be in elections and in constitutional committee to be present in the kitchen, 
when recipes are being cooked. 
156 All interviews gave a summary of DS’ foundational text on social change and the bottom-up approach versus the 
top-down one. 
157 Among others since all mentioned this in various ways. 
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is a party based on a religious social movement where the party is just a tool that serves 
the religious purpose of this movement, and is a legal cover for its religious propagation 
and social activities. Such a social movement does not aim at “politicizing religion; but 
rather at religionizing politics” (Shams, 2013), as they condemn the use of religion to 
serve politics, and consider it a serious violation (Shams, 2013). Thus, NP would be 
simply a tool of religious da’awa and is closer in its structure, management and the 
nature of its cadres to a religious social movement than to a political party. This makes 
NP a religious actor in a political context trying to colour the political with the 
religious, rather than the opposite. In other words, they are trying to make the religious 
discourse colonize the political, rather than assimilating the dominant political 
discourse. This conclusion finds support in their controversial choices during June 30 
revolution.  
DS’ Political Vision in Action: 
The findings discussed above might explain that although NP refused MB’s practices, it 
did not fully approve of Al-Sisi and the June 2013 revolution alliance, 158  and was 
critical of both. For observers, NP did not only decline to support MB when Morsi was 
overthrown, but Makhyon appeared in the road map meeting just after Al-Sisi’s speech, 
and criticised members of NP’s rank and file who joined the Raba’a sit-in.159  The 
situation became complicated after the clearing of Raba’a and the gap widened between 
DS/NP and the rest of Islamists (Brown, 2013). NP was perceived as the supporter of a 
regime that killed Islamists, and as having been used by the regime to legitimize its 
actions (Talibbya, 2013); whereas this could threaten the very existence of the party 
                                                             
158 Which incorporated secular and remnants of Mubarak’s regime elements, besides common apolitical individuals 
who were just angry at MB’s rule.  
159 Nader Bakkar, NP’s spokesman offered to resign for going against the line of his party and saying that Raba’a sit -
in was peaceful 
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itself (Brown, 2013). However, for DS’ leaders, the cost of this action is still tolerable 
since the political party and political participation itself are only an experiment and are 
separate from da’awa. Yet, in reaction to this, observers saw that such a policy choice 
would in fact threaten da’awa and the religious activism of DS (Brown, 2013). NP and 
DS were aware of such a risk however, and they tried to clarify their position through a 
campaign that started during the fieldwork. Thus, DS and NP distanced themselves 
from other Islamists’ choices, which conform to the DS-Islamists relationship pattern, 
particularly as concerns MB. In this regard, as mentioned in previous chapters, on the 
occasions that DS was criticized by other Islamists as splitting their front and for being 
clients of the regime, DS would respond by insisting upon its discourse and position, 
rather than resorting to intellectual compromises and rapprochement with Islamists.160 
Therefore, what happened between DS/NP and other Islamists after June 2013 
revolution was not new, in view of their relationship pattern. 
As noted earlier, whereas some of the youth the researcher met considered what 
happened a coup, others considered it a revolution in which the military sided with an 
angry nation (Talibbya, 2013). This is while others conformed to the official position of 
the party that NP and DS did not really care about the concepts of coup or revolution 
and the debates about them, and preferred to move beyond this discussion as it is of no 
practical use.161 For them, “the problem is in how to deal with reality” (Al-Affani, 2013: 
10). They also justified their choice through saying that the strong presence of an 
Islamist faction would allow for influencing those in power, and that they managed, for 
                                                             
160 See chapter 3 on the crisis of the Iranian Revolution. 




example, to prevent Al-Baradie162 from assuming power as a prime minister, besides 
preventing the complete annulment of the constitution. Thus, they believe that they have 
protected article 2 in the constitutional declaration which protects Islamic identity, and 
that the lack of political understanding made Islamists unable to appreciate the presence 
of an Islamist faction to secure balance with the seculars in the new power arrangement. 
They believe that they were the only Islamist faction to undertake this duty, and that 
some Islamists do realize this but are insisting on weakening NP (Al-Affani, 2013: 10-
11).  
Besides DS and NP framing of secular dominated revolutions as an existential threat to 
shari’aa and Islamic identity, in the case of June 2013 revolution they had fears that 
under such conditions state security practices might return.163 Therefore, there is no 
guarantee that either negotiations or mobilization and protest would work; thus, they 
have chosen the option with the least risk of bloodshed, whereas the only way to keep 
the maximum volume of gains was their presence as a united entity while hiding any 
differences or divisions in front of the parties they negotiate with (Al-Affani, 2013). 
This is, again, a reproduction of DS’ framing tools of cost-benefit analysis and weighing 
the consequences of their actions in view of the context. Such framing processes and 
mobilization target the protection of da’awa and shari’aa and Islamic identity. Thus, on 
one hand, this reflects the primarily religious and realist identity of DS/NP members. 
On the other hand, it indicates the continuity and consistency of their discourse and the 
reproduction of their Manhaj or ideology. 
                                                             
162 The icon of the political change movement in Egypt, and one of DS’ secular rivals, who has been openly criticized 
in the texts analyzed in chapter 5. 
163 NP’s members, despite supporting the road map, expressed in various interviews their fear of the return of the 
state security oppression against Islamists. 
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Meanwhile, according to NP members and statements (Al-Affani, 2013), after the 
“massacre of the Republican Guards' club,” NP withdrew from the road map because 
both the government and MB did not abide by it, and continued their intransigence and 
agitation.164 Mr. Galal Morra, the secretary general of the party, warned against injustice 
in dealing with the situation in Raba’a, and that this might cause popular outrage. NP 
issued various official statements warning against forming a popular delegation to deal 
with the situation in Raba’a with exceptional standards, and that state institutions should 
respect the law or else this would threaten the very existence of the state. In addition, 
DS announced before God that it is does not hold responsibility for all those who 
practised, ordered, instigated, or resolved upon shedding blood (party, 2013a, Al-
Affani, 2013). Younis Makhyon and Ahmed Khalil Khairalla, 165  members of the 
supreme committee of NP, among others, held Al-Sisi, Adly Mansour166 and all their 
supporters responsible for any killings or bloodshed (Al-Affani, 2013: 12-13). After 
clearing the Raba’a sit-in, NP and DS issued a statement (party, 2013b) in which they 
condemned excess use of force and demanded the resignation of the government. In 
addition, Borhami held responsible for the bloodshed all those who ordered a haphazard 
dismantling of the sit-in (Al-Affani, 2013: 13-14). In the middle of the congested post-
June 2013 political context, NP mentioned that their strategic target is the society, 
whereas the state does not represent anything “except a mere hat on a huge body” (Al-
Affani, 2013:16). NP published a booklet in which it re-stated DS’ Manhaj of social 
                                                             
164 For instance, according to NP’s booklet, MB said that terrorist attacks in Sinai will continue until Morsi is back in 
power, and they claimed that there were divisions within the army. NP also asked the Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar to 
mediate but he was considered a traitor by MB, which rejected all means and attempts of reconciliation, until Morsi 
gets back in power, which was, from NP’s point of view, an unreasonable demand. In addition, Al-Beltagi said on 
July 26th 2013 that the army offered that all MB’s leaders can go out of the sit-in and that they would be pardoned 
and that their money would not be confiscated, but MB refused this offer and insisted on the return of Morsi (AL-
AFFANI, S. E. 2013. Who is responsible?  suspicions and replies. In: AL NOR PARTY, A. D. A. A. S. (ed.). Dar Al 
Hoda  
165 The head of NP’s parliamentary bloc in 2015. 
166 The then-provisional president. 
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change, as in the foundational texts of the movement, as an explanation for their actions 
(Al-Affani, 2013). NP’s post-June 2013 revolution framing and justifications conform 
to the conclusions of CDA in chapter 5 as concerns DS’ rejection of protest, and the fact 
that, even if they cautiously participated in protests after January 2011 (see appendix 3), 
they never participated in sit-ins, and this participation was for a religious reason rather 
than due to power conflict. In addition, it was obvious that DS’ Manhaj of social change 
is central in their justification, particularly as regards rejecting Takfir and distinguishing 
themselves from the rest of Islamists’ discourse (Al-Shahhat, 2013e).167 Therefore, in 
view of their Manhaj and history, they did not frame the Raba’a sit-in as a fight for 
legitimacy or shari’a, and they had reservations on the content of the speeches delivered 
in the sit-in that at least implied Takfir (int. Al-Shahhat, 2013). 
To sum up, NP’s primarily religious approach, guided by its Manhaj, made it distance 
itself from both the Islamists and the regime with its June 2013 alliance, since it 
criticized both of them, boycotted all protests, and refused to take any ministerial 
positions (Gawwad, 2013, Al-Affani, 2013). Yet, it remained committed to the road 
map, and accepted a single member representation in the constitutional committee, to 
protect article 2 that has been their initial target for involvement in politics (Talibbya, 
2013). Revising DS’ objectives of having a political party, references and commitments 
discussed at the beginning of this section would make such actions understandable. 
However, such choices could be read as inconsistent, if the concept of a power-seeking 
party or a pragmatic political Islamist movement that uses religion as a tool is projected 
on them. In the case of NP, founded on DS’ Manhaj, the party resembled a tool that 
serves the religious reference, which led to its apolitical policy choices. This led to 
                                                             
167 See chapters 3, 4, and 5.  
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alienating NP from the rest of political powers, cost them state support and a large part 
of their popular base, and gave a controversial image about them.  
The development of NP’s critical situation was clear in the 2015 parliamentary 
elections. However, the party chose to participate in the elections with only two lists 
instead of four, and with 165 candidates instead of 220, to emphasize their intention and 
approach of a cooperative rather than a competitive political power and, according to 
Al-Shahhat (2015), in order to contain the public’s fear that they are repeating MB’s 
experience. He added that one of their electoral lists was in upper Egypt where DS has a 
weak presence, and they wanted to take the opportunity of elections to introduce 
themselves in this area (Al-Shahhat, 2015). Such policy choices conform to the party’s 
nature as non-power seeking, entering politics to interact and to widen the scope and 
outreach of da’awa and Manhaj. However, such intentions convinced neither the public, 
fellow political parties, nor the media. 
As a result, NP did not form any alliances with secular powers during the 2015 
parliamentary elections (Al-Shahhat, 2015), despite the fact that it knew it lost the votes 
of the rest of Islamists. Within this context, NP choices during elections were framed 
around the fact that they are the only Islamist party that aims at securing a foothold in 
the system. Thus, in order to protect the religious foundations, and by using DS’ 
interests versus evils calculations, it became possible to form a temporary alliance with 
non-Islamists for electoral purposes. Although this was true, NP was not welcome by 
seculars at this point. Al-Shahhat mentioned they tried to join any front in the elections, 
but no political power wanted to cooperate with them, and they were basically left with 
one option, that is to run against all other parties and fronts on their own (Al-Shahhat, 
2015). In this respect, while insisting on preserving their religious identity, and through 
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operationalizing Manhaj and framing the situation as an existential threat to shari’aa, 
NP accepted temporarily to have women and Christian candidates and was willing to 
join a secular electoral front in the run for parliament. These policy choices came to 
satisfy electoral laws, while denouncing all three and rejecting them on religious 
basis.168 The gap between their actions and convictions and discourse created a distance, 
not only between NP and other political actors, but also with the public, who perceive 
DS/NP’s flexibility and realism as an abuse of religion (Field notes, 2013-2014).  
Meanwhile, as a result of NP’s choices, after June 30 state-DS relationship largely 
returned to its historic pattern. However, state limitations this time came through the 
Ministry of Religious Endowments, which put restrictions on DS’ sheikhs, and made 
their access to lectures and religious speeches subject to its licensing and supervision 
(Mostafa, 2015 ). Moreover, NP and DS leaders complained of security pressures, and 
state bias against them during elections, which added to the reasons for their minimal 
electoral achievement (Nabil, 2015b), that came way below their modest expectations. 
However, under such conditions and with media defamation campaigns against the 
party, NP decided to continue with the elections, whatever their representation in the 
parliament would eventually become (Nabil, 2015b). 
To conclude, NP’s political isolation might be a result of their policy choices that did 
not conform to political compromises as much as to DS’ Manhaj, and the pattern and 
legacy of their historical relationships with other political powers (including fellow 
Islamists) discussed in previous chapters. In addition, through their engagement in 
debates on political reform, and social change, DS/NP expressed their rejection of what 
they called polarization, since they were keen on affirming that they are not biased 
                                                             
168  Since women and Christians should not be allowed full political rights, and secularism is associated with 
polytheism in their discourse. 
254 
 
towards one group to the detriment of the other, but are offering an independent 
discourse, that might be seen as a third path.169 Despite the consistency in applying their 
Manhaj, their choices remained confusing to the public who, in addition to observing 
what they considered as being contradictions in NP’s political positions, were not 
satisfied with DS’ and NP’s adherence to their shocking discourse as regards the 
national culture, and issues of citizenship. What added to the confusion was NP’s choice 
to run Christian candidates on their lists for the 2015 parliamentary elections; thus 
reinforcing the image of a pragmatic political party. All these choices were not 
understandable from the viewpoint of both specialists and the public. 
In view of the main findings that NP is part and parcel of DS, and that both the 
movement and the party abide by DS original Manhaj, it is useful to explore this 
religious party’s position on the most controversial issues they were faced with in view 
of such Manhaj and the nature of the party. These issues are namely the issue of 
women, and the citizenship of the Christians, in addition to NP’s stance on art and 
culture. 
Controversial Issues in DS/NP Discourse: 
Women: 
The results of CDA (see appendix 5) applied to DS’ and NP’s texts on women reveals 
that, for DS/NP, women are not submissive figures shrouded in black, but nor they do 
resemble a fully liberated model: instead they appear as between these extremes. The 
gap between DS/NP women’s feeling of over-confidence and success expressed in 
                                                             
169 Such rejection to polarization was discussed in the interviews, especially, in the female leaders’ meeting when 
they said, people in politics now want us to be with them or else we are their enemies. Mekki also expressed his fears 
of the possibility of having a police state after June 30, and of the return to the pre-January 2011 revolution. He said 
that NP shares with the rest of political powers (despite ideological and political differences) the fear of the scenario 
of who is not with us is our enemy, and who does not approve of all state’s decisions would be oppressed. 
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interviews, and through ethnographic research observations, and the image of a 
submissive woman (Ahmed, 2011, Khatib, 2006), could be mainly attributed to 
society’s attempts to impose liberal, feminist, and nationalist discourses upon them. 
This is while they actually provide a new model of female politicians and activists who 
might be more empowered and fulfilled by their Salafi Manhaj than many unveiled and 
westernized women, while not matching the feminist and liberal discourses on women’s 
liberation and on what successful women look like (Meijer, 2009, Mahmood, 2001). 
Thus, they are a different model, yet not necessarily in a negative or a positive sense. 
From another angle, there is an obvious gap between DS’ strict religious discourse on 
women and women’s actual moderate practices in reality. Finally, what augmented DS’ 
women’s societal crisis was their personal choice to keep a low profile, and to adhere to 
their traditional role as prescribed by the religious interpretations they adopt.  
Christians: 
As regards Christians in DS’ discourse, putting aside the reasons behind running 
Christians candidates on NP’s electoral lists, CDA results (see appendix 5) highlighted 
the fact that there is a gap between NP’s discourse and their political action in this 
regard. NP and DS see their shocking discourse about Christians as logical, and that 
they have all the right to adhere to it out of belief concerns.170 In view of DS members’ 
vision, the words and terms they use to describe Christians have a largely positive, or at 
least a neutral, connotation. However, Christians believe that their connotation is 
extremely offensive. Moreover, everyday Muslims met on the field see that for instance 
calling Christians ‘Kafir’ is alien to the mainstream discourse that “Christians worship 
God in a different way, and that they have fatal belief and faith violations and 
                                                             
170 Loyalty and enmity 
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misunderstanding, yet it is none of Muslims’ business” (Field notes, 2013-2014). Such 
tolerant or indifferent discourse of everyday Muslims might also reflect an inherent 
national security fear of sectarian conflict, or of discussing such a sensitive issue, even 
if some Muslims do not fully respect Christians (Dalacoura, 2014).171 In addition, the 
arguments used in the interviews imply that accumulations of discursive conflicts 
between Muslim and Christian extremists (in reference to the Bishop Bishoy crisis 
discussed earlier), left DS’ members with hard feelings. However, DS’ members believe 
that in all cases they should strictly abide by shari’a and grant Christians their social and 
protection rights, for the sake of respecting divine orders and for purposes of peaceful 
co-existence. This suggests that they are against the mistreatment of Christians or using 
violence against them. In this regard, Nasr explained that in view of DS’ understanding, 
“DS is the only Islamist group that never used violence against Christians” (int. Nasr, 
2013).  
Yet, “full citizenship rights and status of Christians,” remains the point of contradiction 
between DS Manhaj and religious discourse, and the Egyptian legal framework which 
NP says it respects and follows. This gap between belief and the law, and NP’s attempts 
to combine both in a very delicate equation, may be held responsible for the inconsistent 
behaviour of NP. Therefore, according to its discourse, NP seems to choose such 
controversial acts purposefully, even if they lead to a high political cost, or put the 
party’s image at stake.  
In this regard, despite enrolling Christians on NP’s electoral lists, the party or DS’ 
figures never mentioned that this is out of tolerance and acceptance of full Christian 
citizenship, but rather because of the elections law that imposes this on them, and in 
                                                             
171 Dalacoura says “Let us be honest: for the majority of Egyptians, women and the Copts must be kept firmly in their 
place.” However, people do not want to be politically incorrect. 
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view of the practical considerations where no electoral front accepted to form an 
alliance with NP: they thus had to enrol Christians of their own (Morsy, 2015, al 
Shahhat, 2015). Nevertheless, according to the elections law the Christian quota is only 
obligatory in case of forming lists not for the individual candidates (Morsy, 2015, 
ElectoralCommission), which raises questions about the motivation of NP to enrol 
Christians if they could have just competed for individual seats. One of the possible 
justifications would be that NP wanted to assure the state, and other political powers, 
that they are a political party that conforms to the Constitution, particularly, when there 
was a legal case against them in the supreme administrative court demanding their 
dissolution on the basis of being a religious party in contradiction with the Egyptian 
Constitution (Kamel, 2016). This is while NP insists that it is a political party open to 
all Egyptians but with a Salafi ideology, and like any political party, they have an 
intellectual reference (Int. Mekki, 2013). Thus, in view of NP’s belief and self-
identification, it could be true that Christians’ presence was a formality to complete the 
image of the party, and using DS’ cost-benefit analysis and logic, such policy choice 
might maximize interests and minimize the losses, since for them absence from the 
political scene is a loss, and presence even with insignificant representation is a success 
(Talibbya, 2013). Yet, despite of the negative image that NP acquired, it seems that they 
achieved their target, since the court ruling rejected the party dissolution (Kamel, 2016).  
Despite the enrollment of Christians on their electoral lists, none of them were 
represented in the parliament which might be attributed to the general deterioration in 
NP’s political position, as well as the possibility that DS and NP’s members might have 
chosen to vote for individual candidates rather than the lists that included Christians. 
However, in view of a closed absolute lists system and low turnout in the elections 
258 
 
especially in its first round, NP still got 30% of the votes, and while none of NP’s lists 
won even in Alexandria, DS’ capital and strong hold, 12 individual candidates won (al 
Shahhat, 2015, ElectoralCommission). Nevertheless, putting aside the political 
weakness of NP at this period, which this thesis attributes to the dominance of the 
religious discourse and Manhaj over political considerations, it seemed also that NP was 
trying to keep the balance between Manhaj and legal commitments through 
manipulating the elections law. This can be seen from the position and order of 
Christians on the electoral lists where in all the lists Christians came in the middle or 
towards the end of the lists, sometimes after NP’s women candidates, and despite 
putting Nader Al-Serafi, their prominent Christian figure, as number six on the 
Alexandria list, he came after Hanan Allam the women’s leader in the party, in a 15-
candidate list (SupportNPFront, 2015). Moreover, the Alexandria list was competing in 
a constituency of high Christian concentration where the counter-electoral front “In love 
of Egypt” included, among others, Suzi Nashed, a church-supported candidate; 
meanwhile, the Christian anti-church candidate on NP’s list was considered a traitor 
(Al-Hadidi, 2015, al Shahhat, 2015). So, the order of the Christian candidates and the 
nature of the constituency might void this enrollment of its meaning, even if NP was 
powerful at this period. Thus, if this explanation was true, it would mean that NP 
follows the law but can always manuver in order to simultaneously adhere to Manhaj. 
Art and Culture: 
Such detachment from the mainstream discourse in Egypt is not separate from DS/NP’s 
equally debateable position on art and culture. In this regard, as a Salafi movement and 
party, while proving to be responsive to local traditions, they practise de-culturation in 
view of their rejection of aspects of popular culture (music, dancing, movies, and TV 
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series), as banned by religion and leading to immorality and deviation (Roy, 2004, 
Bonnefoy, 2009, Gauvain, 2013). In this regard, CDA results (see appendix 5) of NP’s 
and DS’ texts show that they do not ban all kinds of art. They only accept the art that 
abides by religious rules and restrictions. Thus, they accept cinema and acting, as long 
as it conforms to shari’a, particularly when it is modest, and does not include insults 
(Gawwad, 2013, Shams, 2013). However, they say that there are clear texts in the Quran 
and Sunna which ban music, according to their interpretation (Women's committee, 
2014). Nevertheless, they respect chanting, and members of DS compose their chanting 
songs and practise poetry recitation, Arabic handwriting and painting, and female 
respondents reported that they had their women’s magazine (Women's committee, 
2014). They were also aware of the popular culture, and were not isolated. However, 
they have chosen to detach themselves from it and to make their own sort of sub-culture 
in which they give up many of the popular cultural aspects (Women's committee, 2014). 
Yet, they said that it is not wise to attack all aspects of culture in a shocking way, but 
rather to apply a more sustainable solution through social change and spreading da’awa, 
which conforms to DS’ long term, gradual bottom-up social change approach, so that a 
Muslim committed society would present more Islamic choices, and give up on sources 
of vice (Shams, 2013).  
Moreover, in interviews, the common point of view among the interviewed was the 
acceptance of traditions, habits and convention. Thus, the way people celebrate, and all 
aspects of modern life are acceptable as long as they are not connected to infidelity or 
pagan practices (Shams, 2013, int. Nasr, 2013). Moreover, convention and customary 
law is highly respected by DS’ members and “is considered one of the references in 
Islamic shari’a, and could be a source of legislation in the absence of a clear religious 
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text dealing with a given issue” (int. Nasr, 2013). Therefore, people’s customs and 
culture172 are highly respected, and DS’ members think that imposing a law that defies 
them would be considered a top-down change that people would undermine and find 
ways to secretly evade. So, if there are harmful habits, they should be countered by 
education and spreading awareness (Gawwad, 2013). Such a stance supports the 
bottom-up approach in DS’ discourse. They also believe that Islam gives a wide range 
of options and alternatives to fit the conditions of people who are diversified as regards 
culture, social class, education, and even weather and regional conditions (int. F. leader, 
2013). This conforms to DS’ discourse that Islam is comprehensive and all inclusive, as 
well as their flexibility and context-based religious rulings.  
The Implications of DS’ Discourse on its Approach to Society, and on Society’s 
Perception of DS: 
From the above, DS discourse reflects a tendency to adhere to a bottom-up reform 
approach to society’s violations, and a non-Takfiri approach to the society, where 
people definitely commit sins and pitfalls (Omar, 2013). On the contrary, they see the 
society as mostly conservative (Int. Mekki, 2013), with no recognition for the role of the 
state in constructing this Islamic identity and in promoting conservative discourse 
(Ismail, 2003), as mentioned in chapter 3. This shows that they do not see themselves as 
the “chosen people” or the “saviours,” but are just people who study, and who have 
extra information that they want to share (Omar, 2013, Gawwad, 2013), and that each 
Muslim should share whatever religious information he learns with others, even if he or 
                                                             
172 For instance, female genital mutilation is not Islamic and is dependent on specific medical diagnosis. However, 
since it is a tradition, DS’ members prefer to spread awareness and use persuasion to fight this phenomenon rather 
than impose laws on the society that defy their traditions. Moreover, underage-marriage, common in rural areas, 
cannot be condemned for DS since Islam does not ban it. However, they do not prefer it and see the only way to fight  
it is through education and awareness as well (Gawwad, 2013).  
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she is not a scholar (Shokry, 2013, Meeting Female leaders, 2014, Gawwad, 2013, 
Omar, 2013). This conforms to the importance of education, and the focus on the 
individual and social levels in DS’ methodology, through means of sharing information, 
direct interaction, and building upon emotional informal and faith-based relationships 
with individuals and groups within their communities (Omar, 2013, Women's 
committee, 2014, Gawwad, 2013).  
The features of their propagation or da’awa discourse, besides being non-Takfiri and 
non-violent, does not assume the role of guardians, as in the case of top-down 
approaches. However, this positive aspect of their social change approach contradicts 
the image of the sectarian, religiously strict Salafis. This could be explained in view of 
their obvious detachment from the popular culture, rejecting most types of art, which is 
perceived as a tendency of de-culturation, and departing from the mainstream discourse 
of Egyptian Islam (discussed in chapters 3 and 5), in addition to their perception of 
women’s political rights and restrictions,173 and the status of Christians and their right to 
full citizenship. Moreover, the fact that Salafis tend to have a special outfit, such as 
Niqab, and dressing in dark colours through which DS’ women are distinguished 
(Gawwad, 2013), as well as letting men’s beards grow (Shokry, 2013),174 make them 
differentiated among other Egyptians, with all the negative and positive reactions to this 
look (Field notes, 2013-2014).  
In view of the abovementioned factors to DS’ discourse, despite being non-Takfiri, non-
violent, promoting a bottom-up approach to social change and accommodating 
                                                             
173 Salafi women follow such rules willingly, and are not giving priority to political rights, but still see that they are 
empowered. 
174 They insist on their look even if it causes social resentment, or problems with security. Shokry said that, in Islam, 
there is no difference between core and crust. All religious rules and practices should be followed even as concerns 
appearance and whatever the challenges are. This was in a researcher’s comment on why DS’ members do not shave 
to hide their identity, since, after June 30, they were subject to security threats from MB, and generally from common 
people in the street who were mad at Islamists.  
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conventions and traditions, it remains resisted by the public. In this regard, the public 
might read NP’s actions as contradictory, and alien. This is because the bridge between 
NP’s policy choices and its rigid adherence to DS’ discourse - through evils-benefits 
calculations and context-based religious rulings - might be unfamiliar to the public. 
Moreover, a religious actor that enters politics and does not shift from the quietists or 
coverts, to the politicos category or the MB model, but rather tries to religionize 
politics, might also be atypical, not falling completely into one or the other of the 
established categories of Salafis or Islamists in the literature. However, as Meijer (2009) 
suggests, such Salafi categories should be seen as a sliding scale. Thus, DS/NP sit at a 
distinct point among these categories. Considering the distinct nature of DS among 
Islamists, and the novelty of NP’s experience, particularly in the Egyptian context and 
within the current discursive field that is dominated by anti-Islamist discourse after the 
MB experience, it is very probable that DS/NP will at least be perceived as a different 
group, if not a dangerous one. These challenges raise questions about the future 
prospects of NP on the Egyptian political scene.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter presented DS’ vision for social and political change as a political actor, 
through analysing the discourse of NP, DS’ political front, to find out whether NP’s 
discourse departs from that of DS. The relationship between DS and NP, both on the 
intellectual and structural levels, was discussed in order to highlight the implications of 
DS’ vision on the nature of NP, and its policy choices.  
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The findings indicate that DS and NP have a unified discourse, with both adhering to 
DS’ Manhaj of change and general guiding principles. The analysis also suggested a 
structural connection between the movement and the party in addition to a clear Shura 
mechanism of managing both DS and NP, and an obvious intellectual decentralization. 
This results in low levels of party discipline, which might be compensated by taking 
adherence to Manhaj as the core framing and mobilization tool of the movement. Thus, 
DS/NP’s strength lies not in the organizational aspect, but rather in their Manhaj. 
Accordingly, NP’s policy choices refer to DS’ Manhaj, and its members are open about 
the religious reference of the political party and its Salafi ideology. This is while 
stressing that it is not a religious party, and with emphasis on its conformity to the 
Constitution.  
In this regard, DS/NP framed the post-revolution situation as representing an existential 
threat to shari’a. Therefore, they operationalized the framing tools of cost-benefit 
analysis based on religious rulings, weighing consequences of actions, and of context-
based choices, that are historically the main tools of DS’ framing. Accordingly, DS/NP 
framed decisions to enter politics, and then to allow women and Christian candidates in 
parliamentary elections, as bringing more benefits than evils. Such actions were taken 
while announcing that they defy Islam and condemning them as a vice that they are 
temporarily compelled to undertake. Thus, in spite of commitment to the Egyptian legal 
framework and social conventions, both DS and NP are open about their beliefs that 
might contradict such frameworks (i.e. the belief in incomplete citizenship rights for 
women and Christians). Such an attitude, which they do not hide, implies a tendency for 
exclusionary practices. These account for the drop in the party’s popularity, and arouse 
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suspicions about NP’s actions that would seem contradictory to the public, even if they 
were resorted to for the sake of abiding by law.  
In addition, DS and NP members are also critical about the aspects of national culture, 
and about secular parties’ thought and choices. Thus, besides their historical distinction 
from fellow Islamists, DS’ and NP’s discourse departs from the mainstream political 
discourse and national culture. Moreover, they created a sub-culture of their own that 
made them different, and despite being aware of their sub-culture, they believe it should 
be spread through da’awa, because it is, in their opinion, the ideal model, being derived 
from Islam. Holding firm to their interpretations, and to a different outlook and 
appearance, is understood by the public as a tendency of either oppressive views, or a 
superior attitude. Such a national impression contradicts DS’ containment approach for 
da’awa, which is at work on limited local areas, and within close circles. This could be 
attributed to the weakness of DS’ communication skills and presentation on a wider 
social scope. Thus, state restrictions and media defamation might not be the only 
reasons for the negative Salafi image in the society. This was particularly noticeable 
when access to the media and wider interactions, in the absence of state restrictions 
immediately after January 2011 revolution, did not help much in changing this image. 
However, this can also be explained in light of the nature of DS’ discursive field that is 
dominated by the Al-Azhar discourse on the religious level and secular’s discourse on 
the political level. 
In addition, such a gap between the party’s actions, belief and the legal framework and 
mainstream discourse, both on the cultural and political levels, made the party’s 
discourse and choices controversial, and led to political losses, and even to political 
isolation. Yet, their mostly apolitical choices could be understood, in view of the party’s 
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nature as non-power seeking, just aiming at securing a political foothold. This is for the 
sake of bringing about DS’ vision on the table and to defend Shari’a, on basis of 
cooperation, rather than political competition, as a shura model of politics. They also 
participate politically in order to widen the scope of da’awa outreach within new social 
classes and sectors, including the elite and governors. Thus, if they are present and have 
access to new places, this is a success for them, albeit more on a religious than on 
political basis. Finally, NP sets a model of a party religionizing politics rather than 
politicizing religion; thus constituting a political entity restricted in its policy choices by 
religious rulings and calculations, rather than adapting its Manhaj to politics. This is 
arguably a new phenomenon in Egyptian politics, where religion traditionally serves 
politics, not the opposite. Therefore, being a new and different model, one that works 
against its context, adds to suspicions about NP actions and intentions, and makes its 





Al-Da’awa Al-Salafyya (DS) and Social and Political Change 
This thesis has argued that Al-Da’awa Al-Salafyya’s (DS) Manhaj of social and 
political change, which is a primarily religious project, did not alter following the 
movement’s entry into politics and the establishment of its political front, Al-Nor Party 
(NP), in 2011. It has further been argued that the wider movement and the political 
party are intellectually and structurally connected. Thus, DS’ approach to change 
represents a vision that was sustained throughout the movement’s history including, 
crucially, the period following the structural changes in the Egyptian political context 
brought about by the January 2011 revolution. Thus, DS’ Manhaj for change is a long-
term, gradual project founded on propagation and education as its sole means. This 
ideology was formed through the movement’s interaction with its Egyptian context, and 
was maintained and extended through a dynamic framing process, which was explored 
through CDA operationalized in this thesis. 
DS’ Manhaj of social change is a project that occurs over three levels: the individual, 
the social, and the state. The final, state level is treated fatalistically, as a divine grant 
which should thus emanate from a reformed society, not imposed on it. Consequently, 
this Manhaj gives priority to the individual and the social levels over the state level and 
to the religious over the political. Accordingly, it is a bottom-up approach that focuses 
on the education of the individual and finding and founding a community of believers 
that carries out sufficiency duties, among them da’awa. Eventually, empowerment will 
be accomplished and the reformed society will make Islamic righteous choices, which 
will be reflected on the state level. Thus, DS does not aim at establishing an Islamic 
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state as such. Instead, it focuses its efforts on the first two levels of the individual and 
the social, leaving the state to divine will.  
This approach to social and political change, besides being gradual and bottom up, is 
also non-Takfiri. This is because DS does not consider a society departing from Islamic 
teachings as infidel; but rather as committing sins and vices that can only be changed 
through da’awa and advice. This implies that DS do not advocate confronting vice 
through violence. Such an attitude can also be attributed to the movement’s rationalist 
nature, where it weighs the consequences of its actions, assesses reality requirements, 
and applies a cost-benefit analysis guided by religion. In this respect, the Manhaj is 
based on the movement’s Salafi methodology of deriving religious rulings from the 
Quran and Sunna with reference to pious predecessors (Salaf). Thus, DS, as a Salafi 
movement, shares with other Salafis the literalist interpretations of Quran and Sunna; 
gives priority to the text over human reason (Al-Naql qabl Al-A’ql). It also emphasizes 
the issue of Tawhid (oneness of God) as its main creed issue and adopts ijtihad 
(individual reason within texts and with guidance of Salaf interpretations) rather than 
Taqlid (imitation) and Madhabyya (following the four Islamic law schools). It follows 
that DS’ intellectual mode is characterised by self-learning and independence from 
scholars, with only shallow scholastic hierarchies (Haykel, 2009), which were reflected 
on the structure and internal dynamics of DS as a social movement.  
DS and the Political Map of Salafism 
However, since Salafis differ among themselves as concerns Manhaj, or the way they 
engage with the world, while sharing the same creed, references, and their relative 
agreement on Ijtihad and Fiqh issues, they also differ as concerns understanding their 
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contexts, and how to apply religious rulings to them (Haykel, 2009, Wiktorowicz, 
2006). Accordingly, DS, despite being a Salafi movement, does not sit neatly in any of 
the standing global or Egyptian Salafi categories in the literature. On the global level, 
DS neither fully belongs to the quietists nor to the covert Salafis, who preach quietism 
while being political activists. This is because DS neither propagated a typical quietist 
approach, despite the clear influence of Al-Albani on DS’ political views, nor carried 
out political activism. Thus, DS does not fall into the political activists’ category which, 
as per the literature, falls within the orbit of MB political thought (Meijer, 2009, 
Lacroix, 2009, Haykel, 2009). Nevertheless, DS, while abstaining from political 
activism, still held an oppositional position against Mubarak’s regime. Meanwhile, on 
the Egyptian Salafi ideological spectrum, DS cannot be considered mild Qutbis as 
suggested in the literature (Gauvain, 2013), since it considers Qutbism as a negative 
label. Moreover, despite its close connections with AS, DS denounces the Madkhali 
trend that preaches full obedience to the ruler.  
In this regard, DS neither approved of the regime, nor declared Mubarak as Kafir, and 
did not adopt the revolutionary approach. Its position was rather that ruling by laws that 
defy shari’a is kufr. Thus, DS applied Takfir on action and did not announce the ruler 
himself as Kafir. This can be connected to DS’ tendency to restrict and limit Takfir of 
individuals, which for DS should be subject to a long complicated process, to be carried 
out only by scholars. Moreover, DS does not see that ousting the ruler through 
revolution is the way out of non-Islamic rule. Thus, while opposing Mubarak, they 
propagated their Manhaj of social change that is based on da’awa and persuasion rather 




Studying DS as a Social Movement 
Being one version of Al-Albani’s theory of education and purification (Lacroix, 2009), 
DS saw that, under Mubarak’s regime, political participation is necessarily associated 
with religious concessions. That is why it opted to stay apolitical, and was highly 
critical of MB for giving priority to politics over religion. This way, DS, while being the 
product of socio-economic, political and cultural conditions and interactions within the 
Egyptian context (Gauvain, 2013), remained distinct on the map of Islamist activism. 
Accordingly, DS’ entry to politics raised questions about its plans and intentions and the 
nature of the role it wants to play on the Egyptian political scene, especially as DS was 
understudied before January 2011 revolution. That is why this thesis sees that the 
starting point in studying DS should not be the political party established by DS but 
rather the religious movement and its vision for change. This is to be able to evaluate to 
what extent the movement influenced the ideology, and, thus, the policy choices, of the 
party, and how its vision was put into action. In fact, confining analysis to the party’s 
policy choices and strategies, or even its discourse, means a focus on the political aspect 
which leads to missing the ideational, theological and legal aspects of the religious 
movement and the party. This usually results in a dichotomous depiction of Salafi 
activism, between Jihadis and the politically submissive, while ignoring the variations 
in between (Haykel, 2009). Therefore, this thesis deals with the religious social 
movement and its vision, as the foundations for the political moves and policy choices 
of the party. It also engages the question of to what extent the framing processes of the 
movement and of its political party, upon entering politics, departed from or conformed 
to the movement’s foundations and original discourse or ideology. 
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Thus, this thesis provided a narrative of the history of DS as a social movement that 
constituted a collective challenge to existing social, political, and even religious 
definitions and arrangements in the Egyptian context. DS developed a common 
approach to social change represented by its Manhaj, with the purpose of applying it to 
society, and propagated it through a specific educational curriculum that has been taught 
in its institutes, mosques, and even in private, to the different generations of the 
movement. In addition, it invested in creating solidarities and networks, based on faith 
sister/brotherhood, and interacted with their secular and Islamist opponents, as well as 
with the state (Jenkins, 2005). As a group struggling over the definition of meanings, 
concepts, and the approach to change, they give special attention to building Muslim 
identity and lifestyle that matches their Manhaj, and to reforming society, and 
consequently state arrangements and institutions (Nash, 2010). 
To better understand DS’ vision for social change, its emergence and development as a 
social movement was studied in view of its Egyptian context, to understand how the 
interactions and the features of this context influenced DS’ framing processes that 
eventually resulted in the formation of its ideology or vision for social change. Such a 
vision was refined through dynamic framing processes in reaction to the developments 
and events within the Egyptian context. Within this context, for example, DS entered 
into discussion and conflicts with MB, and violent and Takfiri groups, through which 
DS developed its distinct vision among other Islamists, despite being accused of 





The Discursive Basis of DS’ Method for Social Change (Manhaj) 
The continuous interactions and discursive conflicts that carved the features of DS’ 
Manhaj were mainly on the issues of its social change methodology - or Manhaj - and 
its position on the state, Hisba (commanding virtue and preventing vice), Takfir and 
violence, and the Iranian revolution or the Shi’ite issue. In addition, they did not join the 
dominant conservative alliance that prevailed in Egypt during their emergence, thus 
departed from the mainstream Islam as propagated by Al-Azhar sheikhs, sponsored by 
the state and supported by the bourgeoisie, and with an understanding with the moderate 
Islamist opposition (Ismail, 2003). This might be because the Salafi approach of DS 
went against the Asha’ari (reason-based) approach of Al-Azhar that also builds on the 
popular segments of Egyptian culture and Sufism. Such creedal and intellectual 
differences with the official religious institution resulted in the marginalization of DS. 
Even within the duality of radicals-moderates that prevailed in the 1980s-1990s, due to 
the rising terrorist attacks, DS, despite being anti-Takfir, anti-violence, was not placed 
on the moderate camp either. This came with DS sharing almost all the features of the 
dominant conservative discourse, however, while keeping a distance and independence 
from the conservative alliance (Ismail, 2003). This can also be explained by Al-Azhar’s 
view of DS, and of Salafis in general, as Wahhabi and non-Egyptian (Gauvain, 2013). 
As discussed earlier in the thesis, DS, despite the high esteem it accords to Mohammed 
ibn Abdel Wahhab and to the Saudi prominent sheikhs, Ibn Baz and Ibn U’thaymin, and 
considering them among their references, was keen on establishing its independence 
from them and on emphasizing the distinct nature and agenda of their Salafi School. 
Nevertheless, DS’ conservative discursive field that aimed at neutralizing radicals and 
besieging seculars through censorship of their intellectual production, while 
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marginalizing DS, indirectly served its survival. In fact, DS propagation mission 
became easier in a context of re-islamization, where the society became fertile for 
accepting DS’ da’awa activities, that was facilitated by the spread of Islamic products, 
mosques, speeches, booklets, and audio-tapes (Ismail, 2003). Moreover, within the 
radicals-moderates’ narrative, being non-Takfiri, anti-violence and due to the apolitical 
nature of DS, it evaded much of state’s repression to Islamists. However, DS-state 
relationship was fluctuating where the state undertook occasional attacks on the 
movement to limit its expansion, while keeping its presence within the state designated 
lines. This could be explained by the fact that, while not put on the moderates’ camp, 
DS was used by the state, though informally, to de-radicalize and contain youth by 
providing a religious alternative to radicals, which might be credible because it 
distances itself from the state.  
DS leaders were also clear that collective action is means to protect and spread da’awa 
and is not an end in itself. Thus, they were willing to give up parts of their structure and 
organizational entities as part of an understanding with the state, in return for allowing 
them to continue da’awa. DS undertook its activities on a wider geographical scale but 
in smaller groups so as not to provoke security concerns, and they carried da’awa in 
private but not in secrecy, and thus were able to teach their curriculum in the various 
governorates, and to infiltrate their Manhaj. This way, DS managed to survive under the 
authoritarian regime, and through the fluctuations of DS-state relationship.  
From the above, DS’ differences with the dominant discourse as well as with fellow 
Islamists, particularly MB, were because of its Manhaj. Thus, DS neither framed state-
sponsored conservatism as an opportunity, nor joined the Islamists’ front, led by MB. 
Accordingly, DS preferred to live with limited resources and to sacrifice parts of its 
273 
 
organizational structures, than to sacrifice the independence of its intellectual agenda, or 
to provide concessions as concerns Manhaj. Thus, Manhaj was always central in the 
movement’s mobilization, decision making, and framing processes.  
The Dynamic Production of DS’ Ideology 
In this respect, DS as social movement does not defend “preconfigured” ideas but was 
rather developing and producing meanings, organizing experience, and guiding action, 
through simplifying events and realities with the intention of mobilization, where 
framing, i.e. the meaning production process, is dynamic (Snow, 2007, 2000). Thus, 
DS’ Manhaj or ideology was formed through interaction with other Islamists, and the 
components of the Egyptian context, through a dynamic process of framing. After 
establishing its ideology, its main features were refined through interactions and 
framing processes which constituted an extension to the movement’s Manhaj. In this 
thesis, the formation of the DS’ ideology and the dynamic framing processes as the 
discursive practices of the movement were studied through critical discourse analysis 
(CDA).  
The result of applying CDA to DS’ foundational texts on social change shows that its 
distinct Manhaj developed as a result of dynamic framing of other Islamist approaches 
to change. In this respect, DS emphasized the importance of the context and conditions 
to politically participate, and dismissed political participation as a means of change in 
cases it would necessarily lead to religious concessions. They also disengaged the 
concepts of Jihad and the Islamist military confrontation groups, where these were held 
to not conform to the conditions of Jihad in Islam. Moreover, they argued that Jihad has 
various stages, of which da’awa should be the first. However, they criticized the 
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individual da’awa approach, on the basis that collective action and organized da’awa 
allow them to carry out sufficiency duties on a wider scope and in a more 
comprehensive manner across all social levels. Thus, DS sees that da’awa and education 
of the individual and finding and founding the community of believers requires a 
collective action to carry out sufficiency duties, which will eventually lead to changing 
of the whole society, and consequently the state.  
As a result, DS identified itself as primarily Salafi, rationalist, prudent, anti-Takfiri and 
anti-violent. It was also stressing its scholastic identity as a group that chose its method 
as a result of expansive research, studies and precise definition of Islamic concepts and 
legal issues. Thus, it is not willing to offer any compromises in order to achieve a 
rapprochement with neither fellow Islamists, particularly MB and Jihadis, nor with the 
conservative dominant discourse. DS was also keen on keeping the consistency of their 
discourse against state repression. It also preserved a hostile discourse against seculars, 
Christians, and the West, which is normal for a Salafi movement. However, this 
perception of the Other and the religious self-identification became problematic when 
DS entered politics. Moreover, the fact that it dismissed political participation as a 
means of social change, and then established a political party after the January 2011 
revolution, raised questions about whether DS changed its Manhaj of social change and 
transformed its discourse, or whether NP would depart from the movement’s ideology.  
To answer these questions this study offered an overview of DS’ texts as concerns the 
various issues in the national debate on social change in the pre- January 2011 
revolution period. Then, CDA was applied to the movement’s texts, during the days of 
protest and Tahrir square sit-in, which reflected their assessment of revolution as means 
of change, within a revolutionary context. CDA was also applied to texts on social 
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change and reform in the post-January 2011 revolution period. This was significant as it 
tracked DS’ discourse upon involvement in political interactions in order to explore 
how the movement’s Manhaj of social change fared in the post-revolutionary context. 
The results of the analysis were compared to the results of CDA of DS’ foundational 
texts on social change. This enabled understanding of the main features and tools of DS’ 
framing processes in its interaction with the different situations and contexts, and 
whether they constituted an extension to or departure from its Manhaj. Then, such 
findings were compared to NP’s discourse, and policy choices, to test whether NP’s 
ideology and framing processes departed or conformed to DS’ original discourse, and to 
the main features and tools of the movement’s framing processes.  
Thus, the main argument of this thesis is based on CDA which indicates that in the 
transitional stage of 2011 revolution and the official entry of DS into politics, DS’ 
discourse did not change except in the form (style, genre, and wording), while keeping 
the core of the discourse (argumentation, word meaning, religious representation of 
reality or priority of the religious discourse over the political). The rest of the 
implications and conclusions about the movement and the party’s relationship, nature, 
and policy choices were based on this main argument that was not to be possible if 
CDA was not foregrounded.  
To sum up, the nature of the methodology, and the CDA as the analytical framework 
applied, in addition to the exceptional moment of carrying out the field work, were the 
means the researcher employed to maintain a distance with the case, and to re-check and 
test the content of the interviews. Accordingly, on the societal level of CDA, the 
researcher contextualized the case study within the global, regional, and local contexts 
over its history while focusing on the intellectual connections, and as far as was availed 
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by the literature, media, and data available from the field to her capacity as an 
individual researcher.  
The Persistence of DS’ Core Religious Discourse 
The CDA results - and comparisons between them in the various historical stages and 
different empirical contexts - revealed that DS’ discourse did not change, since the main 
argumentation, word meaning, and the religious representation of reality were all 
maintained in all the texts in the different periods, and they conform to the foundational 
texts. However, there were apparent changes on the level of genre (access to media), 
style, besides drawing upon political and legal discourses and introducing technocratic 
values; yet all remained dominated by a religious discourse. Thus, the religious took 
priority over the political in DS’ discourse before and after entering politics. In addition, 
the result of CDA of NP’s discourse proved that it conforms to DS’ discourse. This 
means that DS’ ideology was reproduced over its history where framing processes of 
the movement were an extension of its ideology, and its political arm, NP, adopted the 
same ideology and framing tools. Such framing tools are religious justifications, quoting 
Quran and Sunna, framing around religious rulings, re-wording and elaboration of DS’ 
Manhaj and its concepts while preserving its original definitions, and applying Feqh Al-
Waqi’, or weighing consequences and assessing context and reality requirements. 
Consequently, the application of cost-benefit analysis is one of the main tools of 
framing of the decisions that seems to defy the legal Islamic tenets, for instance as 
concerns guardianship. In this respect, actions are to be taken if the benefits to Muslims 
and Islam are expected to weigh more than evils. This is because, in view of the 
constraints of their context and for the sake of making use of the opportunities it 
provides, DS are sometimes compelled to take religiously controversial actions in the 
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name of serving their wider objectives, protecting da’awa and Manhaj, shari’a and 
Islamic identity. Thus, opportunities and constraints are framed around religious values 
and through reassurance of conformity with DS’ Manhaj of social change, that is the 
core of the framing processes of the movement, and the cement that maintains its 
interconnectedness.  
In this respect, in line with the foundational texts, not only was revolution dismissed as 
a means of change, it also represented, in 2011, an existential threat to shari’a and to 
Islamic identity. Yet, the structural changes brought about by the revolution were 
framed as an opportunity to politically participate without religious concessions, making 
the January 2011 revolution the movement’s second opportunity in its history after the 
one that allowed it to initiate collective action. However, political participation is not a 
means of social change for DS, but rather a tool that serves and protects da’awa, while 
also expanding its scope. Thus, in conformity with DS’ Manhaj of change, da’awa 
remains the sole means of social change, with political participation being just a tool. 
DS participation in that sense is on condition of achieving more benefits than evils to 
Islam and Muslims. Consequently, participation at the state level comes to reflect 
whatever reforms first achieved at the social level, but not to impose change. This 
implies that DS/NP will not offer any Manhaj or religious compromises for the sake of 
political gains. Using the same tools of framing, DS/NP mentioned that they will 
participate through democratic mechanisms while rejecting democratic philosophy, thus 
adopting a partial definition of democracy. Accordingly, they will participate while 
denouncing democracy as infidel.  
Consequently, once DS decided to participate and mobilized their followers on such 
basis, while vowing to respect the legal framework and conventions in Egypt, they 
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declared the non-Islamic components of them as vice. Thus, they identified themselves 
as the group that takes part in politics while denouncing vice, and without sacrificing 
religious foundations. This was applied to women’s and Christians’ participation in 
parliament, since they justified them by cost-benefit analysis, while condemning them 
as vice since both groups should not enjoy guardianship. The gap between the legal 
framework that DS/NP follow and their belief and discourse on one hand, and the 
flexibility that their Manhaj provides on the other, made the assessment of their actions 
a complicated process. However, in view of the analysis in this thesis, the consistency 
and continuity of DS’ discourse reflected their adherence to their ideology and the 
employment of the same traditional framing tools of the movement even after they 
entered politics. Thus, their flexibility and practicality is limited by Manhaj, and does 
not reflect absolute pragmatism. As sheikh Borhami said: “yes I am pragmatic as far as 
shari’a allows me to; and I am strict when it comes to religious foundations” (int. 
Borhami, 2013).  
The Intellectual and Structural Interconnection between DS and NP 
Besides demonstrating the consistency and continuity of DS’ discourse on social and 
political change in different political contexts and throughout its history, this thesis also 
argued that NP is both intellectually and structurally connected to the wider movement. 
This makes NP a religious actor in a political context. In addition, their insistence on 
their religious discourse and adherence to their Manhaj, while abiding by the law, 
results in controversial policy choices. Such controversy reflects the inherent tension of 
being a religious actor in a political context: such a context demands primarily office-
seeking and political and policy decisions, rather than entering into prolonged religious 
calculations, justifications, and bargains. The common ideology and its reproduction 
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implied also that DS/NP relationship with the other did not change. Thus, their hostile 
relationship with seculars continued, their rivalry with MB, distancing themselves from 
other Islamists, as well as the fluctuating relationship pattern with the state that allowed 
them to exist but within limits. DS/NP also reproduced their discourse concerning 
Christian and female citizenship, and Shi’ites, thus, expressing exclusionary views.  
Accordingly, this thesis concluded that when the movement established a political party, 
it did so to serve its primarily religious social change Manhaj. Thus, the party represents 
DS in politics and reproduces its discourse. Therefore, NP constitutes a shura model, 
where it acts as “Ahl Al-shura,” who advise the ruler and complement his efforts, rather 
than compete for power. This model - of a religious political actor under a Shura system 
- has a number of features. First, being a model of a non-power seeking, non-
competitive party - within a competitive political context - puts them at odds with their 
political environment. Second, their understanding of religion and their discourse, 
besides being distinct from other Islamist powers in Egypt, significantly departs in some 
aspects from the legal framework and the mainstream of political and cultural 
discourses. Third, their discourse remains relatively open to exclusionary practices.  
Prospects for DS, NP and the Study of Islamist Movements 
The fact that NP insists on preserving its religious Salafi identity and Manhaj and on 
adhering to DS discourse, while being keen on securing a foothold in politics, 
constitutes a challenge to the party and the movement. This is especially so considering 
that their objective is to religionize politics, rather than to become politicized 
themselves. Despite adhering to their Manhaj, the Manhaj’s flexibility gives the 
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impression of pragmatism, abuse of religion, and contradiction. However, for better or 
worse, NP decisions did not defy DS’ Manhaj of social change.  
Nevertheless, in view of the relative stability of DS’ discursive field, the reaction to its 
persistent discourse is likely to be resistance and marginalization. This is despite DS 
being non-violent, non-Takfiri, and adopting a bottom-up approach to social change. 
There are several reasons for this likelihood. Firstly, because DS/NP are alien to 
mainstream Muslims in Egypt, and are distinct among Islamists as well, their Manhaj 
and calculations might be uncommon to the public, or may be unpopular among 
Islamists. Moreover, they represent a religious discourse amidst a political context, 
dominated by a secular discourse representing the June 2013 alliance and in the absence 
of any other Islamist political party. Thus, religiously, culturally, and politically DS/NP 
resist the dominant discourse. This is because in spite of sharing almost all of the 
features of Al-Azhar discourse, differences on the Ash’aari approach and Sufism put DS 
in a different camp. This is while NP and DS emphasize the importance of the Al-Azhar 
institution and are keen on maintaining dialogue with its figures. Their relationship with 
the official religious institutions, the Ministry of Endowments and Al-Azhar remains 
complicated since they are allowed to preach, however are subject to criticism and 
restrictions from both. 
In terms of relationship to the state, toppling the MB regime was a new phase that 
renewed the pattern of DS-state relationship, where NP members complained of security 
restrictions during the elections, and DS sheikhs became subject to the Ministry of 
Endowment authority and restrictions regarding licenses and the content of Friday 
speeches. Thus, DS’ access to discourse is still there, but is legally and officially 
administered and put under control. Also a long history of media defamation of 
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Islamists, and of Salafis among them, as part of the radicals-moderates narrative that 
prevailed in 1980s-1990s and continued into the 2000s, favouring Al-Azhar as the 
guardian of orthodoxy (Ismail, 2003), adds to NP’s challenge. Such duality was revived 
after the MB experience and prevailed after the June 2013 revolution.  
Finally, DS/NP’s discourse on women, Christians, and art and culture, is another reason 
for the movement’s and the party’s alienation. In this respect, relatively refining the 
wording used, besides finding ways to communicate their views to a wider scope of 
society through media, did not serve DS/NP, but rather might have harmed them. This is 
because delivering a shocking discourse that is alien to the mainstream, and 
purposefully insisting on it, does not reflect DS/NP’s daily life and real practices that 
are more moderate and less strict than the religious rules that they feel they are 
committed to explain theoretically. This could explain their relative success in their 
closer circles where they are identified as different, and may be as having a sub-culture, 
but not as radicals or as dangerous. Whereas on the discursive level and in view of the 
connotations of the radicals (non-Azhari) and moderate (Azhari thought), they could be 
classified as radicals, or at least as different or rigid. However, DS’ and NP’s discourse 
never reflected their moderate application of religious rulings, and is seen for the 
previously mentioned reasons as a dogmatic, religiously strict discourse. This implies, 
among other problems, a point of weakness in DS’ interaction, and communication of 
their ideas to the public. In sum, they do not work on explaining the non-Takfiri, non-
violent, and bottom-up nature of their discourse to the public: instead it remains hidden 
behind shockingly strict statements, and a different definition of democracy and 
citizenship and model of political participation. In this regard, DS recognized their 
exclusionary discourse as concerns Christians, Shiites, and Baha’is, and justified such 
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views as exclusion within the normal levels practised even in ancient democracies in the 
west.  
In view of the analysis of DS’ discourse, and the history of the social movement, NP’s 
policy choices were consistent with DS’ position of giving priority to Manhaj over 
pleasing fellow Islamists, even if the cost was their marginalization. Thus, the pattern of 
the DS-Islamists relationship did not change. Consequently, it will be challenging for 
NP to regain its 2011-2012 levels of confidence and support among Islamists, if not 
impossible. Due to the hard choice between Al-Manhaj and maintaining their popular 
base, they have chosen decisively to adhere to their foundational principles (Al-Shahhat, 
2013e), which have historically departed from those of other Islamists. Thus, it can be 
said that NP intentionally lost other Islamist votes. In the near future, it is expected that 
NP will remain isolated among Islamists, particularly after they have chosen to support 
Al-Sisi in the presidential elections (Linn, 2015). However, with the demise of the MB 
alliance, if, in the long-run, NP manages to convince Islamist sympathizers that it is a 
reliable leadership, other Islamists, for practical reasons, might support NP as the only 
remaining Islamist political party. Thus, it is at least conceivable that NP might regain 
its Islamist popular base, without offering Manhaj concessions. 
The most recent parliamentary elections in 2015 resulted in NP gaining 12 seats. 
However, a small number of seats that is, it was compensated for by NP 
parliamentarians gaining membership in almost all the specialized committees in the 
Egyptian parliament. Therefore, on the quantitative level their presence is not 
influential, but on the qualitative level, they are present, even with only one member in 
the committees, conforming to their approach of aiming at presence and at securing just 
a foothold in the system. In the foreseen future, this pattern is expected to continue.  
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From another perspective, the 2015 election, despite being relatively reflective of low 
political mobilization and internal divisions on political participation at this stage in the 
party and the movement, again proved that the main source of mobilization and re-
uniting the party was through referring to Manhaj and defending the existence of 
da’awa and of DS’ objectives. There was also no sign of disintegration of the religious 
social movement, but rather a weakness in the political side that might have changed 
over time since the election in 2015. However, this can only be decided in the light of a 
future round of field work. This present work is meant to focus on ideology rather than 
on tactics and policies and is mainly based on materials collected from the field in 2013-
2014, and media follow-up from 2014-2016. This makes a more comprehensive 
analysis of the policies and tactics of DS and NP the focus of further studies based on 
the results of this dissertation, after carrying out a second round of field work, as NP 
develops and becomes active in a different stage of Egyptian politics. Nevertheless, 
policies and tactics were also discussed in this dissertation (chapters 3, 5, and 6) as far 
as possible for a new political actor that only appeared in the last six years, in view of 
the overarching ideology investigated in this dissertation. 
This study departs from and questions the existing literature on Salafis and on DS/NP, 
not only through the combination of CDA and ethnography, but also due to using such a 
framework to practice what might be considered an immanent social critique of the case 
study. Adopting an immanent critique means that norms that we measure against “are 
not taken from outside or from a specific procedure but directly from the object of 
critique” (Herzog, 2016). Accordingly, this study is not assuming an external critique 
that focuses on the contradiction between some external criteria and the case study and 
its practices. The study is also not a procedural critique that looks at the contradiction 
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between reality and the aspects of a desired and a fair procedure. Finally, this study, 
despite of the fact that it provides an in-depth analysis of DS’ discourse on social 
change and lets the actors speak for themselves then analyzes what they say, it does not 
represent an internal social critique either, one that suffices by revealing the 
inconsistencies between what the movement says and its ideals, and its reality. For 
instance, an internal critique of a racist discourse might not be condemned if it is 
consistent. Thus, the main standard in the internal critique is primarily consistency and 
coherence, which are criteria not derived from the case itself (Herzog, 2016). In other 
words, in the immanent critique, adopted in this thesis, the functional (to criticize 
something for being dysfunctional), ethical (to what extent the social order studied 
brings good and completes life to individuals), and moral (revealing aspects of 
inequality and justice) strategies of critique (Herzog, 2016: 29), are about how the 
studied entity defines functions, norms and values.  
Thus, there was a need for understanding DS as an entity using a systematic approach to 
derive its norms and to understand its meaning making while locating it within context. 
For instance, due to the characteristics of the movement and the nature of its members, 
and based on CDA of DS’ texts on social change over its history, DS attributes a 
religious function to its political party that is defined as one of da’awa tools. In that 
sense, the political party is a means of providing the movement with a legal framework 
in view of the nature of DS-state relationship that is signified by fluctuations. In 
addition, according to DS’ members, political participation offers them access to wider 
sectors, classes, and areas to spread da’awa. Accordingly, being present in the process 
of law making, for instance, they are always keen on expressing the religious point of 
view even if it seems controversial and politically costly (e.g. female genital mutilation 
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(Tareq, 2016)). Finally, for them, political participation is a means not an end and can 
never be the only tool for social change, and that is why through participation they so 
far aimed at presenting a religious voice in the political process. Thus, they aim at 
religionizing politics rather than politicizing their religious movement or using religion 
to serve politics but rather the opposite.  
Ethnographic observations and CDA results proved that such a framing of political 
participation is one of the main tools of members’ political mobilization. Due to the lack 
of discipline and to the intellectual independence within the movement, the party seeks 
to abide by such an understanding of a political party that conforms to DS’ Manhaj of 
social change which represents the primary frame for the movement’s individual 
members (see chapter 6). At the same time, NP does follow the Egyptian law and 
constitution that bans religious parties. Sticking to DS’ religious discourse while 
abiding by the Egyptian law, NP consciously opts for controversial policy choices and 
costly political actions that cannot be simply minimized to pragmatism since they are 
tied to their Manhaj, or to a lack of experience because they are aware of their actions 
and of the political model they want to convey and they do that intentionally. This can 
be proved for instance through a look at DS relationship to Islamists over its history 
which did not change when they entered politics. Thus, DS/NP’s actions were an 
extension of their historical choices (see chapters 3 and 5).  
Therefore, DS/NP, in an attempt to secure a foothold in the system and to protect the 
movement’s existence and unity while mobilizing its members politically, they gave 
contradictory impressions that were not to be understood without an ethnographically 
driven CDA while adopting an immanent social critique. As such, this study is neither 
projecting external standards of how a political actor ought to be, nor of how an islamist 
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group is, but it focuses rather on understanding the movement itself and scrutinizing its 
ideology to see how, if ever, it is reflected in its policies as a new political actor within 
its context. This way the present work not only lays the ground for future studies of NP 
as a political actor, but also questions the definitions of moderation and radicalization, 
and contributes to criticism of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis (Willis, 2006, 
Schwedler, 2011, 2007, Jenkins, 2014). 
On the broader theoretical and applied levels, this thesis’s contribution to testing the 
roots and the durability of a non-takfiri, non-violent and bottom up approach for change 
in an Islamist movement discourse over its history - and in different contexts - might be 
helpful in studying moderation and radicalization. In particular, this thesis indicates that 
in determining if an Islamist group is moderate, it might not be sufficient to observe that 
it has claimed to have revised its tenets, or that it accommodates democracy, the West 
and Christians, for instance. Rather, it is important to test the longer-term trajectory of 
the vision for social change, whether it is bottom-up or top-down, and if it is 
exclusionary and/or authoritarian. The question of Takfir should be also factored in: 
examining the scale, frequency and type of Takfir in the foundational texts of a 
movement enables an appraisal of its potential to legitimise and use violence. 
Consequently, this study proposes a different approach to the study of Islamism and 




EXPLANATION OF THE APPENDICES 
This section on appendices includes the details of the CDA of DS’ and NP’s texts 
collected through archival and ethnographic research. This section shows the way 
Norman Fairclough’s CDA framework was operationalized and applied in this thesis. 
Thus, the appendices include the details and evidence that supports the arguments and 
the conclusions made in the thesis. 
Appendix (1) presents the details of the CDA of DS’ foundational texts on social 
change. 
Appendix (2) presents the analysis of DS’ texts on the debate on social and political 
change in pre-revolution Egypt. 
Appendices (3) and (4) present the CDA of DS’ texts on the means of social change 
during and after the January 2011 revolution periods, respectively. 
Finally, appendix (5) presents a complete analysis of the concepts of women, Christians, 
and art and culture in the discourse of DS/NP. 
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APPENDIX 1: CDA OF DS’ FOUNDATIONAL TEXTS ON SOCIAL CHANGE 
Text 1: Salafism and Approaches to Change, Borhami Article (1992) 
Textual Analysis 
First: Construction of Social Relations and the Self: 
Modality: The text was characterized by high affinity as regards opinions and 
suppositions mentioned by the author. High affinity was also reflected in verbs such as 
“to impose” “must”, and “should” when it comes to holy orders from God, before 
religious obligations, and before and within the quotes of pioneer Salafi scholars. There 
was also the verb ‘to state’ when it comes to listing the author’s arguments, 
understanding, or opinions as universal facts. In addition to the use of expressions such 
as ‘no doubt’, absolute negation, questions to attract attention or for negation, and 
depending on the present tense to stress that what follows is a fact or is continuous. 
Thus, modality in this text was characterized by both high affinity and the use of 
objective rather than subjective modality, which aimed at giving credibility to the 
content of the text and to send the message that the facts mentioned are universal. In 
cases of subjective modality the pronoun used is ‘We’, whether connected or separated 
from the verbs, which gives the sense of a united Salafi position as regards to certain 
issues.  
Ethos: The cover page of the text adopts the format of an academic paper where the title 
is in the middle then the author, the source and the publisher. The title: “Salafism and 
methods of change”, uses the general concept of ‘Salafism’ without reference to DS in 
particular which gives authority to DS as the representative of Salafism. In addition, it 
shows a tendency to present the various Islamist methods of change as a sort of a 
literature review, that provides a critical and an objective reading to all these trends, and 
then present the Salafi stance on such trends. Despite being a medical doctor rather than 
a Shari’a PhD holder, the title ‘Dr.’ was used before the author’s name. Such outlook 
aims at stressing a prestigious scientific aspect for the text, and a tendency to present 
DS’ scholar and co-founder Dr. Yasser Borhami, as one who provides precise academic 
texts and arguments. This identity was stressed all over the text through the use of 
religious jargon, the structure and the strategy used through objectively presenting the 
narratives of each group, then criticizing such narratives and providing a detailed 
explanation of the DS’ definition of ‘Change’ that avoids their points of weaknesses. In 
addition, there was clear citation to quotes of Salafi prominent scholars and main 
references all over the text, which aimed at giving credibility and an academic outlook 
to the text.  
The reference to Quran, Sunna and Hadith, and to certain prominent Salafi scholars 
such as Ahmed Ibn Hambal, Ibn Taymiyya, and Al-Albani, confirms the DS narrative 
about the definition and contours of Salafism, and their Salafi identity. 
 
Second: Construction of Social Reality: 
Connectives and Argumentation: 
Cohesion reflects the rationality and the argumentation of the text, and in this text the 
cohesive makers are explicit on the surface of the text, such as reference (pronouns, 
demonstrative, or definite articles), ellipsis (referring to other parts in the text), 
conjunction (since, and, if, therefore), or lexical (synonyms, hyponym, collocate (same 
domain, pipe and tobacco). Thus, the link between clauses was obvious and the 
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functions of cohesion are mostly for providing definitions, descriptions and 
classification of groups, opinions and trends or concepts. In addition, there were 
elaboration, extension and enhancement to clarify legal Islamic rules, which gave a 
sense of tutorial and preaching approach. There were also causal relations to explain 
certain positions, phenomenon or to state justifications on the side of the author or the 
opposing parties. In addition, there was the conditional relation that aims at providing 
precise specific religious rules away from superficial understandings or generalizations. 
There were also various comparison relations, especially to compare the worse and the 
better choices, which can be referred to DS principle of calculating interest versus 
corruptions and losses, and comparisons between different scenarios, mentioning the 
situation and its opposite, or the word and its antonym, for the sake of clarifying the 
meaning in a tutorial approach. Finally, there was deduction through stating a group of 
facts or conditions and coming up with a logical conclusion.  
 
Transitivity and Theme: 
Transitivity (action, event, relational, mental): God and his rule are the main agents in 
all the processes and actions. In addition, there are parts where Ahl Al-E’lm (scholars) 
and Salaf (predecessors) are the main agents, which gives them authority, credibility, 
and a special position. There were also parts when average Muslims were highlighted as 
agents to stress their obligations, duties, with focus on the relationship between God and 
the self on one hand, and the importance of their dynamic and positive role in society. 
There is the use of the pronoun ‘We’ as mentioned above to give a sense of unity and 
solidarity among Muslims in the face of their reality, challenges, and the religious rules 
and obligations that they have to understand then to abide by, it also helps in engaging 
the reader. In addition, there is a general tendency to state events (event and goal), and 
relational processes more than the use of passive voice when mentioning a general rule. 
This could be because events and relational processes are not as obscure as passive 
voice, and their use is not to hide the agent, but are used where explaining the process 
itself is more important than mentioning the agent. Moreover, using events and 
relational processes might be for the sake of generalization without addressing specific 
persons or groups (to avoid confrontations), while sustaining the clarity and confidence 
adopted by the author through the text, with low use of mental processes to stress the 
objectivity of the text.  
Despite of the fact that passive voice is preferred in scientific texts and in mentioning 
general rules, the author preferred to depend mainly on nominalization. 
 
Nominalization: 
The use of nominalization is obvious in this text that aims at defining concepts and 
explaining trends and schools of thought, thus the majority of sentences are nominal not 
verbal, which gives the sense that it is a scientific paper that deals with specific 
concepts, and terms. Thus, each sentence constitutes a fact, and a definition rather than 
an opinion. The use of nominalization also goes with the tendency to avoiding 
personalization or mentioning particular agents, or groups, which adds to the objectivity 
and abstraction of a scientific text that does not aim at entering into confrontations or 
conflicts but rather help in understanding general trends and attitudes. Thus, each 
sentence started by a noun or clear concept from the Islamic heritage and terminology, 





The theme of the sentences reflects the supremacy of God and the obligation to follow 
His rules. Themes shed the light on the main concepts that constitute the priorities and 
principles of DS, especially as concerns change, such as governance/rule of God, 
legislation, the Islamic legal system and the administrative system. Moreover, there was 
a tendency to put religious prohibitions and orders forward at the beginning of the 
sentence, such as, promoting virtue and preventing vice, the position of DS, Jihad, 
Methodology (Manhaj), and Da’awa. The fact that such concepts are given priority in 
the text reflects their importance and central position in DS vision of ‘change’. It means 
also that they are considered common sense, and basic principles, and are represented to 
the audience, or interpreter in this way.  
Word meaning reflected the wider social and cultural process discussed in the history 
chapters, where DS sustained a unique approach among other Islamists that rejected 
radical social change, violence or exclusion of Muslims. Such definitions implied 
political and ideological investment and formed the general perspective of DS for 
‘change’ and its identity and relationship with the society and the counter-movements. 
The persistence in sticking to such definitions and reproducing them all over DS’ 
history aimed at inculcating them in the minds of its followers as well as normalizing 
them among the rest of Islamist trends on the long run.  
Within this text, there was a detailed definition of ‘Takfir’ and ‘Kufr’ (considering 
someone as infidel, and infidelity) and a definition and history of Jihad from DS’ point 
of view. As mentioned above such definitions and chronology were mainly directed 
against the violent and exclusive Islamist trends, which based their action for ‘change’ 
on extremist imprecise definitions and conditions for Takfir and Jihad in Islam due to 
the lack of academic religious background. There were also definitions of 
comprehensive da’awa and change, and the conditions of ‘ousting governors’ as a last 
resort for ‘change’. Borhami also stressed that DS does not adopt a Machiavellian 
approach, on the contrary, both means and ends should be legitimate and allowed by 
Islam. Moreover, this text presented the religious debate among Islamists regarding 
collective action, as well as DS’ definition of ‘Democracy’ versus ‘Shura’, and the 
distinctions between administrative worldly systems and the legal religious ones. 
Finally, there were the non-deterministic definitions of ‘empowerment’, and ‘The 
Islamic state’.  
The tendency to give the impression that it is a scientific text that provides tight 
definitions, and clarifies concepts, rules, and regulations, depending on trusted 
references, was associated by an obvious religious wording and metaphors inspired 
from Islam and Arab heritage, which in the final product gives an “academic religious 
text”. Both wording and word meaning contributed to describing reality from DS 
perspective, and constructed groups, facts, concepts, and distinctions.  
Wording: The types of words that were used were words such as, Caliphate, Ahl Al-
Sunna, the distinguished sect, the community of believers to signify superiority. Al-
Kufr (infidelity), Kufr Al-Fe’l (the infidel action) as a complicated restricted filtration 
process. There were also a set of dualities, Islamic rule versus Secular Rule, Shura 
versus Democracy, and ‘Omor Al-Donya’ and ‘Omor Al-Din’ (worldly versus religious 
issues), to compare the opinions of the “self” and the “other”. The use of words such as 
‘Ijtihadi (individual reason), ‘contemporary issues’ that shows dynamism. He also used 
‘Military confrontation’, rather than violence or Jihad to avoid positive or negative 
judgments.    
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Within Jihad, the author discussed “the situation of weakness” associated with patience 
and tolerance with non-believers, who harm Muslims. The relevant concepts to such 
situation were ‘Appease of the infidels’ (Mohadanat Al-Kuffar) used to show the 
possibility of reaching a compromise with non-Muslims in case of Muslims’ weakness. 
In addition, there is also ‘Al-Farar’ (escaping and withdrawing) in case of an eminent 
threat where cost-benefit calculations show that confrontation would not be possible 
(DS are not against Jihad but think that it should be done rationally). The author then 
discussed “the situation of strength” associated with fighting ‘Imams of disbelief’ 
(enemies of Islam), and making Ashab Al-Ketab (Christians, and Jews) pay ‘Al-Jizyah’ 
(tax imposed on non-believers) willingly, where words such as ‘humiliation and 
submissiveness’ were associated with non-believers. 
There is also stress on the word “gradual” that reflects the main method of change for 
DS. Al-Naskh (Abrogation of religious rulings) includes Al-Taqqyod, Al-Bayan, Al-
Takhsis, which meant that applying the rule depends on the situation itself and reality 
determines which stage of Jihad are they (jargons here address specialists and Islamists 
in particular), and they show the flexibility and responsiveness to reality requirements.  
The author also used words such as ‘recklessness’, ‘rush’ leading to ‘corruption’ and 
‘evil’, to describe the attitude of those who adopt a violent militant approach to change. 
He defined Da’awa as Jihad, and provided variations on Jihad, such as Jihad of the self, 
Jihad of the Satan, Jihad of infidels, and Jihad of the hypocrites. Thus, DS is against 
confining Jihad to military confrontation, to ousting rulers, or fighting infidels, 
especially that their definitions of infidelity are very restricted. There is also the use of 
the superlatives ‘most important’, the ‘more important’ and the ‘important’, to show 
that there are priorities in Islamic action, and to stress DS’ gradual approach.  
Finally, education and science were the keywords linking Salafi identity to legal science 
(O’lom Shar’yya), and stressing their ethos as scholars.  
Metaphors are meant to construct reality, and the metaphor is then reflected on the use 
of words and concepts. In this text, there are a number of metaphors, for instance, 
‘Living as a Muslim in a society that does not abide by Islam is like living while 
“catching a burning ember’. This simile is inspired from the Hadith that says; “There 
shall come upon the people a time in which the one who is steadfast upon his religion 
will be like the one holding onto a burning ember.”   
The author also compared democracy to a ‘fetish’ made of Ajwa (dates) that infidels in 
Jahilyya before Islam used to worship and sanctify, but when they are hungry, they just 
eat it. This reflects his view of democracy as contradictory and the fake. Whenever, 
democratic mechanisms go against the interests of the more powerful they easily 
sacrifice it. This simile aims at discrediting democratic claims, and is highly ironic. It 
also brought about expressions such as ‘abortion of democracy by the military’, and ‘the 
democracy that they invented’.  
Another metaphor is ‘Pulling people out of darkness to light’ where deviation from 
Islam is the darkness and Islam is the light. This metaphor is inspired from the first 
verse of Surah Ibrahim in Quran which says; “Alif, Lam, Ra. [This is] a Book which 
We have revealed to you, that you might bring mankind out of darknesses into the light 
by permission of their Lord - to the path of the Exalted in Might, the Praiseworthy”. 
‘The straight path to Allah’ is also a common metaphor, which speaks about a straight 
road to God inspired from verse six in Al-Fatiha the first Surah in Quran; “Guide us to 
the straight path”.  
292 
 
The author also warned from the consequences of inter-Muslim conflicts in the 
metaphor “So that our homes are not transformed into a battlefield” and all the resulting 
wording of Blind Fitna (blind conflict and distress), Nakba (defeat) Masayeb 
(calamities). As well as, the metaphor ‘We do not want to be bitten from the pit 
thousand times’ that was inspired from the Hadith that says; “A believer is not bitten 
from the same pit twice”. This means that Muslims should learn from history, and avoid 
rashness in military confrontations. 
The author also presented an image of the Muslim nation as a body whose heart beats 
are the Islamic resurgence groups. He said that such groups are the aspects of life at the 
time when the Islamic body lost all such aspects. Thus, the extreme criticism to such 
groups and the desire to stop them is like curing the sick person by killing him, or 
stopping his heart. 
Interdiscursivity 
Genre: Journal paper in DS magazine, Sawt Al-Da’awa. 
This paper was reproduced by Barahet Al-Dawarat Al-Shar’yya wal Bohoth Al-Elmyya               
(spacious legal courses and scientific research), Montada Al-Baraha (Al-Baraha forum). 
The fact that it is presented as an academic paper reflects the scientific approach of DS, 
and gives the image of a precise rooting to the definition of ‘change’ that is not limited 
to the DS perspective 
Discourse: The text reflects mainly the Islamists’ discourse for change that asserts that 
the society has deviated and that Islam should be revived in order to reform it. Such 
religious discourse is colonized by a scientific discourse through adopting the same 
textual features (grammar, narrative, metaphor, and organization), structure 
argumentation, and strategies of scientific academic texts.  
The combination of scientific and religious is the innovative aspect of DS discursive 
practice and this could be attributed to the fact that the movement since its early 
beginnings was challenged by the leftist discourse that criticized religion as 
contradicting science, progress, and human rights. In addition, the six founders were 
five doctors and an engineer and their influence was mostly in natural science schools, 
so their scientific background influenced their understanding and representation of 
reality. Moreover, DS sheikhs were always accused of being ignorant non-Azharis, 
where Al-Azhar is the official religious institution in Egypt, however, DS sheikhs were 
keen on joining Al-Azhar and on studying and educating themselves, thus, they 
consider themselves U’lama (scholars), or experts in Islamic teachings, who  provide 
precise ideas and concepts.  
Style: of this text is, written formal, and mostly argumentative. 
Activity type: This text is for the sake of preaching, tutoring, and setting the frame for 
the movement. It is also part of defining DS identity, and approach, and to distinguish it 
from the rest of Islamist movements, through rooting the meaning of ‘change’. 
(This applies to all the following texts). 
Intertextuality 
There is manifest intertextuality within this text in the form of discourse representation 
through referring to Quran, Sunna, Sira, and quotes from the books of the main Salafi 
references such as Ibn Taymmyya, and Al-Albani. This manifest intertextuality 
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confirms DS’ identity, and narrative. There is also an implicit intertextuality reflected in 
the strong influence of such sources on the author’s language, and metaphors. 
 
Text 2: The Pre-requisites of Calling for God, Borhami Book (2010) 
Textual Analysis 
Ethos was exactly like in the article where the author was sending the message of a 
neutral, objective scholar whose main references are Quran and Sunna with the 
understanding of Salaf. In addition, modality used in the book was generally the same as 
in the article, however, the author sometimes used low affinity to stress his neutrality as 
concerns other trends.  
Wording: it was almost the same as in the article except that the author’s voice 
disappeared when it comes to controversial concepts such as ‘submissiveness and 
humiliation’ associated with non-Muslims, and about jezyah. In general, he did not 
focus on confrontational concepts. He also used classical Arabic expressions and words 
that are not familiar to average readers. Word meaning: the book that came almost 18 
years after the article kept the same content and definitions without any changes, yet the 
number of academic definitions increased, and they covered both linguistic, and shari’a 
legal definitions. Using excessive technical definitions and jargon, gives the text a 
scientific nature, and makes it more of a specialists’ text if compared to the simple 
concise foundational article, which might explain why the article is a main reference, 
particularly in training and educational courses. 
Like in the article, cohesive makers were clear and they showed causal, explanatory, 
extension, and conditional functions. In addition, there was the numbering that gave it a 
scientific outlook.  
Theme and transitivity: it was almost the same as in the foundational article in the sense 
of the dominance of nominalization associated with definitions and stating facts. As 
regards metaphor, the author again used the image of comparing democracy to the fetish 
made of dates that infidels eat when hungry, which sums up his perception of the 
democratic system. Yet, metaphor was not significant at this version. 
Interdiscursivity 
Genre: this version came in sections of a chapter in a book published in 2010.  
Discourse that the book built upon was again the main Islamist discourse about change 
colonized by the scientific discourse. However, due to interactions and discursive 
conflicts, this version could also be considered a counter-discourse to that of Muslim 
Brotherhood, militants, and seculars, since its argumentation is mainly directed towards 
specific parts of such discourses. This makes this new version of the article a product of 
the historical development of DS within the Egyptian context. 
Style in this version is a mix of formal written style, using classical Arabic, and informal 
conversational style using Egyptian accent and joking in order to clarify some points, 
engage the reader, and link the text to the Egyptian reality. It is also generally 






This version depended heavily on quotes from Quran, Sunna, classical Islamic books of 
Salaf and prominent scholars, and poetry, especially when the author tried to avoid 
confrontation, where his voice disappears and is replaced by a quote from a strong 
Islamic reference about controversial issues or concepts. There was also ironic 
representation of MB and seculars’ discourse. 
 
Text 3: Salafism and Approaches to Change-Political Participations, Borhami 
Lecture (2009) 
Textual Analysis 
Ethos: in the 2009 lecture again reflected the identity of scholars, keen on legal 
sciences, where the lecture took place in a class setting, in which the sheikh is the tutor, 
and the audience are more of students learning from him, in an asymmetrical 
relationship, despite that it did not seem actually to be a class or a training course. 
Borhami acted as the mentor who educates his followers and this was even clearer in the 
questions and answers part when the floor was opened. However, the audience was not 
entirely Salafis, since at a point, a phone rang with female singer ringtone, and sheikh 
Borhami just stopped talking and said “God forbids”, but he did not get out of his way 
to comment on this, since denying such act is the common sense. It is highly expected 
that in view of the movement state relationship discussed in chapter 3, there could be 
security persons among the audience as well.  
There is also a sense of superiority through associating the “We” with noble duties and 
righteous understanding and the “other” by sarcasm and wonder. In this lecture, sarcasm 
came through his voice tone, laughing and making the audience laugh, giving funny 
examples, and exaggeration. He also showed wonder and sometimes shock through 
opening the letters and raising his voice. However, he was not shouting or acting 
dramatically like other sheikhs, but kept a regular voice tone, yet was not monotonous, 
which reflected his capability of addressing the public.  
Modality: was characterized by general high affinity, like the previous versions of the 
article. Especially, when it is based on facts from Quran Sunna or Salaf and prominent 
scholars, and this was through the use of assertive verbs, strong negation or emphasis 
tools, and the use of present tense that implies continuity and gives an impression that 
what was mentioned is a fact, in addition to  issuing clear assertive statements. In this 
lecture, there was also the use of questions to attract attention and to make the audience 
think of the answer until the scholar gives them the way out. There were also negative 
questions directing the audience to reject and disrespect some aspects and ideas, or to 
show wonder and sarcasm. In addition, there were parts where the lecturer associated 
low affinity verbs with the opponents’ understanding of reality, and their definitions of 
concepts, to show scepticism about their intentions and visions.  
Wording: One of the striking aspects of the lecture when it comes to wording was that 
Borhami associated Jews, polytheists and even Christians to the expressions enemies of 
humanity, shutting off the light of God, aberration, delusion, sins, and said that they do 
not promote virtue or prevent vice (for him this duty is only linked to Muslims). 
However, he was not as open about such wording in his written texts.  
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Moreover, he maintained the concept “military confrontation approach”, instead of 
violence, terrorism, or even the concept of Jihadis, despite of the dominant use of such 
terms in media and academia. This means he avoided normative judgments about this 
trend whether negative or positive, despite of the fact that after the discussion, he 
rejected that militant approach and its arguments. Military confrontation as a trend is 
later associated with loss of lives, money, and violation of religious teachings. In 
addition, true Jihad is limited by restrictions and regulations. 
There were also keywords and expressions that signified DS’ approach, such as; the 
path of prophets, the full Muslim personality, worshiping God as if we see him, charity 
is the fruit of charity, the formation of the Muslim personality is the first priority of all 
priorities in Islamic action, the community of believers, sufficiency duties, the Islamic 
approach, cooperation for goodness and piety, Change of the self, change of the family, 
friends, relatives, and neighbors, that come first, Cooperation to spread God’s religion 
(he uses God’s religion to signify that Islam is the only religion of God), the balances of 
benefit versus corruption (cost-benefit analysis), capability and balance of power, and 
shari’a’ rules as concerns blood and money.  
He also rejected a set of aspects such as, Pseudo-religion associated with slogans, 
banners, appearances, and deviation.  In addition to “Elections” that he described as 
“seasons”, in order to show how the processes of elections and democracy are 
temporary, and sometimes become fashionable, but are not as authentic and constant as 
the religious priorities. He associated such processes with the imposition of “alien 
concepts and processes” on Muslims, to rob them of their will, and to spread a certain 
discourse, or discipline to which they become subject to and preoccupied with. 
Moreover, he linked elections to the increase of calamity, violations, and concessions as 
concerns Islamic commitments, and linked democracy and western slogans to 
malignance.  
Moreover, he rejected words such as Individual religiosity (in private sphere), and 
defining religion as rituals. For him concessions are linked to inferiority and submission 
of those who mainly target the parliament.  
The lecture also presented a set of dualities, such as secular versus Islamic, democracy 
versus shura, shari’a as the main source of all legislation versus the nation/people as the 
source of authorities.  
He also linked the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice to capability, education 
and learning legal sciences, and cost-benefit analysis.  
Secularism and equality of religions were associated with ignorance (Jahelyya).  
In his criticism to some practices in Egypt, he said “in some countries”, but the content 
of his comment implied that it is Egypt; however, he is avoiding a direct criticism. Also, 
when he criticized MB, he said “Those who say” and he did not say whom exactly, but 
it could be understood that it is MB, since it was the only group that managed to enter 
the parliament, and was known for a soft discourse about Christians to gain their votes, 
or at least to maintain a positive profile.  
He also used the expression ‘God forbids’ as a comment on those who say that they 
would vote for non-Muslims in some constituencies.  
In a technical definition parliament membership was linked to the concept of 
guardianship, rather than agency.  
He was also straightforward about putting women, commoners or the average man of 
the street, and non-Muslims or infidel in the same category as concerns parliament 
membership and political rights.  
296 
 
Also reasons for rejecting women participation were linked to the fact that they might 
constitute a majority, they might become a “point of focus”, and the possibility of “their 
visibility”, “interacting with foreign men”, and “putting their photos on banners”. 
 
Word meaning:  
This lecture provided a number of definitions from Borhami and DS’ point of view to 
various concepts within both the Islamists, as well as, the secular western thought.  
In this regard, Borhami’s definition of the military confrontation approach stated that 
such trend neither differentiates between Muslim majority and infidel majority societies, 
nor take into account treaties and peace agreements or covenants with non-believers in 
some societies (this might explain the DS’ smooth relationship with Christians, for 
example, despite classifying them  as infidels). In addition, such trend see military 
confrontation as the only means of change which is rejected by DS as false, and 
contradicting with Prophet Mohamed’s teachings, behavior, and policy choices. In this 
regard, he also defined Jihad by negation: ‘it is not disrespect of the sanctity of blood 
and wealth, or any other sanctities’.  
As concerns democracy and elections, Borhami said that they are all imported from the 
west and are irrelevant to the Islamic thought. He rooted them back to the French 
revolution slogans that were for him: Freedom, democracy and equality. He ignored 
fraternity that is more relevant in his mindset to Islam, and to the way he manages 
relationships with fellow Muslims. He also wanted to inject the word democracy among 
western alien slogans to prove his point.  
In this regards he presented the definitions of these three western slogans as follows: 
Freedom: is that people are free to do whatever they want. 
Democracy: is the system where the nation is the source of all authorities legislative, 
executive, and judiciary, and that men of religion and religion itself have no say. Those 
who want to be religious should do that in their private life, but the social system and 
the life of people are formed according to their own will and to the majority rule.  
Equality should be among all people in everything and that referred originally to 
equality of religions. However, Borhami sees that the west never applied equality, and 
there is always discrimination based on race, color, and religion. He said, “God knows 
the degree of fanaticism in such societies that influences all people”.  
On the contrary to Military or parliamentary approaches, DS focuses on developing the 
Muslim personality whose aspects are belief in God, his angels, prophets holy books, 
the dooms day, and fate and destiny. Thus, DS’ approach matches the prophets’ 
educational methods. 
He defined the prophets’ method of education as delivering religious teachings in 
details and gradually away from apparent commitment, formalities and emotional 
attachments to certain outfits or appearances. In this definition, he is warning of 
emotional followers who study religion superficially and stick to appearance of Salafis 
without real in-depth understanding of Islam.  
In this lecture, he also discussed Islamic systems and defined them as: 
1- Promoting virtue and preventing vice system that decides what is right and what 
is wrong. 
2- War and peace systems that decides agreements, treaties, war, targets of war, 
who is the enemy? When do agreements take place? Moreover, what to 
negotiate and issue agreements about? 
3- Conflict resolution and judiciary system that provides rules and penalties. 
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4- The social system that manages gender and class relationships, the relationship 
between the ruled and the ruling elite.  
5- The political system puts the rules for choosing the leader, and his criteria, and 
the targets of the society that should be fulfilled. 
6- The Islamic economic and the financial system specified in Quran and Sunna to 
avoid usury and all other financial violations. 
Transitivity: 
God is generally the main actor/agent. He moves between nominalization, actions, and 
cognitive processes where the main agents are the “We” referring to Muslims or DS, 
“you” referring to the audience, and ‘prophets’ who are the ideal that should be 
followed. Despite of the fact that there was significant use of nominalization associated 
with definitions in this text, it is not as much as in the written texts.  
Cohesion:  
The order of Jews then polytheists and Christians reflected linguistic influence of Quran 
despite that it did not give the same meaning as the Quarnic text. 
There are also clear cohesive markers for comparison, causality, emphasis, elaboration, 
extension, order of priorities. 
To move from an idea to the other he uses the verb “we say” to engage the audience.  
Metaphor: 
- Comparing the process of learning religion details to the preparation for exams 
that cannot be passed by reciting titles, or by a book that cannot be understood 
only through its table of contents. Such metaphors go with the academic nature 
of DS and its followers, and with Borhami who was responsible for the 
university and students’ activities within the movement.  
- Comparing the process of da’awa and change to cultivating a seed that grows 
and is cared for and purified continuously until it flourishes and becomes a tree 
that people enjoy its shadows. This metaphor is to stress the importance of 
gradual change and of persistence and patience while spreading da’awa and 
changing the society.  
- Comparing politics to a game with well known limitations and ends. In this he 
takes politics lightly and says that the results of elections and of the whole 
process is pre-decided and is not transparent or fair, and this is followed up with 
metaphors such as: 
“Limitations put a ceiling on Islamists’ ambitions”, and “the wrestling or 
conflict arena of politics”.  
- Comparing the legitimacy of the political systems, and their image by a painting 
where elections are complementary touches, or frills, which signifies how he 
thinks that elections are marginal and are just a formality.  
- Finally, he used the simile of the “date fetish” again to describe democracy, and 
how it could be easily sacrificed to get rid of Islamists. 
 
Interdiscursivity 
Genre: this is a public lecture delivered in 2009.  
Discourse: this text again built upon the Islamic discourse for change, the scientific 
religious discourse, as well as responding to discourses of Muslim Brotherhood, 
militants, and seculars. 
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The style: is spoken, mix of formal classical Arabic and a conversational style using 
Egyptian accent and joking, besides mentioning examples from reality. The style of the 
lecture is also more of tutoring through repetition, questions and answers form, and 
analogies. The lecturer’s voice becomes sarcastic when he quotes western values and 
ideas, or those of Islamists in counter-movements, especially when he speaks about MB 
without mentioning them. He opens the letters and raises his voice slightly to stress or 
exaggerate.  
Intertextuality 
There was explicit representation of quotes from Quran verses, Sunna, Salaf and 
prominent scholars’ contributions. However, the quotes from holy texts were not as 
oftenly used as in the written texts, yet the influence of the language and wording of 
Quran and Sunna were clear throughout the lecture. In addition to religious texts, in this 
lecture and for the first time, Borhami quoted articles from the Egyptian 1971 
constitution, and its amendments in 1980, from articles 86, 17, 99, and 2. 
 
Text 4: Series of lectures on Reform: No. 19, 20, 21, and 22, Al-Shahhat (2010) 
Textual Analysis 
In Al-Shahhat lectures, ethos and modality were the same as in the previous versions of 
the text.  
Transitivity:  
Relational processes and actions, dominated the lectures where the main agent is mostly 
the “We” that refers to the lecturer and the audience, and this is to engage them, create 
solidarity, to assure them that there is mutual understanding, and to avoid subjectivity.  
There is also a balance between nominalization and verbal sentences. This use of verbal 
sentences and actions signifies a positive mood of being active and in control, and 
matches Al-Shahhat straightforward expression of ideas and positions.  
Connectives: 
Beside comparisons and elaborations, the lecture mostly used numbering and listing 
which added to the systematic nature of Al-Shahhat lectures.  
Metaphor:  
Defending collective action and describing it as a cosmic law, Al-Shahhat compared the 
individual effort to a pond, while collective action and the formation of a group as the 
water of the river in its strength and usefulness. Meanwhile, he referred to the Egyptian-
African Nile river problems, which were discussed in media at that time, which added 
to the lively mood of his lectures.  
Word Meaning: 
- Al-Shahhat linked da’awa to being public, open and peaceful, rather than secret 
or underground. 
- Empowerment for him is a stage in social change but not at step in the DS’ 
methodology, since it cannot be brought about through planning and milestones, 
it is a grant from God who decides when and how, and da’awa is not a 
commercial or administrative process that depends on plans and time frames.  
- He associated the parliamentary trend with lubricity, compromises, concessions, 
and transforming fixed religious constants into relative issues subject to 
difference in opinion. For instance, flexibility with loyalty and enmity, 
governance of God, and artistic production (songs and literature).  
299 
 
- The parliamentary approach is linked to concessions through either recognizing 
sins but promising they would not use their power to ban them once in 
parliament, or through redefining sins, in order to gain votes. 
- For the first time, Al-Shahhat mentioned the concept of “Double standard 
discourse”, and linked it to the parliamentary approach that is clearly represented 
in MB. He said that proponents of such discourse deliver a certain message to 
their followers and another to the public, and since technology made it 
impossible to keep two contradicting discourses, followers of the parliamentary 
trend started to unify their discourse through using the most mild and softest 
religious discourses even with their followers. For him this harms da’awa and 
dilutes it. Whereas DS absolutely refuses double standard discourse, and is 
rather associated with precise religious rules, transparency, and openness. 
- Al-Shahhat provided a definition of the education of the individual in the 
various approaches to change: 
For the Military confrontation approach: they select aggressive violent individuals who 
are used to arms, crimes, sins, and who are alienated. Such type of persons might be 
injected with a religious emotion, and could be easily influenced if shown some respect. 
Consequently, they become apparently religious without understanding or studying 
Islam, and are used in military confrontations under an Islamic banner. This leads to 
dramatic repercussions, whereas Jihad actually requires balanced Muslim personalities. 
For the individual da’awa approach it does not invest in dialogue and negotiation skills 
of its individual followers, or carry out da’awa activities, thus, the aspects of the 
Muslim individual for them are not complete, and they focus on belief, rituals, morals, 
or Fiqh. 
The parliamentary approach selects individuals based on their capabilities to gain 
power, and practice politics, and prepares them mainly to be able to enter the 
parliament. 
Unlike the abovementioned approaches, DS works on finding the individual that 
becomes the nucleus of the Muslim community, thus, the DS individual Islamic 
education, and preparation process should be precise and comprehensive. Again, there is 
a sense of superiority in perceiving DS and its methodology in comparison to other 
approaches even though the starting point was to show respect and neutral stance as 
concerns all trends.  
Wording:  
Al-Shahhat choice of wording reflected a more confident and straightforward tone: 
- He rejects describing Islamic resurgence as an extremist Wahhabi thought, 
versus the moderate Asha’ari thought of Al-Azhar, and he used “Islamic 
resurgence” instead of Salafis or Islamists.  
- People of the book, or Christians and Jews are polytheists.  
- Monotheism is the base on which everything in da’awa is built.  
- Islamic shari’a’ is the one from God and is the one that achieves people’s 
interests. 
- Linking Sufism to hysteria, superstitions, and polytheism of cemeteries.  
- Linking seculars to claims, that Quran is made by humans. 
- Defining Muslims’ reference as only Quran and Sunna with the understanding of 
the pious predecessors of the nation, and not the United Nations documents and 
agreements or the secular thought or human rights.  
- He highlighted the process of the Self- purification, ritual and moral wise.  
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- He said that all Islamic trends share the same concepts, but with different 
definitions and targets.  
- He also mentioned the concept of “Safety visa in countries of infidels”, which 
means that once such countries grant a visa, then it is a safety and security 
agreement that a Muslim should respect once they arrive in these countries. This 
concept is an argument against those who allow terrorist attacks in western 
countries since they are infidel. 
 
Interdiscursivity 
Genre: the texts analyzed are part of a series of lectures delivered on weekly basis to 
DS’ followers, with no details about whether they are open to outsiders. 
Discourse: these lectures drew upon the scientific religious discourse, as well as 
responding to discourses of counter-movements and other social groups. 
Style: formal spoken but is very similar in structure, wording and organization to 
written texts, and there is no joking or sarcasm, but rather a serious tone confined to 
formal Arabic. It is also mostly argumentative, and tutorial, however, the floor was not 
open for discussion, or at least that was not recorded in any of the 22 lectures. 
Intertextuality 
Al-Shahhat is closer to application and operationalization of the DS’ method of change 
and of linking DS’ thought to reality, rather than rooting and establishing the idea like 
Borhami.  
Thus, Al-Shahhat did not focus on using quotes from Quran, Sunna, and Salaf and 
prominent scholars’ texts to prove each and every point and definition as in Borhami’s 
texts, but rather depended on the use of logic, examples from daily life, and adopted 
media narratives about the various issues. 
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APPENDIX (2): PRE-REVOLUTION TEXTS ON SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
CHANGE 
Among DS’ contributions as regards the 2000s rising wave of protest was Sheikh Said 
Abdel A’zim’s175 lecture (2008) on April 6th, where he insisted on delivering a lecture 
on that day in opposition to the call for the first general civil strike under Mubarak’s 
regime. Abdel A’zim’s argumentation against striking was based on DS’ Salafi Manhaj 
of providing evidence from Quran and Sunna, which he said they both should be the 
bottom line in assessing the situation. The fact that he frames strikes of April 6th 2008 
around DS’ Manhaj result in a number of observations. First, he dismisses strikes as a 
means of expression, since hunger strikes are suicidal, and because, weighing the 
consequences of civil strikes, it would lead to more harm and evils, than to benefits, and 
are thus not accepted by Islam. Second, he indicated that there is a problem in the 
society’s value system and priorities, since people would strike and protest for 
materialistic basic needs while they never think of protesting for condemning vice, sins 
and religious transgressions, which he gives priority over economic basic needs. Third, 
in extension to weighing consequences of strikes, he suggested that an alternative 
method based on spiritual method, and charity and social solidarity would be more 
efficient than protest and without the risks associated with them. He also discredited the 
general coordinator of Kefaya movement George Isaac; however while emphasizing 
that his criticism is not on sectarian basis but basically because he does not approve of 
Kefaya’s method for social change. For him, opinion leaders should be aware of Shari’a 
and Islamic rule to be able to direct people in the right path.  
In fact, the religious representation of reality, of defining concepts, and of judging 
events and priorities, prevailed in the event of April 6th strike, in addition to DS’ tools of 
cost-benefit analysis, and calling in conspiracy, which all constituted the main features 
of DS’ discourse and continued to guide its framing processes at this stage. In contrast 
to the MB-seculars rapprochement that took place in different cycles (Shehata, 2010), 
Abdel A’zim discredited the secular movements, and said that ‘communists’ (the 
leftists) could exploit protesters and raise slogans that defy people’s faith and which are 
not representative of them. Uncommonly, this text included personalization, as Abdel 
A’zim named a certain politician and movement, whereas in DS’ foundational texts the 
focus typically was on actions not on persons.  
According to DS’ narrative (Abd El-A'al, 2010), such anti-protest position made secular 
movements and media accuse them of supporting Mubarak’s regime and his power 
inheritance project, particularly in view of Abdel A’zim’s (2009 ) article, titled “The 
Religious Ruling on Power Inheritance.” Sheikh Abdel A’zim’s position on the doubts 
about Mubarak’s intentions to pass on power to his son was that all secular powers, 
whom he treated as one bloc, use democratic slogans and concepts in their take on the 
power inheritance issue, and are concerned about the constitutional amendments, while 
disregarding the Islamic teachings and Shari’a rulings as concerns the governor and his 
criteria. In his argumentation, he thinks that such secular opposition movements are 
                                                             
175 Sheikh Abdel A’zim is one of DS’ six founders. 
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fighting the wrong battle because of the absence of the religious component in their 
calls for social and political change. However, this general comment on seculars’ 
activism became more specific when Abdel A’zim (2010a) criticized the “The National 
Association for Change”, and its prominent leader Mohamed Al-Baradei for the absence 
of the religious content in their definition of social and political change and objectives, 
whereas shari’a should guide any foreseen change, otherwise the change would be to the 
worst. Thus, for him, democracy and liberal values cannot replace Quran and Sunna. In 
this article, DS’ concern about the seculars’ calls to cancel article (2) of the Constitution 
became clearest. In addition, DS’ indirect criticism to MB continued on basis of 
departing from da’awa, and MB’s choice to keep silent as concerns shari’a in order to 
gain popularity, whereas “what is right should be accepted and who defies it should be 
counter-argued whoever he is” (Abdel Azim, 2010a). Thus, the difference between DS 
and seculars and MB opposition alliance was mainly on the absence of the religious 
component, not on change in principle.  
According to Abdel A’zim (2010b), despite his repeated message that his reservation on 
the secular movements for change is on the definition and methods of “change”, his 
comments were represented in media as a Salafi approval of passing on power to the 
Mubarak’s son. In reaction to media misinterpretation of DS’ position, Abdel A’zim 
criticized the secular media in a lecture (2010b) and stressed that he never endorsed 
power inheritance, and that the main issue that he defends is the rule of God, respect for 
Shari’a, and the Islamic identity, against the secular calls for an ancient Egyptian 
identity and an Egyptian Islam. In fact, Shari’a and the Islamic identity of Egypt were 
the key concepts of DS that continued to guide their framing processes in the following 
situations, particularly during the revolution as will be discussed in the next section.  
According to DS’ narrative (Abd El-A'al, 2010), this media imposition of DS’ discourse 
reflected the polarization of the society at that time, when DS had to take sides, so 
either they join the opposition alliance  unconditionally, or else are considered part of 
Mubarak’s camp. Such problematic situation continued to shape DS’ image and 
relationship with the other political powers during and after the Revolution, as will be 
shown in the coming sections. In this regard, an article on Tariq Al-Salaf website 
questioned whether Salafis are an obstacle to reform (Abd El-A'al, 2010) and 
emphasized that the main difference between Salafis and the rest of the political powers 
demanding change, is that such groups call for a change void of any religious rulings or 
content. Moreover, they are not against Mohammed Al-Baradei, the icon of the 
Egyptian movement for change, on personal grounds, but because of particular 
ideological and religious differences and issues. Such differences have to do with his 
secular orientation, the willingness to compromise and rethink article (2) of the 
Constitution, his visits to the church to attend the Christian ceremonial prayers, the 
support immigrant Copts accord to him, and his relationship with the USA and the West 
(Abd El A’al, 2010). However, it is impossible that DS opts to side with the secular 
project of Mubarak against him. In addition, this article revealed a sense of victimization 
that is manifested in stating the exclusionary policies of Mubarak’s regime that 
discriminate against Salafis and marginalize them, and even oppress them. Framing the 
national debate on social and political change as polarized suggests again that DS is 
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subject to misunderstanding and judgments on one hand, and on the other it indicates 
that it provides a counter-discourse or an alternative path for social change. In this 
respect, this article (Abd El-A'al, 2010) reproduced DS’ three levels Manhaj for social 
change, as in the foundational texts.  
In the light of DS’ reservations on the “concept of change” introduced by the secular 
movements, and the rising number of protests in the period from 2004 to 2010, DS’ 
position on protest as means of change and of expression was framed as a religious 
ruling, or fatwa, expressed in Al-Shahhat’s comprehensive article titled “Waqfa Ma’a 
Al-Mozaharat (A Pause to Discuss Protests)” (Al-Shahhat, 2009). This article starts off 
with a presentation of the various religious approaches to this issue, and then expresses 
DS’ position, which considers protest as legitimate as long as it meets the religious 
standards, and are for legitimate purposes. Therefore, since protest is neither clearly 
prohibited, nor allowed, the decision to protest should be subject to respect of shari’a, in 
addition to cost-benefit analysis. But, in reality, protests are full of violations, even if 
unintentional. Meanwhile, there are alternatives to protests for the purposes of spreading 
the word. In addition, applying pressures on the government through protest is neither 
feasible nor acceptable in the third world. Such religious ruling, is based on shari’a 
restrictions and cost-benefit analysis, it is also context-based, thus, reflecting DS’ 
primarily religious nature, rationality and realism. In addition, Borhami answered a 
question concerning protest and its religious ruling, where he emphasized the same 
position, and clearly mentioned that DS has chosen the position of non-participation in 
demonstrations and protests (Borhami, 2010b).  
Nevertheless, DS supported and participated in the protests against the church’s 
pressures on Christian women who convert to Islam, where the most famous case was 
that of Kamilia Shehata in 2010 (Spencer, 2011). As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
Christians were associated with polytheism, and conspiracy, and were framed as part of 
the enemies of humanity in the DS’ texts analyzed. Also, the issue of loyalty and enmity 
that implies loyalty to God and enmity or denouncement of polytheism and kufr had its 
implications on the relationship with Christians (Meijer, 2009). In line with such view 
of the other and of this major issue in DS’ discourse, it is expected that in Kamilia 
Shehata crisis, DS adopts a confrontational discourse, saying that “every bishop makes 
up part of the bible, and that Muslims are generous in dealing with their opponents to 
the extent that they made such opponents attack Muslims… Thus, taking Muslims 
lightly requires a strong position and reaction to show that they are capable of defending 
their religion.” This was not only because of Christian converts, but also according to 
the Salafi narrative in reaction to Bishop Bishoy’s harsh criticism to Islam and Quran, 
and his statement that “Muslims are guests in Egypt” 176 . DS’ leaders expressed 
opposition to the church practices, and to the perceived government support for them. In 
this occasion, they announced that they are determined to what they called “rescuing, 
and backing” the Christian women who converted to Islam but were under pressures 
from the church to return to Christianity (The captive sister Kamilia Shehata, 2010a). 
Therefore, DS’ senior sheikhs supported peaceful protests as a means of expression for 
                                                             
176 Which was an unprecedented escalation on part of the Christian figures against Muslims. 
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the first time. However, sheikhs stressed that participants in the protests should abide by 
the religious rulings (The captive sister Kamilia Shehata, 2010b). They were also 
critical of the fellow Muslim sheikhs who did not take a firm a position on the issue of 
converts to Islam, and who were afraid to express Muslims’ anger (The captive sister 
Kamilia Shehata, 2010b, AnaAlsalafi, 2010)177. Such angry reaction went on for around 
three months before the bombing of the Two Saints Church in Alexandria on the new 
year’s eve prayers of 2011 (AhramOnline, 2012). Following the bombing, and in line 
with their anti-violence approach, DS’ leaders issued a statement in which they 
condemned the attack, on the basis that such attacks defy the Islamic approach based on 
da’awa and advice, would also lead to the spread of evils in the whole society, open the 
door for accusing Islam of violence and bloodshed, and would only serve enemies of 
Islam178 (statements, 2011). Nevertheless, despite their non-violent history, Sayed Bilal, 
one of DS’ young members, was arrested as a suspect, and was tortured to death 
(AhramOnline, 2012). 
Nevertheless, the torture of Bilal was framed as a mere incident of injustice (Borhami, 
2011g), that requires caution in dealing with, since losing one person does not justify 
the sacrifice of more DS’ members for revenge. Thus, members were asked to be patient 
like “Moses and his followers,” and that the action that will be taken is going to be 
through legal channels, for “courage does not mean taking uncalculated steps,” and that 
actions should be based on “capability and strength.” Also among the actions that 
should be taken are prayers, patience and zikr (prayers), since abandoning many of 
God’s orders is the reason behind calamities (Borhami, 2011g).  
Al-Moqaddem’s (2011b) analysis of the situation after the church bombings aimed at 
calling the attention of DS’ members to the threats jeopardizing the Islamic identity and 
the rights of the Muslim majority in Egypt. In this case, DS’ senior sheikh adhered to 
DS’ religious cause, and was keen on focusing their discourse and efforts to serve their 
religious concerns, rather than being dragged to other issues, which are secondary from 
DS’ leaders’ point of view. Meanwhile, he referred to Christian public figures in order 
to emphasize the conspiracy explanation of the church bombing. He also stressed that 
“it was a tragic event and that any rational person should sympathize with the victims, 
however, there is much exaggeration in people’s reaction to the bombings, as if it is the 
Holocaust, for which we should all atone, while we are not responsible” (Al-
Moqaddem, 2011b). He hinted on the positive discrimination to Christians and to the 
imbalance in dealing with the Muslim majority. In this regard, he believes that there is 
positive discrimination towards minorities, and that they are being “spoiled” while 
ignoring the demands of the majority under Western pressures, and because of the 
                                                             
177 One of the occasions in which DS’ leaders expressed their opinions in Kamilia Shehata issue in Sheikh Mahmoud 
Abdel Hamid’s daughter’s wedding, for weddings and funerals were among occasions that DS’ sheikhs use to deliver 
their speeches away from permissions and state restrictions (int. Nasr, 2013).  
178 DS’ statement reminded of the centuries long Egyptian Muslims and Christians coexistence, and the tolerance and 
security that prevailed, despite of the different beliefs, except for rare incidents of violence, that could be easily 
understood using a “scientific objective and fair treatment” to each crisis. DS also condemned calls for foreign 
intervention in Egyptian affairs and considered it a justification to attack Muslims’ lives, money, and mosques. In 
addition, they prayed that God protects Egypt from all conspiracies that aim at spreading fitna (sedition), and 
threatens its stability 
305 
 
“rumors that the Copts in diaspora spread about the sufferings of Christians in Egypt, 
while this totally defies the Egyptian reality”. Due to such state choices and minority 
policy, Al-Moqaddem expressed concern about “Egyptian Islamic identity”. In this 
regard, he mentioned that Western countries defend their identities through, for 
instance, banning of Azan, and through unjustifiable intervention in designing the 
architecture of mosques. Such acts are acceptable for Al-Moqaddem, since they protect 
the belief of the majority in Western nations; however, he demands the same 
understanding to be applied in Egypt, which has the right to protect the identity of its 
majority as well. Similarly, he questioned the protection of Muslims in Germany, for 
instance, when Marwa Al-Sherbiny, an Egyptian Muslim citizen was stabbed, and then 
her husband was stabbed in the court while following up her case. He also asked about 
whether the US as a colonizer was capable of protecting Churches in Iraq (Al-
Moqaddem, 2011a).  
Meanwhile, he clarified that exaggerated reactions to the church bombings only lead to 
fanaticism. Moreover, he said that “calculated reactions and thinking of the 
consequences of their choices is not cowardice”, and that “tolerance with people of the 
book is out of question and it is a strategy not a tactic” (Al-Moqaddem, 2011b).  
306 
 
APPENDIX 3: THE CONCEPT OF REVOLUTION IN DS’ DISCOURSE: CDA 
OF JANUARY 2011 REVOLUTION TEXTS 
The analysis of DS’ texts during January 2011 Revolution reflected that DS’ leaders 
maintained their reservations on protest. On January 21st, 2011, when there was a direct 
question on Ana Al-Salafi site about the religious judgement of participation in the 
planned January 25th protests, the reply indicated that DS’ senior sheikhs see that DS’ 
members should not participate in January 25th protests. According to the sheikhs, this 
decision came out of their feeling of responsibility and out of keen commitment to the 
prerequisites of Egypt’s security in such tough period, and in order to thwart the plots of 
enemies propagating the spread of “fitna” (AnaAlsalafi, 2011c). On January 26th, 
following the break of protests, Borhami (2011e), in an article, warned against 
bloodshed as a major sin, which triggers rage and sets things out of order, especially in 
absence of an aware leadership. In addition, he addressed the decision-makers, requiring 
them to take prompt and effective actions to contain people’s growing anger, rather than 
focusing on media propaganda, or resorting to violence. He advised the nation to avoid 
bloodshed, and to safeguard lives and property.  
DS’ statements that followed adhered to the movement’s position of addressing security 
concerns, particularly after January 28th violent clashes between the police and 
protesters (AnaAlsalafi, 2011h, AnaAlsalafi, 2011j). Such clashes ended up by the 
withdrawal of the police from the streets, which witnessed the spread of looting and 
plunder, while protesters sat fire to the headquarters of the ruling party. Then, military 
troops were deployed to keep security, and a curfew was announced (Reuters, 2012).  
 
CDA of January 2011 Revolution DS’ Texts: 
Textual analysis: 
Amidst the ambiguous situation that prevailed in the Egyptian scene, before, and after 
2011 Revolution, DS’ texts reflected a sense of high affinity, and decisiveness as 
regards their choices and evaluation of the situation. Such decisiveness suggests that, 
DS had a developed position on such situations. In addition, all DS’ texts stated the 
same reservations on protest as introduced in the foundational texts on change, they 
used the same decision making approach, and they insisted on their position even after 
the success of protests in toppling Mubarak. Such observations might imply that their 
decision of nonparticipation was not extemporaneous, but could reflect their vision on 
means of change formed over the movement’s history. Such high affinity was revealed 
in clear commands, modal verbs, and absolute prohibition. For instance, “do not take 
individual actions,” “the Muslims should all carry out their duty,” “you are required 
to…,” “you must,” “it is not possible,” “we see that we should not participate in January 
25th protests, sheikhs’ take on protest is clear-cut, and the situation in Egypt is different 
from that in Tunisia.” Thus, the decision to abstain was not optional or left to followers’ 
choices, but was one of the definite issues.  
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In addition, DS’ ethos throughout the texts showed that they feel victimized, and 
oppressed, and revealed their grievances under Mubarak’s regime. Their feeling of 
victimization under Mubarak was clear in expressions such as “defamation campaigns,” 
“injustice,” “being subject to accusations,” and the “absence of the rule of God 
(applying Shari’a).” Yet, with all these grievances, they justify boycotting protests by 
their “patriotism” and “responsibility towards the country.” Thus, such grievances did 
not change their position on protest, that was in their wording and word meaning, linked 
to “Fitna,” “threatening security,” the “greatest harm,” the “targets of the enemies 
(conspiracy),” “looting and plunder,” “chaos,” “destruction of properties,” and 
“attacking people”. On the contrary, they expressed their method of change clearly, that 
is “Da’awa in the best manner,” as the religious judgment states “God ordered believers 
to call for Him peacefully and patiently without harming anybody or causing more 
losses.” This was directed to DS’ members abroad as well, since some of them have 
shown support to the protests. Therefore, the religious judgement advised them to 
follow the consensus of the sheikhs, particularly, when they are away from the reality in 
Egypt.  
Borhami also in his article stressed that change should start by the “individual,” and that 
“each should start by changing himself,” since this would be the way out of people’s 
problems and complaints. In this respect, he mentioned the verse 96 of surat Al-A’raaf 
“And if only the people of the cities had believed and feared Allah, We would have 
opened upon them blessings from the heaven and the earth; but they denied [the 
messengers], so We seized them for what they were earning." In DS’ Alexandria 
conference on February 8th 2011, there was a manifest representation of Quranic verses 
that calls for change that starts by reforming “individual manners” and by “repentance,” 
as the revolution for them signified distress. For instance, the verse 43 of Surat Al-
Ana’am: "Why then did they not entreat when Our distress came to them? But their 
hearts were hard, and Satan made all that they used to do seem fair unto them," and 
verse 11 of Surat Al-Ra’ad: “For each one are successive [angels] before and behind 
him who protect him by the decree of Allah. Indeed, Allah will not change the condition 
of a people until they change what is in themselves. And when Allah intends for a people 
ill, there is no repelling it. And there is not for them besides Him any patron.” 
In this regard, DS’ first statements after the breakout of protests revealed special interest 
in the individual whether his security, or basic needs. This could be understood in the 
light of the abovementioned DS’ adherence to its means of change, and the fact that the 
individual represents the first level in DS’ methodology of change. Since, according to 
DS method discussed in Chapter 4, reforming individuals should be the starting point of 
a wider social change, and this cannot be achieved without maintaining the appropriate 
climate for propagating da’awa. Such concerns contradicted the calls for protests from a 
DS point of view. Therefore, statement (1) on January 29th, and statement (2) on 
January 31st, did not discuss the demands of the protesters or their legitimacy, but rather 
focused on the fear of “fitna” leading to bloodshed and chaos; thus, threatening people’s 
security. These statements suggested an action plan based on forming groups to fight 
against looting and plunder, to organize traffic and to support the army in securing the 
country. They also called for avoiding the discussion of controversial issues that might 
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stir conflict among people. Moreover, they advised people to check whether their 
neighbors need help. They also called retailers to refrain from monopoly and pleaded 
them to reduce prices and asked private hospitals to open their doors for any persons.   
Despite of the high affinity as concerns issues of DS’ foundations and position, there 
was low affinity as regards the details of the events, or the narratives of media sources, 
such as; “It was said that there is a clash between Mubarak and the minister of interior.” 
In addition, the use of passive voice, and the description of incidents, rather than 
specifying certain actors, particularly at the breakout of the protests, were all indications 
that showed that, under such crisis, they did not acquire adequate information, 
especially that they were not part of such events, and thus adopted a cautious approach, 
and avoided running into any confrontations. Therefore, in the first texts, they present 
media narrative with a neutral tone without supporting or disapproving. Meanwhile, 
DS’ observations and action plans were based on the givens, which they observe in 
reality. Thus, they kept a distance from the events and the protesters, yet they were not 
isolated from their social context.  
Argumentation, Wording and Word Meaning and Metaphors: 
Accordingly, in view of DS’ resistance to the idea of protest and revolution, and 
because of their cautious approach to the situation, DS’ leaders did not use the concept 
“Revolution” in the movements’ statements. They rather used “protests,” “crisis,” or 
“current events,” until Alaa El Din’s Friday speech on February 11th 2011. Despite of 
the apparent appreciation of the Revolution in such speech, the concept was still linked 
to chaos, fitna, bloodshed, and the possibility of losing the foundations of the country, 
which conforms to DS’ foundational texts, their position on the Iranian revolution 
discussed in chapter 3, and their initial stance as concerns revolution as means of 
change.  
Moreover, senior sheikhs’ narratives as concerns the 2011 Revolution, and the actors 
involved in it seemed to be reserved, or unenthusiastic. For instance, Borhami’s 
evaluation of January 25th protests was that such protests were beyond the capacity of 
the traditional opposition parties, or change movements, who, for him, have a limited 
influence on the public. However, January 25th protest revealed that the youth and the 
ordinary people on the street are in rage, and would not retreat unless there are real steps 
taken towards reform, to fight corruption and remove injustice. Sheikh Alaa El Din in 
the Friday speech, discussed the ambiguity of the regime’s official statements, and said 
that this might provoke the outrageous people, leading them to confrontations with the 
army, which he perceives as the most dangerous stage, since unless people control 
themselves, the very foundation of the state would be under threat. He added that “the 
youth of the internet, seen before as the video games youth, were the ones who triggered 
the largest and unprecedented popular revolution in world’s history. Even in the most 
populous countries, even in China, no revolution came out with 8 million protesters, and 
no nation came out in this way in the contemporary history to topple a regime. 
However, control is required, which means that there should be a vision, and prudence, 
since Prophet Mohammed said, ‘You must be compassionate. Whenever there is 
compassion in something, it adorns it, and whenever it is removed from something, it 
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disgraces it.’" Thus, he calls people to protect state foundations, despite all the demands, 
since avoiding internal clashes, especially with the army, was one of the main warnings 
of Sheikh Alaa El Din, who seemed to be worried about the attitude of the protesters. 
Calling the activists involved in January 2011 Revolution, “the youth of the internet” in 
both Al-Shahhat and Alaa El Din’s texts, might reflect a perception of them as cyber 
activists, who were not present on the ground before, and are new comers to real 
activism. Moreover, using expressions such as the “largest revolution in world’s 
history” and “contemporary history,” were representative of the local and international 
media narratives that Sheikh Alaa used to pave the way for his criticism and advice 
with, so as not to alienate the audience on that day that constituted the peak of protests, 
and witnessed the toppling Mubarak later. After toppling Mubarak, Al-Shahhat in his 
article “To the Youth of the Revolution,” differentiated between the revolutionary 
alliance, and the average youth of the revolution who had no definite ideological 
affiliations from his point of view. It seemed from the content of his article that he 
considered the latter as the real makers of the revolution. He made the point that he 
respects the efforts the youth exerted, and argued that DS and other movements might 
have come late to the revolution, since DS was restricted by the regime, whereas youth 
with no affiliations were more capable to act spontaneously and escape regime 
suppression. However, again, he sees that their lack of an ideology or a vision was 
considered a defect.  
From the above, such texts emphasize DS’ perception of the situation as a chaotic one 
that lacks vision. It also reflected that DS did not give much credit to the opposition 
powers, or the revolutionary alliance. 
Sheikh Alaa El Din seemed to be praising the Revolution while he was actually 
reiterating the same fears and concerns of revolutions as means of change that were 
stated in Borhami’s foundational text. Thus, in a direct response to questions about 
whether to participate in protests or not, he said that participation to support just 
demands is only accepted if governed by religious rulings. However, under the 
conditions mentioned above, things have been getting out of control, and the DS feared 
bloodshed. Thus, it was clear that he discouraged people from participation. Yet, he said 
that he could not claim that he owns the truth, and is not sticking to one opinion and 
rejecting others. “Only God owns the truth, and He guides whoever He wants to it.” 
“Nobody should stick to his opinion and deny others to, at a moment where we are 
united to improve and change our conditions.” Such attitude might imply again an 
attempt to embrace the audience, and to be close to the society, even though DS 
continues to adhere to its alternative path, and to promote a counter-discourse to the 
revolutionary discourse which was dominant at that stage.  
In his narrative of the Revolution, Al-Shahhat said that as DS expected and warned, 
bloodshed left 300 killed and thousands injured. Police disappeared or withdrew from 
the streets, and the army went out to keep security, a curfew was enforced, looting, 
destruction, and bullying spread all over the country, and the US was present through 
holding meetings with the political powers in the embassy, and the situation ended by 
announcing an open sit-in in Tahrir Square. Such narrative came after the end of the sit-
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in and its success in toppling Mubarak, which signifies a constant DS’ position, from 
the beginning until the end of protests. 
Al-Shahhat defined the concept of Revolution in this case as a crisis exposing lives, 
properties, and means of earning living to eminent danger, while vague regime 
management dominated. Thus, the situation only turned from a “limited youth protest 
movement” against corruption and power inheritance led by youth, into a real 
revolution, escalating to the level of a societal crisis threatening the rest of sectors and 
people within the society. Thus, he might be making a point that DS’ evaluation of the 
situation was realistic at the beginning, and that they did not deal with it as a revolution 
except after certain developments.  
Al-Shahhat also doubted that the protesters were aware that it was a revolution, or had 
specific demands. According to Al-Shahhat, despite of the regime’s slow reactions to 
the protests, it provided unprecedented concessions that “protesters never dreamed of.” 
However, at this stage protesters rejected the suggested reforms of the regime, and 
insisted that Mubarak should step down. The demands of protesters were general, and 
were not clear, and it seemed that they are dictated by the media or international 
statements. The Revolution was associated with the slogan “people want to get rid of 
the regime.” Therefore, such absence of clear targets or demands, from DS’ point of 
view might explain their lack of enthusiasm about the situation and talking about 
international dictation might imply a conspiracy, since they even warned “there are 
some attempts to push the country in the direction of absolute chaos.” 
Accordingly, DS detached its followers from the protests, and focused on dealing with 
its consequences. Thus, DS’ texts during the first days of protest and sit-in, tackled 
everyday problems, summarized the situation in points, and put an action plan, where, 
numbering was the main connective in the statements (1, 2, and recommendations of the 
Rally conference) (AnaAlsalafi, 2011h, AnaAlsalafi, 2011j, AnaAlsalafi, 2011d). Such 
concise and action-oriented texts reflected DS’ experience and focus on social activism. 
Meanwhile, the political component and wording was almost nonexistent at the 
beginning of the Revolution, they even considered political debates, and ideological 
arguments, as “controversial issues,” and as “nonsense leading to conflict”, and thus 
should be avoided.  
Nevertheless, besides the pragmatic and rational approach in DS’ texts, they included a 
strong religious component. Their Islamic identity dominated the texts, as well, and was 
represented through linking the definitions and explanation of all issues to Islam, as 
well as referring to Quran and Sunna to prove their point. Their religious identity was 
also clear in considering God the main and the only actor to whom they surrender and 
follow (God ordered us, we are submissive to God and his orders, we follow the orders 
of God). They also spoke in plural reflecting a sense of community and solidarity (our 
acceptance, keeping the spirit of the community, acting as a group). Their focus on 
“sins” as a leading to “disasters,” and “repentance” as a way out from the “crisis and the 
calamities,” and that prayers and Quran are the means to survive, as part of the action 
plans, all signifies a pure religious discourse. For instance, Borhami, in his January 26th 
article, said that “nationwide repentance is a must to protect the country against 
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calamities.” In the first and second statements, among the actions suggested were 
nationwide repentance, prayers and asking God to end the crisis. In all the texts 
analyzed, there was a manifest representation of Quran and Hadith. 
However, with the development of the situation, in addition to stressing security 
concerns and using religious expressions such as the “belief of the nation,” and “the rule 
of God,” and considering those who oppose Islamic demands among seculars, as 
“climbers on the shoulders of the nation,” DS’ texts started to include political and 
human rights wording. For instance, unlike the case of Bilal’s torture, texts after the 
breakout of the revolution included expressions such as “the social contract,” “the 
constitution,” “oppression,” “torture,” “arbitrary detention,” “the urge of reforming 
security institutions,” “good treatment of the people,” “the prompt annulment of the 
emergency law,” “freeing those who were imprisoned without trial” and “fighting 
regime directed media.” Moreover, in Alaa El Din Friday speech, Mubarak was highly 
criticized and described as “a psychopath,” and that “Mubarak’s men are protecting him 
because their survival was tied to his presence in office,” which is a significant 
development in DS’ speeches, since criticizing the president and naming him was not 
observed in any of their pre-Revolution texts examined.  
Such change in the wording of the texts started in DS’ third statement (AnaAlsalafi, 
2011i), and the statement from the Legal (religious) committee for protecting rights and 
freedoms on February 5th and was signed by all DS’ senior sheikhs. Such statements 
brought up the concerns about Article (2) of the Constitution that they were worried that 
seculars, who seemed to be dominating the scene, might ask for getting rid of it. They 
also demanded to end emergency law. In addition, for the first time since the breakout 
of the Revolution, they gave legitimacy to the protests saying that their demands 
conform to Shari’a, the international conventions, and the nation’s consensus, thus, 
those who were killed while fighting for justice, development, and the reform of the 
political system and its institutions are “God willing, considered martyrs.” Such 
statement came after the bloody escalation in Tahrir Square that the media called the 
“Battle of the Camel,” which erupted right after an emotional speech delivered by 
Mubarak to contain people’s anger (Fathi, 2012). As a result, DS stressed that protests 
should remain peaceful and conforming to Islamic rules, and to avoid any misguiding 
slogans and deviations. 
Being religiously driven, the texts produced with the development of protests focused 
mainly on “the Egyptian Islamic identity” threatened by seculars, and this was 
obviously the main motivation of DS’ actions at this stage, especially with the third 
statement on February 1st 2011, and the Legal committee statement on February 5th, 
2011 (AnaAlsalafi, 2011f). On February 8th 2011, in DS’ rally conference in Alexandria 
(AnaAlsalafi, 2011d), which was held 12 days following the breakout of protests, they 
showed a rising concern about the scale and the influence of the protests, particularly as 
regards the annulment of “Article (2) of the Constitution,” the “Egyptian Islamic 
identity,” and the “role of Islam in Egypt.” The texts that followed stressed that Egypt 
should be a state where all decisions and issues conform to Islamic Shari’a, and that 
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anything that defies this is “untruthful,” especially that, according to DS, the masses of 
people approve of Islam as their reference.  
In the February 11th Friday speech, sheikh Alaa El Din (2011) said in his narrative of 
the situation that the demands of protesters are legitimate; however, they are not one 
group, but are divided, and have various demands whether economic, political, or 
social. Thus, such groups must have a common factor that unifies them, and this should 
be something that “no one can deny” or that enjoys national consensus. For him, in 
reality, the identity of all these groups is Islamic; therefore, the highest ceiling of their 
demands should be the application of Shari’a. This is because being a Muslim implies 
that one should observe Islam privately and apply the rulings of God to daily life 
management, because Islam is a religion and a state, and every Muslim should believe 
in this, as a condition for his sound faith. However, such belief goes against the secular 
claims that call for separating state and religion and reconsidering Article (2) of the 
Constitution. He said that the demand of the protests now is just to get rid of a corrupt 
ruler, but a worse one could replace him if people disregard the application of Islamic 
Shari’a. Alaa El Din stressed that Islam could not be minimized to rituals or inflicting 
“Hadd punishment,” since it is rather a comprehensive religion, and those who do not 
believe in this, are “sinners and are on the way to polytheism.” 
In this regard, Alaa El Din (2011) explained “the basis of a state of Islam” as the one in 
which sovereignty is in Shari’a, and powers are with the people, who should be ruled by 
a governor that acts as their deputy and is responsible before them for applying Shari’a. 
In addition, there should be a Shura council in such state, whose members should be 
experts and religious people. This council is responsible for choosing the governor. 
Finally, the system in the state of Islam is a complementary not a competitive one, and 
the governor is not supposed to monopolize everything. Such system helps to attain 
stability and security, and to gain God’s satisfaction in the other world. For Alaa El Din, 
such state is the ideal and what ought to be, but what is possible from his point of view 
is at least to apply Shari’a to Muslims’ life. 
Such speech conformed to the argumentation in Borhami’s foundational text (Borhami, 
1992), thus, revealing consistency in DS’ discourse as regards issues of change, 
governance, and Shari’a. Moreover, DS’ texts in this stage brought back one of their 
main issues that is protecting Article (2) of the Constitution, and the definition of the 
concept of “change,” which was one of the key differences between DS and the secular 
activists and politicians before the Revolution, as mentioned in previous sections.  
In Al-Shahhat article (2011), he said that they realized the danger of secular demands to 
isolate religion, accordingly they launched a campaign against attempts to annul Article 
(2) of the Constitution. As per Al-Shahhat (2011), DS focused on the target of having a 
constitution with an Islamic reference, and this was criticized by “some Islamists,” who 
saw that DS’ campaign was not in the right timing, when the whole nation should be 
united behind national targets. The rest of DS’ fellow Islamists said that they were not 
certain that fears of isolating religion were realistic, especially that, the committee 
formed to revise the constitution included Islamist figures. However, Al-Shahhat (2011) 
provided evidence that these fears were true, first because DS’ campaign was launched 
313 
 
before the formation of the constitution committee. Second, that it was not only Copts 
in diasporas that called for the annulment of Article (2), but also the liberal figure 
Ayman Nor who called for returning to the 1923 Constitution, which did not include 
this article, and Al Baradei, in addition to the “so called group of intellectuals” who 
called for reconsidering this article, which provoked Al-Azhar itself. Third, the 
constitutional committee requires a popular support to protect Shari’a. Al-Shahhat also 
warned of calls to form a new constitution through an appointed committee rather than a 
referendum, which he sees as a preemptive action on part of secular intellectuals. This 
could be understood, from his point of view, as a way to evade people’s desire to 
protect Shari’a, which would express itself any way in a referendum.  
Thus, the recurrence of the confrontation between DS and secular powers was in fact an 
extension of the debate on the definition, direction, and references of “change” in the 
discourse of both sides.  
In this regard, DS repeated that they are not against change in principle, but are against 
the secular approach, and the means of social reform that they adopt. Therefore, DS 
refused the polarization that the society has undergone before and during the 
Revolution. In the Friday speech, Sheikh Alaa El Din (2011) said that they reject 
polarization and are not willing to accept extremes and dualities that brought up by 
various actors during the Revolution, such as choosing between either chaos or 
oppression. He also mentioned that they are also faced with the choice of either 
sacrificing Shari’a, or else being classified as Mubarak’s followers and the corrupt 
system supporters. He stressed that DS is in the middle, supports all legitimate demands 
of the protesters, but only if they conform to Shari’a, and if protests are expressed in a 
way that does not deviate from Islamic rulings. Sheikh Mohammed Sarhan (2011), in 
February 11th Friday speech, mentioned that having a different approach does not mean 
that they are “traitors,” or “agents of the regime.” It is only that they have a different 
point of view, and are meanwhile guarding the internal front. He said that one of the 
calamities and the tests that they live through over the days of the revolution is the 
extreme polarization that divides friends and families, “you are either my advocate, or 
my opponent.” 
Ethos: 
Such ethos/position leads to the idea that DS’ references and motives are both religious, 
rather than political, for the fact that they did not provide any religious concessions, 
even on the level of political maneuvering. In addition, their neutral texts based on 
safety, security, and religious discourses at the beginning of the revolution were only 
transformed to include political, legal, and human rights discourses, when they expected 







Reproduction of DS’ Discourse on Social Change: 
However, DS’ adherence to the position of defending a Shari’a-guided change, to be 
enhanced through campaigns, statements, conferences, and lectures, seemed unwelcome 
amidst the polarization that characterized the then dominating revolutionary climates. 
According to Al-Shahhat, “supporters of protest asked us not to prohibit protest as long 
as we are not participating, and we complied and even more… So we hope that our 
brothers would accommodate our conferences and lectures, which explain the issue of 
the rule of God, clarify the benefits of Shari’a, to overcome the flaws blemishing 
secularism, and the prevention of any retreat (in Shari’a application) in order to secure 
the minimum of people’s demands. Even if our brothers see such conferences as waste 
of time and effort, they would not be leading to any expected evil. If they do so, they 
would be maintaining the spirit of brotherhood based on faith.” Al-Shahhat added that 
DS did not move after they missed the “train of the revolution,” but rather when 
Mubarak was still in power and the situation was still awaiting either success in 
toppling him, or the abolition of the revolution. He stressed that the main motive for 
DS’ actions was the secular threats; particularly that DS defines things precisely without 
exaggeration or complications. Nevertheless, when they came out with a different point 
of view, they “acted under the slogan of abstaining from blaming or criticizing any 
power, but rather under the feeling of collective responsibility.” So they “hoped that this 
would be the dominant spirit.” Therefore, it is obvious that DS demanded equal 
treatment and acceptance on part of the revolutionary alliance. This was not the case at 
that time, as it seems that DS that started to express its demands, while it was not part of 
the revolutionary alliance and even refrained from taking part in protest, was not 
welcome at such stage. 
Genre, Style, and Discourses: 
Nevertheless, they maintained the same religious genre since the texts were mainly 
religious judgments, official statements issued from DS, Friday speeches, and articles 
on Al-Salafi website. Such a religious genre was directed to DS’ members in particular. 
At the beginning, the style of texts did not depart from DS’ usual argumentative, formal 
written or spoken Arabic, with few vernacular Egyptian terms in the Friday speeches, 
especially, when the sheikh gets emotional or enthusiastic about a certain idea that he 
wants to elaborate on. However, the quotes mentioned above show that the style turned 
from advisory, warning, and tutoring, as well as descriptive providing a narrative of the 
situation, to being critical, defensive, and even confrontational as they started to defend 
Article (2) of the Constitution, and to face what they see as a secular threat. Such 
changes in DS’ discursive combination, in which the discourse and the style built upon 
were both transformed, only occurred when one of the movements’ foundations were 
threatened. It was not a reaction to any of the other radical developments that took place 
on the ground during the revolution.  
DS’ religious discourse was maintained, however, after almost 12 days of protests, the 
widening audience, building upon political and human rights discourses, and adopting a 
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more confrontational style, all reflected their deeper involvement in their political and 
social context at this stage of the revolution. Despite the fact that such attitude marked a 
change in DS’ discursive combination; it reinforced their discourse on change, in the 
sense of how change is represented in their texts, at the levels of both the means and the 
ends, which they refer to as “change methodology.”  
Nevertheless, the observed change in DS’ discursive combination at such historical 
moment of the revolution, particularly after around 12 days of protest, in comparison 
with the texts produced during the early days of the revolution does not express a 
significant change in DS’ discourse, if viewed on a wider scope. This is because the 
CDA of the pre-revolution foundational texts about “change” in chapter 5, and the texts 
discussed above as concerns DS’ relationship to the social and political mobilization 
process that occurred in Egypt between 2004 and 2011, show that such texts 
occasionally used both a relatively confrontational style, and religious political and 
legal discourses. Such discursive combination was observed in reaction to threats to the 
movements’ core foundations particularly as concerns “change methodology” and the 
pure religious issues; however, was not detected in cases of political and human rights 
issues, within both the analyzed and discussed texts. For instance, Sheikh Abdel Azim’s 
texts as concerns seculars’ definition of change, as well as the texts produced during 
Kamilia Shehata case, in addition to a number of spoken texts among the foundational 
ones analyzed in chapter 4, if compared to texts produced in reaction to Sayed Bilal’s 
torture, and the beginning of protests in January 2011, would support this observation. 
Intertextuality: 
Moreover, DS’ statements also showed that DS’ targeted audience widened. At the 
beginning, they addressed DS members, the believers and the good people, then all 
Muslims, and then other people in the society, such as the government, hospitals, 
retailers, and protesters, in addition to their usual rivals among fellow Islamists, 
seculars, and certain politicians. Thus, under the pressure of the revolution, DS started 
to interact and to direct its call to more actors. They praised the “chivalry of the 
Egyptian youth” and “their heroism” in securing their country through the popular 
committees, the “role of the Egyptian military,” and finally, the “youth of the 
revolution” and hopes for a fruitful interaction with them. 
However, despite the observed changes in the textual features, the discourses and the 
style built upon in DS’ statements and articles, there remained a manifest representation 
of Quran, Sunna, and Islamic heritage in such texts, as well as the media narrative. This 
means that DS’ revolution texts, if compared to the whole texts analyzed and discussed, 
adhered to DS’ main references and acted within the contours that defined their identity 
as Salafis, and reflected a religious discourse, which is open to media sources. In 
addition, in Al-Shahhat report to DS’ followers about the leaders’ management, there 
was a manifest representation of DS’ first, second, and third statements, in addition to 
Borhami’s article on January 26th, which evidenced that DS warned of bloodshed and 
clashes and asked all parties to avoid such consequences. Thus, following up their 
intertextual chain reflects consistency in DS’ positions as concerns the events, and 
protest in general. 
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DS’ Participation in Protests after 2011: 
Nonetheless, despite of the anti-protest position, DS’ participation in protests and 
marches after January 2011, was again religiously motivated, and was part of its 
coordination with the Islamists’ coalition (AnaAlsalafi, 2013b) for the sake of 
emphasizing Islamists’ demands vis-à-vis those of the seculars. On such occasions, DS’ 
statements were committed to the movement’s discourse about protest, and reflected a 
reproduction of Senior Sheikhs’ texts as concerns avoiding chaos, and abiding by 
Shari’a rulings (Party, 2013 ). Accordingly, it was clear that their participations would 
be confined to protest, but would not be extended to sit-ins, or radical actions, 
especially, if protest challenges the institutions of the state, particularly the Supreme 
Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), the Constitution, or the landmarks agreed upon as 
concerns the political process. They also would never participate in protests which are 
carried out under the slogan of a “second revolution.” For DS, this participation in 
protests was mainly when protest in Tahrir square served as an alternative means of 
expression in absence of institutions. However, DS was pushing for elections and for 
reaching the road map milestones agreed upon, to put an end to the then continuing 
protests (party, 2013a, party, 2013b, Net, 2013, Borhami, 2012a). In this respect, they 
did not see that pressure through protest is “understandable” after the formation of 
legislative, and executive institutions (AnaAlsalafi, 2013b).  
Moreover, Borhami’s January 26th 2011 article was republished on June 28th 2013, two 
days before June 2013 Revolution which toppled the MB regime. This article was 
reproduced in DS’ statement under the title “Never fall for Fitna” (AnaAlsalafi, 2013a), 
which warned of the preparations for protests against the MB on June 30th 2013. Such 
statement repeated the same discourse about revolutions, and framed it as Fitna that 
both the nation and the regime should avoid, and they mentioned that they exerted much 
effort to help all parties get out of the crisis peacefully. Thus, even if they give 
legitimacy to protesters’ demands, they criticized the methods and the practices. 
Moreover, they suggested solutions for the regime to avoid an escalation of the 
situation, despite of the deterioration of the relationship between NP and the MB regime 
(Al-Watan, 2013).  
Therefore, the intertextual chains of DS’ texts on protest as means of expression, and 
revolution as means of change, proved to be coherent until 2013. The reproduction of 
Borhami’s text, two years later in a revolutionary situation, and DS’ statement a few 
days before the June 2013 protests, in addition to NP statement on June 30th2013 (Party, 
2013 ), show that they insisted on their position in this regard. However, as mentioned 
above, when such texts are represented in media, or in the other political powers’ 
discourse, they are reproduced in a way that shows that DS is against change, especially 
in a polarized context. Yet, both NP and DS continued to reject the mobilization of the 
June 30th Revolution alliance and the counter-mobilization of Islamists. Nevertheless, 
NP was the only Islamist party which participated in the ‘road map’ after June 30th 
Revolution (party, 2013a, party, 2013b, Net, 2013).  
Such observations should lead to a number of deductions. First, in the light of 
comparing texts produced during the revolution to the pre-revolution texts, it is 
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understood that there was no significant change in DS’ argumentation, text features, 
interdiscursivity and intertextuality, during the revolution, even within a changing 
societal context. Second, that the consistency in DS’ discourse on change and 
revolution, and the priority of the religious over the political, persisted during January 
2011 Revolution, even though, the revolution constituted a “crisis” for DS, and a 
challenge to their discourse. In addition, it is obvious that DS’ different approach, which 
was on the sidelines of the mainstream discourse of change at this moment, might be 
responsible for the ambiguity of DS’ intentions, and might justify the fears and 
questions raised about DS’ later involvement in politics, particularly among the public 
and the outsiders, who were only introduced to DS when it started to express itself on a 
wider scale during the 2011 revolution, with such discursive combination of religious 
genre, religious and political discourses, both with a confrontational style. Thus, they 
represented a religious actor within a political context, where religion was confined to 
being a tool of political maneuvering; therefore, DS was more exposed to doubts about 
the credibility of their religious demands. Moreover, they were presenting a counter-
discourse in resistance to that of the revolutionary alliance, when such an alliance 
assumed the image of the victorious, and the righteous, especially, after their success in 
toppling Mubarak. Such doubts increased with DS’ intention to enter politics, and the 
question of whether they are a religious or a political actor, and if a religious actor, 
whether their unique position hides an “extremist” or “violent” thought?, which was 
unwelcome in the Egyptian society, as per the public and other social and political 
groups at that time. 
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APPENDIX 4: CDA OF DS’ POST-REVOLUTION TEXTS ON REFORM AND 
SOCIAL CHANGE 
After June 30th Revolution, which put an end to MB rule, Al-Shahhat wrote a series of 
seven articles about reform, starting from September 2013. Marking two years of DS’ 
involvement in politics, such series represented an emphasis on the movement’s reform 
methodology. Meanwhile, it constituted a self-identification process through defining 
the “We” in opposition and in comparison to the “Other”. 
In rejection to the calls to adopt an absolute application of western concepts and 
methods of reform in Islamic countries, Al-Shahhat views that reform rules are 
absolute, while reform methods are context based. Therefore, the situation should be 
precisely assessed, while being aware of the hoped-for targets, or the idealistic situation, 
then to decide the suitable handling of each case. He said, “There is no one prescription 
that fits all patients, thus, we cannot apply to Muslim societies the reform methods 
developed by non-believers and non-Muslims” (Al-Shahhat, 2013d). 
In this regard, according to Al-Shahhat, Muslim societies should adopt gradual change. 
Then, he provided a classification of Islamists’ approaches to change, which seemed to 
be influenced by the post-Revolution developments. For him, there usually exists three 
Islamist approaches to gradual reform, “first, the group that strictly rejects any gradual 
solutions for social deviations” in reference to the military confrontation approach. 
“Second, a group that accepts compromises and are willing to adapt Islamic 
interpretations to fit such compromises,” and it seems that this represented the MB or 
the parliamentary approach, in the light of DS’ criticism to MB’s obvious religious 
concessions. “Third, the group that accepts gradual change, while recognizing the faults 
and shortcomings of the existing system, and rejecting any religious concessions, which 
represented DS’ approach” (Al-Shahhat, 2013d). This description of DS’ position was 
in view of its participation in politics, within a democratic structure, while openly 
rejecting democracy for being non-Islamic. Such involvement in politics required 
selecting DS’ women to be candidates for parliamentary elections, something that 
touched on one of DS’ core beliefs, that there is no guardianship for women. However, 
as mentioned above, doing this, they were clear that they still believe in women’s 
religious ineligibility to hold a legal guardian position. However, cost-benefit analysis 
calculations dictated that at such moment, for the sake of defending the Islamic identity 
and the application of Shari’a, they needed to enter the parliament. Accordingly, they 
had to comply with election laws and regulations, meanwhile, stating that such laws and 
regulations are unethical. 
From a wider perspective, Al-Shahhat specified some criteria to compare the various 
approaches to reform, including the non-Islamist ones. He mentioned that the 
differences among approaches might be emanating from their reference, the 
understanding of such reference, or the methods of treating deviations, and the earlier 
difference arises among such three stages, the deeper it becomes. For instance, the 
difference between seculars and Islamists is a fundamental one, since it is in the 
reference. According to seculars human experience is the reference, thus, they would 
legitimize usury, whereas for Islamists “Shari’a has the upper hand.” As for Islamists, 
319 
 
their approach is composed of the belief system which means applying deduction 
methods on issues of belief, and the practical methods of fiqh, or reform methods. In the 
past, the difference among Islamists revolved around deduction methods, and 
consequently around the remainder of belief issues. However, the contemporary 
difference among Islamists mostly concerns the reform method, “for instance, whether 
all methods of reform are legitimate, including lying.” In this example, he seemed to be 
projecting on MB political methods that they have criticized earlier (Al-Shahhat, 
2013d). 
Al-Shahhat highlighted the main approaches to change that were discussed in the 
foundational article. However, under the top-down approach, he added to the 
parliamentary approach the revolutionary one, and the actions of militants. The 
revolutionary approach is a new category that was not mentioned in the foundational 
text. He stated clearly that DS calls for a comprehensive reform to the individual, 
society, and the state. However, he says that in political science, change approaches 
vary among those who call for a radical prompt change, and those who call for an 
accumulative gradual change, and that DS belongs to the gradual reform approach. In 
this regard, they view that both approaches cannot claim credit for a revolution, and that 
the main difference between reformers and revolutionaries lies in mechanisms. 
Followers of reform approach work to achieve the possible level of reform, while the 
revolutionary approach supporters endeavor to escalate the situation until it ends into a 
crisis (Al-Shahhat, 2013c). 
Al-Shahhat then traced the roots of DS’ reform in human sciences, particularly 
sociology, where he stressed that the human being is a social creature, and that 
individualism remains a philosophical idea. Therefore, individuals have a sense of 
belonging to their communities, to which they abide by certain commitments. He also 
discussed the concept of the state and authority, saying that reformers were preoccupied 
with the idealistic form of individuals, the social relationship among them and the 
idealistic system of governance (individual liberties, justice and distribution of 
resources). Thus, without reforming individual, society, and the state, there will be a 
gap that allows the spread of corruption, stressing that this is the comprehensive reform 
that Islam calls for, due to its comprehensive nature “that could not be denied.” 
Therefore, he rejects the claims attempting to confine religion, to be limited into a 
private sphere, as a personal relationship between man and God. He stresses that there is 
no separation of Islam and state and society, thus criticizing seculars for the claims they 
propagate, such as “no religion in politics and no politics in religion.” His argument 
against seculars was that separation of state and religion depends on which religion it is. 
For instance, the history of secularism is a result of  the alliance between feudalism and 
the Catholic Church in Europe, and for him, this was the reason why religion was 
associated with autocracy (Al-Shahhat, 2013f). In this regard, he mentioned that the 
Greek system of democracy was replaced by a combination of autocracy and theocracy, 
until people got rid of both through revolutions. For Al-Shahhat, such historical 
developments are irrelevant to Islam, whereas secularism remains relevant to 
Christianity in its most recent version, and to other religions as well (Al-Shahhat, 2013f, 
Al-Shahhat, 2013h). Finally, despite the fact that Islam does not discuss certain issues 
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such as presidential elections, accountability, and public and private sectors, it does put 
a framework and a value system for various fields based on Shari’a. In that sense, an 
Islamic system means the application of such framework by whatever means and 
mechanisms, as long as they do not defy the framework (Al-Shahhat, 2013f). 
He then discussed the three levels of DS’ social change methodology, starting by 
depicting the characteristics of the good Muslim individual, who has to be “aware of the 
truth and the right way” and to be “merciful.” He discussed the reform of the “mind, 
self, spirit, and body,” and the reform of the “belief, rituals, morals, and behavior.” He 
stressed that “self-control” is more important than fear of the law and the state, 
particularly if one is aware and is well educated. Other characteristics include 
“satisfaction, being moderate, pursuing religious knowledge and education,” and 
making use of other people’s experience as long as it doesn’t defy Shari’a (Al-Shahhat, 
2013a). Having specified such characteristics, Al-Shahhat, however, clarified that those 
who do not strictly adhere to such idealistic model cannot be described as infidel or 
non-believers, since there is always a midway in between the two extremes of 
announcing that someone is infidel (kafir), and being tolerant with sins and evils (Al-
Shahhat, 2013a). This was in view of the overwhelming trend accusing some people as 
being kafir, which Islamists’ media propagated, especially during the MB rule (Abdulla, 
2014). 
Furthermore, Al-Shahhat gave details of the characteristics of solidarity in the Muslim 
society, which should be based on faith connection, while rejecting fanaticism. For him, 
the virtuous society can be built on “calling for virtue, preventing vice, teaching 
mercifulness and supporting solidarity.” For him, freedom, justice and equality, are 
areas where the state can play its role. However, the family must maintain its status as 
the corner-stone of the Muslim society. In this regard, the mosque remains the main 
incumbent for education, and the social system can go forward through achieving the 
sufficiency duties of Islam (Al-Shahhat, 2013b). 
On the level of the state, governance should not suppress individuals and must observe 
establishing justice, both social and judicial. It has to be said that there is ample 
evidence on the obligation of creating a governance system, as in Islam there should be 
a governor, who must be obeyed. In addition to having a governor, the characteristics of 
the Muslim state should prevail under the supremacy of Shari’a, entrusting experts and 
specialists (Ahl Al-Hal Wl-A’qd) to hold the Shura system, and keeping a social 
contract. Such a social contract constitutes an authorization from the people to the 
governor in order to govern on their behalf. This Islamic system should be based on 
justice, equality, and freedom as long as people do not defy Shari’a, where they have the 
freedom to choose the governor, whose behaviors are to be checked directly or 
indirectly by Ahl Al-Hal Wl-A’qd (Al-Shahhat, 2013g). 
For Al-Shahhat, reforming the individual is the easiest part since human instinct helps 
in discriminating the good and the evil. However, reform of the society, where the 
family is the building unit, is rather difficult, despite the presence of the traces of 
solidarity, cooperation, and promotion of virtue and prevention of vice, as all these 
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values are shaken and confused due to the presence of multiple cultural sources to 
which the society is exposed (Al-Shahhat, 2013h). 
Nevertheless, the reform of the state remains the most difficult of all due to the huge 
gap between the existing state and what it ought to be in a Muslim state. The existing 
state is a territorial one, based on citizenship, and the role of the government is to 
manage the resources, and to keep order. Some add to the government’s functions the 
task of guarding the values of society. In addition, democracy has prevailed in 
contemporary states as a governance system that all nations pursue. On the contrary, the 
Muslim state is based on faith and belief, and the role of the state is to guard religion 
and to manage the country according to religious rules, where Shura is the system that 
could be applied through various mechanisms, accumulated over generations. Such take 
on the modern state raises questions about the understanding of DS’ sheikhs of the 
citizenship concept (Al-Shahhat, 2013h). 
Moreover, he discusses the concept of sovereignty, with the connotation of the “will” as 
part of the democratic concept. He asked where sovereignty lies in the various types of 
states and systems, mentioning that in Islam sovereignty is neither in the governor for it 
is not an autocracy, nor in the imams and men of religion, since it is not a theocracy. 
Moreover, it is neither in the law, nor in the nation as in western democracies. In Islam, 
it is both in Shari’a as well as in the nation, and it is impossible to establish an Islamic 
state without both of them. In view of this definition, democracy should be limited by 
Shari’a, which does not make it a typical democratic system or a pure Islamic system, 
but, it would be the convenient way to apply democracy in a Muslim context. Thus, for 
Al-Shahhat, a Muslim state has a unique nature, specific to Islam, however, there is no 
concept that describes it yet, but it is generally described as the Islamic system (Al-
Shahhat, 2013h). 
He also discussed the concept of the religious state both in the western and in the 
Islamic literature. The fact that DS does not approve of the western definition of the 
religious state or a theocracy, conformed to Al-Shahhat pre-revolution text about 
democracy, where he said that for the West, the church historically claimed a 
connection with God, so whatever priests said was God’s word, and the ruler is God’s 
shadow on earth, and that his rule is the rule of God. However, DS does want a religious 
state, at least not in the western sense, but one that rules by God’s Shari’a to which both 
the governor and the governed should be subjected. In this case, the law of God has 
clear foundations, and “Ijtihad” is subject to certain rules and methodology, therefore, 
nobody can claim to be speaking in the name of God, or dare to monopolize God’s 
words (Al-Shahhat, 2010). However, he says that when Islamists enter politics, they 
have no option but to say that they do not want a religious state, but rather a civic one 
with religious reference. For him, “civic” means a state that is not based on any 
religious foundations, but rather on ethnic, or geographic basis. This contradicts with 
him saying that “Islam does not recognize national affiliations, partisanship, and 
fanaticism” (Al-Shahhat, 2010). 
After the Revolution, the refusal of using the term of “civic state” in the Constitution 
was obvious in DS’ comment on Al-Azhar document that supported such approach. In 
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this concern, DS statement mentioned that the word civic is the Arabic translation of the 
English concept of “secular” or “non-religious” state and DS strictly rejected that the 
Constitution includes the word civic, which contradicts Islamic Shari’a reference 179 
(AnaAlsalafi, 2011g)180. Moreover, in TV interviews during MB rule, Borhami stressed 
that DS does  not aim at a religious state in the European or the western sense, however, 
they find secularism irrelevant to Islam (Al-Laithy, 2012 ), and that Da’awa launched 
everywhere, through using lenient and kind words, is the only means of change that DS 
recognizes, where they hold the state responsible for Da’awa, thus, all socialization 
means should serve this purpose. In addition, he clarified in a few words what he means 
by the application of Shari’a, determining the allowed and the forbidden, assuring that 
such application takes into account the cost-benefit analysis, the capabilities and 
weaknesses, and is context base, thus, it pays attention to people’s conditions 
(Ramadan, 2012).  
Meanwhile, in reaction to the fears and the controversy about DS and Salafis, Al-
Shahhat said that they would like to calm people down by assuring that they would not 
be hasty in introducing prompt or sudden application of Shari’a. In the mean time, they 
would apply a specifically rational concept of Shari’a, on understanding that a sudden 
application of Shari’a would result in a catastrophe, similar to that which would happen 
in case of a applying a sudden change of the existing banking system into an Islamic 
one. Salafis would introduce the changes required gradually. In addition, they would not 
impose their own religious concepts, but rather the interpretations issued by the Al-
Azhar-based Islamic Research Complex, as a neutral and trusted religious authority (Al-
Demerdash, 2012). Along the same lines went Borhami, who supported the application 
of Islamic penal law since this will deter criminals, saying that 90% of the crimes would 
disappear, thus, he did not shirk from this controversial concept, yet, he said it is not 
easy to apply and it needs preparing people through media and education (Ramadan, 
2012). 
In view of such strict position on Shari’a, DS and NP did not feel that they are isolated 
from society. On the contrary, they saw that they are fighting for national demands. For 
instance, their insistence on maintaining article 2 of the Constitution reflects, from their 
viewpoint, the demand of the whole nation, based on the results of referenda. Thus, 
assuring media that all talk against Salafis was unjustifiable due to the fact that they 
were not only representing themselves but also the whole society (Ramadan, 2012). 
Borhami also said that besides working on the application of Shari’a, entering politics 
availed DS the opportunity to have access to various media channels, and by so doing 
they added to their platforms, widened their audience, and made them closer to their 
society. This way, he views that entering politics has neither distracted them nor 
negatively impacted Da’awa, but rather made them closer to sectors of the society they 
                                                             
179Al-Shahhat was DS’ representative in this discussion.  
180 In a debate with the liberal figure, Amr Hamzawy, Al-Shahhat, adhered to the same definition of democracy and 
to his position and arguments on secularism. He further insisted on a constitution that gives Shari’a the upper hand in 
legislation, and that under Islam freedom is restricted by Shari’a, while under liberalism liberty is restricted by public 
interest. He also mentioned that he is open to all ideas, and methods, if he guarantees that legislation is for God (AL 




were not familiar with before (Ramadan, 2012, Ramzi, 2013). This was the way DS 
members saw themselves, despite of their shocking statements and strict positions in 
some situations. Nevertheless, such shocking statements over a long period, and in the 
light of the post-Revolution developments, have left a relatively positive impression 
about DS. So, despite people’s reservations on DS’ arguments and perceptions, they 
praised their consistency (field notes, August 2013). As an indication of such positive 
impression about DS, a Christian comedian movie star, who hosted Borhami in a TV 
talk show, voiced his belief that Salafis are generally known as straightforward, and are 
not double faced. Even if they have shocking statements (Ramzi, 2013, Sarhan, 2013), 
they would not hide them. Feeling proud of such impression, Borhami said that many 
people share this opinion, even though they sometimes get angry with DS’ comments 
on certain issues, and they begin to think that Salafis are strict or extremist. In further 
clarification, he said that Salafis are strict in matters enjoined by Shari’a, but they are 
more flexible about things that do not defy it. Borhami saw that an example of such 
flexibility is that people watch him on the TV saying to his host, “we are partners in one 
homeland” (Ramzi, 2013). However, he would never offer compliments or give any 
concessions as concerns the issues of faith (Sarhan, 2013). One of the issues that 
Borhami might be hinting at in this situation is the description of Christians as non-
believers, and refusing to greet them at their religious feasts. 
This brings up the issue of Takfir, declaring individuals or groups as Kafir. In this 
regard, Borhami had to clarify that both DS and NP do not resort, in a haphazard or 
indiscriminate way, to the judgement of Takfir. They should know first if the person 
judged is aware of his choices and practices, and that they should advise him before 
declaring him kafir. Thus, he was keen on emphasizing this meaning, in addition to 
denying the idea of changing vice by hand, or using violence to fight sins in society. For 
instance, DS followers would never destroy a pub, since it will be built and maintained 
again. On the contrary, DS method is rather to use Da’awa and advice to change the 
society, which serves as a deeper and a more sustainable way of changing vice 181 
(Ramzi, 2013). He also showed willingness for cooperation to reach to mutual 
understanding with the rest of the powers in society, for the sake of achieving Egyptian 
national interests. He said “if Egypt is a bucket with two handles so that two can carry it 
together, NP aims at creating seven handles so that everyone can share and participate.” 
In this example, he was using the Egyptian proverb equivalent to “takes two to tango.” 
Sending such a message was a kind of projection on the situation under MB rule, where 
leaders of MB excluded the rest of political powers and aimed at dominating all 
institutions. The anchor comment was sarcastic when he said seven not one in a hint at 
MB (Ramzi, 2013). 
This emphasizes the non-Takfiri, non-violent nature of DS and NP, assuming the image 
of an open and cooperative political actor, expressing willingness for working with 
                                                             
181 Al-Shahhat highlighted that changing vice by hand should be confined to institutions, particularly the police, who 
is authorized to carry out that duty, and that all what he can do is to call people through Da’awa to leave vice and 
hold on to virtue. However, since he is well aware of the society, he would not dare to call a drug addict to leave vice 
since he knows very well that such an addict might use violence against him. For Al-Shahhat, change requires certain 
ability, provided it should not involve violence, either to the one who preaches or to the wrongdoer (AL-
WARWARY, M. 2012. Interview of Sheikh Abdel Mone'em el Shehat on Al Arabiyya Channel  Al Arabiyya..   
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others, with no exclusion to any power or any group in another attempt to distinguish 
themselves from the rest of Salafis, and Islamists, and particularly the MB. In addition, 
DS as being subject to cultural exclusion wanted to show its nationalist aspect with 
sharing the same homeland, where Egypt is the common ground for them, and where 
the achievement of the national interest is the main target. Borhami showed that through 
accepting the invitation of a Christian anchor, and an actor, with all the reservations of 
Salafis on cinema and art, he has stressed the meanings aforementioned. Moreover, he 
went into the TV studio, hoisting a big Egyptian flag, acting in a friendly way with the 
anchor. Throughout the interview, Borhami was keen to dispel the stereotypes about 
Salafis as grim radicals, who have no sense of humour. Thus, he was laughing and 
joking, and interacted with the caricatures and the comments of the comedian actor, 
however, cautiously, in order not to fall in religious or political mistakes. He was also 
keen on being objective in his comments on MB despite being open about NP clash and 
difference with them (Ramzi, 2013). 
As concerns NP visits to the US and Europe, he said that Al-Nor does not want to 
replace MB in such countries, and that he does not perceive the West as the powers 
deciding the leaders of the Egyptian people. In clarification, he said that they travel to 
introduce themselves and clarify their views, and propagate their Da’awa to people who 
do not know them, in addition to explaining their attitude towards Christians and 
women (Ramzi, 2013). In another talk show, a young NP MP, Hassan Abu Al-Azayem, 
also showed that he was impressed by his experience in the US, particularly, as 
concerns the fact that when Obama won over Romney, the Republicans respected 
election results, and, unlike Egyptians, they were truly committed to the democratic 
mechanisms. He also seemed to be proud that he was lucky enough to have a baby born 
in the US, and that Jewish doctors cared for his wife, and that a Muslim sheikh was 
called in to whisper Azan in his baby’s ears, which he defined as reflecting true social 
justice and tolerance (Ramadan, 2013). 
From the above, despite the ideas of western conspiracy that remained in their 
discourse, after entering politics, DS and NP followers seemed open to learn about and 
to give credit to the west, initiate dialogue, and to interact with westerners. In addition, 
the presence of Abu Al-Azayem in a talk show with poets, cinema director, a musician, 
a lady singer, with an outfit that is considered finery for Salafis, a Christian politician, 
and the head of the Famers Union, was an expression of taking the nation’s side and 
readiness to deal with all social sectors, and that they tolerate diversity. Such figures 
also constituted the alliance of June 30th Revolution against MB regime (Ramadan, 
2013). However, despite all attempts to resist the stereotypes about Salafis, Borhami in 
the comedy talk show, maintained DS’ discourse, and asked the producers that they do 
not put on music. While he accepted that there were unveiled women, he called them to 
wearing the veil (as part of da’awa) (Sarhan, 2013), and did not have a problem 
watching and even commenting on caricature (Ramzi, 2013). Also amidst a group of 
intellectuals and within this context, Abu Al-Azayem maintained DS’ discourse, 
defended Islamists, and focused on criticizing media bias in dealing with them, and the 
seculars’ lack of commitment to democratic mechanisms (Ramadan, 2013). 
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Accordingly, they achieved presence in new contexts, and tried to be part of the political 
scene, while preserving their approach and discourse. 
Thus, despite of entrenching this image of having a tolerant nature and openness to 
other political powers, and of being a distinct Islamism model, DS continued to reject 
what they call the “philosophy of democracy,” and all its relevant concepts. However, 
they expressed clear commitment to the democratic mechanisms, despite of the fact that 
they consider such mechanisms as non-Islamic. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
they were keen on holding elections and sticking to post-January Revolution road map, 
instead of protests and sit-ins. When asked about whether an Islamist parliament 
represents the nation, Borhami answered that election is the only mechanism used in all 
countries to measure the popularity of political parties and the representation of the 
nations. He also mentioned that in 104 countries around the world, parliaments draft 
constitutions, and the percentage of participation might not exceed 40%. In addition, 
when he was asked about the appeals on the constitutionality of the parliament, 
Borhami clearly answered that until the supreme court takes a decision in this regard, 
the parliament will continue to work on the constitution, without excluding any political 
power (Al-Laithy, 2012 ). Accordingly, it was clear that he respects elections, 
institutions, and court decisions182. In this regard, NP presented an initiative to the 
Salvation Front, providing a political resolution to the escalation of the confrontation 
between MB and the rest of the non-Islamist powers, and the exclusion of NP itself. The 
initiative included a number of articles. First, the formation of a coalition government, 
second, forming a committee to amend the debatable constitutional articles, third, the 
independence and neutrality of governmental institutions, fourth, appointing a new 
General Prosecutor, fifth, investigating the violent incidents which occurred during the 
MB rule, sixth, a point agreed upon by all the parties involved in the initiative, that no 
one faction is capable of governing the whole country and excluding all the others, and 
that all political powers should cooperate and work together for serving the country, 
seventh condemning all aspects of violence or attacking public property while 
preserving the right to peaceful protest, eighth, setting a code of conduct to put an end 
to the diatribes among the various political powers (Sabe'e, 2013, Al-Sabbagh, 2013). In 
a press conference, Makhyon said that Egypt is for all Egyptians, and is not exclusive 
for one faction, where he meant clearly the MB (Sabe'e, 2013). MB criticized NP after 
this initiative, for being an Islamist party providing support to what the MB called the 
destruction front, while MB themselves signed a new initiative with the salvation front 
later (Sultan, 2013). In this regard, DS and NP clarified that this initiative is for 
realizing national rapprochement and unity, and was not meant to be against MB or any 
other Islamist faction, and is not meant to divide Islamists. In addition, there is a 
difference between issuing an initiative to start negotiations based on constitutional 
rights, and alliance formation. In this concern, they said that they did not join any 
alliance that contained secular parties during the elections, while MB did. Moreover, 
they said that MB who criticized them for supporting the salvation front against the 
                                                             
182 Al-Shahhat was also committed to the road map agreed upon with SCAF, and was keen on following the 
democratic mechanisms, and the political means AL-LAITHY, A. 2012 90 - Minutes program, Interview with Yasser 
Borhami 90 - Minutes program.. 
326 
 
Islamists, did the same a few days later, and that during the national dialogue President 
Morsi refused to discuss NP initiative. Borhami viewed such attitude on the part of MB 
as monopolizing power and institutions, dominating all aspects of political life in Egypt 
and adopting an exclusionary discourse, which was called in media the 
“Brotherhoodness” and which Borhami said that the DS insists on resisting it (Abdulla, 
2014, Borhami, 2013a, Borhami, 2013c) 
In same line with adhering to a political management of the situation, and despite the 
deterioration of DS-MB relationship, Borhami also stressed that if people were angry at 
Morsi, there should be a constitutional mechanism to change the president, and did not 
give much weight to Tamarrud (HUSSEIN, 2015), that was collecting signatures to 
topple the president, for any way they might not bypass the number of votes that Morsi 
got, and there would be suspicions about the authenticity of the people’s signatures  
collected. Thus, as he only recognizes legal and constitutional methods, Borhami said 
that the only way out, days before June 30, was that Morsi had to resign. In case Morsi 
refused to resign, Borhami suggested that parliamentary election should be held as soon 
as possible to counterbalance Morsi’s power and to introduce the necessary reforms, 
through a constitutional solution (Ramzi, 2013). 
Such respect of institutions and democratic mechanisms was also applied within the 
organization and the political party. In view of the fact that the choice of a presidential 
candidate to be supported must be taken institutionally, Borhami mentioned that they 
formed a committee which has to hold meetings with various presidential candidates 
and ask them various questions. When they receive answers they submit them to the 
administrative boards of both DS and NP, which take the decision (Al-Laithy, 2012 ). 
There was also an emphasis on the separation of DS and NP, when Borhami said that 
the political party has an official position that does not interfere with the religious 
organization. However, he said that at the same time DS followers can act as cadres of 
the political party, yet the party has its own mechanisms (Al-Laithy, 2012 ). 
Nonetheless, his emphasis on the separation of the party and the organization, while 
sharing the same cadres, and referring to the advice and guidance of the six founders of 
DS, made it difficult to secure the party’s independence. Furthermore, the 
institutionalism that they take pride in, both in the movement and the party, did not 
mean that they fully embraced democratic mechanisms inside DS’ entities, or that the 
decisions taken by the administrative boards were necessarily representative of the 
followers, or the rank and file of DS, particularly the youth. For instance, the issue of 
selecting the presidential candidate was subject to four criteria decided by the senior 
sheikhs. First, the media performance of the candidate and to what extent he adopts the 
Islamic project. Second, the capabilities, the personal traits, and the skills of the 
candidate, and that he should not be calming down the fears of the west to the detriment 
of Egypt’s interests, or the defection of his faith. Third, the quality of the candidate’s 
program and to what extent the program is realistic and feasible, and whether he has 
experts involved in putting his plan. Fourth, is the group of assistants and consultants of 
the candidate. In this concern, Borhami objected to the tendency that the youth of DS 
and NP should choose the candidate, since their choice is emotional, if they are not 
aware of the required qualifications and traits of a candidate. He criticized the youth 
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who would go to an extreme, saying that if you do not support their choice then you 
deserve the worst. Thus, he clearly mentioned that the knowledgeable and experienced 
people should be those who undertake selection of the presidential candidate (Al-Laithy, 
2012 ). This makes their management closer to Shura than to democracy. 
As a result of such approach, Al-Shahhat said that the Shura council of DS voted by 
80% in support of the presidential candidate Abu El Fotouh, and that their votes were 
based on what the Islamist candidates have said to the administrative board, in addition 
to opinion polls for DS’ followers, voters, and listening directly to the candidates (Al-
Shahhat, 2012). Borhami also said that the youth are well represented in the movement 
and the party and that the shura council comprised a majority of youth. However, the 
votes for Abou El Fotouh in the Salafi constituencies were very low (Ramadan, 2012). 
The gap between the choice of the leaders and that of the youth and rank and file of 
DS183 and NP was obvious through the actual votes of the followers of the movement to 
that candidate (Rahim, 2012), (Nagi, 2012). 
Also, leaders’ openness to media was not well received by DS’ followers who, 
according to the Christian anchor, did not accept Borhami’s participation in such a 
comedy program. According to the anchor, in reaction to the anger of DS’ followers, 
Borhami directed them to objectively revise the issue of loyalty and enmity, where they 
would know that accepting to sit with non-believers, kafir, or with those who are 
accused of hypocrisy, without saying anything that contradicts faith, is not banned by 
Shari’a. He added that sitting with such people does not mean that they do not have 
deep faith differences with them, assuring that he is willing to sit with anyone, since he 
would express his same views. Such reaction bothered Salafis as well as the rest of the 
audience. However, the anchor saw the interview as a fruitful one, saying that it helped 
to dissolve lots of  misunderstanding and differences (Sarhan, 2013). In addition, Sheikh 
Fawzi Al-Said, a Shubra Salafi sheikh, also harshly criticized Borhami for this program 
(Al-Said, 2013). Thus, this media contribution was neither welcome among the Salafis 
in general, nor was favourably received by the rest of the audience.  
In sum, despite of the obvious pragmatic/rationalist attitude of DS and NP, their 
cautious attempts to open up for media and society, were restricted by their religious 
discourse, and the core principles of the movement, in addition to the censorship of the 
popular base.  
According to the CDA of DS’ texts at this transitional stage, it was obvious that there 
was high affinity about their beliefs and their religious teachings, yet, they were 
uncertain about the political scene, or their chances to succeed in politics. Thus, DS’ 
senior sheikhs were cautious, and had to follow up with DS’ followers, as part of their 
framing process, in order to contain frustrations. At this transitional stage of 
transformation from a non-political to an active political actor, they were keen on 
maintaining the confidence in their methods and thought, as well as the 
interconnectedness of the movement. 
                                                             
183 For more details about the internal debate as concerns the presidential candidate, and rank and file reservations on 
Abu El Fotouh, see (BORHAMI, Y. 2012b. Why Abdel Mone'em Abul Foutouh was chosen ? . 
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Borhami’s contribution as concerns DS’ social change methods and political 
participation in the wake of January 2011 Revolution was through an interview to 
Islamyon.net, which was published in Al-Salafi website, in addition, to two lectures. 
Thus, there was no change in the genre of DS’ texts at this point. However, besides 
dealing with questions by the DS’ followers, and focusing on the framing process, the 
interview presented above, tackled questions of the media, the political powers, and the 
ordinary man in the street. This was a sign that DS started to be transformed from an 
observer of the society, whose texts are confined to addressing the movement’s 
followers, into an active actors all over the Egyptian society. The first lecture was based 
on religious discourse, while both the second lecture and the interview were built upon a 
religious-political one. However, the broad lines of DS’ discourse were maintained 
through all three texts. Thus, the representation of reality was through Islam, in addition 
to cost-benefit analysis, based on Islamic definitions, and rules. In addition, there was a 
manifest representation of Quran, Sunna, Ibn Taymyya, Al-Goweni, and clear influence 
of these texts on the written and spoken styles of Borhami, in addition to referring to 
media narrative. However, in a significant change in DS’ texts and particularly 
Borhami’s texts, he named and quoted specific politicians such as Al-Baradei, Ayman 
Nor, and Sawires, and considered them representatives of the secular anti-Islam powers. 
Before the Revolution, DS’ sheikhs rarely resorted to personalization according to 
previously analyzed texts, but were rather keen on indirect criticism of their opponents. 
However, these indirect hints continued in the case of MB, until DS became no longer 
part of the MB alliance, and started to openly criticize MB’s exclusionary policies. 
Similar to Al-Shahhat’s pre-Revolution lectures on reform, analyzed in chapter 4, the 
texts reflected a religious scientific and rationalist identity, where Islamisthe motive and 
the objective, and all argumentations are proved by a manifest representation of 
religious quotes, from Quran, Sunna, and Islamic scholars such as, Ibn Taymyya, Ibn 
Baz, Ibn Othaymin, Al-Albani, Mohamed Omara, and Said Abdel Azim. However, in 
the post-Revolution texts, he did not confine his references to religious texts and 
concepts only, but rather introduced and discussed concepts of sociology and political 
science (Al-Shahhat, 2013d, Al-Shahhat, 2013c), such as the “social nature of humans,” 
“individualism,” “rotation of power,” the “definition of the state,” and of the various 
approaches to reform. He also resorted to a tutoring and preaching style through using 
metaphors to clarify his views, such as dealing with social deviation as a disease that 
needs treatment, and that each society is a patient that needs a specific prescription, thus 
western perspectives are not necessarily helpful in an Islamic context (Al-Shahhat, 
2013d). Unlike the pre-Revolution lectures, this was a series of formal Arabic, 
argumentative articles, in which Al-Shahhat was able to control his temper, and to 
choose his wording and expressions, trying to be politically correct. In addition, he 
maintained a religious, scientific discourse more than a political one. While the pre-
Revolution spoken texts included shocking expressions, and were relatively 
confrontational, in the post-Revolution lectures, he preserved an academic form, where 
it seemed that he carried out a research, defined concepts, presented the various views, 
then provided his argumentation for criticizing them, rather than merely depending on 
impressions or media narratives. Al-Shahhat’s articles were all published on Ana Al-
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Salafi, DS’ website, and the researcher was directed to them by NP member before 
deciding to have an appointment with Al-Shahhat. According to a young party member 
that the researcher met in the field, these reform articles are one of the main references 
for members of the party as concerns DS’ vision for change. The importance of such 
texts within the new context emanates from their systematic explanation of the reasons 
which motivated DS’ to participate in politics, where Al-Shahhat rooted such choice in 
DS’ methodology and foundational texts. In addition, he linked DS’ approach to the 
wider reform literature, as an attempt to convey the message that DS’ approach is not 
exceptional or alien to the society, on the contrary, it builds upon human accumulations. 
However, while connecting their approach to society and humanity, he stressed the 
Islamic identity of their project in light of the comprehensiveness nature of Islam. 
Moreover, the post-Revolution period availed Al-Shahhat a wider audience, to include 
all those who want to understand DS’ thought and intentions, not only the Salafis. Thus, 
these lectures aimed at providing answers to questions about the nature of DS and its 
perceptions. 
Thus, in light of the CDA of the post-Revolution texts about reform and social change, 
DS sheikhs did not change their core argumentation, wording or the meaning of terms. 
Yet, there was a change in their discursive combinations. The main change was in the 
genre, since they were open to new channels of expression other than publishing, 
lectures and lessons in mosques and at social events, and the movement’s official 
websites. After the Revolution, they became guests to famous talk shows and had 
significant and unprecedented media presence. Even more, they appeared in shows with 
certain controversial TV anchors. In addition, it was obvious that the proportion of 
political and legal discourses relatively increased in their post-Revolution texts, and 
they started to include legal texts and to quote politicians, more than they used to do in 
pre-Revolution period, as they became even closer to the language of the people and 
were trying to show connection to national and cultural components of the Egyptians. 
However, all such changes did not touch upon the movement’s core beliefs, methods 
and definitions. They stressed their position of not offering any religious concessions. 
Meanwhile, they justified the exceptional decisions they had taken, as to women 
participation in politics and elections, as being taken only when they were compelled 
and after interest-evils calculations, while announcing the religious judgment and 
mentioning that such arrangements and regulations are religiously wrong. This 
emphasized the priority of the religious component in their discourse, and might explain 
people’s impressions about their rigidity, despite of their obviously pragmatic approach. 
In an attempt to address that wider audience, Borhami participated, in his capacity as 
one of the six founders of DS, where he was interviewed by secular anchors. According 
to observations made on a selected sample of such talk shows, Borhami used a spoken 
conversational style, and a simple Egyptian accent, sometimes humorous and sarcastic, 
and was also friendly and open about family life, yet, built upon religious political 
discourse. His argumentation and word meaning conformed to the texts previously 
analyzed; yet, his answers seemed to be ready-made, and well prepared for expected 
questions that seemed to have been asked several times in media and society. 
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It is observed that the restrictions were eased when dealing with NP members’ media 
contributions, if compared to the founders and high rank members of DS. For instance, 
the party members appeared on TV with unveiled female anchors (Kharsa, 2012, 
Sarhan, 2012, Nabil, 2015a, Abdel Azim, 2012), and they were adopting a political 
rather than a religious discourse, however, the religious component and insistence on 
DS core values were present in all their contributions. Moreover, the movement’s 
younger generations, who joined the party, used a mild language in the sense that it used 
familiar wording closer to everyday language, and was dominated by political 
discourse, however, they did not depart from the main arguments of their movement.184 
For instance, Nader Bakkar, the then spokesman of the party, had a calm attitude in 
dealing with media attacks; his discourse was mainly political and focused on 
procedural issues and party decisions. In view of the nature of his role as a spokesman 
of the party, he had a clear understanding of DS and NP views and had argumentative 
skills, which allowed him to withstand long discussions. Unlike the leaders, Bakkar 
avoided any criticism to any political actor or group, and was keen on keeping a neutral 
tone. In addition, he was not challenging to the dominant revolutionary discourse as 
concerns the Revolution’s slogans; “the revolution would continue until all demands are 
met,” and that “it is the Revolution of the people.” As a way to introduce political 
mechanisms without provocation of the protesters, he said that, while Egyptians 
continue their revolution, they should be keeping their gains from it, in a hint to the 
parliament. Moreover, he spoke about the complementary relationship between the 
parliament and Tahrir Square, where people should correct all the authorities if they 
deviate from the right path, and that without Tahrir Square the parliament could have 
not existed. However, the parliament is working on getting people’s rights from SCAF 
(the executive branch) (Youtube, 2012, 2012b) (Youtube, 2012, 2012b) (Youtube, 
2012, 2012b) (Youtube, 2012, 2012b) (Youtube, 2012, 2012b) (Youtube, 2012, 2012b) 
(Youtube, 2012, 2012b) (Youtube, 2012, 2012b) (Youtube, 2012, 2012b) (Youtube, 
2012, 2012b) (2012c, 2012). Thus, according to the party policy line, he was adhering 
to the road map, and said that people should give the parliament a chance to work and to 
fulfil their demands (Youtube, 2012, 2012b)(Youtube, 2012, 2012b)(Youtube, 2012, 
2012b)(Youtube, 2012, 2012b)(Youtube, 2012, 2012b)(Youtube, 2012, 
2012b)(Youtube, 2012, 2012b)(Youtube, 2012, 2012b)(Youtube, 2012, 
2012b)(Youtube, 2012, 2012b)(2012c, 2012). However, religious discourse represented 
a significant part in his discourse when he was faced with religious questions or 
situations that require a religious opinion. Nevertheless, he insisted that he is not a 
sheikh but rather a student of Oulum Shar’ia (Al-Ebrashy, 2011), and that he does not 
present his own personal views, but rather the policy of the party (Kharsa, 2012). In 
addition, he works hard to divert media attention from religious controversial issues to 
economic and political ones, since by the passage of time, DS and NP members would 
                                                             
184 Nader Bakkar, NP spokesman, is known for being closer to his generation on the level of outfit and language, 
except for the Salafi beard, and with his appearance and management, he constituted a role model, or at least was 
similar to almost all the youth that the researcher met on the field. They were friendly approachable and would even 
act as family, especially when they trusted and got used to the researcher. Whereas leaders were not as approachable, 
and the researcher had to be very strict when it comes to wearing veil, time and length of the meeting, and the 
reactions and behaviour.  
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realize that they should resist “media tricks” and avoid getting dragged to controversial 
issues. In his media contributions, victimization remained a feature of his discourse, 
demonstrated in complaints about exclusion, media discrimination and intentional 
misrepresentation, and fear of pressures from the minority, however, the western 
conspiracy was replaced in party and DS’ members’ discourse by a desire to introduce 
themselves to the west and to enter into debates with westerners (Mosallam, 2011, Al-
Rahma, 2011, Al-Arabiyya, 2011, Al-Hadidi, 2011b, Ramadan, 2013, Ramzi, 2013). 
While preserving a cautious approach to media and political and social groups, there 
were incidents where political interaction generated some exceptional situations, such as 
the attendance of Bakkar to the wedding of Amr Hamzawy, the liberal figure who got 
married to an Egyptian actress. It was an unfamiliar scene to find a Salafi in such 
context that he perceives as full of finery aspects. Bakkar had to justify his position and 
was on the defensive when fellow Islamists and seculars launched a harsh attack against 
him (Al-Ebrashy, 2012, 2012a). Such a situation was repeated when Bakkar said that he 
does not see that forbidding music and cinema is absolute. This rather progressive 
comment was shocking to the DS popular base, and required a decisive reply from 
Borhami to correct Nader (Borhami, 2014). Thus, despite of the fact that the youth and 
the party members seem to be more open, and closer to the people, they do adhere to 
DS’ principles and to the agreed upon policy for the party, and are well disciplined in 
this regard, particularly when it comes to religious issues, or when there is conflict 
between what is religious and what is political. 
In the months leading to June 30th Revolution, seculars’ TV talk shows dealt with 
reservations on MB’ exclusive policies, and the deterioration of living conditions under 
their rule. An example of such talk shows was one that came in a series of episodes, 
under the title of “What makes us angry in Egypt,” in which various political and 
cultural figures took part, and it even welcomed a member of NP, whereas MB’ 
representatives were absent. In such an example, besides the presence of NP and the 
absence of MB, there were a number of observations. First, it was not common to see a 
female singer wearing a revealing dress and singing in the presence of a Salafi. Second, 
the young NP member, while present, seemed not to be part of the scene, despite the 
fact that he was building mainly on a political rather than a religious discourse. This is 
because he was critical to media imbalance, and obviously defended all Islamists all the 
time, giving hints about seculars’ disrespect of democratic mechanisms, and was not on 
the same page of the rest of the participants who were critical of the exclusionary nature 
and the confrontational means of MB and its Islamist alliance, which Al-Nor was no 
longer part thereof.  Third, such attitude alienated him and gave an impression that he is 
pro-MB, while the official position of his party was against them. Such scene could be 
taken representative of DS and NP position in society in general, after June 30th, 2013, 
when they were judged by rival powers and social groups to be serving as a fifth 
column, or as another version of MB (field notes August-October 2013). This marked 
the beginning of another phase of social isolation for DS. 
In sum, following up the discourse of DS and NP texts after 2011 Revolution, it is 
observed that they constituted a reproduction of their discourse. It also proved that, 
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despite the apparent changes represented in attending talk shows and building upon 
political discourses, they did not change their argumentation, and wording, or changed 
their religious or change discourses. Thus, change was confined to the genre, style, a 
relative increase in the political component depending on the position of the person, and 




APPENDIX 5: WOMEN, CHRISTIANS, AND CULTURE 
 
Women in the Discourse and Reality of DS and NP: 
Unlike the image of weak, submissive women shrouded in black, field observations185 
and findings have unexpectedly revealed that the majority of female members of DS 
and NP are well educated, occupying major positions in both the organization and party, 
while practicing very important professions in society. In addition, they have been 
active at various stages over the progress of DS, as an organized social movement. 
They, however, do not deny that the movement was joined by average uneducated 
women, for instance, simple peasants, whom they think understand the simple message 
of DS but are not capable of expressing it, and that outsiders intend to make 
generalizations about the movement through focusing on these women (int. F. leader, 
2013). 
Such findings were quite puzzling in the light of the strict teachings and opinions of DS’ 
founders on the one hand, and the deeply-rooted negative beliefs of non-Salafis about 
such women on the other. 
The Social and State Perceptions of Salafi Women 
The social isolation of religious or veiled women in general, let alone the ones wearing 
Niqab, was attributed to the fact that such women perceived their Islam as being 
different from that of the mainstream of community and of Al-Azhar (Ahmed, 2011: 
80), to the extent that “some people were not only baffled but also were offended and 
angered by the dress” (Ahmed, 2011: 84). However, Salafi women interviewed in DS, 
believed that what they abide by is “the Islam” not a version different from that of the 
society, and they believed that people are good by nature, and that they just lack the 
knowledge as concerns some religious issues (Gawwad, 2013, int. F. leader, 2013).They 
also stressed the fact that they try to study in Al-Azhar (int. F. leader, 2013)186, and 
some of them graduated in the institutions of Endowment Ministry (Gawwad, 2013). 
Nevertheless, the literature on women who were influenced by the Islamic resurgence 
movement in Egypt, showed for instance, that professors began in the 1970s to dismiss 
girls wearing veil from their classes, and some people perceived such girls as 
backwards, who were being  paid by Saudi Arabia to encourage them wear such veil 
(Ahmed, 2011): 84-86). In this regard, Dr. Allam187 mentioned that cars might chase 
girls to call them bad names and ridicule them for their Niqab, “despite  the fact that 
some of them are medical doctors, enjoying strong patriotic feeling”, but, are severely 
criticised by fellow Egyptians (Int. Allam, 2013). Meanwhile, she mentioned that 
medical doctors wearing Niqab are generally deprived from enjoying scholarships for 
higher medical studies, and that their bosses bluntly tell them that such deprivation is 
                                                             
185 The researcher managed to meet 33 DS’ and NP’s female members. 
186 Kafr El Dawwar leader’s daughter is a graduate of one of Al-Azhar institute and was top of her class, thus, was 
aiming to teaching at the same institute.  
187 Allam is a political and religious leader, while her husband decided not to work in politics, and he is just a medical 
doctor dedicating his time to scientific research. 
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intentional because they wear Niqab, and that their outfit should not be normalized. 
Furthermore, Allam mentioned that her son who suffers deaf mutism, was also deprived 
of an educational scholarship in USA or Japan, which was secured by the Library of 
Alexandria, because his mother was found to be wearing Niqab (Int. Allam, 2013). 
Niqab was connected to extremism, terrorism, and security concerns, at least, 
unnecessary religious exaggeration, especially if it is not legalized or encouraged by 
official religious institutions (Hackensberger, 2009, Salama, 2007)188. 
Such attitude assumed by both the State and society was reinforced by media and 
cinema that affirmed the negative conceptual images about Islamists in general, and 
among them Salafis, linking Niqab and veil to women commodification, which were in 
such movies an indication of fundamentalists’ corruption (Khatib, 2006): 89-90), 
besides, attributing all what is not Egyptian to Islamists (Khatib, 2006): 90-91). 
Egyptian movies generally excluded the different meanings behind the veil, while 
focusing on one perspective that associates veil with backwardness and repression. 
Even if veiled women were allowed to speak their passivity reflected their silence, 
whereas unveiling and liberation were represented as factors that give women a say in 
society. In addition, veil was used to signify difference and to distinguish Egyptian from 
the “Other”, where the Egyptian identity is constructed and based on modern and 
secular notions, which are seeking to destroy alternative bases of identity (Khatib, 2006: 
91). 
Despite of all obstacles and harassment, the number of women wearing that outfit is in 
the rise (Ahmed, 2011: 145). This poses questions about the extent of such women's 
conviction, and of the intellectual references that form their strong belief and will to 
challenge all the pressures of state and society. 
Women in DS’ discourse and literature: 
It was observed in the field, and through CDA, that the founders’ contributions 
constituted the main intellectual source for DS’ affiliates. In one of the meetings with a 
female leader189 in Al-Buhayra governorate, the researcher was referred to the main 
intellectual reference of DS’ women that is A’wdet El Hijab (The Return of the Veil), a 
book written by Sheikh Mohamed Ismail Al-Moqaddem (int. F. leader). That woman 
offered the researcher the second part of the book that includes the rights, duties, and all 
the rules and regulations that has to do with women’s lives. In addition, almost all male 
and female members when they discuss women’s issues and position, they would 
mention proudly Al-Moqaddem’s introductory quote: “You are half of the nation and 
you give birth to the other half, then you are the whole nation” (Al-Moqaddem, 1999). 
                                                             
188 Then-Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, Sheikh Mohammad Sayed Tantawi, stated that full-face veil “is not religiously 
permissible” and that it is only a tradition that has nothing to do with Islam. He then issued a decision preventing girl 
students in religious institutes from wearing Niqab. The Supreme Council, as the highest seat of religious learning in 
Sunni Islam approved of the decision and it was enforced. Later on, the Ministry of Higher Education approved the 
decision and stated that it should apply to all Egyptian Universities. 
189 Kafr El Dawwar leader is just a religious leader, and despite that her husband is a political and a religious leader 
and ex-parliament member, she has chosen not to work in politics, and saw that she prefers not to take any 




In this book, Al-Moqaddem defends the full veil, as prescribed by Islamic Shari’a, and 
the traditional role of women as mothers and wives at the first place, according to Salafi 
interpretation. Al-Moqaddem attributed calls for women’s liberation to a western 
conspiracy that aims at ruining the Muslim society through corrupting women. For him, 
women are a double edged sword, as they are the corner stone of Muslim renaissance 
since they are responsible for education and the bringing up of Muslim generations. He 
believes that without women’s role prosperity and Muslim Caliphate cannot be revived. 
Accordingly, since women are the key for success, their deviation and corruption would 
be the easiest way to destroy any society (Al-Moqaddem, 1999: 7-14). He discussed 
legal guardians’ responsibility for women’s straightforwardness, and held progressive 
fathers and contemporary husbands responsible for women’s misconceptions and 
departure from God’s teachings (Al-Moqaddem, 1999). He says that women were 
manipulated and pushed to leave their homes for education and work under a non-
Muslim system that exposes them to men in coeducation institutes and workplaces, 
where they are associated with men, let alone the social events that combine both sexes. 
He condemned those who call for women’s liberation describing them as the real 
enemies of women, since they overload them with issues that are beyond women’s 
nature and capabilities, and then they manipulate them (Al-Moqaddem, 1999: 32-34). 
Al-Moqaddem sees that women have been taught that such liberation would save them 
from the enthrallment and that it is their right that they should never give up (Al-
Moqaddem, 1999: 25, 34). Women for Al-Moqaddem are defined through their 
relationship to men, since she is the mother, sister, wife, and daughter of Mujahidin, or 
of men generally. Thus, Al-Moqaddem views women’s duties and contributions as 
dependent on men’s role (Al-Moqaddem, 1999: 25). He provided a comparative study 
to show the difference in women’s status under various civilizations, whether  Greek, 
Roman, Chinese, Indian, and Iraqi civilizations, extending the comparison to consider 
women's status  under both Judaism and Christianity on one hand, and their status under 
Islam on the other. According to his narrative women were humiliated under all such 
civilizations and were deprived of their basic rights, to the extent that their human 
nature was questioned (Al-Moqaddem, 1999: 45-56)190. In addition, he provided an 
overview of women in pre-Islam Society (Jahilyya) and concluded by describing 
women’s status in contemporary, non-Muslim societies as being humiliated, full of 
deviation and exploitation (Al-Moqaddem, 1999)191. Islam then came to honour women 
who are men's partners, and they became equally responsible for work and for life. He 
mentioned examples of mercy and honouring of women in Islam (Al-Moqaddem, 1999: 
75-96). For him, complete woman–man equality is impossible, due to the difference in 
their nature. He then stated a number of differences between men and women. For 
instance, women cannot go to Jihad, they cannot become prophets, in most cases they 
get less inheritance, they cannot divorce, compensation for women’s murder is half that 
                                                             
190 Such tendency to compare the “honoured, precious, and protected Muslim women” to the “humiliated and 
suffering women” in the west and in other cultures and civilizations throughout history was the attitude of all the 
interviewees whether males or females, when women’s rights issue is raised.  
191 He sees that girls in the west are kicked out of their homes at the age of 18, and if they stay at their homes, they 
would pay the rent of their room and their living expenses to their parents. All this led to a number of consequences 




of men, she cannot become a president, and they cannot enjoy polygamy. In addition, 
women are generally, emotional and passionate, and the fact that in court two female 
witnesses are equivalent to one male witness, is an evidence for him, that women’s 
normal place is her home. Thus, women are not fully aware of legal and financial issues 
and need to remind each other. Women should have a legal guardian and a mahram192 to 
accompany her when she travels (Al-Moqaddem, 1999: 134-135, 145-146, 147-152). 
He also discussed mother’s rights and duties, the mutual rights and duties of married 
couples. Again, he mentioned biographies of strong believers and women scholars (Al-
Moqaddem, 1999: 209-475, 539-561, 600-627). Such book, which was written by the 
founder of DS, constituted the foundational book, or guide on women and women’s role 
and rights for DS’ followers. 
This explains the fact that before January Revolution, and in a lecture in 2009, Sheikh 
Yasser Borhami (Borhami, 2009a) said that women should not become guardians and 
that they should not become parliament members. Salafis generally depend in this 
regard on the Hadith saying: "No people would thrive if they ordain a woman as their 
sovereign". 
After the 2011 Revolution, women of DS were encouraged to undergo political 
participation. Accordingly, they joined the membership of Nor Party, the political wing 
of DS, and Sheikh Borhami issued an advisory opinion (Fatwa) allowing women to run 
for parliamentary elections. In his counsel, he said that the basic rule is that women 
should not be parliament members. However, he added, Islam encourages Muslims to 
maximize benefits and minimize losses. Hence, based on cost benefit analysis women 
can exceptionally run for elections, as the harm of violating the basic religious rule is 
less than the harm of leaving the parliament exclusively to secularists, who might issue 
a constitution that violates Islam and restricts Da’awa. He also said that if DS had 
banned political participation under a corrupt regime, the Revolution now secures a 
better political climate, where their participation would be meaningful (Borhami, 
2011a). 
Using the same logic, Borhami, in another counsel, allowed veiled women to uncover 
their faces while voting. He said that besides the fact that uncovering face is allowed by 
religion  in case of necessity, the harm of a foreigner looking into a woman’s face is 
much lesser than quitting  political participation at this critical point, when Muslims are 
required to support the agenda of Islam and safeguard national identity. Thus, all 
women are encouraged to vote and to mobilize others to promote the true Islamic 
approach (Borhami, 2011b). 
At the first Salafi women’s conference in Alexandria in October 2011, Borhami stressed 
again that women’s participation in parliament is a corrupt act which is not allowed by 
religion but the NP is obliged to accept such condition for political participation, instead 
of leaving the whole political scene to those who might fight Islam and the call for God 
(Abu El-Enin, 2011 ). 
                                                             
192 Someone of her relatives to chaperon her, i.e. a husband, a father, a son, or a brother. 
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Salafi women candidates then raised lots of questions and cast doubt on the NP’s 
perceptions of women’s rights and their agenda in this regard, when they put the 
pictures of flowers and sometimes the photos of their husbands 193, instead of their 
photos, on their electoral banners. At such time, members of the NP defended such 
attitude as a free personal choice of full-face veiled women candidates, who would not 
in any way show their faces in pictures, especially, that showing a picture is not 
enjoined by law. So, the party can never force these women to show their faces to the 
public against their own will (Hassanen, 2011).  
At a meeting with women of NP leaders in Alexandria in January 2014, they confirmed 
to the researcher that such attitude came out of their own choice, and that they are 
irritated by the exaggerations and prejudgements of such matter in the media. They also 
mentioned that their faces do not make any difference, as the more important is their 
capabilities and skills, which enable them to come up with creative ideas that would 
serve their country's people (Meeting Female leaders). Such arguments were again 
confirmed during the preparations for 2015 parliamentary elections, where women are 
given the right to use the logo of the party instead of their faces (Mahmoud, 2015). In 
this concern, Dr. Allam asserted that the main criteria of choosing the women 
candidates are the same applied for men, and that Niqab is not an obligation, but rather 
the capability of acting in the parliament, together with the critical analytical mind. 
Meanwhile, women must have the will to give priority to public interests over personal 
or party interests (Kamal, 2014).   
To sum up, the founders of DS and its leaders are clear about the religious restrictions 
on women’s public guardianship and the priorities of women’s duties in Islam. 
Obviously their discourse, as concerns women, contradicts the feminist and liberal 
discourses. However, unlike the general impression that Salafis are dogmatically 
reserved as concerns women’s rights, they proved to be adaptive and flexible in one of 
the most critical issues in their thought. In view of a feminist or liberal thought, this 
flexibility could be read by some outsiders as a tactic, in contradiction to Salafi thought, 
while for others it constituted a religious concession for the sake of gaining power. This 
added to the aforementioned negative conceptual image about Salafis as hypocritical or 
corrupt, and that when they would actually assume power they would ruin all the 
achievements, which women made over the past years. On contrary to the suspicions 
which the non-Salafis made, and which the researcher observed in the field, NP’s 
members confirmed on various occasions that they strictly abide by the established rules 
of the Salafi thought, which implied the necessity of judging each case separately, and 
of applying cost-benefit analysis, where they should maximize gains and minimize 
losses without committing fatal violations to Shari’a (int. F. leader, 2013). Accordingly, 
DS’ women do not deny that women’s public guardianship is a corrupt act, and that 
they did not give any concessions during the electoral process itself, as regards 
women’s veil, and the appropriate Islamic conduct. 
                                                             
193 However, in the case of putting husband’s name or picture instead of the woman candidate’s, the NP’s spokesman 
mentioned several times that it was a plot against NP, and that the party filed a process verbal at the police in this 
regard, yet, such information was not corrected in any of the Egyptian or western media sources (AL-AL-HADIDI, L. 
2011a. Nadder Bakkar Interview with Lamees El-Hadidi. 
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Field Observations and CDA Results: 
The researcher met a number of DS’ and NP’s women, who were visited at their homes, 
NP’s headquarters, and work place, in Alexandria, Al-Buhayra, and Al-Fayyom 
(Women's committee, 2014, Gawwad, 2013, kindergarden, 2013, int. F. leader, 2013, 
doctor, 2013). However, the access to Salafi women was not easy and required a long 
time to gain confidence and understanding to the project from the side of male leaders 
and members first, who then allowed the researcher to spend long time in their homes 
with women members and to meet their families. On the one hand, years of state 
oppression and fear from the state security, counter-Islamist movements, particularly, 
the MB, and intruders might explain the high standards of women protection. On the 
other hand, this matches the over-protective Salafi teachings as concerns men’s duties 
towards women, and women’s precautions and restrictions on movement and interaction 
with the society. As a result of the abovementioned conditions, women’s activism and 
fame were confined to their city or village, and may be to their neighbourhood. Thus, 
there were many local female leaders and preachers, yet they were not known to the 
public in the same degree like their male counterparts (int. F. leader). This meant that 
DS’ women worked in the public domain, yet only on the social level, over the last four 
decades. However, their recent active role in politics was based on their contributions 
and reputation in their districts. Dr. Allam confirmed this in her narrative of how she 
was chosen to become the NP Secretary-General of Women and of her clashes with 
MB, since she said that they have always known her as a rival (Int. Allam, 2013). 
Unexpectedly, all the ladies that the researcher met were well educated even if they did 
not enjoy a high social status, but they stressed that education, research and knowledge 
are in the core of the movements’ thought. For instance, the researcher met with medical 
doctors, PhD holders, scientists, and a lawyer, who wears Niqab, education specialists 
and a school headmistress, who wore coloured head covers, and having average make-
up. Even those who did not work, or belonged to lower social classes still had an active 
role in charity work and in Da’awa. This could be explained by the fact that DS started 
in universities, and that most of them joined the movement when they were 
undergraduates. 
Moreover, the women interviewed by the researcher, seemed to be generally 
enthusiastic and confident. Out of their daily life stories, it was clear that they are 
empowered at both the DS and NP, and they attributed this to the fact that Islam stresses 
husband and wife partnership194. However, for them, men and women are never equal, 
yet, through their various contributions in life, they complement one another. For 
instance, a female leader said that husbands and wives developed their ideological 
tendencies and religious knowledge through this partnership. Since they were studying 
together, discussing, and even arguing until they formed an understanding that their 
choices might not be the same as their husbands’ choices (int. F. leader). Another 
female member said that she was conservative since she was a child but she only 
                                                             
194 Women can join DS even if their brothers or husbands are MB or belong to any other Islamist group. A young 
lady mentioned that she is facing pressures from her MB brother to leave DS, especially after June 30, but she insists 
on her position, and is highly critical of her brother’s attitude. 
339 
 
became a Salafi once she joined DS’ Al-Furqan Institute with her husband (Int. Allam, 
2013). Actually, women’s memories and narratives showed that Salafi thought and code 
of conduct were never imposed on them by their husbands, but was a personal choice 
that developed through research and education, and was sometimes associated with a 
certain turning point in their lives. 
At one of the meetings with an ex-Shura Council member at his home in Al-Buhayra 
Governorate his wife, who was one of the interviewees as well, had been interrupting 
him, she had a loud voice, self-confidence, and her husband respected her and even 
relied on her to remind him of some points. This same lady, who asked the researcher 
not to mention her name, said that she was responsible for her home, and that she has 
taken care of her husband when he was imprisoned during Mubarak’s rule, and that this 
is what women of the movement would normally do. She said that since she was in a 
critical situation, she moved on her own without a mahram. Yet, this was an exceptional 
case, and that normally she would prefer not to break the rules of women’s travel and 
movement (int. F. leader). This was not the only case since similar visits in Alexandria, 
and Al-Fayyom proved that women were neither silent nor suppressed at their homes. 
They know that DS’ men never practice polygamy, which can never be tolerated by 
women of DS. Moreover, it is clear that women's observation of Salafi teachings and 
acceptance of the restrictions, identity, social role, and duties that such teachings dictate, 
is a matter of personal choice. 
Out of the aforementioned observations, women are actually the backbone of the 
movement, and might be one of the reasons of its survival and its hidden point of 
strength, since they were responsible for the bringing up of the new generations, 
educating them and spreading DS’ thought in homes, kindergartens, institutes and 
mosques, as well as being socially active through socializing and charity work (int. F. 
leader, 2013, kindergarden, 2013)195. They also managed to protect their homes and 
families when their husbands faced oppression and arrest by the State Security. 
Thus, it was not surprising, that they stressed that their strong affiliation to DS and then 
to NP was based on critical thinking, interaction and research, and sometimes through 
comparing DS to other Islamist groups and even secular entities (Meeting Female 
leaders). In addition, they were keen on clarifying that they can pose to their sheikhs 
certain controversial questions, and can argue against their sheikhs’ opinions and 
decisions. They even mentioned that Sheikh Borhami held conferences and lectures to 
discuss women’s political concerns, and that their female leaders do not take their 
opinions for granted (Meeting Female leaders). 
Such general findings added to the puzzle, which required a deeper look at the texts 
collected in the field, in view of the intellectual references of the interviewees, and of 
their social and political context. In this regard, the researcher operationalized CDA to 
the texts, in order to take account of the contradictions and to contextualize such texts. 
 
                                                             




This part presents a brief overview of the results of CDA of texts collected in the field.  
The texts were characterized by high affinity as regards opinions and suppositions 
mentioned by the women in reaction to both religious and political questions, reflected 
in assertive verbs and expressions, and the modality was generally subjective where the 
pronoun used is ‘We’, which gives the sense of high awareness of their identity, and a 
unified attitude towards certain issues. 
As concerns the ethos (self-identification); the postures, frequent laughs and joking, 
firm language, strong voices, and facial expressions, were ways women wanted to say 
that they are happy, liberated, and empowered, and to send a clear message that 
conceptual images about them are not true. They were also keen to look presentable 
within their homes to prove that women can fully enjoy their lives in their private 
sphere, and that Niqab does not deprive them of their femininity and self-esteem196. 
Regarding cohesion within the texts, the cohesive makers are explicit on the surface of 
the text, which at some point gave a sense of tutorial and preaching approach, and 
reflected an organized stream of thought. For instance, cohesive makers were used for 
deduction through stating a group of facts or conditions and coming up with a logical 
conclusion. As for transitivity, God and his rule are the main agents in all the processes 
and actions. In addition, there is a general tendency to state events (event and goal), and 
relational processes, especially when they mention MB, who were their historical rivals. 
However, unlike men, women interviewees were more open about their criticism to 
MB, and Mubarak’s regime and would use clear sentences in that regard. 
The ladies’ wording: “God’s love”, “obedience of God”, to reflect that their motives and 
authority all come from God. They mentioned “Egypt”, “the country and love of the 
country”, “serving the country”, “I love the soil of Egypt”, “we are highly patriotic”, 
rather than the Muslim Umma or the nation, which implied a nationalist patriotic 
attitude, unlike fellow Islamists who might not respect borders among Muslim 
countries. They also used jargons and technical language when they discussed religious 
issues, in addition to the English scientific terms that were used particularly by the 
medical doctors, in addition to words such as the “triangle of poverty, ignorance, and 
illness”, the “social context”, and “respect of traditions”. This implied their level of 
education and their awareness of their social and political context. There was also the 
use of the words, “our dear sisters” and similar emotional wording even when they talk 
about their rivals, which reflected both their nature as women and as activists in a 
religious movement rather than political party members. Words like exclusion, we were 
                                                             
196 In the Party meeting, female leaders, and young NP’s members acted spontaneously, and stressed a feminine 
identity, as wives, mothers, and ladies who go out of their homes mainly for religious reasons, and for God’s reward, 
thus, they did not conform to the professional look and style of working women, and politicians. Besides sticking to a 
traditional feminine identity, and being passionate when they express their views, babies and children came with their 
mothers; however, this might be because of the special nature of this meeting that was more of a focus group to 
discuss the work of women in NP with the researcher. Many of them besides being mothers, they carry out social 
work, spread Da’awa, and might be also studying in post-graduate programs. They were proud with their activities 
and hard work, and repeated that despite being what they are, they have various contributions.  
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excluded, fear, obliged, all reflected their grievances under the pre-Revolution regimes 
and the MB counter-movement that aimed at dominating Islamist groups. 
As regards turn taking, it occurred smoothly and did not reflect a strict hierarchy, except 
in the party meeting when the Secretary-General of women in the party tried to control 
the discussion and women responses to the researcher. She did that clearly in a mentor 
like attitude, and it seemed that they accepted her directions willingly, may be because 
she is their mentor as they said, or because the researcher was present and they wanted 
to keep a good image and a unified attitude towards the various issues discussed. 
However, Dr. Allam was not able to keep control most of the time, since women were 
keen on telling the new comer everything about the activities they are proud of and to 
share their political views, and the explanation of their righteous religious approach. For 
instance, by the end of the women party meeting, after each one took her turn to speak, 
voices overlapped and they all interrupted each other. 
On the discursive level, the discourses they built upon were scientific religious and 
political ones, despite of the fact that the genre of the texts collected are semi-structured, 
and conversational interviews, besides a focus group, encounters with female DS’ and 
NP’s members were closer to women’s everyday talk. However, sometimes women 
seemed well prepared for the meetings and there were clear messages sent to the society 
through the researcher. The style is an informal spoken text, that is conducted in 
Egyptian accent, and that it is both critical and argumentative. They would listen to the 
issues and claims that the researcher discusses, refutes them, and provides a counter-
argument. 
As regards Intertextuality, the texts quoted and used were from Quran, Sunna, and the 
contributions of the DS’ founders, mainly Al-Moqaddem's book. They also joked and 
were ironic about the criticisms and the prejudgements against Salafis. However, except 
for the women’s party meeting that was attended by several young ladies, and fresh 
graduates, it was obvious that they do not usually quote expressions or passages from 
popular culture, whether movies, theatre, drama, songs, or even proverbs, which are 
texts Egyptians generally use in their daily conversations. Moreover, they expressed in 
all cases their disrespect of some arts and considered them banned by religion, which 
might have contributed to their relative isolation from the society on the cultural 
level197. 
As for intertextual chains, as mentioned above, the texts included an adaptation to Al-
Moqaddem's book and to Islamic teachings from women’s point of view. 
In almost all the interactions with the Salafi women their strategy was to accommodate 
the researcher, and express appreciation to her personally and towards her project. They 
treated her as a “We” not the “Other” despite of the fact that the researcher is unveiled 
and had a western look, for instance they told her “You are a Salafi by nature”. They 
also used their knowledge, education and professions to assume authority over the 
researcher, for example as preachers, or medical doctors, in order to convince her that 
                                                             
197 Further details will be discussed in the section on culture and de-culturation in DS’ discourse. 
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what they say are facts not just opinions. As for the content of the texts, women were 
defending the Salafi thought and rules as concerns women, with all possible arguments, 
for instance, as concerns legal guardian, inheritance, and the role of women and their 
political rights. Their main argumentation was that none of the rules influence 
negatively their independence and free will, and that they consider them to their 
advantage and protection, rather than means of suppression. 
To assess how such texts are consumed by the public, the researcher shared the content 
of the texts with people in her community and in this regard, people had mixed feelings 
of relief that there might be some hope in such ultra-conservative parties, yet, they 
generally do not believe them and have doubts that they are pretending to be tolerant, 
and open minded to gain votes and assume power. 
In order to explain the gap between the findings about Salafi women in the field 
and the doubts and conceptual images that the public has about them, the textual 
and discursive analysis above should be contextualized. 
Among the negative images that Egyptians have about Salafis, is their oppressive nature 
or, at least, the fact that they believe that they own the only right explanation of religion. 
Such image seemed to be closer to reality through the discourse analysis of DS’ ladies. 
For despite of all the efforts to prove their tolerance and acceptance of the Other, Salafi 
women’s assertive tone and firm language about all what they believe in religiously and 
politically, implies that they might feel that they knew the truth, and that they want to 
inform people with their right understanding, and share it with them. Thus, even if as 
per the interviewees, they do not assume superiority over the society, and they tend to 
adopt a containment approach198, their determinism, and firm holding to their beliefs 
might have created a distance between them and their society. However, the researcher 
was told that young non-Salafi girls are never obliged to wear the veil in the Quran and 
religious schools of DS (kindergarden, 2013)199, and that forcing them to cover would 
be useless, for the reason that if the girls are not convinced with the veil, they would 
throw it away once they leave the school (kindergarden, 2013). This attitude implies a 
bottom-up approach based on persuasion, and conforms to DS’ general methodology. 
However, despite of the relatively mild practices, the discourse produced gives the 
opposite impression. 
Nevertheless, Salafi women would not be as liberated and empowered as they try to 
show, since they actually try to convince themselves and the others with all the 
explanations of DS’ sheikhs as concerns perspective on women, and despite their 
                                                             
198 According to the researcher’s experience, DS’ women do not criticize the subject of da’awa, but rather build upon 
any positive side in him or her according to their point of view. 
199 The head of the Alexandria kindergarten is the wife of a prominent figure in NP; yet, she preferred not to be 
identified and refused to record the conversational interview. She mentioned that she has chosen to keep a low 
profile, not to work in politics and is not interested in political discussions,  and she confined her contribution to 
taking care of babies and children, while focusing as well on her home and her own children. According to her the 
kindergarten serves non-Salafis in the district, as well, and they find it a clean and a reliable place to leave their 
children in, especially when they get some religious education and recite Quran, starting at the age of three, through 
using the “Norany method”. The lady and her husband showed interest in human development courses and events, 
and in education. She was wearing Niqab, and spoke in a low voice, and despite of her social work, she was a shy 
person, not outspoken like the rest of DS’ ladies met in other contexts.  
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personal free choice to be Salafis, they are subject to such explanations and confine 
their understanding to Islam to them, even if these interpretations might be challenging 
or intolerable when applied in everyday life. However, they stress that each case has its 
own conditions, since there is no generalization in Islam, thus, exceptions are always 
possible depending on the situation. For instance, they said that they approve of all 
God’s rules and orders, and among them polygamy, yet they do not tolerate that their 
husband marries another one. In the case of the Kafr El Dawwar leader she said that in 
her situation, she moved around without a mahram to visit her husband in prison and 
provide him with necessary medicine. “Thus, in case of necessity there is always 
flexibility” (int. F. leader, 2013). They all stressed that  their life is not as tough as 
others might see (Women's committee, 2014). Beyond the precision of such statements, 
this is another evidence of the gap between DS’ strict discourse, and their rather mild 
practices. 
Besides being perceived as strict, Salafi women are sometimes not considered fully 
Egyptian, which is not only attributed to their appearance, but also as aforementioned, 
because of the fact that they are culturally isolated, despite of their active role on ground 
between charity and call for God. 
In addition, DS’ Salafi women kept a low profile due to the fears they had; the 
harassment, exclusion, and pressures, on part of their counter-movement the MB and 
the state security (all interviews), thus their reality was not revealed to the public. In 
addition, the simplicity of the DS’ discourse that refers Muslims to Quran and Sunna 
through Salaf understanding attracted a large number of women from different 
backgrounds and among them poor women who might not be educated like the leaders 
and active members of the organization and NP. Such women who are unable to explain 
and argue contributed to the negative image of manipulated women Salafis, “even if 
they are not and are only unable to express themselves” (int. F. leader). 
To sum up Salafi women provide a new model of women politicians and activists who 
might be more powerful than many unveiled and westernized women, yet they do not 
match the feminist and liberal discourses of women’s liberation and of how a successful 
women should look like, in addition to the obvious gap between DS’ strict religious 
discourse, and their mild practices. 
Moreover, Salafi women might be culturally isolated, thus, are judged as non Egyptians 
especially those who wear Niqab among them. However, these women always stress 
that they are Egyptians; yet, they do not match the dominant nationalist discourses, 
where such nationalist discourses also assume that they own the truth about the 
Egyptian national identity. 
In conclusion, Salafi women are not the submissive women shrouded in black, 
meanwhile, they do not fully resemble a liberated model but a pattern in between. The 
gap between their feeling of over-confidence and success and the image of a submissive 
woman could be mainly attributed to society’s attempts to impose liberal, feminist, and 
nationalist discourses on them, while they actually represent a different model, yet not 
necessarily in a negative or a positive sense. What augmented DS’ women’s societal 
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crisis was their personal choice to keep a low profile, and to adhere to their role 
prescribed by the religious interpretations they adopt.  
Christians in DS’ and NP’s Discourse: 
One of the most controversial issues about DS and NP was their discourse about 
Christians generally, and particularly as regards their citizenship and full political rights. 
This section discusses the results of CDA of texts collected in the field, through 
interviews with NP’s and DS’ leaders, their youth and women.  
The wording of the texts analyzed revealed that Christians were linked to concepts of 
“Nasara”200 with the positive connotation of those who supported the religion or the 
order of God. By this word the Quran describes them (Women's committee, 2014). 
However, an NP’s female member said that Christians do not like the word despite that 
it is an honour for them to be supporters of God’s orders, yet they prefer to be named 
after Christ, thus, Salafis go around this and call them by their own names in everyday 
life (Women's committee, 2014). In nearly all the interviews that discussed Christians’ 
affairs there was a strong reference to their history under Muslim rule, and in one of the 
interviews the word Ahl Al-Dhimma/Zimma was linked to Christians (int. Nasr, 2013). 
The “Dhimmi” according to Oxford Encyclopaedia of Islam and law is “a non-Muslim 
who is in the covenant of protection (dhimmah) with the Muslim ruling authority. 
The dhimmah accorded hospitality and protection to Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, and 
in some cases other non-Muslims, on condition that they paid the jizyah (a poll tax) and 
acknowledged the domination of Islam (Scott, 2016). ”  
According to the American Heritage Dictionary a Zimmi is “a non –Muslim subject of a 
state governed under Shari’a laws. Under such state they are granted the freedom to 
worship, and they entitled to the protection of life and property by the state, although 
they were constrained to pay a special tax. However, they were not granted full legal 
status accorded to Muslim subjects (Dictionary, 2011). 
Even if the exact word of Dhimmis was not used, its definition prevailed in describing 
Christians’ rights in Islam. Makhyon said that “Islam prescribes that Muslims should 
protect non-Muslims, which means that a Muslim might sacrifice his life for the sake of 
defending a Christian”, and that Christians enjoy respect and all the rights, particularly 
the right to hold their prayers and rituals, and they carry out their duties as well (int. 
Makhyon, 2013). In reference to Christians’ status, Ahmed Rashwan said that in 
Muslim countries we have a different contract (conv. int. Rashwan, 2013). Adel Nasr 
stressed that Shari’a prevented causing any harm to Christians (int. Nasr, 2013).  
They tended to provide historical evidence from the Islamic history on how non-
Muslims enjoyed dignity and peace under the Islamic rule 201  (int. Nasr, 2013). In 
modern history they refer to the fact that Pope Shenouda III had resorted to article 2 of 
                                                             
200 Most interviewees used this word.  
201 To the extent that Jews fled oppression in Andalusia to the Ottoman empire in order to gain more rights under 
Islamic rule, in addition to the favourable conditions Christians live under the Islamic rule in Egypt, after being 
suppressed and tortured by fellow Christian Romans (INT. NASR, A. 7.11.2013, 2.15-5.30. 
 2013. RE: interview. 
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the constitution in order to defend the church’s right to manage Christian personal 
affairs, according to Christian religious verdicts, as Islamic Shari’a prescribes (int. Nasr, 
2013, int. Makhyon, 2013). Thus, NP’s members and DS’ sheikhs see that Islam and 
Shari’a, if applied in the right way would be the guarantee for the rights of the Christian 
minority (int. Nasr, 2013, int. Makhyon, 2013). However, such definition of Christians’ 
rights implies an incomplete citizenship, and despite that they recognize all social and 
protection rights, according to Makhyon Christians’ rights are “not absolute, since we 
are a country with a Muslim majority, and minority and majority could never be equal 
in everything” (int. Makhyon, 2013). Nasr said that Islam has a comprehensive Shari’a 
and is based on preserving religion and ruling the earthly life according to the divine 
rules. “This Shari’a is complete and free of any alterations, I am not like that of 
Christians, that is based on some values and moral rulings” (int. Nasr, 2013). Therefore, 
Nasr asked “would it be logical that the governor who rules Muslims with their religion, 
Shari’a, and Manhaj be a non-Muslim?” (int. Nasr, 2013). For Nasr, and Makhyon, 
according to the modern democratic system it is a majority rule. Consequently, as a 
Muslim majority, will be ruled by Shari’a, and in Islam this who can accomplish the 
objectives, should be a Muslim, since a non-Mulsim can never maintain Shari’a (int. 
Nasr, 2013). In addition, the president is a role model (int. Nasr, 2013, int. Makhyon, 
2013).  
Moreover, they believe that, based on human instinct any social group should be ruled 
by someone who shares its belief (int. Nasr, 2013). DS’ and NP’s members do not see 
any discrimination in this regard, (int. Makhyon, 2013) but it is the human nature, and 
logic that in any human group, majority will take more rights, and their belief will 
prevail, and they would prefer a leader who shares this belief (int. Nasr, 2013). 
Nevertheless, they confirmed that the Egyptian law, which is the legal framework under 
which they work and follow, guarantees for Christians full citizenship rights. However, 
“DS’ religious belief and their logic dictates that they must oppose that a Christian 
becomes a presidential candidate, since in Islam there are rules and conditions for 
guardianship that should not be violated, and if it happened they would clearly judge it 
as defying Shari’a, despite the fact that they would still follow the law” (conv. int. 
Rashwan, 2013). Yet, they say that if this is the law, and if the constitution gives the 
right for any non-Muslim or non-Sunni to be a presidential candidate, they bet that due 
to conventions and culture, the Muslim general atmosphere would tend to choose a 
Muslim-Sunni president, and would not accept any other options (int. Makhyon, 2013, 
Int. Mekki, 2013). Meanwhile, Makhyon does not see any problem that Christians hold 
whatever positions in the state, other than the presidency, as long as they proved to be 
experienced and loyal Egyptians. As an evidence to this idea, he mentioned the fact that 
prophet Muhammad used a “kafir guide” in his trip through the desert between Mecca 
and Al-Madina (int. Makhyon, 2013). Moreover, he said that NP believes in 
“administration” rather than “governance” or “ruling” of the country, and that a good 




Besides arguments of “human instinct”, “minority-majority” justification, the practical 
concerns of “convention and culture”, and the “Islamic Shari’a”, that all support an 
incomplete citizenship for Christians, they believe that western practices go beyond 
empowering the majority over the minority, to the extent practising discrimination 
against Muslims, whose conditions are terrible in the west202. Thus, in reality, freedoms 
in the west has a ceiling that protects the foundations of the state (int. Nasr, 2013). 
Whereas Christians in Egypt can refer to their religious verdict in personal affairs, 
Muslims in the west cannot refer to their Shari’a in personal affairs, and should abide by 
the laws of the countries where they live, such as in France, or in the US where for 
instance polygamy is criminalized (int. Nasr, 2013). Therefore, Makhyon sees that 
Christians in Egypt are “the happiest minority in the world, however, they do not 
appreciate the bless that they enjoy” (int. Makhyon, 2013).  
In this regard, they all tended to compare the Christian minority to Muslim minorities in 
the west. The first question that is asked is “why Muslims who pay taxes and carry out 
all their duties in western countries are still treated as second class citizen?” They also 
mention that Muslims are denied the right to specify the religion of the president, while, 
western constitutions sometimes determine the religion and the sect of the president 
which could be for instance, catholic (int. Makhyon, 2013, int. Nasr, 2013). In this 
regard, they criticize the western countries for claiming that they maintain human rights, 
and they blame Muslim countries for discrimination, while they do empower the 
majority over the minority, and even suppress Muslim  minorities (int. Nasr, 2013, int. 
Makhyon, 2013). 
During the period when the field work was conducted had coincided with the work of 
the Fifty’s constitutional committee, after June 30 2013, where the Egyptian church 
representatives opposed the article 219 that interprets the word “principles of Islamic 
Shari’a” under  article 2 of the Constitution, such opposition bothered NP’s members 
who believe that it is “none of the Christians’ business”, and that what Christians call 
the MB’s constitution included article 3 that guarantees rights of Christians to refer to 
their religious verdicts in personal affairs, and to appoint their spiritual leaders. Such 
article was issued for the first time in Egypt’s history, thanks to Islamists where NP’s 
members and among them Makhyon were members in the committee that approved 
such article, at the time when Muslims’ rights are never mentioned in any western 
constitution (int. Makhyon, 2013). Such Christian 203  opposition to article 219, was 
understood by NP’s members as a “conspiracy or a  plot” against Islam to turn it into 
wide vague principles that can never be applied in reality, through voiding article 2 of 
its meaning (int. Makhyon, 2013, int. Nasr, 2013). Such explanation is based on DS’ 
and NP’s narratives about the church’s discourse. Accordingly, they supported their 
fears by evidence from “stories told” about the separatist tendency of late Pope 
Shenouda in the 1950’s who according to their narrative led a Copts’ independence 
movement, besides what they believe is the church’s literature, and their reading of the 
content of the Christian newspaper Watani, in addition to the most recent discursive 
                                                             
202 Some governments refuse to allow minarets or Hijab. 




conflict, discussed in chapter 5, with Bishop Bishoy who considered “Muslims as 
temporary guests in Egypt, and are going to leave” (int. Makhyon, 2013, int. Nasr, 
2013). Such things besides reflecting bad intentions towards Muslims, are perceived by 
DS’ members as “seeds for sectarian sedition,” which  “undermines Egyptian national 
unity”, and “leads to the destruction of the country” (int. Nasr, 2013).  
However, as concerns sectarian sedition incidents, Nasr believed that Muslims and 
Christians are equally responsible for them and that sometimes Christians violate 
Muslims’ rights. For Nasr, article 219 is one example for “how a minority is trying to 
impose its opinion on the majority”, from his point of view (int. Nasr, 2013).” 
Thus, they argued that the Christians are a “positively discriminated at minority”, while 
Muslims are the “oppressed majority subject to discrimination”. Such argument was 
mentioned earlier during the crisis of the church bombings discussed in chapter 5. 
While Sheikh Ahmed Farid avoided to discuss the topic of Christians in the interview 
he said “I swear to God Christians are taking all their rights and even more, Muslims are 
the discriminated at majority”. They seemed to be responding to pressures from the 
west in this regard, which from their point of view completely defies reality of 
Christians in Egypt (int. Nasr, 2013, int. Makhyon, 2013). 
Thus, as concerns citizenship, DS’ and NP’s members do believe in an incomplete 
citizenship for Christians. Despite of their background that is influenced by the concept 
of Dhimmis, which was obvious in their argumentation, however, they preferred to base 
their opinion on the definition of democracy as the majority rule, and on the actual 
application of democracy in western countries. Saying that this indicates that there is no 
absolute democracy or rights, thus, Christians being a minority could never be equated 
to the Muslim majority, from their point of view. Their justification to this exclusionary 
view, is that in practice Muslims in the west are not full citizens, and it is inconceivable 
that at any time, there could be a Muslim presidential candidate in a western country for 
instance (Int. Mekki, 2013). This change in the wording, and the discourses they draw 
upon, where they tended to use definitions of democracy, human rights issues, and legal 
references, did not mean a change in their word meaning where the definition of 
Christians’ status, and the obvious presence of the definition of a Dhimmi, without 
using the word though, reflected consistency in their discourse about Christians’ 
citizenship. They were mainly saying the same thing in a different way, which leads to 
the same conclusion and reflects insistence on adhering to their original DS’ discourse, 
despite becoming political actors. Therefore, in view of the Egyptian constitution, their 
position in this regard, remains politically controversial or incorrect within the Egyptian 
context.  
Nevertheless, they say that when Christians  listen to NP’s viewpoint from NP’s 
members, they react positively (Int. Mekki, 2013). In addition, NP despite having a 
Salafi ideology, is a political party that is open for every Egyptian citizen, even for 
Christians,  as long as they believe in the party’s ideology and objectives (Int. Mekki, 
2013, Women's committee, 2014).  
348 
 
Nevertheless, DS’ members also linked Christians to the word “Kafir,” or infidel in the 
sense that they are non-Muslims, which is a fact, however, for Christians this word 
means that they are atheists, or may be evil, since infidelity in the Egyptian accent is 
used as an exaggeration sometimes to deny evil or lack of mercy. Such word was not 
mentioned in any of the interviews or conversations held in the field with DS’ or NP’s 
members, yet there is evidence from media (Al-Hadidi, 2015, Al-Ibrashi, 2015)204, and 
in comments in talk shows and interviews in the field, with average Egyptians whether 
Muslims or Christians (field notes), indicating that DS’ members use the word.  
What led to more resentment is the repeated fatwa DS’ sheikhs, particularly Borhami 
that it is prohibited in Islam, to greet Christians in their feasts since the Christmas and 
Easter are connected to beliefs that defy Islamic faith. Thus, since in Islam feasts are 
part of religion, then Muslims can only celebrate Edul Fetr and Edul-Audha. 
Meanwhile, Christians are free to enjoy their feasts and are never obliged to greet 
Muslims in theirs, or to do anything against their faith (int. Nasr, 2013). In addition, 
Muslims are free to share Christians all other social occasions, weddings, funerals, 
birth, and they are ordered by religion to support Christians in calamities and visit them 
in case they are ill, or in need for help (int. Nasr, 2013). However, such fatwa irritated 
Christians, and astonished Muslims (Al-Hadidi, 2015, Al-Ibrashi, 2015).Moreover, it 
was not a matter of consensus among Muslim sheikhs (field notes) (Al-Ibrashi, 2015). 
Nevertheless, at the NP’s female members meeting, they insisted on stressing that this 
did not negatively affect their relationship with their Christian friends and neighbours, 
as media says, since they share everything with them, and life is full of occasions that is 
far more important than feasts, in addition to offering charity and services to Christians 
(Women's committee, 2014, Gawwad, 2013). On the contrary, “because of DS’ 
popularity on different levels some Christians joined the party (Women's committee, 
2014).” Some interviewees in the female leaders’ meeting, said that it is a personal 
freedom, and that their Christian friends and colleagues get used to this fatwa, and they 
do not care (Women's committee, 2014). They supported their point by saying that their 
relationship with their Christian neighbours was much better after DS’ efforts in 
protecting them during the 2011 Revolution (Women's committee, 2014). However, 
despite insisting that their relationship is not affected, a lady said that “they used to 
exchange feast cookies with their Christian neighbours and that they used to attend their 
weddings in churches, but after “religious commitment” both stopped doing this” 
(Women's committee, 2014). However, despite the change in the pattern of their 
relationship they still exchange visits (Women's committee, 2014). The wording they 
used was friendly such as “we have Christian neighbours who brought us up”, “they 
care for my 68 years old mum who wears Niqab”, “our Christian neighbour trusts my 
husband and consults him when goes to buy assets” (Women's committee, 2014).  
                                                             
204 Nader Al-Serafi, the founder of 38 Copts against the church personal affairs law, and NP’s Christian candidate for 
2015 parliamentary elections, said that he understands DS’ use of Kafir, as a non-believer, and that he appreciates 
NP’s positions on combating sectarian conflicts, and is equally treated in the party based on the Egyptian 
Constitution, whereas he thinks that NP’ members’ religious belief is goes against the law, religion is not part of his 
relationship with the party. On the contrary, his competitor in the same constituency Suzy Nashed, who is Christian 
as well yet a candidate of the nationalist front “In love of Egypt”, said that she finds the word kafir very offensive and 
that even if it is a fact she does not dare to use the word, and would rather use the word non-believer. Mrs. Nashed, 
believes that NP’s views would harm the Egyptian identity. 
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Such positive language about Christians, their stories about providing their services, and 
support for everybody with no regard to his religion, and that they protected Christian  
properties and churches during 2011 Revolution (int. Nasr, 2013), came against all the 
impressions about Salafis’ perceptions of Christians, despite of conforming to the 
definition of Dhimmi in Islam. Accordingly, such input was focused on issues of social 
rights, and religious obligations and duties of Muslims towards non-Muslims, for 
purposes of peaceful and healthy co-existence similar to that of Al-Madina during the 
days of Prophet Mohammad (Women's committee, 2014, int. Nasr, 2013). “Therefore, 
sticking to their Islamic faith and rulings, does not contradict with being friendly with 
Christians” (int. Nasr, 2013). It is obvious that NP’s members interviewed could not 
understand why they have a good experience of coexistence on the personal and 
neighbourhood levels, while they have an extremely negative image as concerns 
Christians on the national level (Women's committee, 2014).  
From the abovementioned analysis, such national resentment might be explained by the 
fact that DS’ members ignore the irritation to Christians due to the fatwa of greeting in 
feasts, and to the use of offensive or belittling terms on describing Christians from the 
public viewpoint. However, beyond the wording and the cultural issues, the most 
critical part is that Christians’ rights in Islam for DS’ members are confined to the social 
side, thus Christians’ full citizenship and political rights were the point of concern for 
Christians (Al-Youm, 2015). 
Nonetheless, DS’ discourse on Christians, discussed above, contradicted the party’s 
choice to run Christians on their lists for the 2015205parliamentary elections206, which 
put NP’s Christian candidates under pressures from the Christian community, to the 
extent that NP did not announce their names (Al-Youm, 2015, Masr, 2015, Fouad, 
2015). Such step, did not only infuriate Christians (Fouad, 2015), but also reinforced the 
image of a pragmatic and inconsistent political party (Al-Hadidi, 2015). The Christians 
who joined the party in the elections were accused of treason, and of being part of a plot 
against the church (Al-Hadidi, 2015, Al-Ibrashi, 2015). Among such debate on the 
contradiction between DS’ discourse about Christians and running Christian candidates, 
Makhyon mentioned that NP are running Christian candidates only because the law 
obliged them to do so, and if it were not for abiding by law, NP would not have thought 
of running Christians for  parliamentary elections (Kamel, 2015), yet, Nader Al-Serafy, 
who is not only a Christian NP’s candidate, but also member of the NP legal committee, 
commented on this saying that this is the Salafi thought and the party is abiding by law, 
and the main criteria for judging it is “our performance in the parliament, and the 
legislations we intend to push for” (Kamel, 2015). This conforms to NP’s position in 
adopting DS’ discourse, while abiding by the Egyptian law, despite the fact of denying 
the religious violations under such law.  
 However, in all cases no one of the Christians, won any of the seats in the parliament 
(Ali, 2015). The Christian candidate, who turned against NP after the elections, said that 
                                                             
205 The field work did not cover the 2015 elections. 
206 The elections law, stated that a quota of 24 Christians should  run on the lists of each party or front all over the 
country (FOUAD, A. 2015. Who are the Christians of the Salafi NP? Al Monitor. 
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the party did not support her and that they stopped to contact their Christian candidates 
after the elections. She also said that there are divisions within the party regarding 
Christian candidates (Hegazy, 2015). However, Nader Al-Serafy, the Christian 
candidate of NP in West Delta, said that he will continue with NP and will follow its 
decisions, and support candidates in the second round of the elections (United, 2015). 
He also said earlier that the party was committed to the guardianship rules, but 
discussions were made, and due to their calculations they agreed upon running Christian 
candidates (Kamel, 2015). However, neither DS nor NP stated that they believe in such 
step or consider it conforming to Shari’a. Thus, DS and NP maintained their beliefs 
about Christians, while running Christian candidates, in contrast to their rules about 
Christian’s guardianship.  
Nonetheless, in the interviews carried out in the field, they mainly talked about 
presidency not the parliament. However, in view of their previous religious adaptation 
as concerns women guardianship, they probably used the same cost-benefit analysis 
from a religious perspective as shown in other chapters, regarding this issue of 
Christians’ guardianship. One of the possible justifications, in view of the analysis in 
this dissertation, would be that NP wanted to assure the state, and other political powers 
that they are a political party that conforms to the Constitution, particularly, when there 
was a case against them in the supreme administrative court demanding their dissolution 
on basis of being a religious party, in contradiction with the Egyptian Constitution 
(Kamel, 2016). Where NP insist that they are a political party open to all Egyptians but 
with a Salafi ideology, and like any political party they have an intellectual reference 
(Int. Mekki, 2013). Thus, in view of NP’s belief and self-identification, it could be true 
that Christians’ presence was a formality to complete the image of the party, and using 
DS’ cost-benefit analysis and logic, such policy choice might maximize interests and 
minimize the losses, since absence from the political scene is a loss, and presence even 
with insignificant representation is for them a success (Talibbya, 2013). Yet, despite of 
the negative image that NP acquired, it seems that they achieved their target,  since the 
court ruling rejected the party dissolution (Kamel, 2016). 
As mentioned above, they are keen on a political presence, however without sacrificing 
their foundations. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that NP is the only remaining 
Islamist party, they had to consider cooperation with other non-Islamist fronts, despite 
of their religious reservations on alliances with non-Islamists, however, nobody allowed 
them in and they had to run alone in the elections (Al-Shahhat, 2015). Thus, the only 
condition for them to continue was to run Christian candidates, which makes a case for 
an interests-evils argument.  
To sum up, putting aside the reasons behind running Christians candidates on NP’s 
electoral lists, the obvious fact is that there is a gap between NP’s discourse, and their 
political action in this regard. NP and DS see their shocking discourse as logical, and 
that they have all the right to adhere to it out of belief concerns. In view of the DS’ 
members vision the words and terms they use to describe Christians really have a good 
or at least a neutral connotation. However, Christians believe that their connotation is 
extremely offensive. Moreover, average Muslims met on the field see that such 
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discourse is alien to the mainstream discourse that “Christians worship God in a 
different way, and that they have fatal belief and faith violations and misunderstanding, 
yet it is none of Muslims’ business” (field notes), the researcher was also told “since 
when we think twice before greeting Christians, and since when we say Muslims and 
Christians” (field notes). Such tolerant or indifferent discourse of average Muslims, 
might also reflect an inherent national security fear of sectarian conflict, or of discussing 
such sensitive issue, even if some Muslims do not fully respect Christians (Dalacoura, 
2014),207 field notes). In addition, the arguments used in the interviews imply that 
accumulations of discursive conflicts between Muslim and Christian extremists (in 
reference to Bishop Bishoy crisis discussed earlier), left DS’ members with hard 
feelings. However, DS’ members believe that in all cases they should strictly abide by 
Shari’a and grant Christians their social and protection rights, just for the sake of 
respecting divine orders, and for purposes of peaceful co-existence. This suggests that 
they are against the mistreatment of Christians or using violence against them. In this 
regard, Nasr mentioned that in view of DS’ understanding, which he explained, “DS is 
the only Islamist group that never used violence against Christians” (int. Nasr, 2013), 
and Thabet, said that “in the case of Kamilia Shehata, rank and file of the movement 
joined protests, but DS refused to initiate any action or to take the lead in this, since 
despite their clear position, they avoid confrontation” (int. Thabet, 2013). 
Yet, “full citizenship rights and status of Christians,” remains the point of contradiction 
between Al Manhaj or DS’ religious discourse, and the Egyptian legal framework which 
NP respects and follows, as they say. This gap between the belief and the law, and NP’s 
attempts to combine both in a very delicate equation, might lead to the inconsistent 
behaviour of NP. Therefore, according to their discourse, they seem to choose such 
controversial acts intentionally, even if they lead to a high political cost, or puts the 
party’s image at stake.  
Such detachment from the mainstream discourse in Egypt is not separate from their 
equally debateable position on art and culture.  
 
 
Culture and De-culturation: 
The issue of NP’s rejection to art and culture, which was seen by Egyptian artists as  
reactionary and taking Egypt backward, was brought up mainly when NP’s Shura 
council member demanded that ballet be prohibited in Egypt (Al-Youm, 2013)208.  
                                                             
207 Dalacoura says “Let us be honest: for the majority of Egyptians, women and the Copts must be kept firmly in their 
place.”  
I07 In a meeting of the Shura Council's Culture, Information and Tourism Committee, to decide on the budget for the 
Opera House for the new fiscal year, Gamal Hamed, NP’s member, linked Ballet to nudity and said that it 
spreads immorality and obscenity to the people. Hamed said that “he is not against the arts in general, but that he 
opposes "nudity" in the name of art or under the banner of cultural slogans.” (AL-YOUM, A.-M. 2013. Salafis 
demand end to women's rights body, ballet. Egypt Independent. 
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In this regard, NP’s and DS’ members interviewed, said that they do not ban all kinds of 
art. However, they accept the art that abides by religious rules and restrictions. Thus, 
they accept cinema and acting, as long as it conforms to Shari’a, particularly when it is 
modest, and does not include insults (Gawwad, 2013, Shams, 2013). However, they say 
that there are clear texts in the Quran and in Sunna, which, according to their 
interpretations ban music (Women's committee, 2014). Whereas they respect chanting, 
and members of DS compose their chanting songs, they practise poetry recitation, 
Arabic handwriting, painting, and women said they had a women’s magazine (Women's 
committee, 2014). They also saw that the researchers’ interest in art is a type of 
psychological tricks, called “displacement”, however, by time the researcher would 
draw her attention to other things (Women's committee, 2014). Nevertheless, the ladies 
were aware of the popular culture, and were not isolated, but rather, knew the jokes and 
the expressions used in the movies. However, they have chosen to detach themselves 
from it and to make their own sort of sub-culture in which they gave up many of the 
popular cultural aspects (Women's committee, 2014). Nevertheless, they spoke 
everyday Egyptian accent, and one of them admitted that she has difficulty in resisting 
listening to music particularly the classical Egyptian songs, but she is trying hard to get 
rid of this habit,  since she knew that it is wrong (Women's committee, 2014). The same 
impression was taken from young men who were aware of the Egyptian artistic 
production, yet boycotted it and had reservations on the defamation of religious people 
and the dualities presented in cinema that shows secular westernized as good people and 
religious people as evil and ignorant terrorists (Bakkar, 2013)209. Another young man in 
the party affirmed the distinction between the religiously accepted art, that is subject to 
religious rules, and the banned art that violates them, and said that our job is to advise 
people, and they are free to follow or to ignore our message (Shams, 2013). When 
discussing art and culture, he mentioned that unfortunately, “the Egyptian culture is 
now associated with the public places in tourist areas such “the Pyramids street 
Cabarets”, which implies, in his understanding, a connection between arts and night life 
(Shams, 2013). However, he said that it is not wise to shut down all places, but rather to 
apply a more sustainable solution through social change and spreading Da’awa (Shams, 
2013), which conforms to DS’ long term, gradual bottom-up social change approach, in 
which they rely on a reforming individuals and society, so that a Muslim committed 
society would  make more Islamic choices, and give up sources of vice. He said that he 
will never say that folkloric dancing and ballet are accepted just to please people. In this 
regard,  and according to his viewpoint ballet requires a certain outfit that is not allowed 
in Islam, and, in his opinion, women should never perform such dancing (Shams, 2013). 
This bottom-up approach was approved by an NP’s leader who stressed that a more 
sustainable change should come from the bottom, and from changing society, rather 
than shutting down night-clubs (Mekki).This goes in line with rejecting violence or 
changing vice by hand, as one of the main rules of promoting virtue and preventing 
vice, in DS’ discourse, earlier discussed.  
                                                             
209 Mahmoud Shaltoot attended the discussion and showed awareness of what Bakkar pointed at, he confirmed his 
point and was ironic about the stereotypes, and suppositions of Egyptian cinema. 
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In interviews, the common point of view among persons interviewed was the 
acceptance of traditions, habits, and convention. Thus, the way people celebrate, and all 
aspects of modern life are acceptable as long as they are not connected to infidelity or 
pagan practices (Shams, 2013, int. Nasr, 2013). Moreover, convention and customary 
law is highly respected by DS’ members and “it is considered one of the references in 
Islamic Shari’a, and could be a source of legislation, if there is no clear religious texts 
dealing with certain issues” (int. Nasr, 2013). Therefore, people’s customs and culture 
are highly respected, and DS’ members think that imposing a law that defies them 
would be considered a top-down change that people would undermine and find ways to 
secretly evade. So if there are harmful habits, they should be countered by education 
and spreading awareness (Gawwad, 2013). Such stance supports the bottom-up 
approach in DS’ discourse. They also believe that Islam gave a wide range of options 
and alternatives to fit the conditions of people who are diversified as regards culture, 
social class, education, and even weather and regional conditions (int. F. leader, 2013). 
This conforms to DS’ discourse that Islam is comprehensive and all inclusive.  
Therefore, their discourse reflects a tendency to adhere to a bottom-up reform approach 
to society’s violations, and a non-Takfiri approach to the society, where people 
definitely commit sins and pitfalls (Omar, 2013). On the contrary, they see the society 
as mostly conservative (Int. Mekki, 2013). In spite of the fact that such generalization 
might not be necessarily true. However, it shows that they do not see themselves as the 
“chosen people” or the “saviour”, but are just people who study, and who have extra 
information that they want to share (Omar, 2013, Gawwad, 2013), and that each Muslim 
should share whatever religious information he learns with others, even if he or she is 
not a scholar (Shokry, 2013, Meeting Female leaders, 2014, Gawwad, 2013, Omar, 
2013). This conforms to the importance of education, and focus on the individual and 
social levels in DS’ methodology, through means of sharing information, direct 
interaction, and building upon emotional informal and faith based relationship with 
individuals and groups within their communities (Omar, 2013, Women's committee, 
2014, Gawwad, 2013).  
The features of their missionary or Da’awa discourse, besides being non-Takfiri, and 
non-violent, it does not depict society or assume the role of the guardians such as the 
case of top-down approaches. However, this positive aspect of their social change 
approach, contradicts the image of the sectarian, strict, Salafis. This could be explained 
in view of their obvious detachment from the popular culture, rejecting most types of 
art, which is perceived as a tendency of de-culturation, and departing from the 
mainstream discourse as regards Egyptian Islam (discussed in chapter 5), in addition to 
their perception of women’s political rights and restrictions 210 , and the status of 
Christians, and their right to full citizenship. Moreover, the fact that Salafis tend to have 
a special outfit, such as Niqab, and dark colours through which DS’ women are 
distinguished (Gawwad, 2013), as well as letting men’s beards (Shokry, 2013)211, make 
                                                             
210 Even with the fact that Salafi women follow such rules willingly, are not giving priority to political rights, and see 
that they are empowered. 
211 They insist on their look even if it causes social resentment, or problems with security. Shokry said that in Islam 
there is no difference between core and crust, all religious rules and practices should be followed even as concerns 
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them differentiated among other Egyptians, with all the negative and positive reactions 
to this look (field notes). Such factors constitute a challenge to DS’ discourse, and to 
NP’s political acceptance, where at least they would be perceived as a different group, if 
not a dangerous one.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
appearance and whatever the challenges are. This was in a researcher’s comment on why DS’ members do not shave 
to hide their identity, since after June 30 they were subject to security threats from MB, and mainly from common 
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